France, England and the Politics of the Salonica Campaign (1915-18) by Dutton, DJ
France, England and 
the Politics of the 
Salonica Campaign 




David John Dutton 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 




BEST COpy AVAILABLE. 
VARIABLE PRINT QUALITY 
I 
Lbstract 
France. England and the Politics of the Salonica Campaign 1915-18 
is An attempt to trace and explain the vlorkings of the Anglo-li'rench 
Entente in wartime. The study has a built-in bias towards the French 
side of the campaign, since it is the author's belief that the expedition 
is explicable only in terms of French internal politics and ETance's 
wartime aspirctions. The policies and actions of England were essentially 
responses to what happened in Paris. If the study appears somewhat 
one-sided, therefore, this is because the campaign itself was one-sided. 
'vlith such uneven cooperation between the allies, it is not surprising that 
the 8alonica Expedition emerges as one of the least fruitful exercises in the 
allied direction of the war. 
The study makes use of extensive collections of hitherto largely 
unexamined ministerial archives in England and France, together with a 
') 
<-. 
number of private collections. The latter, and particularly some previously 
untapped French sources including the painleve, Jules Cambon and Leon Bourgeois 
papers, have proved profitable and have served to confirm the ~thor' s 
impression that individuals played an enormous part in shaping the development 
of the campaign. The thesis therefore contains detailed analyses of the 
motivations and driving forces behind the leading protagonists of the story -
Sarrail, Joffre, Briand and Painleve. 
BeSides providing a detailed expose of the campaign itself, the theSis 
advances our knowledge of several more general aspects of the Great War. 
In particular the politics of France in the period between the summer of 
1915 and the autumn of 1917 are carefully surveyed and analysed. Then new 
light is thrown upon the nature of French war aims and the way in Which 
these differed from those of England. To this extent the artificiality 
of the Entente Cordiale is emphasised. 
This work owes much to the advice, help and cooperation of 
others. In particular I would like to thank Professor P. Renouvin, 
Professor D.C. Watt and Mr P.M.H. Bell for their useful suggestions 
and encouragement. lowe a particular debt of gratitude to my 
supervisor, Professor D.W.J. Johnson for his support, advice and 
encouragement. M. Jean Painleve provided valuable information about 
his father, as did his niece, Mme A. Rouby. M. Daniel Langlois 
Berthelot kindly granted me access to his uncle's papers and readily 
answered my questions. M. Clouet supplied reminiscences of his 
period as French consul at Salonica, while the late Sir Compton 
Mackenzie wrote to me in connection with his activities in Greece 
during the war. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my typists, 
Miss M. Greenhalph and Mrs N. Fagan for their patience, endurance 
and expertise, and of course to the staffs of the various libraries 
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The war of 1914-18 was not charaoterised br great imagination on the part 
of the Allies. .ls an al terna tive to the unending oarnage on the Wes tern Front 
the leaders of Britain and France attempted two lesser campaigns in the 
!lear-East, (1) designed to bring the war to a speedier conc11l8ion than seemed 
possible by ha.ering away at the GerllBn linea in Flanders and Balgi_. 
Neither was a success. Of these, the first - tbe use of aea mobility to strike 
with amphibious power at the Dardanelles in 1915 - bas long oocupied the 
attention of historians. The 8alonioa expedition, however, whioh s ... saw as 
a meaDS of striking a mortal blow at the Central Powers b7 attacking them 
through the weak underbelly of AUstria-Hungary, bas received less consideration. 
Military histories and personal reminisoenoes are not lacking, but reoent 
attempts to chart the very iDYolved political and diploaatio background of the 
oampaign have been hindered by a laok of arch1T&l .. terial. (2) This is 
inevitable in an episode in which a ailitary oaapaign was so inextricab17 
entwined with the internal politios of Britain and Franoe and in which the 
motives, actions and aspirations of indiTiduals pla78d such a large part. 
Percipient observers reoognised this at the tille. "H1 own opinion is that until 
all the dooUllents now held seoret in difterent countries ••• are revealed 
there will be very tew men indeed who know the iMide story ot the Allies' 
doings in the Balkans, theBe two rears past •• (3) The opening ot ministerial 
documents together with _n1 private collections justifie., theretore, a new 
examination and analysis of the 8&loni08 adventure. 
After initial expeotations ot a short, sharp confliot bad proved mis-
plaoed, the Great War degenerated into a self-perpetuating vioious circle. 
The continuous absorption of human saorifices imposed upon governments and 
generals a aense of awful r8aponsibilit,y to prove that these lives bad not 
been spent in vain. This theT could only think of doing by winning the next 
time. USing the sa .... thod. Little flair was evident in finding a different 
approaoh in the searoh for Tiotory and men whoae reputations rested on 
just1f1ing the sacrifices already ottered assailed bitterly thoae who 
suggested trying something new. All 1915 opened, however, aOll8 change appeared 
to be entering this essentially static situation. The three salient features 
of the war were the deadlock in Pranoe, the 1aperative need to relieve that 
deadlock betore BDaaia vas overwhelmed and the growing belief ot a naber of 
politioians in tbe pos.1bilit,y of rel1ev1n, it b1 diTeraionary politioo-
strategio operations in the East. Bat i1; 18 _1D1J1; the background of the 
(1) as opposed to colonial expeditions. 
(2) aee A. Palaera The Gardeners ot §a1on1oa (1965) and A. Doou ••• Balkans 14-18 (1964). 
(3) G. Ward Prioe. 'lhe stop of th' §tIopie• AmY (1917), p.237 
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bloody slaughter of the war that all plans for finding, by sudden and complex 
manoeuvres or devices, short outs to viotory, can alone be effectively depicted. 
An inoreasing number of politicians, answerable in the last resort to their 
parliaments, were coming to the conclusiDn that an al ternatin nst be found. 
That the would-be alternatives proved quite abortive has not dimmed the 
en thusiasll of their supporters. Manr his torial18 have become alaoa t lyrical 
about the possibilities of the Dardanelles Cupaip. 'l'.bere ia aoathing 
grandiose and splendid about the whole operation, inoluding even the miraculously 
successful evacuation, which inert tablr oaptures the iugination. "It was the 
~st imaginative oonoeption of the war and its potentialities were almost 
berond reckoning. It .ight even have been regarded, as Rupert Brooke bad 
hoped, as a turning point in historr". (1) Sillilarly Lord Attlee has said that 
Gallipoli was "an imaortal gamble that did not oo.e off ••• Sir Winston ••• 
had the one strategic i4ea in the war. He did not believe in throwing nar 
.. sses of people to be lIassaored ... (2) Few, if al17, Inglishllen haTe been 
equallr poetiC about the Balonioa Campaign. One hears nothing of an "u.ortal 
gamble" in the Balkana. Thia oan larplr be explained by two factors. The 
Dardanelles was a relatively short-lived caapa1gn which did not haTS the 
opportuni ty to be beset b., political in trigae and it had 'the aeri t of being 
terminated before its tutilitr had beoa.e apparent to all. Seoondly Salonica 
was as 1I11oh a 1'rench enterprise aa Gallipoli was Bri ti.h, and it is with 
reluotance that countries see merit in the projecte ot others. At the 
Dardanelles, Prance played the role of a "docile 8uperau.erar,-.(3) but in the 
Balkans sbe dictated the course of event.. IIoreover, not tor .ally decade. had 
a British governaent ambarked on a military under taking with greater 
repugnance than it did in October 1915. AIJ Pau17abon(4) noted, just as the 
)Tench had bean ruhed into the Dardanelles affair without adequate studr of the 
operation, so England was led by )'rance to SalODica vitilollt even baTing tt. to 
consider the i.plioatioD8 ot what she was doing. (5) III taot Franoe carried a 
far greater weight thaD Britain in the first half of the land war and while 
Bri tain, after the begiuiDg of 1911 ... .u.d aa incre .. ingly larger 8.., in the 
direotion of the war as a whole, 8&lonioa re .. ined to the end the ahild of 
]'ranoe. 
(1) A. MOorehead, Qa11iROli (1956). P 364. 
(2) T. B18g1n8. Yinston Cburob111 and the Pardanelle. (1963),p 185. 
(,) E. Delase. !be ;rasedl of the Dardanelles (19'2)~p 251. 
(4) !be prest1g1oua Jrench a~a •• ador in London. 
(5) p. caben to J. caabon 6/12/15. Jule. cabon ISS, Vol. 1. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the voices raised in detenoe of the 
88loni08 expedition have been predominantly French. "ROve magnifiquel Sa 
realisation n'etait pas impossiblel c'etait la guerre abreg8e de plus dtune 
annee et notre restauration financiere combien facilitee - c'etait la 
dislooation oomplete de ltempire austro-bongrois, qui fut une faute, sans 
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doute evitee - c'etait Ie aorcellement du Reich allemand, qui e~t un bienfait, 
rendu possible - c'etait l'Europe preservee de l'ettondreaent total de l'empire 
ruBse et de sa bolchevisation, terrible point de gangrene pour notre vieux 
mondei(l)The diplomatic historian Pingaud bas described Salonica and not the 
Dardanelles as the great "might have been n of the whole varl "5i ••• l'entente 
anit pu ajouter l'appoint, non plus seuleaent des divisions prillitivement 
prevues, mais des 200,000 hammes destines plus tard a .tre t.mobilis8s dans 
l'entreprise des Dardanelles, quelle n'aurait pas eta la toroe offensive de La 
masse ainsi form •• pour prendre I' .1utriche 1 revers, en aba ttre ausai tet la 
resistanoe et avancer peut-ltre de trois annees Ie term. de la guerrel n (2) 
And again, "l'on ne peut s'emp8cher de songer a la tournure qu'aurait prise la 
guerre si les 400,000 Anglais et les 140,000 Franpais qui par.rent d. leur 
vie la oonqu'te de quelques 8rpents d. terre en Pioardie avaient pa .tre 
transportes sur Ie theAtre oriental de la guerre - n'auraient-ila pas torme 
une masse asses importante pour prendn une heurause ottenaive, em})Ocher 
l'ecrasement de la Roumanie, peut-ltre .... attaquer l'.1utriche et entamer 
l'acte final de la lutte?N(3) When the militar;y possibilitiee ot the caapaign 
are b.ing considered, hovever, it IlUBt alv-r. be re.mDered that the terrain of 
the Balkans was extraordiDarUY taTourable to _ defeuift action by the central 
Powers and not to an ottenaive aotion on the part of the Western allie.. By 
going to the Danube, moreover, Britain and Franoe, 80 tar trom til1ding an 
easier Mans of approach by which to attack the Central Powers than the Western 
~ont, would have been attacking on a front which vas siDBUIarly easy for them 
to defend. .1 oaapaisn in Southern Macedonia meant ti&htiag BW,garia and such 
reinforce1l8nts as Germany, .1ustria and Tarke, oould un.,. to send her, with 
the advantage in co.-nnioationa being against the We.tern allies. 
Indeed, when the oupaign tinally got undervay. it vas launohed, not with 
high hopes of invading Austria, but with the striotl, lilti ted aill of cOIling to 
the rescue of the Serbian arar, and, .s Britiah ailitary opinion recognised, aa 
(1) R. Davids 'Le druae isnore de l'eMe d'Orient (1927),p u 
(2) A. Pingaud s Biatoire DiplO!!ti9U! de 1. lr!noe J)!ndant 1& Grande Guer%e 
(1938), Vol. 1., p 215 
(3) ibid Vol. 2., p 142 
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a military measure to aid Serbia directly, the landing of allied forces at 
Salonica was absurd. The hostile armies concentrating on the eastern and 
northern frontiers of Serbia were certain to overwhelm and overrun that 
country bafore any effective aid could possibly arrive. As a political move 
to encourage and determine the action of Greece the despatch of allied troops 
was perhaps jus tified. In a sense, though, specula tion as 1;) the military 
potential of the Salonica expedition is of only aoademio interest. The fact 
is that if it were ever hoped that the campaign might prove the means of 
bringing the war to a speedy and, this hope never lIB terialised. Pai th in such 
a possibility was always limited - consequently Salonica provides a familiar 
s tory of wanting the ends wi thou t supplying the means. Only a t the verr end 
of the confliot did the Allied Armee d'Orient make significant military progress. 
For the rest the 5&lonica forces were locked in the sort of military deadlock 
which characterised the Western front. When its aohievements are considered, 
therefore, the view which marks the expedition as a waste of time, lien and 
resources appears the IIOst logical. But assessllents of this nature are 1I0re 
properly the provinoe of the military historian and the present study will 
ooncentrate on the diploaatio and political aspeots of the oampaign. 
At all events "of all the probleu which brOU8ht soldiera and statesmen 
into conferenoe during the years 1915-11 the 5&lonica expedition was at once 
the most peraistent, exasperating and unfrui tf'ul.,,(l) The chief causes of this 
were the animosities and rivalriea with which for centuries the diplomatio 
affairs of the ;&ikans had been interwoven, the differences of opinion between 
the two Entente governments aa to the policy to be pursued, the lack of anr 
directing machinery to conduct the allied war effort aa a whole, and the 
politioal underourrents in Paris by whioh the attitude of Pranoe VBS too often 
detel.'llined. The result was possibly the worst enaple of the breakdown of the 
coali tion in the whole of the war. '!'he his tory of no other episode in the 
oonflict ShOW8 80 olearly the divergent views and taotioal mistakes which 
paralysed the allies' aotions. Nowhere else oan the weaknesses inherent in all 
coalitions be seen lIore vividly. Por nearly three years the tvo goveroaents 
failed to agree OD whether it would be better to aocord tbe campaign -une 
offensive oom.e objeotif ou une retraite oomma ePilogue".(2) And in failing 
to ohoose between the two they adopted a middle oourse which oa.bined the 
weaknesses of both. They left at Salonica an expeditionarr foroe strong enough 
to weaken the armies of the .. in front, but insuffioient to .ake its presenoe 
geDUinely felt iD the Balkans. 
(1) Sir W. RobertsoDI Soldiers and S~te"'D (1926), Vol. 2, p 8~. 
(2) Pingaudl Ope oit., Vol 2, p 353. 
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On 18 June 1915 Winston Churchill(l) circulated to the Cabinet a note on 
the General Mili taxy Situation in the war. In it he argued that a lack of any 
real coordination in the exertions and plans of the allies had been evident at 
every stage of the war to that date. This he reckoned to be one of the chief 
causes of the failure of the milt tary campaigns of 1915. Churchill concluded 
that unless the campaigns of 1916 were to take the same unsatisfactory course 
that those of 1915 had so far taken, it appeared vital to assert a far higher 
degree of common aotion and for the great belligerants to make plans together, 
- which would offer the prospect of setting a term to the present struggle, 
the duration of which had already far exceeded the opt1aistic expectations of 
the majority of supposedly expert opinion in Britain.(2) SiRilarly, at the 
end of October 1915, Sir William Robertson, the British Chief of Staff in 
France, noted that for months past the English and French had been put at a 
great disadvantage by the lack of coordination in their conduct of the war.(3) 
The opening of a new theatre gave the allies the chance to oorrect the 
mistakes of earlier joint endeavours, but it was a chance which \bel notably 
failed to seize. If, as the Foreign Secret&rJ, Sir Edward Grer asserted, the 
first object of allied diplomacr in wartime was to preserve solidaritr, the 
salonica EXpedition came nearer than anrthing else to destroJ1ng this primarJ 
aim. GreY' could scarcelY' have been thinking of this cupaigu when ~ 
conoluded that the goal "vas coapletelJ and successfullJ achievedn .(4) With 
the expedition passing through one of ita periodic crises at the beginning of 
December 1915, Caabon oonfided to his brother that what worried him most was 
the prospect of a breach wi th liDgland. Be was appalled at the a tU tude of the 
QUai d'Oraay which seemed blind to the iIIplioatiOlUl of this danger, "Berthelot, 
qui est incapable de concevoir une mentali te etrangere De redout. pas ce 
desacoord et croit que nous pouvcns t.poaer nos vues".(5) !he allied conduct 
of the military campaign and of the related que.tion of palicr in ~ece 
continued along this unaatisfactor, path for a further tvo Jeara. 
In lieu or a unified bodJ or insU tuHon to coordinate the direction of 
the Entente's political and milit&rJ strategy, the leaders of Britain and 
(1) Chancellor of the DachJ of Lancaster. 
(2) Note bJ Churchilla 18/6/15, CAB 31/130/16. 
(3) Pingaud, OPe cit., Vol. 2, P l~l. 
(4) Lord Grey, '!Yentz-Five l,an (1925), Vol. 2, p 160. 
(5) P. CUbOD to J. cabon 6/12/15, JUle. OaaboD HSS, Vol. 1. c.r. the rather 
strange cOllll8Dt bJ R. D. Challen.r ira G • .1. craig and J. Gilbert (eda) 
'!be Diplc:aata 1919-39 (1953) p 11, "duriag the war he [BeriM10tJ had 
done Doh to iIIproft relationa with ~at Britain". A.t this d.te 
Berthelot w.s 'adjoint .u dir.ct.ur d •• affaires polit1ques et ca.meroial.s' 
at the Quai d 'Or'.Y'. 
9. 
France could do no more than substitute a seemingly endless eeries of allied 
conferenoes. But as Arthur BalfouPdoted when considering the problem of 
Greece a ''What impresses me most painfully is the futility ••• of our various 
international conferences. They have not been few in number, but in many 
cases the resolutions - long disoussed and embodied in formal minutes duly sig-
ned by the governments ooncerned - bave been departed from as soon as the 
Conference separatedn .(2) The lack of machinery to direct policy inevitably 
meant that what came out as policy lacked consistency and coherencea WEn 
lis ant oes pages on sera frappe des multiples variations de la politique 
suivie par les Allies, des frequents changements de front, l'initiative 
succedant a la reserve et l'action hardie au recueil~nt".(3) Contemporaries 
were not blind to the need for some sort of control aachinery, but 88e.ad 
unable to effect it, perhaps because they feared that it would involve the 
subjection of their authority to that of their allies. As early as October 
1915 the unofficial but influential observer, Lord EBber, noted the necessity 
for a small and effioient dire~8taff of the ablest French anq British 
officers, naval, lIili tary and poli tioal who could so marshal and coordinate 
faots and suggestions that the inferenoes drawn from thea would be indisputable 
and oertain to oontrol the exeoutive aotion of the military oommanders of 
both nations. Be oonsidered that the events of the past weeks had been a sad 
commentary on the lack of political and military directing power. The probable 
aotivities of the enemy had been foreseen by soae and not by others with a 
consequent laok of deoision and preparation. When these had beoa.a neoessary 
the result had been "hurried oonferences, obscured oounsels, vague and 
conflioting purposes, followed by deoisions and oounter-deoi8ions. n (4) Lord 
Selborne, the Minister of Agrioultnre, went further and argued that the absence 
of any striking suooess for the allies in the war had been due 1I0re to the 
absence of any oentral oontrol of its oonduot than to any ~r cause. The 
French govel'l1ll8nt had promised to aid ~eeoe with 150,000 .. n without 
oonsul ting England, the British had promised to aid Rtalania with 200,000 
(1) Elder states_n of the Conservative party aDd an influential figure in 
view of his long-standing membership of the committee of Iaperial 
Defenoe, he suoceeded Grey at the Poreign Office in Deoember 1916. 
(2) Minute by Balfour on Memorandum by Nioo180n on allied policy in Greeoe, 
21/1/11, l.O. 311/2880/26310. 
(3) Introduotion to L'.l.ffaire Cin01ue 1914-18 - Lieutenant Guiot, Service 
Historique de l'Etat-Major General de la Marine. 
(4) Note by Lord Eaher 12/10/15, CAB 31/1~6/4. 
10. 
without consulting France. "Eaoh one of these decisions may have been (1) 
justifiable, but it is not possible to wage war suocessfully by these methods". 
Not until the end of 1911, however, with the creation of the Supreme War 
Council, did such a coordination take place. Throughout 1915 and 1916 France 
attempted so to inflate the prestige of their military chief, General Joffre, 
as to gain for him a commanding voice not only in the conduct of French 
strategy, but in that of the allies as a whole.(2) And before saatty had been 
restored to the situation there had been time to create out of the Balkan 
theatre "un veritable champ de manoeuvre des gaffes de la Coalition".(3) 
Apart from the struggles between allies the fate of the 38lonioa 
Expeditionary Force hinged on the outcome of the struggle between the military 
and political authorities inside Franoe, and to a lesser degree England for 
control over the oonduot of the war. France, when the c8llpaign opened, was 
working out her solution to the problem which in one way or another beset 
every belligerent nation." the problem namely of the enoroaohment of military 
authority on oivil. It took France three agonising years of war to resolve 
the question of relations between the High Cosmand and the government. The 
professional soldiers of Franoe were regarded as the historioal allies of their 
fellow authoritarians, the nobles, prelates and Kings. The politicians, on 
the other hand, were disoiplel of the revolution - or at least professed to 
be - and paid lip-servioe to the bourgeoiS ideals of liberte, egalite and 
fraternite. The outbreak of hostilities soon revealed that the state which 
had once typified the Bonapartist solution to the proble. of wartt.e oommand 
had utterly failed to provide a ready-aade alternative. In 1914 civilian 
ministers of war had such measure of influenoe on ailit&ry policy as was 
cOilpatible with the fact that the country had had forty-tvo war Jainistera in 
forty-five years. "Consequently France at war was to grope by trial and 
error from the military rule of Joffre to the ainisterial fir.ness of 
C1emenoeau". (4) In fact ]'rance emerged fro. the four year struggle with her 
civilian governaent and democratio inati tutiona intaot. "seldom was the nation 
in less danger of a ' .. n on horseback' than on 11 Bove.ber 1918,..(5)Foch, the 
mi1itarJ hero, was oaap1etely overshadowed by Cleaenceau, the father of 
victory. By November 1917 France was ready to acquieace in a quasi Jaoobin 
dictatorship, and the exhausted nation emerged under the rigorous rule of 
Clemenceau, who exe.pl1fied the will to victory and, aore iJDportantly, stood 
as the Qbaapion of civil primacy over the .i1itary. In the efforts of the 
(1) Memorandum by Lord Selborne 18/10/15, CAB 37/136/20 
(2) Pelle to 'lboaa8 25/11/16, Albert ThOllU JISS, 94 u 2~7. 
(}) Note by H. Niche on the direction of the war, 26/12/16, Painl.ri MSS 313 
jp 55. 
(4) J. C. King. Generals and Poli tidane (1951), p 16 
(5) ibid p 242 
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civilian government to capture control of the war effort the Salonica episode 
plays a crucial role. In all probability Joffre would have been able to deter 
the government's incursions a little longer, but for the intrusion of General 
Sarrail, designated commander of the Armee d'Qrient, into the political arena. 
The politico-military struggle was waged less bitterly but no less surely 
in England. British military opinion never waivered in its convid1on that the 
sole path to victory lay in sending every available man, gun and shell to the 
French front to kill Germans and break their lines in the West. To one degree 
or another, however, many politicians and notably Lloyd George(l) focused their 
attention on the Eastern theatres. In the early part of the oonfliot the views 
of Lord Kltchener, the Secretary ot State for War, were sacrosanct. On 21 May 
1915, when Lord Northcliffe published a Tehement attack on Kitchener, there 
was a spontaneous movement of public anger in aany parts of the country and the 
offending newspaper was burned on the Stock Exchange. (2) The effect of this 
situa~ion was that for most of 1915 the Cabinet and its associated committees 
accepted the War Minister's advice as to what vas technioally possible without 
any real knowledge of whether this had any basis in fact. Abusing his position 
as Secretary for War, Kitchener not only concentrated sll power in his own 
hands but kept all information in his head, releasing only such scrape to his 
colleagues as he thought fit, thus making criticism of his plans on technical 
grounds exoeedingly diffioult. This inevitably foredoomed DCheseS such as 
Lloyd George's early efforts to open a Balkan front from Saloni08. Alaost all 
the experienced members of the General Staff had gone to Pranoe with the 
Expeditionary Force. Xitchener had apparently little confidenoe in those who 
had taken their places at the War Office and preferred to be hiJlself the fount 
of military advioe to the Cabinet. Thus ministers did not haTe before them any 
reasoned military proposals for alternative action, inoluding a survey of the 
diffioulties involved and the means of overcoming them, which waa one of the 
normal funotions of a General Staff.(~) The basio result was a fundamental 
lack of liaison between military and political authorities in the direction of 
the British war effort. When service representatives attended cabinet .etinge 
in the early da}'B of the war they appeared to do 80 only to answer specific 
questiOns direoted ~ them. By 1916, however, the aili tarr under Sir William 
(1) SUocessively Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mini.ter of Itmitions and 
Seoretarr for War under A8qui th, he becaae Pri_ Mini8 ter bilIaelt in 
December 1916. 
(2) W. S. Churchill. The World Crisis, Vol. 2 (192~). p ~7l 
(~) F. Maurice. Lessons of Allied Cooeration (1942), p ~6. 
Robertson had asserted their primacy, but at the expense of a latent crisis 
with the politicians which came to the surface with the formation of Lloyd 
George • a governmen tat the end of the year. 
Not surprisingly Salonica never became quite the obsession in England 
that it did in France. Governments of the latter seemed at times to be 
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totally dominated by the campaign. "Salonique et Sarrail, Sarrail et Salonique ll , 
wrote Paul Oambon despairingly in October 1916, nC'est 1& en effet la seule 
chose importante pour le gouvernementn.(l) This reflected the way in which 
the campaign became increasingly embroiled in the party political struggle in 
France which, despite claims to the contrary, was never very far beneath the 
surface of professed unity of purpose. In those darkest mo.ats of the war, 
therefore, when France looked agonisingly in on berself and the cry of nil 
faut en finir" reached deafening levels, pent-up nerves, given free range in the 
secret sittings of the Chamber Bnd Senate, usually found an outlet in 
criticising the government's conduct of the Selonica campaign. Albert 
Legrand, an official at the Quai dtOrsay, commenting on the dEturbing 
concentration on internal politics in time of war, declared that "dans les mil-
ieux parlementaires, on ne pense et on ne s'interesse vraillent qU'aux 
combinaisons JIlinisterielles et au jeu des groupes". For hi. the only pure 
area left was tIle front des amees". (2) Be could not, however, have had the 
Balkan front in JIlind for this waa but an extension of the political intrigues 
which beset Paris. The growing awareness in England of the relationship 
between the campaign and French internal politics inevitably coloured the way 
in which Englishmen looked upon Salonica. For Robertson "French politicians 
are at the root of the trouble tt • (3) Similarly, the English premier, .uquith, 
came to the conclusion that "something curious was going on in Franc8n.(4) 
Indeed as suspicion of French politics became joined by suspicion of French 
war aims the factor which dominated and even poisoned allied diplomacy in 
regard to the Salonica Expedition was the growing convicton in England that, as 
Shakespeare's Marcellus felt of Denmark, "something was rotten in the state 
of France tt • It was this above everything els8 which reaoved all possibility 
that the campaign would have a happy and fruitful outcome. 
The present study will attempt ~o analyse the ractors and forces which 
determined the policies of the allies in the Balkan theatre during the Great 
War. The diversity or these, produoing as they did, oonflicting ai_ and 
interests, ensured that the oooperation of England and France in the salonica 
(1) P. Cambon to J. Caabon 21/10/16, Jules CaaboD MSS, Vol. 1. 
(2) Legrand to Barren 29/12/16, Barren MSS, Vol. 3. 
(3) Robertson to Banbury Williams 16/2/16, Robertson MSS 1/35/57. 
(4) War COIIIIi ttee 24/10/ 16, CAB 42/22/5. 
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Expedition would be far from smooth. The resulting conflicts carried with 
them grave implications for the survival of the Entente under the stress of war. 
Perhaps even more significantly the repercussions of the campaign on the 
internal development of Franoe played an important part in determining the sort 
of regime which emerged from the trials of the military conflict. 
14. 
CHAPrER 2 
The Origins of the Campaign 
On 21 September 1915 General Maurice Sarrai1 told War Minister Millerand 
that he had been informed by the Prime Minister, Rene Viviani, that Salonica (1) 
could not be envisaged as a base of action for the newly created ArmSe d'Orient. 
yet within two days, in the face of Bulgarian mobilisation and after the urgent 
pleas for help of Premier Venizelos in Greece, the Frenoh Government had 
agreed, without oonsulting their English allies, to the despatch of forces to 
Selonica to help Greeoe fulfil her treaty obligations to the threatened serbia~2) 
The military campaign in the Balkans, which was to last until the end of the war, 
was thus set on foot with indecent haste. The actual ooncept of an expedition 
based on Salonioa had, hcneter, more respectable origins. It derived from that 
reappraisal of the military situation whioh followed upon the realisation that 
original thoughts on the war's nature and duration bad been grossly mistaken. 
By the end of 1914 it was obvious that the struggle, whioh almost everyOn'~d 
assumed would be decided early on by a massive pitohed battle, was in fact 
developing into a war of attrition, in which frontal offensives, though 8till 
widely seen as the only means of suocess, would be hideous~oostly in terms of 
manpower. Poli tidans on both sides of the Channel, therefore, began to think 
in terms of an alternative route into the heartland of the Central Powers via 
the soft underbelly of the Austrian _pin. Might not such an approach prove 
easier and less self-destructive than one through the plains of 1landers? 
Tbere is considerable doubt as to who was the first public figure in 
France to come up with the idea of a campaign in the Balkans. It se8118 safe to 
assume that several people II11st have envisaged it at INch the sa .. tiM - so 
evidently unproduotive were proving operations on the western front. In 
Bove.ber 1914 Aristide Briand, Viviani's Minister of Justioe, produoed a plan to 
send an allied foroe of 400,000 troops to the Greek port of Balonica .0 as to 
protect Serbia,influence the other Balkan states and bring about an offensive 
against the southern flank of Austria-HUngary. (4) Apart fre. a strategio 
motivation Briand seems to have been responding to a seot10n of French public 
opinion whioh fervently believed that the wide diffusion of Prench .onel, 
language, thought and influence in the Near-East would indiaaolub1, tie its 
inhabitanta to Jrance.(5) This pre.sure group which had created. nuaber of 
(1) Sarrail to Millerand 21/9/15, 51 1}2 
(2) Delc.sse to Guillemin 2}/9/l5, A. E. 'Guerra' Vol. 283. 
(}) One notable exception was the Enalish War J(;iaister, Lord Ki tchener, who 
acouratell predicted a long drawn-out confliot. 
(4) A. Pingaudl Les Origines de l'Expedition d. Saloniq,ue, R. H. JUly-Dece.ber 
19}5, p 449. 
(5) Por Prench interests in this area se. below pp 2'-?- l 
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organisations interested in the affairs of the Near-East had been 
joined at the outbreak of war by a section of the press in urging that 
the government should take prompt action to safeguard French interests 
in the Eastern Mediterranean.(l) 
But Joffre, whose power in the direction of the war in France had 
been supreme ever since the government's evacuation to Bordeaux had 
signalled a virtual abandonment of authority, was quick to quash 
Briand's scheme, arguing that the war could not be won outside France. 
At very much the same date General Franchet d'Es~rey drafted a long 
memorandum in which he proposed the despatch to Salonica of five army 
corps, which would then be transported along the Vardar-Horava valleys 
to Belgrade so as to mount an offensive aimed at Budapest in the spring 
of 1915.(2) This dooument was handed over to the President of the 
Republic, Raymond Poincare, at the beginning of December 1914. Others 
have attributed the paternity of the idea as early as October 1914 to 
General Gallieni, Military Governor of Paris, (3) but the general himself 
claims no responsibility for the concept.(4) But oertainly by February 
1915 Galliani had become an enthusiastio convert to the idea of an 
expedition to Salonioa - to use it, however, not for an advance into the 
Balkans but as a base for a maroh upon Constantinople with an army 
strong enough to encourage the Greeks and Bulgars to join with the 
Entente.(5) Even Poinoare has attempted to reserve for biaself some of 
the credit for the conoeption of a Balkan campatgn.(6) At all events 
the question was raised again on the first day of the new year. 
(1) G. R. Cassar. The French and the Dardanelles (l97l ),p ~5 
(2) P. Azan. Franohet d'Ea;p!rey (1949), pp 42-~. 
(~) M. A. Leblond. Gallieni parle (1920) vol. 2, p 57. see also 
M. Hankey. The SUpreme Co_nd (1961) Vol. 1, p 254. 
(4) J. Gallieni. CamelS (ed. G. Gallieni), (19~2), passim. 
But see also P. B. Gheusi. Guerra et ~.lre \1919), p 1~61 
"La ~ janvier 1915, 1e capitaine G ••• &or1vaii sur soqigendaa Ie 
general Gallieni et M. Briand pen0h88 sur le. cartes de la ence, 
les reux fues sur Salonique et la vall .. du vardar. Ils sont du 
m8me avis I une armee qui debarquerai t a Sa10nique et marcherai t 
vers le nord aerait s~re d'operer une diversion pui8sante et 
deoisive, de nous gagner lea Balkan8, de liberer 1e Boaphore et 1es 
Dardanelles et de marcher aur Budapest et sur l'enorae grenier 1 
ble de 1a Rongrie". 
(5) B. H. L. Harta Reputation8 Ten Years After (1928), p 9~ 
(6) R. Poinoare. Au Servioe de 1a mnoe (1926-~~), Vol. 7, p 128, 
c.f. G. suarez, Briand - Sa vie, 80n oeuvre, {19;8-52) Vol. ~, p 149. 
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At a reception at the Elysee Palace Briand told his colleagues that he 
no longer believed in the possibility of a breakthrough on the Western Front and 
that it was necessary to search a decision elsewhere. He proposed, tbe~ore, 
the formation of an Anglo-French expeditionary force to be sent through Serbia 
into Austria-Hungary. (1) The proposition seems to have had the support of 
Viviani and it was decided that the question should be placed before General 
Joffre, without whose assent no action would be possible.(2) On 7 or 8 
January, Joffre was summoned to the Elysee but resolutely refused to countenance 
any diversion in Southern Europe, arguing that his own plans involved an 
attack in the spring against the enemy's defensive line in Artois and 
CMmpagne for which he would require every available soldier. Joffre was 
delighted at his success in winning round the government to hiB pdbt of view 
and the idea of a Salonica expedition was for the time being allowed to drop.(3) 
Nonetheless, conourrent developments on the other side of the Channel meant 
that the plan could not be buried as definitively as Joffre would have liked. 
At the end of Deoember 1914. Colonel Hankey(4). Lloyd George and Churchill, eaoh 
aoting independently. were coming to Similar conclusions about the war situation. 
All were alarmed by the prospect of an interminable war of attrition in France 
and were anxious to bring in new allies in the Balkans to increase the 
pressure on TUrkey and Austria-Hungary and relieve that on Russia. Their concern 
was given addedveight with the arrival of an urgent appeal for a diversionary 
movement from the Grand Duke Bioola8, the Russian Commander-in-ch1ef, on 
2 January 1915. Even ICi tcbener was SJ1llp8 the tic to the idea of opening up a 
new theatre of the war in reaction to the policy of slaughter being pressed 
upon him by Joffre and the British COlIID8nder in France. Sir John French. who 
maintained their faith in the efficacy of frontal assaults in France and 
Flanders. (5) As ICitchener told French, the British government were coming 
round to the view that onoe the defence of the western front had been provided 
for, any surplus troops might best be employed in an alternative theatre,(6) 
while Lloyd George went so far as to tell Asquith that on11 the Balkan theatre 
offered foreseeable prospects of a deciSion in the war.(1) 
(1) G. suarez, OPe oit., Vol. 3, p 90. 
(2) Poincarea OPe cit., Vol. 6,p 3. 
(3) E. Herbillonl Du G!ner&l en Chef au GouverneMnt (1930), Vol. 1, p 90. 
(4) Secretary of the Ca.mittee of Imperial Defence sinoe 1912. 
(5) R. R. Jamesl aa11ipgli (1965),p 26. 
(6) Sir F. Hauricel OPe oit., p.31. 
(1) A. Pingaudl OPe cit., Vol. 1, P 133. 
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Later in the month the French War Minister had ample opportunity to 
assess for himself the state of opinion in the English administration in the 
course of a visit to London. But Millerand faithfully repeated Joffre's 
objections to the proposed Balkan adventure inducing the War Council to give 
way and on 26 January reported back to his own Cabinet without apparently 
indicating the concrete proposals made by the EngliSh.(l) Nonetheless two 
days later several members of the English War Council put forward the idea of 
the despatch of a purely nominal force to Salonica as an earnest of Britain's 
intention to send more when available. The Greek Minister in London was 
reported to have suggested that the appearance of even 5000 allied troops in 
the Balkans would suffice to influenoe Bulgarian opinion. Kitchener argued 
that suoh a force would be the object of ridicule, but the main difficulty 
was seen to lie with the French, for Asquith reported that Millerand had not 
taken very favourably to the idea of assisting Serbia. (2) .Although, out of 
a meeting consisting of Ki tchener, Balfour, Lloyd George, Churchill, Wolfe 
MUrray and callwell,(~) all except Xitohener were in favour of a foroe being 
sent to Salonioa as soon as possible, it wa~inted out that such action would 
be diIficul t without going back on what had apparently been guaranteed to 
Millerand a few days earlier.(4) Callwell considered that Joffre and the 
French War Ministry were too obsessed with the idea that the decisive theatre 
of the war existed in France and believed hi .. elf that _ore effective openings 
were possible in the East. (5) His views were strengthened when the Greek 
Premier Venizel08 _de known his oountry's willingness to enter the war on the 
allied side provided Roumania did the same, while at a Meting of the French 
Council cf Ministers on 2 February Millerand found ht.aelf in opposition to the 
combined opinions of Poincare, Briand and Ribot, all of whoa urged the wisdom 
of a Balkan oampaign.(6) 
SUch then was the mood when Lloyd George visited Paris on 4 February. 
ostensibly to discuss economio problems. In conversation with finance minister 
Ribot he discovered that Millerand had never mentioned to his oolleagues 
that the suggestion of an expeditionary force to Salonioa had been .ade to him 
when he was in England. After subsequent conversations vi th Viviani, Delcasse 
and Briand, Lloyd George realised that they too bad been kept in the dark and 
he found the. astonished and annoyed that Millerand bad not fully reported 
the matter to them. The Chanoellor found their atU tude to be INch more 
friendly to the idea than that or MilleraDd, while Briand told hill that, with 
(1) suarezl OPe oit., Vol. ~,pp 91-2. 
(2) BankeYI OPe oit •• Vol. l_p 274. 
(~) Respectively Chief of the I_perial General Staff and Direotor of Hili tary 
Opera tiona • 
(4) Callwell to Robertson ~/1/15, Robert.on MSS 1/8/1. 
(5) ibid 4/2/15. Robertson MaS 1/6/2. 
(6) Pingaud • OPe oit •• Vol. 1, p 211. 
the possible exception of the Foreign Minister, Deloasse, the rest of the 
French Cabinet were opposed to Millerand and unanimously in favour of the 
prinoiple of an expeditionary force of two divisions being sent to 5a10nioa 
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at the earliest praoticable moment. Briand also~nfided his belief that, if 
Greeoe and Roumania agreed to enter the war, Joffre would be obliged to provide 
the neoessary foroes.(l) The French Government therefore agreed to the sending 
at once of an army oorps to Sa10nioa providing Kitohener sent to France the 
four divisions he had already promised,(2) while Mi11erand appears rel.ctant1y 
to have obtained Joffre's oonsent within the next oouple of days.(3) So Lloyd 
George returned from Paris on 6 February together with De1cass8, who bore the 
promise of his government to send a division to Salonica if the British would 
do the same. Xi tchener agreed with the majority opinion that this was a cheap 
price to pay if it induced Greece to join the allies.(4) 
Callwell was now confident that the Frenoh government recognised the 
importance of securing the Balkans in the interests of the Entente and the 
possibility of doing so without a military effort sufficient appreoiably to alter 
the strategic situation on the Western Front. (5) At a meeting of the English 
War Council on 9 February Asquith argued cogently for the advantages of the 
proposed expedition and it was decided to send a telegram to Athens explaining 
the intentions of the allies and requesting the intervention of Greece.(O) 
Kitchener stressed the importance of Russian participation in the operation and 
Delcasse, still in London, pressed the French War Ministry to provide the 
necessary rifles to induce the Grand Duke Nicholas to cooperate in the proposed 
allied venture.(7) But Venizelos absolutely declined to entertain the idea of 
Greek participation in the war without the collaboration of ROum8nia, which was 
becoming increasingly unlikely following the conolusion of a Germano-Bulgarian 
loan agreement. On 15 February Greeoe categorically refused to join the 
Entente and when the English War Council met four days later the attitude of 
Xi tchener had oooled markedly. The idea of operations in the Balkans had, 
therefore, once more to be abandoned. Individual ministers in England might 
still maintain that the basic ooncept was a aound one,(8) while in France Viviani 
(1) Lloyd George to Grey 7/2/ 15, Lloyd George MSS E2/l5/4. Q.uoted in 
D. Lloyd George. War He_oirs, Vol. 1 (19}}), p 407. 
(2) Note by Benie 4/2/ 15, Bar!ie MSS. 1'0 8OO/112/Gr/15/4. 
(3) Poincare. OPe cit., Vol. 6, p 48. 
(4) Sir W. Robertson, OPe cit., Vol. 1, p 98. 
(5) Callwell to Robertson 8/2/15. Robertson MSS 1/8/}. 
(6) CAB 42/l /}3 
(7) Delcasse to Viviani 9/2/15, A. E. 'GQerra', Vol. 219. 
(8) MemorandUJI by :Balfour 24/2/15. CAB 24/1/ 6• 
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reported in mid-Maroh that the idea of a Balkan diversion was again gaining 
favour among his oolleagues,(l) yet essentially the idea vas a non-starter, 
especially after the resignation of Venizelos on 6 March. Moreover the allies 
were now embarked upon an alternative side show at the Dardanelles. For as 
long as anyone retained oonfidence in the prospects of this operation the 
possibility of opening up yet another theatre of war vas remote. 
At the beginning of 1915, therefore, the Saloni08 campaign had appeared 
as a fruitful initiative designed to unite the forces of the Balkan states 
against the central Povers. When the expedition ultimately materialised in 
October, hovever, it vould be as a last minute expedient dictated in the final 
instance by considerations of French internal politics. This fundamental 
change is crucial to an understanding of the subsequent development of the 
campaign. The repeated setbacks at the Dardanelles served above all to convince 
most politiciaDs on both sides of the Channel that a cheap victory in the war 
was not a feasible proposition. Thus vhen the Saloni08 campaign emerged again 
as a possibility it did so only secondarily as a result of the conflict 
between "eastern" and "western" concepts of the var. The response of the 
French government to the increaSing disoon*ent in the country at the slaughter 
on the Western Front was an uDderlying faotor, but it vas not this which 
precipitated the Dev campaign. Moreover the Saloni08 expedition vas got 
underway with almost no technical evaluation of its strategic possibilities. 
It was in no sense a oalculated measure designed to bring the var to a speedy 
conclusion. For, if at the end of 1914 the General Staffs of all the 
belligerants had essentially run out of ideas for winning the war, by the late 
sWDlller of 1915, at least Dong the Entente, the advocates of an Eastern 
solution to the deadlock on the western Front had similarly been thwarted in 
their hopes and expectations. The dramatic change in the French attitude which 
oame in July 1915 with the decision once more to conoentrate on an eastern 
strategy resulted in the main from political intrigue vi thin Franoe. This. 
above all else, explains the paral1Bis which beset the 5&lonica Campaign for 
the first two years of its history. 
French politioal circles in the summer of 1915 vere. if not var-weary, at 
least becoming anzious at the lack of achieve .. nt to show for a year of 
unprecedented effort, and far more ready to oriticise the direction of the war 
tban they had been a year earlier when, with a 8ubltae gesture of patriotic 
ooncord, politioal diffioulties and dilferenoes had been 8ubaerged beneath the 
veneer of the so-called Saored union. In this developing situation the two 
figures moat TUlnerab1e to criticism vere inevitably those .ost readily 
(1) BerbilloDI OPe cit., Vol. 1, p 129. 
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associated with the war effort - General Joffre, the French Commander-in-
Chief, and Alexandre Millerand, Minister of War in the Viviani government. It 
was now obvious that the war which almost all bad expected to be over before 
Christmas 1914 was in fact of a completely different nature from that which had 
been anticipated. MOreover there was a growing feeling in political circles 
that Joffre, despite his victory of the Marne, was not the general most likely 
to win the war for France. His slow wits together with his inexperience of 
higher war study rendered him little more than a modern Delphic oracle, 
proclaiming the sanctity of the frontal offensive. He was the mere mouthpiece 
of a military hierarchy which had de Grandmaison as its ohief intellectual 
influence and de Castelnau as acting high priest.(l) Criticism of the French 
commander ranged from dissatisfaction over his military policy to a belief that 
he was trying to establish a dictatorship at Chantilly. But the government 
could not oonsider replacing Joffre since his prestige among ordinary 
Frenchmen remained high.(2) His critics were thus limited for the time being 
to parliamentary circles, especially among the groups of the left. But 
Joffre had baDme so pampered through the zeal of War Minister Millerand in 
shielding him that he had grown to regard the War Ministry a8 a buffer between 
himself and the government. Those who wanted a change in the command quickly 
understood that they would not get it froll Millerand. So to reach the general 
it became necessary to attack the minister. The solidarity between the two 
men was such that a crisis in the command would almost certainly entail a 
ministerial upheaval.(3) Millerand too readily believed all that the High 
command told him, thus allowing Joffre to usurp his authority over the armies 
and so reduoing himself to the mouthpiece of the Grand Q.uartier ~neral. AJJ 
Joffre noted with gratitude, when parliamentary opinion became more anxious 
and insistent, all the more firmly and oonsistently did Millerand defend the 
general's liberty of action.(4) 
It was to the misfortune of both Joffre and Hillerand that the early 
mon ths of the war saw the emergenoe of • new popular baro in the person of 
General Maurice Sarrail - a man~ose views and aasociates .ade him an 
embarrassment, indeed a threat to Joffre. lor Sarrail appeared to have 
imagination and flair when Joffre was dull and lacking in ideas. His political 
views, moreover, set him immediately at odds with his superior officer and 
(1) B. H. L. Barta OPe oit., p 13. 
(2) Cassar, OPe oit., p 151. 
(3) J. C. King. OPe oit., p 42. MermeixI Joffrea La Pre_iere Crise du 
Commandement (1919), pp 26, 31. 
(4) J. Joffrea ~rsonal Memoirs (translated by T. Bentler Mott), (1932), 
Vol. 2, p 3 • 
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made him a fooal point for those politicians most ready to criticise the 
commander-in-chief. Sarrail was one of the few figures in the French High 
Command whose allegiance to the republican ideal was beyond question. He had 
emerged therefore as the darling of the Left wing and in particular of the 
Radical-Socialist party of whioh he was a member. This was the party which 
had arisen from the group that had loyally supported Gambetta's Republioan 
Union and had stood foremost on the battle line in defenoe of the rePUblic.(l) 
Sarrail had been the only high-ranking officer in the 18908 to speak in defence 
of Dreyfus and he had subsequently found the way open to rapid advancement under 
the anti-clerical war minister, General Andre. His stature had risen 
dramatically in 1914 as a result of his part in the battle of the Marne in which 
he had commanded the Frenoh Third Army. (2) But it was Sarrail's poli tioal 
backing which made him suoh an important figure, particularly at a time when the 
semblance of parliamentary government wa. returning to France after the virtual 
diotatorship of the early months of the war.(~) It was only in 1915, for 
example, that the parliamentary commissions were able to play an important 
role. Until then real authority in the direction of the war belonged to the 
General staff, in fact to Joffre. The relative stabilisation of military 
operations on the western front recreated parliament as an efficient organism.(4) 
The unofficial but acknowledged leader of the Radical-Socialist group was 
the former Premier, Joseph Caillaux, a politician whose dubious activities 
during the war were eventually to bring him before the High Court. At the end of 
1915 the English ambassador in Paris, Lord Beriie, reported that C8illaux 
oould rely on the votes of 150 deputies(5) and this backing represented a force 
which no French ministry nor the High Command could afford to ignore. However 
one interprets Caillaux,'s wartime politics, one would agree with Suarez that he 
came to be a rallying point for all elements in the French state which were out 
of SJlllpathJ with the goverDJIent or the army hierarchy a "Partout ou l'on 
conspirait, ou l'on se revoltait, ou l'on S8 derobait au deVOir, 80n noa 
apparaissait comma une devise, un signe de ralliement. n (6) Sarrail was 
therefore an oivious embarrassment to Joffre while he re .. ined among the Prench 
military elite and the relationship between the tvo .. n was further strained by 
the fact that whenever the possibility of Joffre's reaoval vas mentioned, the 
name of sarrail would not be far di8tant. As early as Pebruary 1915 there bad 
(1) Cassar, OPe cit., p 12. 
(2) ibid p 152. 
(~) B. H. L. Bart. Through the log of War (1938), pp 129-32. 
(4) G. Monnerville. Clemenc •• u (1968), p 40~. 
(5) Bertie to ~y 25/12/15, Bertie MSS.F.O. 800/167/Fr/15/90. 
(6) suarez. OPe cit., Vol. ~, p 432. 
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been circulated by the Headquarters of the French Third Army - whether with 
S8rrailB connivance it is unclea~l2 two memoranda which concluded that if 
Joffre found himself indisposed for a fortnight and command passed to Sarrail, 
the enemy would indubitably be chased out of France because of the new 
conceptions of strategy which Sarrail would bring into the higher direction of 
the war.(2) Joffre, it was said, did not want capable republican generals to 
have commands which could attract attention to themselves and so demonstrate 
Joffre's own incapacity.(3) The animosity between the two men naturally 
grew stronger and by the end of March Sarrail was complaining bitterly to 
Poincare ~bout Joffre and the barrage of orders and counter-orders which he 
received from the Grand Quartier G8neral.(4) By June the Deputy for the 
Marne, Margaine, was urging upon the President of the Republic the need to 
replace Joffre by Sarrail at the head of the French Army.(5) In these 
ciroumstances the Commander-in-chief was inevitably on the loOk out for the 
means to ruin his rival. 
Millerand's position was no Ilore comfortable than that of Joffre. As 
early as March he was severely attacked in the Chaaber, but managed somehow 
to extricate himself.(6) Poincare found it necessary to critioise Millerand's 
attitude, his apparent inertia and his obstinate unwillingness to give precise 
information to the parliamentary commis8ions.(7) His uncritical defence 
of Joffre and his general behaviour increasingly set Millerand at odds with his 
ministerial oolleagues and by early July each meeting of the French cabinet 
seemed to produce an "incident Millerand H .(8) The unreaitting efforts of the 
commissioners to inspect material and men at the front and the reluotance of 
the War Ministry, backed by the High Command, to admit them posed a dilemma 
which could only be resolved by the removal of Millerand or by a radioal 
reduction in the powers of the parliamentary commissions. The War Minister 
displayed an uncritical faith in Joffre's rightness and did not care to 
question his deoisions and propositions. He regarded it as a duty to cov.r 
and defend him even when the attaaks directed against Joffre were only too 
(1) In Bonsoir of 23/2/20 Sarrail denied that the documents ca.e from the 
headquarters of the Third ArmJ. 
(2) MSrmeix. Sarrail et lea Armeea d'Orient (1920), p 178, P. K. de 1a Gorce. 
The Frenoh Axml (1963), p 106. 
(3) MSrmeix. Joffre OPe oit., p 52. 
(4) Poincarea OPe cit., Vol. 6, p 137. 
(5) ibid p 254. 
(6) Di&r1 entry 8/3/15. Edouard de Billy MSS. carton 2. 
(7) Poinoare. OPe cit., Vol. 6, p 277. 
(8) A. Ferry. Les Carneta Secrets (1957), p 89. 
justified. (I) Matters came, therefore, to a head when Joffre decided to act 
against Sarrail - for it was up to Millerand to explain the commander's moves 
before parliament. 
At the beginning of July 1915 Joffre seized upon a military setbaok suffered 
by Sarrail to strike out at his ri~l. A German attack on 30 June inflicted 
heavy casualties on Sarrail's Third Army and the general's counter-offensive, 
based on two divisions of reinforcements despatched by Joffre, was delayed too 
long. In addition it appeared that on some ocoasions Sarrail had not reported 
the truth to General Joffre - he had lost trenohes and had failed to announoe 
the faot in the hope of winning them baok before it had been disoovered.(2) 
Joffre immediately wrote to General Dubail, commander of the Group of Armies of 
the East, and instruoted him to oarry out an investigation of the operations in 
the Argonne and Serrail's role in them. Joffre showed unoharaoteristio subtlety 
in his choioe of Dubail sinoe the latter was a staunoh republioan and favourite of 
the politioal left in very muoh the same way that Sarrail was. In the event that 
his report proved unfavourable to Sarrail, it would be difficult, Joffre 
calculated, for the former's friends to claim that Sarrail had been the viotim 
of a political witch-hunt.(3) Joffre later wrote that in order to show that it 
was for purely military reasons that action was taken in regard to Sarrail he 
entrusted the enquiry to a commander whose uprightness and independent judgement 
had never been brought into question. (4) Another observer, however, considered 
that the tone of Joffre's letter to Dubsil dictated the required response.(5) 
Joffre wrotea "I wonder, however, if the answer is not to be found higher up and 
if the moral atmosphere in the Third Army is such as to pami t the free 
development of that energy, initiative and devotion which are essential in warn~6) 
Certainly at the Grand Quartier oen.ral Herbillon noted that what was being 
held against sarrail was not so much his military failures as the fact that his 
command of the army and his relationships with his subordinates were determined 
by his own political leanings. Sarrail esti_ted a II&n's value not on the 
basis of his m[itary prowess but OD the radicalism of his politiOS.(7) 
(1) A. Aularda Histoire Poli tique de 18 Grande guerre (1924), p 148. 
(2) Yarde-Buller to Kitchener 26/7/15. w.o. 159/11/18. 
(,) G. H. Cassara OPe cit., pp 154-5. 
(4) Joffre, OPe cit., Vol. 2, p 376. 
(5) A. Ferry, OPe cit., p 100. 
(6) Joffre to Dubail 16/7/15, Joffrea OPe cit., Vol. 2, p 374. 
(1) HerbilloDa OPe oit., Vol. 1, p 166. 
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Dubail presented his findings to Joffre on 20 July in the form of two long 
reports. The first on the subject of the military operations was both 
critical and laudatory of Sarrail's conduct of affairs. The biggest criticism 
made against the general was that he had failed to constitute any army 
reserves. (I) The second report on the atmosphere at Sarrailts headquarters and 
in his army was more damaging. Dubail found in Sarrail ts dealings with his 
junior officers "des procedes qui enervent Ie commandement subordonne et 
nuisent a son prestigell.(2) Sarrail had often not acted the part of an army 
commander to the full. He had, for example, shown an unwillingness to visit 
his troops and interest himself in their welfare. The overall tone of 
Dubail's two reports was therefore not favourable to Sarrail, but neither was 
it as damaging as has been claimed. (3) SenSing perhaps what was afoot 
Margaine wrote a long letter to Viviani protesting that the 'republican general' 
was being molested by the Grand Quartier G8neral~4) A day after receiving 
Dubail's reports, however, Joffre sent his liaison officer, Herbillon, with 
a letter for Millerand in which Sarrail's replacement at the head of the Third 
Army was announoed. Joffre stated his willingness to give Sarrail command of 
an army corps unless the government had another mission for him - a phrase 
which perhaps betrayed Joffre's desire to see hil rival removed from French 
soil.(5) On 22 July, therefore, the Council of Ministers was presented with 
the fait accompli of Sarrail's dismissal. 
(1) Ferrya OPe oit., p 100. 
(2) Fonds Joffre, 14Nl. 
(~) Basing his analysis of this episode on the version of the memoranda given 
in Joffrets memoirs, G. H. Cassar has argued that the first report 
"charged Sarrail with gross incompetenoe" and that Dubail "reco ... nded a 
change in the leadership of the Third Army and augges ted that Sarrail be 
assigned to take command of the less important ArmJ of Lorraine". 
[ Cassara OPe cit •• P 155) But this faila to square with the remark of 
Marcel Se.bat, pre.ent at the Counoil of Ministers when the two reports 
were read out, that there existed between Dubail's .. .aranda and the 
severe oonclusions whioh Joffre drew from them a hiatus. []'em, Ope cit •• 
p 1001 The versions given in Joffre's me.oire bear in fact little 
resemblance to those in the Fonds Joffre [ Mluiatere de la Querre. l4BlJ 
which Cassar appears not to have seen and in which Dubail merely oonoludes 
that "on pourrai t lui [Sarrail J adresser des re.oatrances serieuses." 
The dooument in the Fonds Joffre wbioh recommends Sarrail's removal 
appears not to be the work of Dubail, but is pe%haps Joffre's own 
oonclusion from the general's report. This seeu to have been read out 
by Poinoare at the Cabinet .. eting on 22 July and indeed Poincare 
attributes it to Dubail. [Poincarea Ope cit., yolo 6, p 3351. But if such 
were the case it would be diffioult to make sense of Se.bat's comment. 
(4) Poincare. OPe cit., Vol. 6, p 332. 
(5) Herbillona OPe oit., vol. 1, p 110. 
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At the Cabinet meeting Ribot voiced the feelings of many of his 
colleagues in suggesting that it was unfair to punish Sarrail for his setback 
in the Argonne, whereas no one had been disoiplined for the recent failure 
at Arras. But an unwillingness to do anything which might arouse Joffre's 
anger and even his resignation was a limiting factor on the discussion and the 
auggestion that Sarrail should be entrusted with the command of the Army of 
Lorraine was shouted down by Briand, who argued that the continued presence of 
Sarrail in France would provide an exouse for renewed political agitation. 
Many ministers had the impresaion that Joffre would like to see Sarrail sent 
to the Dardanelles and it was decided to sound out the ca.mander-in-chief on 
tlis idea.(l) General Gouraud had recently suffered a serious injury at the 
Dardanelles and a replacement was required, although vhen Millerand had 
discussed the matter vith Poincare earlier in the month there had been no 
question of Sarrail being offered the post.(2) Millerand now voiced opposition 
to Sarrail's appointment to the Dardanelles command and the Under-Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, Abel Ferry, sensed in his attitude the seeds of future 
discord. Ferry felt that at the cabinet meeting on11 Poincare had managed to 
rise above the level of partJ political intrigue.(3) Kltchener was informed 
that Briand. for example, had supported Sarrail ainoe he hoped to strengthen his 
standing with the radical-socialist party in the Chamber in order to fulfil his 
ambition of replaoing Viviani at the head of the government.(4) 
Sarrail heard of the blow which had befallen him on 22 July and vas 
instructed to report to the War MinistrJ on the following da1. Before doing 
so, however, he learnt from the Minister of the Interior. the Radical 
Socialist. LouiS Malvy, that the Counoil of Ministers had thought in terms 
of making hi. Commander of the Dardanelles ExpeditioDarJ Foroe.(5) Once the 
news of Sarrail's dismiasal became ca..on knowledge a Ito~ of protest arose. 
La Radical prepared an article in which it vas argued the t the general was the 
victim of a cabal. but the censor stepped in before this could appear. (6) 
Herbillon quiokly gained an impreSSion of the parli ... ntarJ agitation caused by 
the whole affaira "Sarrail eat un drapeau me dit un gras hoame. on n'aurait 
(1) Poincare. OPe oi t., Vol. 6, Pl) 336-7. 
(2) ibid, p 304. 
(3) FerrJl OPe cit •• p 101. 
(4) Yarde-Buller to Kltchener 24/7/15. w.o. 159/11/12. 
(5) H. Sarrail. Ion CQlllll8Dd.aent en Orient (1920), p vii. 
(6) Censored article, 5N 364. 
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jamais d~ Y toucher. La priver de son commandement, clest donner un 
soufflet au Parlement, en frappant le seul general republicain.lt(l) Yarde-
Buller(2) reported to Kitchener that Sarrail was Ita dangerous man" and that 
it was more than probable that he would organise a political cam~ign against 
Millerand and Joffre.(;) Millerand certainly came in for fierce stacks, 
there being talk of the radical socialist group deputing a Commissary to 
watch the army.(4) The Minister had already been forced to take on three 
under-secretaries, one for munitions, one for supplies and one for sanitary 
and hospital questions, thus severely restricting his own authority, but now 
the Chamber wanted his skin.(5) Partly because of Joffre's astute choice 
of Dubail, however, the parliamentary left found it difficult to use the 
dismissal of Sarrail as the linchpin of their attack on M1l1erand.(6) 
Sarrail had therefore to decide whether or not he would accept the 
command at the Dardanelles. Appreciating perhaps the motivation which lay 
behind the offer he declared to Millerand and Viviani on 23 July that. 
having been relieved of his command in France, he could not accept what was 
evidently an inferior appointment. His career, he asserted. was at an end and 
he would go into retirement. Somewhat to Poincare's irritation Viviani now 
planned to try to obtain Joffrels consent to giving Sarrail command of the 
Lorraine army. Perhaps this would lessen parliamentary agitation. In the 
game of politics one had, Viviani reminded the President of the Republic, to 
learn to live with the Chamber.(7) On 24 July the Council of Ministers heard 
that Joffre. although he had already designated General aerard for the Jxmy 
of Lorraine, was apparently not opposed to the idea of giving Sarrail command 
at the Dardanelles.(8) But parliamentary intrigues had already suoceeded in 
setting up Joffre and the power of the Cbaaber against one another - a 
situation in which Poincare saw in Sarrail the recreation of Boulangism.(9) 
Thera was also a general outcry against Mll1erand, and, behind him and Joffre, 
the government itself was not immune. But Poincare felt that the parliamentary 
agitation was not spontaneous and that Sarrail himself was mixed up in it. 
(1) Herbillona OPe cit., Vol. 1, p 170. 
(2) Head of the British Mission at French Aray Headquarters. 
(3) Yarde-Buller to Kitchener 26/7/15. w.o. 159/11. 
(4) Lord Bertie of Thame. Diary (ed. by Lady A. G. Lennox). (1924), p 204. 
(5) poinoarea OPe oit., Vol. 6, p 344. 
(6) Bertie to Grey 27/7/15. Grey MSS, F.O. 800/58. ibid 1/8/15, Bertie MSS, 
F.O. 800 167/Fr/15/55. 
(7) Poinoarea OPe cit., Vol. 6, p 340. 
(8) ibid, p 341. 
(9) A. Ferryl OPe oit •• p 103. 
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Several ministers even reported receiving emissaries from Sarrail, so, 
convinced that this political unrest must be ~uelled. the government decided 
to send the Minister of Public Instruction, Albert Sarraut, one of Sarrail's 
poli tical sympathisers, to try to persuade the general to reconsider his 
decision concerning the Dardanelles command.(l) Visited also by Briand, 
Sarrail's opposition to the offer weakened, although he remained adamant 
that he would only accept if the expeditionary force were strengthened.(2) 
On 25 July therefore, Viviani was able to tell the President of the Republic 
that sarrail might after all go back on his earlier refusal,(3) while the 
following day the Radical-Socialist deputy, Franklin-Bouillon, confidently 
announced to the Chamber Foreign Affairs Commission that Sarrail would shortly 
be leaving at the head of the Dardanelles Expedition.(4) 
An examination of the problem of reinforcements was reque.ted from General 
Gouraud, who declared that three or four new divisions were needed. The 
Council of Ministers, meeting on 27 July, rallied to the same conclusion, and 
Viviani and Millerand were entrusted with the task of obtaining Joffre's 
approval. (5) B\.1t Joffre showed himself reluctant to allow Sarrail to take 
command of a reinforced expeditionary force. His change of heart appears to 
have been dictated by little more than his personal antipathy towards sarrail, 
for he now expressed the hope that the command should be offered to General 
Franchet dtEsperey. (6) liThe exeroise of power and the ruin of a rival appear 
to have beoome more important to Joffre than the immediate task of finding a 
way to defeat the enemyn.(7) Joffre was summoned to appear before the Cabinet 
on the last day of July, when his eXcuse that he was unable to spare four 
divisions from the Western Front was flatly rejected by the government. Meeting 
again, later in the day, but this time without Joffre, the ainisters decided 
to nominate sarrail commander of the Dardanelles Expedition and to get him to 
prepare a plan of operations straight away.(8) B\.1t Sarrail, sensing his own 
strength, placed before Millerand on 3 August three conditions which would have 
to be fulfilled if he were to accept the comund. Be required that an t.ArllNie 
d'Orient' should be oonstituted, that he should not be placed under the British 
Commander, Sir Ian Hamilton, and that he would not depart without the agreed 
(1) Poinoare. OPe oit., Vol. 6, p }42. 
(2) M. Sarrail, OPe oit., p viii. 
(3) poinoare. op.cit., Vol. 6, p 344. 
(4) Parliaaentary arohives, C 7488. 
(5) Poincare. OPe oi~., Vol. 6, p ~1. 
(6) ibid, p 348. 
(1) G. H. Cassar. op.cit., p 163. 
(8) Poinoare. OPe cit., Vol. 6,pp 350-1. 
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reinforcements. (I) Millerand was in no position to resist since the Chambers 
were clamouring for the appointment of travelling commissions which would 
effectively transfer much of the authority of the government over the army 
to the Senate Army Commission. Sarrail's close associate, the deputy Paul 
Doumer, was heavily involved in this intrigue, to which the general himself 
was probably rather more than a passive observer.(2) 
Lord Bertie was able to keep the English Government sketchily informed 
of the development of events. He understood that General Bailloud, the acting 
commander at the Dardanelles, would prefer to return to France rather than 
serve under sarraii:) Franklin-Bouillon informed the British ambassador 
that the Radical-Socialists hoped Sarrail would receive the command as com-
pensation for his earlier dismissal by Joffre, but Bertie could obtain no 
confirmation of this from Delcasse. After leaving the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, however, Bertie read of Sarrail's appoin tmen t in '18 Temps. He 
concluded, therefore, that Delcasse~8t be deaf or an awful liarR.(4) 
Sarrail's political supporters were certainly active on his behalf and on 
4 August an article by Gustave Herve in the Guerre Social. was seized by the 
authorities. In it Herve had predicted the end of the Sacred Union if Sarrail 
did not receive entire satisfaction.(S) When the Cabinet met again on 
5 August several members voiced their reluctance to do anything which might 
appear to humiliate a republican general. The ministers therefore readily 
accepted the conditions laid down by sarrail,(6) and later in the day the 
general was informed that he had been selected to command the Arm8e d'Orient.(7) 
For perhaps the firs t time in the war the wishes of Joffre in a military 
matter had not been respected.(8) The implications of this precedent for the 
future of any campaign under Sarrail's direction were ominous in the extreme. 
The political and personal divisions inside the French state bad been revealed 
to lie jus t benea th the surface - 'I' affaire Sarrail' had proved an unpleasan t 
reminder of the precariousness of the Sacred Union. But General Sarrail's 
subsequent career would further shake and ultimately destroy this chi.ara of 
internal unity. 
(1) M. sarraila OPe cit., p viii. 
(2) Yarde-Buller to Kitohener 31/7/15, w.o. 159/11/24. 
(3) Bertie to Grey, 3/8/15, Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/l67/Fr/15/56• 
(4) Bertie to Grey 6/8/15, Grey MSS, F.O. 800/58. 
(5) Edouard de Billy MSS, carton 2. 
(6) Poinoarea OPe cit., Vol. 7. p 11. 
(7) Sarraila OPe oit., p ix. 
(8) A. PerrJl OPe cit •• p 100. 
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vlhen Joffre had been confronted by Millerand on 29 July with the news 
that the French Government intended to reinforce the Dardanelles Expedition hiB 
reaction had been to stress the impossibility of withdrawing any troops from 
the Western Front until September, when the results of an offensive which he 
proposed to carry out in Champagne and Artois would be known. He called for 
a rational plan of operations and suggested that an officer of his General 
staff should be sent out to the Dardanelles to collect the neoessary informati&~~ 
Asked by Poincare two days later if it were possible to keep a certain number 
of divisions ready to be transported to the Dardanelles, Joffre wrote to 
Millerand on 3 August that the present circumstances were far too uncertain to 
allow any such movement of troops. Joffre stressed his own responsibility for 
the defence of France and argued that he must be left free to act in the main 
theatre offensively or defensively as he saw fit - and with the full complement 
of his armies.(2) Obviously while Joffre maintained this sort of attitude it 
would prove most diffioult for the government to keep its promise to Sarrail 
of providing him with reinforoementa. In the oircumstances Sarrail's continued 
lukewarmness towards his new command was entirely explioable. Moreover 
haggling with Sarrail made Millerand impatient and provoked him into a slip. 
"The desire to see me removed from the Frenoh front and from Franoe", observed 
the general at the end of the war, "came out in a phrase which escaped the 
ministers 'if you imagine that I am going to let you remain in Paris until 
September 151" (3). Nonetheless on 11 August Sarrail produoed a written 
appreciation of what a French foroe might be expected to aohieve in the eastern 
theatre. He suggested a number of sohemes basea on action from Chanak, the 
Bay of Adramyti, Smyrna, Alexandretta and Salonioa.(4) Sarrail, himself, 
appears to have favoured the idea of a Serbian expedition through Salonioa.(5) 
Joffre quiokly dismissed Sarrail's study as too flimsy(6), and when questioned 
by Poinoare a few days later beoame vehement in his opposition to any extension 
of existing operations at the Dardanelles. What, be asked was intended to 
be done - simply p~re an expedition to pacify a factious general? The 
President of the Republic was obliged to remind Joffre that both Generals 
Gouraud and Bailloud had recommended the extension of the soope of operations 
(1) Joffre. OPe cit., Vol. 2, p 371. 
(2) Joffre to Millerand 3/8/15, 5N 132. 
(3) Sarrail. OPe cit., pix. 
(4) Note au sujet de 1. situation militaire en Orient, 5B 132. 
(5) P. Coblentz, ~ 5i18Doe of Sarrail (1930),pp lO}-4J Poincare a OPe cit., 
Vol. 7, p 39. 
(6) Minist~re de la Guerraa Les armees francaiees dans la grande guerra (1924), 
tome 8, Vol. 1, annex 318. 
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for purely military reasons. 
corps for September. Poincare 
Joffre might resign. (1) 
Grudgingly, therefore, Joffre promised two army 
thought it evident that, if pressed any further, 
On 17 August it was decided in the Cabinet that Viviani should request 
Sarrail to study more closely the strategy of an operation to force the 
Straits, leaving aside all the other expeditions which the general had 
envisaged. (2) Just over a week later Joffre was informed that the government 
felt it indispensable that reinforcements should quickly be sent to the 
Dardanelles. But Joffre insisted that he would have to hold on to the four 
divisions requested until~ or 22 September when he would know whether or not 
his Champagne offensive had been effective.(3) Joffre argued later that his 
agreemen t ",as based upon the belief tha t a definite plan of action had been 
established by Sarrail in the report which he had prepared on the instructions 
of Viviani. (4) But Sarrati's report, dated 24 August, was limited to discussing, 
without final conclusions, the possibilities of a landing on a number of points 
on the European and Asiatic coasts. There was no detailed analysis of the 
number of troops required nor of the prospects of success.(5) Joffre 
therefore had the question promptly examined by his own secretariat in the 
Section d'etudes de la n8fense Nationale. The conclusions of this body, which 
must have delighted Joffre, were emphatically opposed to the resumption of 
offensive operations at the Dardanelles on the basis of the forces currently 
being envisaged. (6) Joffre now requested that, if the plan should still 
proceed, the divisions which he had previously promised for the end of 
September should be held back until the first days of October. Sarrail. 
moreover, should be required to go out to the eastern theatre to assess the 
situation and its requirements at first hand.(1) 
Arguing that the operations carried out so far at the Dardanelles by 
Sir Ian Hamilton had now failed, Millerand called on 28 August for a new 
approach to the problem(8), and three days later the French Cabinet concluded 
(1) Poincarea OPe cit., Vol. 7, p 31. 
(2) ibid, p 42. 
C~) ibid, P 68. 
(4) Fonds Joffre. 14K 10, but the confused version given in Joffre's memoirs 
(Vol. 2, p 311) in which the Marshal claims to have received Sarrail's 
report 8S early a8 24 August scarcely supports his ca8e. 
(5) Joffre to Millerand 1/9/15, 16N 1678. 
(6) Note a~~jet des Dardanelles, IbN 1678. 
(1) As note (5). 
(8) Millerand to Delcasse 28/8/15, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 1065. 
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that the four divisions already earmarked should be ready to start for the 
Dardanelles on 20 September.(l) The English authorities were informed of 
this French decision and were requested to use their own units to replace the 
two divisions under Bailloud at Cape Helles so that France would have the 
whole of her forces at her diSPosition.(2) Joffre, appearing before senior 
ministers, repeated his wish that Sarrail should leave as soon as possible to 
study the possibilities at the Narrows and again stressed that he could not 
accept responsibility for the detachment of a single division from the 
Western front before October. He would sooner resign. And even in October, 
Joffre maintained, the four divisions would probably be quite insufficient 
to force the Straits. Viviani, Millerand, Delcasse and Poincare bowed before 
Joffre's obstinacy(3) and on 3 September the full Cabinet agreed to invite 
Sarrail to leave to study in conjunction with General Bai110ud the possibilities 
of a reinforced expedition.(4) But Sarrai1 appeared unwillng to leave France, 
while at the same time Joffre's desire to see him depart grew apace. The 
Commander-in-chief thought that Sarrail was stalling in the hope of acquiring 
after all a command in France, andjS1t that the government was too frightened 
to order him to leave. Colonel Herbillon sensed that Joffre would heave a sigh 
of relief onoe his rival was out of the way.(5) But Joffre's enthusiasm to 
see Sarrail depart did not make him any more willing to provide him with 
reinforcements and, in answer to Millerand's request of 7 September that he 
should have four divisions ready to embark at Marseilles in the first week of 
October, Joffre now replied that he could not spare the units in question by 
that date and urged the government to reconsider his earlier objections before 
deciding on a course of action.(6) 
The allied oonferenoe held at Calais on 11 September vas effeotively a 
triumph for Joffre. The hope was expressed that the troops would be ready to 
leave on 10 October and that operations could begin around the aiddle of 
November. But no definite arrangements were made and if Joffre's offensive 
in the west proved suooessful the Dardanelles enterprise would be cancelled 
to allow the general to use all his troops to push hoae the victory in 
France. (7) In fact the constant postponement of operations at the Straits 
into the winter months was making their ultimate materialisation increasingly 
(1) Poinoare: OPe cit., Vol. 7, p 73. 
(2) Millerand to Deloasse31/8/l5, A. E. 'Guerre' Vol. 1065. 
(3) Poinoare. OPe oit., Vol. 7, P 79. 
(4) ibid, p 83. 
(5) Herbillon. OPe oit., Vol. 1, p 183. 
(6) Les armees franoaises dans la grande guerre. tome 8, Vol. 1, annexes 
348 and 351. 
(7) Frocas-verbal, CAB 28/1. 
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unlikely. (1) Joffre followed up this tactical success by presenting the 
government with a further note from the Section d'Etudes de la Defense 
Nationale. This argued that Joffre's coming offensive in the West was of such 
critical importance that he must be allowed to employ all available troops on 
it until its outcome had been decided.(2) As this appeared to leave the 
prospects of serious action at the Dardanelles even more vaguely in the future, 
Millerand felt obliged to remind Joffre that the Calais agreements were based 
on the assumption that the general would prepare four divisions to be ready 
on 10 October.(3) Joffre replied that he could not promise that the divisions 
designated for the Near-East would be ready on time, and voiced further 
objections to the whole concept of the proposed operation. Responsible for the 
national defence, Joffre argued that he would be lapsing in his duty if he 
failed to point out to the government the dangers of an enterprise which he 
felt might deal a deadly blow to the whole war effort.(4) Viviani was 
beginning to despair that the operation would ever get under way. ilL' operation 
des Dardanelles ne se tera pas. Le G.Q.G. ne veut pas qU'elle se fasse, parce 
que clest Ie general Sarrail qui c0Ullll8nde. II (5) But if the government·s 
troubles with Joffre were not enough, Sarrail was at the same time stepping 
up the conditions upon which he would take on the command. A force of 
100,000 men was now being mentioned, while Sarrail insisted on command of the 
allied contingents as well as a guarantee of Italian assistance.(6) Sarrail, 
however, did not maintain these pretensions for long and on 23 September 
submitted a further report to the War Minister which was nov limited to the 
prospects of action on three points - Boulair, Gaba T8pe and the north-west 
coast of Asia Minor.(1) Thus the situatio~s still extreaely fluid when the 
in ternal wranglings in France were overtaken by the rapid developDen t of 
diplomatic events. The mobilisation of the Bulgarian army rendered irrelevant 
further discussion of operations at the Dardanelles and recreated the 
prospects of a Balkan campaign, such as had been envisaged at the beginning of 




G. Cassara Ope cit., p 191. 
Note au sujet des Dardanelles, 15/9/15. A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 1066. 
Millerand to Joffre 14/9/15, Les armees francaises. Tome 8, Vol. 1, 
Ann. ;58. 
(4) Joffre to Millerand 20/9/15, 51 132. 
(5) Poincarel OPe cit., Vol. 1, pIll. 
(6) Cassara Ope cit., p 19;. 
(1) Sarrail to Millerand, 21/9/15. 5N 132. 
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earlier plans and seize upon the idea of an expedition to Salonica is a clear 
indication that the dominant consideration was not so much strategy as the 
desire to get Sarrail out of the countrya "Il faut eloigner Ie general 
Sarrail m~me au p~'ix d tune armee." (1) 
Parliamentary agitation for some action in the Eastern theatre was 
gaining ground. As Caillaux argued on 22 September a great oJeration was 
imperative to provide a success somewhere in the Near-East. The right-wing 
deputy Denys Cochin felt that this should be looked for not at the Dardanelles 
but elsewhere.(2) The opportunity for such an&ternative operation was soon 
provided when Sofia decreed general mobilisation on 23 September. The 
Serbian government, under the imminent threat of being overrun, appealed 
immediately to London and Paris for aid, while from Greece Premier Venizelos 
asked for allied assistance to enable Greece to honour her treaty obligations 
to Serbia. The French Minister in Athens, Guillemin, had already discussed the 
possibility of an allied expedition through Salonica with Venizelos, and had 
learnt that the Greek king would inevitably make a formal protest against 
the violation of his countryts neutrality, but that the Greek government 
would in fac t "allow its hand to be forced." (3) When the news of the 
Bulgarian mobilisation came through Guillemin conveyed Venizelos t urgent 
request to the Quai d'Orsay that the allies should provide 150,000 men, 
adding that Venizelos hoped that a reply would be forthcoming within twenty-
four hours and that the replies from London and Paris should be made without 
consultation between the two governments.(4) Guillemin urged acceptance of 
Venizelos t proposal, arguing that if the allies did not respond the armed 
assistance of Greece would be forfeited for the duration of the war.(5) 
Sensing that Delcasse would be hostile to any oriental expedition, 
Poincare arranged to confer with him about Guillemints deapatobes.(6) By 
7 p.m. on 22 September the Foreign Minister had still not replied to Athens. 
The President of the RepubliC, who attributed Delcassets tmertia to the fact 
that his son had been oaptured by the enemy, finally persuaded him to reply 
that if the rumours of a Bulgarian invasion proved true Venizelos' request 
would be examined sympathetically.(7) The Foreign Minister's personal view, 
(1) Undated note by Colonel Bou~t on the role or Jofrre, Fainleve MSS, 313 
AP 109. 
(2) Chamber Foreign Affairs Commission, 22/9/15, C 7488. 
(3) Gui11emin to Delcasse No. 432, 19/9/15. A. E. tGuerre t , Vol. 283. 
(4) ibid, No. 440-1, 21/9/15. ibid. 
(5) ibid, No. 442, 21/9/15, ibid. 
(6) Poinoarel OPe cit., Vol. 7, p 114. 
(7) ibid, p lIb. 
however, was that the threat to Serbia was essentially a bluff.(l) In the 
meanwhile Venizelos, who evidently viewed the situation more seriously, 
prepared to mobilise Greece's own forces.(2) In the French Cabinet on the 
same day, however, the weight of opinion was behind Poincare and not 
Delcasse, and it was decided to send a firmer message of support to the 
Greek premier. Viviani, Briand, Ribot, Millerand and Navy Minister 
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Augagneur considered that, even if Venizelos were forced to resign by the 
attitude of his monarch, France should still go to the aid of the Serbs.(;) 
So Venizelos was now informed that France for her part was ready to supply 
the troops which the Greek leader had requested.(4) The motivation behind 
the decision of the French Government was probably never fully worked out. 
Above all the situation appeared to offer the prospect of breaking the 
deadlock created between Sarrail'e acceptance of the Dardanelles command and 
Joffre's effective refusal to satisfy his rival's demands. There was no doubt 
also an unwillingness to see Serbia crushed and to allow the Central Powers 
to register a further prstigious victory, facilitating the DraSS nach osten 
with all its inherent threats to Frenoh Levantine aspirations, while a fear 
of the parliamentary consequences of inaction must also have been near the 
surface. But in all probability none of these motives ever completely 
surfaced from a welter of confusion and panic reactions. In fact the French 
ministers, and in particular Millerand(5), whose parliamentary position had 
never fully recovered from the battering it had received from 'L'affaire 
Sarrail', appear to have acted with inordinate haste. At all events it is 
important to notice that the deoision belonged to the politicians. Joffre 
merely acquiesced and thus the oampaign would be undertaken with a total lack 
of strategic planning and forethought. 
Not surprisingly, however, Venizelos was delighted with the French 
response and his enthusiasm was shared by GUillemin.(6) Tbe French Military 
Attache in Athens, General Braquet, also warmly applauded his government's 
decision. He considered the early despatch of forces to be vital and felt that 
the Dardanelles operation should be wound up as soon as possible, siace French 
(1) Delcasse to Guillemin, No. 436, 22/9/15, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 28;. 
(2) GUillemin to Delcaase, No. 451, 23/9/15, ibid. 
(3) Poincarel OPe cit., Vol. 7. p 116. 
(4) Delcasse to Guillemin, No. 44;, 23/9/15, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 283. 
(5) Paul Cambon to Jules Cambon 6/12/15, Jules Ca.bon MSS~Vol. 1. 
(6) Guillemin to Delcasse, No. 458, 24/9/15, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 28}. 
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resources were not adequate to maintain two expediions in the Near-East.(l) 
But General Bailloud, concentrating his attention on the lack of military 
foresight, sounded a cautionary note, arguing that with Bulgaria hostile the 
operation faced grave problems, especially in view of the difficult terrain of 
the Balkan peninsula. (2) Paul Cambon, on the other hand, felt that the French 
decision was somewhat premature in view of the fact that no prior agreement 
had been reached with Lord Kitchener, the English War Minister.(;) France's 
decisions had indeed been arrived at, as Venizelos had requested, without 
reference to England and it was only when the French commitment had been made 
that the ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, was told to express the hope that 
the British government would send instructions to their ambassador in Athens, 
Sir Francis Elliot, to give the sams promise to Venizelos on behalf of the 
English administration.(4) 
Fram Athens Elliot had reported that a decree for Bulgarian mobilisation 
had been signed but not published on 21 September. He noted that Venizelos 
took the situation very aeriously and warned that the Prime Minister would 
resign if the Greek king did not accept his policy. He added, however, that 
the Greek statesman was oonfident of carrying his 1I0narch with him if the 
answer of the allies to his request for troops were favourable.(5) On that 
same day Maurice Hankey had conoluded that "the idea of co_i tting the Allies 
to yet another campaign in thil!l part of the world ••• is lIost objectionable 
from a military point of view." He antioipated, moreover, that Britain 
would enoounter strong opposition from France to any such propoSal.(6) Initial 
British reactions to Venizelos t appeal were handioapped by Xitchenerts 
absence from London on military business. But Grey's personal impre8sion was 
that it was not possible for the oountry to send a military force to Greece 
immediately, alth0Ta this lIieht not be ruled out later on. (7) Meanwhile 
Sir .Arthur Nioolson 8) informed the Greek amba88ador that although Britain 
was fully aware of the gravity of the ai tuation and also of the di.fficul t 
and delicate position in whiah Venizelos was plaoed, no firm oommitment could 
(1) Braquet to Millerand 25/9/15, 1B 1337. 
(2) Bailloud to Millerand 24/9/15, A. E. 'Guerra', vol. 10;0. 
(;) Military attacne, London to Millerand 24/9/15, ibid. 
(4) Delcasse to Cambon, Bo. 3015. 23/9/15, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 283. 
(5) Elliot to Grey Bo. 854, 21/9/15, F.O. 371/2266/135856. 
(6) Bote on the position in the Balkans, drawn up at the direction of Asquith 
CAB 24/1/ 23. 
(7) Grey to Elliot, Bo. 769, 22/9/15, F.O. 311/2266/135856. 
(8) Permanent Under-Secretary at ~e Foreign Offioe. 
yet be made.(l) This hesitation was enoouraged by the faot that Lord Bertie had 
reported that no answer had yet been given to Athens by the Frenoh 
Government. (2) Pressure inside the Foreign Office to make a definite deoision 
had, however, begun to mount by the time that the Dardanelles committee 
met on 23 September. Lord Robert ceoil(3) urged the very great importanoe 
of the immediate despatch of a amall force to Salonica, and argued that 
even 1000 men would be better than nothing. (4) By the time that Grey met 
his governmental oolleagues, therefore, he had come to the conclusion that 
the allieR must make an i~diate landing at Salonica. News from Sofia had 
suggested that within fifteen days the Serbians would be crushed by the enemy 
forces. Lloyd George, reviving his old enthusiasm for a Balkan campaign 
produced wildly optimistic calculations to suggest that an intervention by 
150,000 men would result in the adhesion of 500 or 600,000 Roumanians and 
possibly also 200,000 men from Serbia and 150,000 from Greece. These 
figures totalled up to not far short of a million men, whom the Austro-
Germans would have to attack and in winter this would be a very difficult 
operation. SUrely, he concluded, it was worth sending 150,000 men to gain 
so rioh a reward. Lloyd George's oratory waa, however, not suffioient to 
oonvince all his oolleagues with the result that the Dardanelles Committee 
merely decided that Lord Kitohener should ascertain whether the Frenoh 
Government had oontemplated or worked out any details for sending troops to 
Salonica on behalf of Greece and Serbia.(5) 
Ki tobener argued tha t an Anglo-Frenoh force of up to a maximum of 
300,000 men might be reqUired and wished to know if the oalculations of the 
Frenoh military authorities agreed with his ovn.(b) A telegram was also sent 
to the British minister in Athens asking what number of troops would be 
required at salonioa to induoe Greeoe to honour her treaty obligations and 
give her full support to Serbia if Bulgaria attaoked the latter.(7) This 
telegram was important as being the first definite .. ntion of any proposal on 
the British side to land troops at Salonioa. But by the time Venizelos 
received this enquiry he was also in possession of the definite commitment 
of the ~i dtQrsay. Taken in oonjunotion witn the Frenoh offer, Venizelo8 
took Greyts message as an earnest that the whole force he bad asked for would 
(1) Nioolson to Grey 23/9/15, CAB 37/1>4/30. 
(2) Bertie to ~y 22/9/15, No. 681, F.O. 311/2266/136600. 
(3) Parliamentary under-Seoretary to the Foreign Offioe. 
(4) Minute for Sir E. Grey 23/9/15, Ceoil MSS, P.O. 800/195. 
(5) Dardanelles Comaittee, 23/9/15, CAB 42/3/28• 
(6) Military Attaohe, London to Millerand No. ll~, 23/9/15. A. E. 'Guerra', 
Vol. 980. 
(7) Grey to Elliot No. 716, 23/9/15, F.O. 311/2266/136596. 
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be sent, although he warned that at any moment his deteriorating relationship 
with King Constantine might prompt his own resignation.(l) The stately 
course of British diplomacy had thus been overtaken by the precipitate 
decision made in Paris and in the face of this fait accompli. together with 
definite news that Bulgaria had issued orders for 8 general mobilisation to 
take effect from 25 September, the 32nd meeting of the Dardanelles Committee 
unanimously agreed to inform the Greek Government that Britain was prepared to 
associate herself with the reply of the French guaranteeing the forces asked 
for to enable Greece to fulfil her pledges to Serbia. In the course of this 
meeting Kitchener read out an appreciation by the General Staff, the wording 
of which merits attention, for it delineates the bounds within which the 
British military authorities were prepared to contemplate a second Eastern 
front - bounds which, if adhered to, would unquestionably have prevented the 
relatively futile confinement of large numbers of British troops in this 
unproductive theatre of operations for the remainder of the war. It readl 
"It must be clearly understood that the role of the 150,000 allied troops 
for which Greece has asked and which will, if necessary, be sent to Salonica 
will ••• be restricted to enabling and aSSisting the Gre.k army to protect 
the Serbian flank and the line of communication with 8&10ni08."(2) 
Elliot was now instructed to make an identical declaration to Premier 
Venizelos to that already mad. by Guillemin, promising to enable Greece to 
fulfil her obligations to serbia.(3) Grey stressed, however, that the 
despatch of troops to Salonioa mast remain dependent on the consent of Greece 
which had not yet been reoeived.(4) And when no such invitation was forth-
coming Grey suspended the diversion of transport to 5810nica.(5) But the 
Foreign af!ice was warned tha t if no Bri tieh or French troops landed in Greece 
in the following few daye the unfortunate impression would soon gain ground 
that the Allies were unable to oarry out their announoed purpose.(6) Cecil 
considered that the key to the situation was the presenoe of allied troops in 
Macedonia as soon as possible. That and that alone gave a real chance of a 
favourable issue and no question of an offioial welco .. should be allowed to 
delay it. (7) Grey thus felt that he had IX) choice but to send Bome ships 
(1) Elliot to Grey, No. 868~24/9/15, '.0. 311/2267/l,s053. 
(2) C.I.D. preois of doouments prepared by M. Hankey, CAB 42/4/21. 
(3) Grey to Elliot, No. 780;24/9/15, F.O. 371/2267/1,s71. 
(4) Grey to C. des Gras, No. 465, 24/9/15, F.O. 371/2261/138172. 
(5) Grey to Elliot, No. 192, 27/9/15, '.0. 371/2267/138769. 
(6) O'Beirne to Grey, No. 633, 28/9/15, F.O. 311/2261/140452. 
(7) Minute by Lord Robert Ceoil, 30/9/15, F.O. 371/2267/141051. 
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without delay, on the understanding that they wo~ be welcome to Greece.(l) 
But at the heart of the British Government's motivation was the fact that the 
French, by their unilateral decision, had left Britain with little alternative. 
As Asquith explained to the ling "the French at once agreed to comply and 
it was impossible for us in the circumstances to hold back".(2) 
In Paris one central~rsonality - General Sarrail - had been kept 
curiously ill-informed of the development of events. On 25 September he heard 
from the Sorbonne historian, Alfonse Aulard, that the Council of Ministers had 
decided to send one of the Dardanelles divisions to Salonica, while three days 
later he learnt that the destination of the newly designated Armes dtOrient 
would be Salonica and not the coast of Asia Minor. Leon Blum, chef de 
cabinet at the Ministry of Public Works, suggested the possibility of an 
exchange of posts with Franchet d'Eaperey, who had shown an interest in the 
Near-East command, while the deputy Paul Benazet warned the general against 
getting involved in an Oriental hornet.' nest. Even Georges Clemenceau 
advised Sarrail against acceptance of the new command.(3) Millerand, having 
let Sarrail knov of the new destinatioD of his army asked him to draw up a 
note on the subject of French interveD~ion in the Balkans. Sarrail complied 
and concluded that "si l'effectif de. troupes fran9aises dirigees sur les 
Balkans ne comportait que les troi8 br1gades actuellement designees ••• cet 
envoi ne pourrait pas avoir de veritable portee militaire". As the expedition 
stood at the time it oould not be cona1dered as other than "un gesten .(4) 
Nonetheless the response of the French government was to issue official orders 
designating Sarrail as Commander-in-Chief of the French army operating in 
Serbia. His mission was in the first instanoe to cover the communications 
between Salonica and Serbia against all threats from the Bulgarian troops 
and eventually to cooperate with the Serbian army in active operations against 
the enemy foroes.(5) In an attempt to illuminate these somewhat vague 
instruotions Sarrail oalled on Delcass8 on 5 Ociober. The choice of Delcaase 
in Sarrail's attempt to obtain elucidation was perhaps not a good one. 
Viviani had already oomplained of a paDiysis of will on the part of the 
Poreign Minister (6) and at all events SArrail received no satisfaction from 
(1) Grey to Elliot, Ho. 817, 30/9/15. F.O. 371/22b7/140452. 
(2) Asquith to George V, 2/10/15, CAB 37/135/1. 
(3) Sarrail, Ope cit., pp xiv-xv. 
(4) Sarrail to Millerand 2/10/15. 16K ~275. 
(5) Order by Mi11erand 3/10/15, 7N l3}8. 
(6) Poincare. OPe cit., Vol. 7, p 130. 
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him nor from poincare(l). The general seems nevertheless to have concluded 
that he could achieve little further by waiting any longer in Paris and on 
7 october he departed for Sionica. Perhaps this new campaign would yet 
create the opportunity to establish once and for all his military reputation. 
The prospects probably appeared more inviting to him than enforced inactivity 
in France. But before Sarrail had had time to reach his destination dramatic 
developments in Greece had undermined the already shaky premises upon which the 
expedition was based. Just before the first allied landings Venizelos, 
finding his position in relation to his King untenable, reSigned. So the 
AnGlo-French force which had gone to Greece to enable her to fulfil her 
obligations to Serbia, found itself confronted by a Greek army, in the process 
of mobilisation, which would at best be neutral and which might even prove 
to be hostile, for King Constantine was suspected of sympathies with Germany. 
Paul Cambon reflected on the gravity of the Situation, "Toujours est-il 
que nous debarquons maintenant a Salonique pour porter secours aux Serbea 
qui risquent d "tre coinees entre les Austro-Allemands et les BIllgares. Noue 
voici done avec un nouveau front de bataille." He remained, however, 
unconvinced of the soundness of the allies' strategyl "C'.st done en 
Champagne et en Artois que les choses prendront tournure et que la 
repurcussion des evenements determinera le sort des Balkaniques".(2) Events 
were to show that Cambon's fears were not without foundation. 
(1) 
(2) 
Sarrail. OPe oit., p xv. 
p. cambon to H. Cambon 3/10/15, 
(ed. H. c.-bon), Vol. 3 (1946), Paul Ca.bon - Correspondance 1870 - 1924' p 83. 
40. 
CHAPrER 3 
The BeginniQgS of the campaign 
From the outset Kitchener was apprehensive that it might prove impossible 
to confine the new expedition to its original limits, fearing that the figure 
of 150,000 allied troops would soon have to be exceeded. He called therefore 
for a conference with the French to determine what instructions the first 
troops should receive on landing, together with the ultimate role of the a~1 
once it had been constituted at Salonica.(l) Robert Ceoil felt that, although 
Britain was bound to offer assistance to Serbia and Greece, if this 
assistance was rejected it was by no means clear that she could not use the 
troops destined for Salonica to better effect elsewhere.(2) By 4 October the 
British Government was ready to give the problem more detailed attention than 
it had yet received and Kitchener announced to the Dardanelles Committee that 
there would be a conference at Calais the following day to settle the forces 
that should be sent and the rele they were to carry out. He thought that 
the matter was rather oonfused and believed that it was possible that neither 
Joffre nor the Frenoh General Staff knew about the promise which had been 
made to send 150,000 BIen to 5&lonica by the Allied govermaents. Asquith 
hoped that the French would put their cards on the table at this lDeeting, but 
8 cautionary note was again sounded on behalf of the General Staff by Sir 
Edward Carson. (3) He read out the follOWing extract from a paper dated 
2 Octoberz "The balance of advantage is against the employment of any Allied 
troops in the Balkan theatre which could possibly be thrown into the soale in 
France, unless it can be shown that the defeat of the Serbians would more than 
counterbalance success by the allies in the main theatre and that such deteat 
cannot be delayed without the employment of Allied forces in the Balkans. tt 
This Carson rightly considered to be ~ very important expreSSion of opinion" 
and one which should be "borne in mind in coming to a decision upon the 
sUbject. n (4) It Blight profitably be argued, however, that this sort of 
consideration .hould have been carefully examined before British troops were 
actually committed to the Balkan theatre. 
(1) Attache Militaire, London to Mi1lerand, No. 129,1/10/15. A. E. 'Guerra'. 
Vol. 1030. 
(2) M1nute for Lord Crewe 2/10/15, 7.0. 371/2270/142529. 
(3) 'l!wt Attorne1 General 1n the .A8qui'th GoTerrment, he reSigned when be 
oonsidered that the British delay in •• nding torces would lead to the 
destruction or Serbia. 
(4) Dardanellea Committee 4/10/15, CAB 42/4/2• 
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At the Calais conference it became evident for the first time that 
a serious divergence existed between the two governments in relation to their 
new enterprise. As the First Lord of the Admiralty, Arthur Balfour, pointed 
out to the Dardanelles Committee the following day, the French approached the 
Balkan problem from the Serbian point of view and had actually ordered troops 
to proceed up to Nisch. The British, on the other hand, had made it clear 
that their troops were intended to assist the Greeks to fulfil their obligationl 
to Serbia. Kitchener, in a criticism which could equally well have bean applie( 
to himself and his colleagues, argued that the French attitude was rather 
unsatisfactory as they had not thought out the consequences of the steps they 
had taken. Thus at Calais it had emerged that the French had already given 
orders to General Bailloud to proceed with his divisions into Serbia, while 
Kitchener had been obliged to point out that it was not the British intention 
to send troops from the neighbourhood of Salonica for Serbia until it vas 
definitely ascertained that the Greeks vere taking an active part in 
operations and that the line of communications would be secured.(l) 
Fleeing from its own indecision the Dardanelles Committee dropped the 
entire question in the lap of the War Office and Admiralty staffs on 
6 October. Reporting three days later the combined staffs concluded that the 
risks involved in detaching 150,000 men to Serbia were too great to justify 
action being taken on the .lerader hope of 'beirag able thereb)" to preftllt 
lRUlit1oll8 od other rein£oro"'l1ta fro. reaching the 'l'al:D. ~1 reported, 
.oreover, that of all the T&rioua po •• ible operationa a ren.ved ottenaive at 
Gallipoli vas that which seemed most likely to prove advantageous in the 
Mediterranean theatre of war.(2) The resignation of Venizelos, news of which 
reached London on 6 October, proved a fUrther complicatioD for the British 
Government. Elliot vas instructed to explain to Xing CODstantine that 
Bri tish troops had been sent to salonica on the understanding that Greece 
intended to support Serbia against Bulgaria and that the cooperation of 
British and Frenab troops would be weloome to and was desired by Greece to 
enable her to support Serbia. As it appeared possible that Venizelos might be 
succeeded by a government that would adopt a policy of neutralitJ, Grey felt 
it impossible to send more troops to 5&lonioa until tbe situation had been 
oleared up.(~) 
(1) Dardanelles Committee 6/10/15, CAB 42/4/3. 
(2) General Staff Paper 9/10/15, W.o. 32/5593. 
(3) Grey to Elliot No. 852, 6/10/15' Grey to Bertie No. 2257, 0/10/15, 
F.O. 371/2270/145526. 
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Prime Minister Viviani viewed the situation rather differently and, 
having lost faith in the capaoity of his ailing Foreign Minister, arrived 
in England to conduct negotiations with Asquith and the English Government 
in person.(l) Viviani forcefully argued that the unopposed entry of the 
Bulgarian and German armies into Serbia would have dire consequences for allied 
prestige in the Near-East and the entire Islamic World. He staunchly denied 
that the offer of military assistance had been made solely in relation to 
Greece's treaty commitments to Serbia. contrary to British calculations the 
resignation of Venizelos entailed not the abandonment of the operation but the 
necessity to recognise that the force of 150,000 originally envisaged would 
no longer be sufficient. But Viviani made it plain that the imperative 
necessity for France of defending her own soil meant that she could make only 
a small contribution to any additional reinforcements which the allies might 
judge nece8sary.(2) As was to become usual in the conduct of the oampaign, 
however, France's political and military leadership were not in accord and on 
the following day at Chantilly, Joffre maintained. although Kitchener 
remained unconvinced, that much could still be done with the basic force of 
150,000 men. This would substantially assist the hard pressed Serbian army.(3) 
Matters came to a head when on 11 October Sir Arthur Nicolson received a 
telegram from M. Zaimis, the new Greek Prime Minister, to the effect that in 
the latter's opinion the casus foederis in relation to the Graeco-Serbian 
treaty had not arisen in the present situation. Moreover the atU tude of the 
Greek government in the current European conflict would be no more than one 
of benevolent neutrality towards the Allied powera.(4) Thus the whole 
justification for British intervention in the Balkans - to assist the Greeks 
to fulfil a specific treaty obligation - had been undermined at a stroke, 
and the logio of the situation was that Britain must DOW either withdraw 
competely or conform to suoh more extended plans of operatiOns as seemed 
to be envisaged by the Frenoh. A statement of these French plans had been sent 
by Joffre to Xi tohener two days earlier. in which it was argued that the 
mission of the troops should be to oover and hold the railway line between 
Salonica and Uskub in order to seoure oommunioation. wi'th the serbian army 
and the supplies of that army, and to oover the right of the Serbian Army, 
preventing any attempt of the enemy on Central serbia. Joffre stressed that if 1 
(1) Note by Guil1aUlD8, archives of the Belgian Ministrr of Poreign Affairs. 
Politioal Correspond~nce. Prenoh Legation, July - December 1915. 
(2) Viviani to De1oBs88 No. 2}09-l0, 7/10/15, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 10}O. 
(3) Prooes-verbal. w.o. 159/1/29B 
(4) Nicolson to Grey, 11/10/15. CAB 37/135/20. 
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in the future, a new distribution of Greek and Roumanian forces led the 
allies to increase the amount of their effort in the Balkans, France, having 
a limited number of men at her disposal, could not take part in such an effort, 
the responsibility for which would fall entirely on the British Government.(l) 
The divergence which was beginning to emerge between the conceptions 
of the two governments was further revealed when Viviani attempted to gain 
British approval for a statement of explanation which he intended to make 
to the Chamber of Deputies on 12 October. The British did not like any 
mention of "assistance to Serbia" which left out the original Greek invitation, 
since they believed that without Greek cooperation Serbia would need the help 
of a really large allied force which would be most unlikely to arrive in time. 
Thus the declaration, as Viviani proposed to make it, seemed like an open-
ended commitment by England and France rather than the clearly defined 
involvement which the British government was prepared to accept.(2) From a 
military and diplomatic point of view Grey had been "delighted" at the 
decision to open a Balkan front. But he reflected that the sending of a large 
force into the Balkans had been examined several months before and expert 
opinion had been no more in favour of it as a military operation then than it 
was now. Moreover, Grey did not feel "comfortable" when expert military 
opinion was disregarded.(3) In an attempt to clarify the situation Paul 
Cambon visited Grey on the morning of 14 October and expressed great anxiety 
that the British were not going to fulfil the engagements which he said had 
been entered into to send troops to Salonice in accordance with the understanding 
arrived at when Viviani was in London. Cambon asked whether it was true that 
Britain was not sending any more troops than those already at Salonica, 
whereas the promise had been made to send with France a total of 150,000 men. 
Grey pointed out that the promise to Venizeloa had been conditional on Greece 
carrying out her treaty engagements. If Greece liould not do so then Grey 
held that the allies were under no obligation to send tbte particular force. 
At the meeting with Viviani, he recalled, he had made it clear that it was not 
safe to send a foroe into the Balkans without being assured of a base at 
Salonica, of which the allies could only be certain if Greece cooperated. 
Grey stressed that preparations were going ahead for sending the troops that 
had been agreed upon, but these would not be available tmaediately, and the 
place of disembarkation and the use to be made of them .uat be decided according 
to circumstancea.(4) 
(1) SUmmary of Joffre'. note of 9/10/15, CAB 42/4/6• 
(2) Viviani to Cambon No. 3307, 11/10/15, A. E. 'Guerre' Vol. 10}O, Note by 
Sir E. Grey, CAB 37/136/3. 
(3) Memor8dua by Sir E. Grey, 13/10/15, CAB 37/13b/ 6 • 
(4) E. Grey: Ope cit., Vol. 2, p 222a Grey to Bertie 10. 815 14/10/15, F.O~ 371/2270/ 151538 a Cambon to Viviani 14/10/ 15, No. 23f7. A. E. Guerra', 
V~la lO~ 
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Grey pushed home his point when he reminded Lord Bertie, for communication 
to the French Government, that the British plAns could not be carried out unless 
General Joffre was prepared to facilitate the release of the troops from 
(1) France, since England had no other source of supply. But Joffre was most 
unhappy about what he saw as an entirely new point of view, when asked by 
Sir John French, Commander-in-Ghief of the British Army in France, t~ relieve 
two English divisions which were to be transferred to the East. Joffre argued 
that Sir John's reserves were far better placed than his own to sustain such 
displacements and at the same time warned Mi11erand that the British 
government should be urged to expedite its despatch of forces to Salonica unless 
France wished to find herself alone in supporting the whole weight of the 
expedi tion. (2) 
The English C~?inet remained deeply divided with one section, including 
Lloyd George, wishing to send troops to Salonica, while another, including 
Kitchener, wanted to make another big effort at the Dardanelles. (3) With the 
aim of forcing the British Government to come to a decision Millerand arrived 
in England on 15 October. (4) He and his colleagues were concerned that, 
according to the reports arriving from General Sarrail, the British troops 
were showing every intention of remaining at Salonica during the winter rather 
than preSSing north in support of the Serbs. (5) The military situation was 
deteriorating daily as the plight of Serbia beCaJle ever more desperate. As 
the Serbian Legation in London warned, the force of the Serbian artIlY WIllS not 
sufficient to bear any longer without help the enormous pressure exerted bY' the 
combined Geman, Austrian and Bulgarian armies. (6) Millerancl DOW bluatly 
asserted that if the English did not send troops to Salonica the French 
GoverDllent would resign and the Entente would be endanpreel. Gener.tU. CallweU 
felt that the French must be in abject terror of Sarrail BAd of public 
opinion, which fondlY' imagined that saving the Serbs was a,/perfectly simple 
operation. In fact Callwell thought the task of the exPftditiOll was an 
imposaible one. The French plans did not appear to have "fen properly thought 
, .-¥. 
out by the General Staff and he could not lmderatand how they proposed to 
(1) Grey to Bertie, No. 2349, 15/10/15. F.O. 371/2ZlO/152C'A7. 
(2) Joffre to Mill.rand, No. 8324, 15/10/15, A. B. 'GQerre', Vol. 1031. 
(3) Robert Blake: The Priftte Papers of Do.las H&:ig, "( 1952). p 108. 
(4) Paul Cuban: Correspondence, Vol. 3, p 86. 
(5) Viviani to Cubon, 10. 340', 17/10/15. A. "J:. 'Ouerre', Vol. 1031. 
(6) Note fro. the Serbian Legation 16/10/15, CAB·· YI/1-,6/17. 
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manage for transport. (1) Callwell told General Robertson, who was anxiously 
viewing the situation from France, that the British General Staff was totally 
opposed to operations in IvJa.cedonia which were "objectionable from every point 
of View.,,(2) Robertson took heart from this statement and urged that Britain 
should: beware of having her hands forced ~ l1illera.nd or an;( other French 
politician. He considered that strained relations with the French would be 
far preferable to losing two or three divisions in the Ba.l kana and. perhaps even 
losing the war. (3) 
In conversation with MU1erand, Sir Biward Grey raaaaerted that the despatch 
of English ~ontingents to Balanica was dependent on Greece's participation in 
the war. ltlil1erand protested at this s ta tament and leullt tba t he could count 
on the support of IJ.oyd George whose opinions were the same as those of the 
French government. (~.> Viviani w1l1ingly prolonged HLllerand~a stay in IlCIIIdon 
in the hope that agreement misht be reached, (5) aDd the lrfu HLn1ster!s 
persisi;ance was indeed rewarded whan a joint declaration was approved to the 
effect that the two aovernmenta were agreed to oemti,nue to seDd the 150,000 
men, while reserving the ri8ht to re-examine the situation 1£ circUllletalloeB 
WEtZ'e to d8lllDd it. (6) Nonetheless the Fr..u,ch GovC"lD8llt oont1nued 'to receive 
intormation that the AasJ,:f.ah faroes upon arrival refWled to move em fr~ tbe 
town. (7) Vi v1Am:I. -.mad _t 1;he CQD8eClucces of a cl1sagra.ent between the 
two oountrieB would·}aaye ... iowa :1n~ :NperOUSi0D8, which could be 
explo1 ted b,y the..,-. He s1iress4lCl 1Iberetare 1ibe &Ui t&'r7 rmd t:I.IJla.1d.o 
ad:, .. Ultages of the oampa:l.an aIld oonolud.ec1 fibat -1& partie .. t ~ ••• 80\18 
BCla88 sur 1e terra:1n olnoua SC1111188 at DQUS 118 poI.lVoaa l!aMadamerr". (8) 
Fr~ reports in his possesSion the Jlranoh .pr.ner feared. tDat the att1tu4. 
of the ~:1sh r1sked pa.raJ.pillg the action of the JlrIllOh .tatooea DQW ":nDOiDg 
to 1;he a:1d of the Scob1ans, (9) wt as Paul C8abon tiric to tIqllId.D 1ihe 
d1£fioult7 vaa 'to OOIlriAoe honest lIu.t timorous ap:lr11ia 1D the ~sh PC'DMIl't, 
faa.rful. of a disuter in 1he JICNZl'taill warfare 1IIpOaed ... ·tIM BaJJam laad.a084»8, 
(1) C&llvell to Robertson 20/10/15, Robartsan H:J8, 1/8/26. ~ 
(2) ibid 22/10/15, ibid 1/8/28. 
,,> Robertson 'to C&llvel1 2'/10/15, ibid 1/8/29. 
(4) oaaban to TiT1aDi 18/10/15, Bo. 2421, .l. B. !Gu.arre!. Yol. 10~1. 
(5) ViviaD:l. to Cambon 19/10/15, 10. 3428-9, ib1cl. 
(6) caboD to Viviani 19/10/15, Ho. 2430-1, ibid. 
(7) Vivialli to oambon 110. 3447, 20/10/15, .l. B •. !~.! Vol. 1031. 
(8) ibid Ho. 3462, 21/10/15, lldA.. 
(9) ibid No. '468-9, 22/10/15, ibid. 
that everything should be sacrificed in the cause ot proapt action. (1) Grey 
tel t that Sarrail was acting very rashly in advancing northwards with so 
B1IIl11 a torce and cOllsidered that he should retreat. (2) But tro. Paris Lord 
Bertie warned that Frellch public opinion llight euily be eD8perated it the 
English shoved any .i8Ds ot baolting out ot the 8&lonica expedition. Jotfre 
bad expressed the view that it was necessary both trora aili tary and political 
points ot view to continue operatiol1s baaed on Salonioa and indeed to send 
additional troops, (,) while within the Foreign Oltice itaelt Sir J.rt1rar 
Bicolson warned that .our relatiol1s with France will be .eriously t.paired 




The .tt.ot which all this pressure was hariag OD the Britiah sonraMnt 
".. revealed when the Dariuellea Co..t ttee _t on 25 October to ooll8ider the 
BalJran situation, at a _tiDg which was cruoial in exp08iDg the essential i 
l 
1IIpotenoe ot tbe Brio tish posi tiOD. '!he nature of the deciaiou zeacbed ~re and.~ 
~ 
.are }Mlrtioul.arlJ, that of 'the argaents used to support tbeII go a long way I 
towards explaining 'that supine inerti. ill Bri taint a Balkan policy aDd her 
tatai willingneas to acquiesoe in ~ w~ of French diploaacJ in ~s 
'theatre, vJ:&ich was to characterise the whole of 1916. .1t the .. tiag 
n tchener said that 1be 7rench II1li iarT .1t_oJ» had b1"01llht h1II a .'b.'oD«ly 
worded no ... .akiug • requeat that Britiah tzooPl abould not ... ent to 
.llu:andria, as lt1tobener riahecl, 'b1at atra1cht to salonioa, .iace OJ .elaJ 
would pemit of the cle.tmotion of tM Serbian amJ. In OtaMDU"'. opinion 
tbe te:t'118 ill wh1ch the .ote va. owuoMcl augp.W that iibea ".. a political 
IIOtift lIIhind it and that it vas not baaecl entirely on tba requirHenu of 
atrates7. 'b que.tion which aroae in hia aiDd, tbazetore, va vbether • 
retual on tbe J:rl tiab part to oc.pl.J with the Prench d~. would plaoe the 
:mnch Gonraaent in UJ political dittioul V. Bclvard GnJ doabW vbether 
Jotb:e thOl1lbt tile expedition .trat&gioallJ .cnmd. 01""" oblipd to baot it 
tor otbar reuou, poa.iblJ tor tear that 0'b1'ViH JII,ll.ena4 wClllld tall aDd 
the cm. w1ta1re proteotiq Joffre tr .. ontiat. VCNl. De znancl. (5) 
To thi. 0"_.1' adcled that, it lIillerand rea1pecl, QeDe:ra1 Joffre would DOt 
be able to .atain hi. poaitioll and that would entail. oouidenb1e ~ 
in the po1i07 of J'ruoe. JI1a acJT10e vu, tMnton. tba't Bn taill abould .ll 
(1) caboD to Yi'riani .0. 246.4, 2'/10/15, ibid. 
(2) GnJ to Blrtl •• 0. 2'74, 22/10/15, 1'.0. '71/2270/156221. 
(,) Jeri1. to On, .0. 7,a + 7'4,2'/10/15, 1'.0. n1/mo/156fj28-9. 
(4) .ioo1801l to GnJ 24/10/15, 1'.0. '571/2270/157640• 













the French that abe intended to take the oorrect course, but that if' this 
involved any danger or upsetting the French goveraent, ebe vould send the 
troops aaked for to Salonica. Sir John French, bastil;r su.oned froa his 
Headquarters in Franoe, then expounded upon the interaal French peli tical 
situation in a va., vhich reve_d that the British au1ihorities vere tull., 
aoquainted with the intrioaoies of 'l'atfaire Sar.rail,.(l) !be picture drawn 
vas of a ver., delicate struoture, whieh aD1 fal.e 110ft ~1' JraDce's all., aiBht 
serve to upset. '!his expos. provoked ibe .oat pertiJaent of q1J8.tiona froll 
Aus"n Cbaaberlain, the Seoretary for India. If the SalODica expedition vaa 
a tutile IlilitarJ operation, he ubd, vas it wortbllhile oonductiDg it in 
order to eave II. JI;111erand, General Joffre and the Preuch GoveraMnt? 
n tohener, who ebould preelJllll.~l., haTe presenteel the aUi tarT po1ut of new, 
8D8Vered with ponde~u au'tihoriv that 1101"8 ihan thie vas at stab - it vas to 
save the alliaDoe i teeU, if ~land were to break vi tb JlraUoe the war vtIDld 
be over anel Britain elefeawd. (2 
'l!le illplicatioDe ot thie .e'U.DC vere eDonlO_, tor al tboqh it coald 
1lO~ been a:p,preoiated at the tiM, the Bri tieh Qove~nt ".. dtectivel., 
abdicating ita riBbt to haft aUf acre thaD 'the IIOIIt DOainal of YOicee in the 
direotion of allied etrategr iD the Baltans. !be prinoiple bad been eetabliabed 
that the _1ntenanoe ot the enet1q ftftoh ~ lIhoald han priori:\7 OYer 
all other lIilitar, and dipla.atio oauideratiou in tie theatre of the war. 
It MaDt tbat Prance orud juatity all ta1iua aha .... e and "')Uicatiou in 
her poliOJ' in thie area, and eeoare the adherellos of the Bri.tillh to tbaa, OIl 
the ground. of the etabiliv of her ova da..t1o polit1oal .1wat1OD. III 
adoptiag thie prinoiple Britain vu 11ke11' to e .. lop her b:Md~ of .aaoeu,ri 
in the Balta_ tor the tOrieeeable tatare ill a paralJ1li. 0000011 of ..... ion 
to tbe vill of her al11' - aDd tlds 11 ~aiee11' vbat ... Ded at leut UIltil 
the tall of the Briand goTerllll8llt ill tbe .priDC ot 1917. m. atWilpta to 
reasart a degree of illdepeadeaoe and .Oftftip _tbori V ill Bri't1ah ,oliOJ' 
towards tJIe SalOllica nterpri..e Vere do..a to _ ....-a tR feu ot the 
diaraptiDB etteot tbe7 1Ii8ht haft OIl the other eide of tbe Chan_I. (,) 
(1) COIIp&re Sir rnaeriot -.noe'. ft .. -ope oit., p 51 - that tbe Britiah 
conr-at ... 11II&VU'e ot the poUti.oal _t1ft~ bebiDd ftenoh 
diplOMOJ. 
(2) ])a1'daaelle. Ca..itte., 2,/10/15, CAl 42/4/17. 
(,) See _low. abaptere 5 aad 7. 
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The Dardanelles Committee deoided in the end not to make any firm decisions 
until General MUrray, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and General callwell 
had visited Chantilly to put the English point of view to Joffre. (l) But 
Joffre immediately let lUllerand DOli that he f.l t that these two officers 
would lack the necessary authority to conclude a definitive agreement. Joffre 
considered that the English hesitations in the present situation represented 
-Un abandon en pleine bataillen .(2) With the Prench oaa.ander in this frame 
of mind it was no surprise when the military oonference held on 21 October 
failed to resolve the impasse. At the suggestion of the President of the 
RePUblio,(3) therefore, Joffre deoided to come to London in person to exeroise 
his powers of persua.ion. Grey expres.ed his delight at the news of Joffre's 
Tisi t. '!hough he wa. aware the t there was a poli tioal side to the qu8s tion, 
he aaid that he regarded it a. one to be settled on ailitarr grounds alone. 
He was therefore enoouraged to hear fro. Paul C_bon that Joffre would be 
discussing the questioD fro. a purely .ilitar,r point of Yiew.(4) Tbe Poreign 
S8ore"tarJ"s expeotatioDB would, howeTer. be radely di.appointed. '!be views 
which Joffre expres.ed at 10 DowDing street cue as a nrprise to British 
ainisters who had suspeoted that hia entimaia .. for the SalOllioa expedition vas 
at the 1I08t luUv8l.'ll. He il18ia.d on the iIIportanoe or doiog everything 
possible to save the Serbian &rill' and "lined that, if the eD8IIJ were checked, 
Greeoe oould still be br0118ht in on tile aide or b Allie.. )lore iIIportantly, 
howeTer, frOID oertain raarU let fall by Joftre after the .. tiag it appeared 
'that hi. own retention of tile poIIt of Ca.&nder-in-chiet or the J'rench a1'IIf 
and ..... n the p8manenoe of the allianoe itseU -1&ht depend OIl the reply ot 
the British sovernaent.(5) ntobener'. accowat of the episode vas that Joffre 
pointed a piatol at the cabinet and aaid, "U you back out or Salonioa it is 
the end of the ED.ate", and be thuaped tbe table ad tile cabinet saft vq. (6) 
Joffre YU aware 'that Sarrail'. political tnead. were 1I1"liag OD the aa1IJlaisn 
in Saloniaa vi til 'AM_aoe and pining fresh npporten aD4 be eTiden t1y tel t 
'that h1a ~i tiOD w01lld be oo..,ro.iaed unl ••• be Pft the oapa1p hU npport 
ad .ecured Briti.h partioipation ill it.(7) 
(1) Cabon to ViYiani 10. 2491, 26/10/15, A. B. 'Qaerze', Tol. 10}2. 
(2) Joftre to JIllleraDd 10. 42~, 21/10/15, 16. 1619. 
(') XUlerand to Tin.lli 28/10/15. A. I. lQaem'. Tol. 10,2. 
(4) ~ to Lord Qnrfi11. 28/10/15, Ho. 850, P.O. 371/2'Z10/16CIJ6,. 
(5) Bote ltJ X. Bukey, CO 42/4/10, j,ppenclix C • .,. Jlnrice. OPe cit., p 54. 
(6) Bartie. meR (e.v, for 9/11/15), Tol. 1, p 262. 
(1) On Joffre'. ohaIlc1DC attitude ~o the oapdp ... P. s. Olinr to 
A. Cbaberlaill 14/12/15, Cbaaberl.in ISS A.C. 14/6/ 61. 
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Given the oonsiderations which were now shaping British policy it was 
not surprising that a memorandum by Joffre on the role of the Allied armies 
at 8810nioa was soon aooepted by the .A8qui th Government. The assertion by 
Sir Archibald ~y at the Dardanelles Ca.mittee on }O October that the 
opinion of the General Staff and of the principal offioers of the Bri Usb 
Expeditionarr pOroe in Franoe was unanimously opposed to the Serbian enter-
prise as a milita~ operation was unoereaoniou8ly ignored.(l) Joffre's 
dooument oonoeded that the original 81a8ion of the Salonica foroe oould no 
longer be aohi~ed, but it argued that the polaibility existed ot re-8stablish-
ing o01lllllUl1ioationa with the Serbian ~. (2) C_bon reported that the 
English ministers had been deeply impresled by the preoiaion and olarity of 
Joffre's explanatioraa and by the _asured authority of his words, (~) but all 
the available eTidenoe woll! 8Ugplt that the French oOlaUder _rely blackllailed 
his alliee into agree .. nt. Few if al11 ministers were prepared to risk a 
quarrel with the French goV8rmlent whioh had olearly deeply o~ tted itself 
in the utter. .1oting perhape on the prinoiple ibat war is too serious a 
.. tter to be left to soldiera, the Dardanelles Ca.atttea deoided to reoomaend 
8upport for the J'renoh &rIIJ in it. task of ensuring o~ioa tiona vi th the 
Serbs. (4) It is traa that ntohener'8 reply to Joffre did appear to baTe a 
sting in its tail. "In Tiew of the French 8ta1'f • tatement dated 29 October 
1915, inoluding definite oaloulatioll8 of the capacity of the port of 
Salonica and of the oarr}'ing pr of the railw&JI into Sar'bia ••• and in Tiew 
of the striotly Ulli ted role that the Jlranoh General statt aad General Joffre 
desire British troops to fultil, Tis, to ensure the position ot Salonioa to 
lCriTOlak inoluaive, in order to support the J'ranoh &rIIJ ••• and vi th the f'all. 
understanding that if oa.lUllioation with the Serbian Aml' oallDOt be opened 
and ain'tained, the whole .Allied foroe. will be withdrawn to be used u 
oirolmatancas M7 require, the Briti8h GoverDMnt are pN,arad to cooperate 
enerptical.l7 in the _ner propoaed by the )lreach ~nt •• (5) But in 
the 118bt of the oOllFOIIised poai tiOD in which Bri tiah diplaMOJ had bHn 
plaoed by ita too williDB .ubs.rTienoa to the intricaoie. of )Tenoh politic., 
the venOll of Bri ti8h r.8iawce in all7 particular cri8is va not liblJ to be 
(1) CO 42/4/20. 
(2) IIIIIOrad_ by Joffre 29/10/15, CO ~7/1~7/"9. 
(~) C-boD to ftriaa1 10. 2524, 30/10/15, .1. 8. 'Guaxn', Tol. 10~2. 
(4) K. S-nkaJ. OPe o1t., Tol. 1, p 454. 
(5) D.tcm.ner to Joffre ,a/1o/1s, CJ.J Y1/l~7/'9. 
as strong as these words might suggest. The deoision to withdraw from 
Salonioa would inevitably have to be a French one. General Robertaon, aoon 
to baDme Chief of the Imperial General Staff and who had been present when 
Joffre issued his scarcely veiled threats to the British government, Bounded 
a cautionary note. Be warned that 'the situation in the Balkans Ilight soon 
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be quite dU"terent tram what it was then and that 1IOr8 troops would almost 
certainly be ne.dad besides those already agreed upon. Ever,r possible 
develop!l8nt should therefore ba worked out by the joint statfs in oonsul tation, 
otherwise there would be a Mre~tition of the jumble, oross purposes and 
friotion of the past month".(l But despite the prophetio nature of'Robertson's 
o01lllDents, his warnings were ignored. British diplOMC)" was in fact in disarra)" 
and Bertie heard that the confusion at the JOreign Office vas "indescribable". 
Grey, in particular, was ver,r tired and disgusted at the failure of his 
Balkan policy.(2) 
Beneath the .curry of diplOll&tic activity the salonica capaisD had at 
least got underwa,. Despite uncertainties about the landing, the :frenoh apnts 
on the 8pot .ecured that ~is pa.8ed off without inoident and vi~ no opposition 
from the Greek authoritie8. (3) Reoeiving at the begiDlliq of october 
K1tchenar'8 esttaate that it aisht be neoe,s&rJ to o~t up to 400,000 .. n 
to the Balkan peninsula" the Grand QuartiU' General drew up a seoret report 
which rejeoted this 8uppoaition as aoat unlikel" Indeed.., suppl.e.n'tarJ 
effort over and above ]'ranoe' s ini tial c~i taent of around 60,000 _n would 
haTe to be provided by the 1Rg1ilh. Cbantilly oonoluded ~t !rance and Poland 
reUined the only theatres of operatioDII where the allies OO1Ild expeot to bring 
the war to a suooessfUl oonolusion. (4) Joffre seised upon this state.nt of 
opinion to reaind Millerand that allJ reaoval. of troope froll the V .. tern Pront 
to Salonioa 1Rl8t be kept to a striot ainilNa. _either 1ibe taot 'Uaat the 8nell1 
was iBtaUed on J'renoh terri tor,r only eiBhtr kilOMtres t1'Oll Paris nor the 
state of 7rench resourceS in _n and llUDitiona pemitted h'eDce to oonstitute 
a large expeditioDU7 to:roe for Salonioa'<5) Prellch offioials out in Q;reeoe 
inevi tably Tiew_ the proDl_ in a differellt liPt aDd Qaillemll urged that 
the rapid ".patch ot 150,000 un would have an excellent etteot on Greek 
(1) v. Robert8onl OPe oit., Tol. 1, p 194. 
(2) Record of ooDftraatioli with LaIIIIdOVlle, canOD and LlOJd George, 28/10/15, 
Bertie ISS, ~.O. 800/172/~/15/l5. 
(3) lnquet to 1I1l1erand ,/10/15. .,. 134l. 
(4) .,te .,. the )1!t Jareau OIl n tohellerts telecra Wo. 129, 3/10/15, 5W 1,2. 
(5) Joffre to tillerand ,/10/15, 16. 1678. 
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public opinion. Only this could bring Greece into the war and avoid a 
disaster for serbia.(l) General Braquet, on a .1ssion to Salonica from his 
base at Athens, felt that at least a division should be left at the Greek 
port with the idea of making it into a militar,r base for the future.(2) 
But on 12 October Generals Bailloud and Sarrail were authorised to cross the 
Serbian frontier although they were to be careful to aintein cOlllllW1ications 
with Selonica.(}) SUbsequent instructions left Sarrail with considerable 
liberty of action.(4) 
On 11 Ootober Bulgarian troops finally clashed vi th Serbian units and two 
days later eaob aide declared war on the other. On 13 Ootober the Bulgarians 
also met with J'renob forces and b,. tbe 17th both Paris and London bad 
declared war on Bulgaria. Greece and Roumania, however, steadfastly :ref'wled 
to exchange their position of neutrality tor the dangers iDYolved in active 
participa tion. The British General staff, boveTer, asked b,. the Dardanelles 
C~ittee on 11 Ootober to exaaine the question, concluded that only the entry 
of Greece and Rou.ania "would ~U8tify consideration or the e.p1oJMnt ot an 
allied forae in the Balltau". (5) Yet within a utter of' d&J8 the War Office 
heard that the Greek General Statf were of the opinion that tor Greece to send 
help to Serbia would be to inY1te diauter and destruction. 'l!1e Greek staft 
alsc considered "that whateftr D1IIIber of' allied Voop8 were aut in the,. would 
not arrive soon enough to .an Serbia and that theretore the,. could be IIOre 
uafull,. e1lplored in .laia Kinor or )'ranoe. (6) Bot aurpriaiagl,.. theretore, 
it vu vi ttl oonaiderable relllotance that the Bri tiah Goftr.ent final1r 
authorised it. torce. to cros. the frontier into Serbia. (7) Braquet nmiaed 
"that the attitude of the BDgliall 'Roope vu probablr deta1'llillad bJ their wiah 
to &TOid aemag under the orders of a J'nnch seneml.. br deaired, be 
~t, to operate quite independent!,ot tbe JTenCb ~.(8) 
~a. Buchareat the ~nch ltL1itarr .&:tta0b8, Ct: Mut Pichon. urpd the 
neces.ity ot hia cOllntrr'a inTol.,..Mnt in the Baltana it the allie. hoped to 
(1) QQillnin to Delou.' 10. 551. 10/10/15, .,. 1~38. 
(2) Braquat to Itlllerana 1'0. 59. 9/10/15. A. S. 'QQerft·. Tol. 10}O. 
(~) XUlerand to :mnch Couu1a_. Sa10n108 1'/10/15. iltid. 
(4) II. Sarrail. OPe 01 t •• p 42. 
(5) State.at of the "ri ... of the QeIl8raJ. statt ill reprd to a poe.ible 
de.,..lo,..nt in the Jalkan .itaa~ion 1,/10/15. v.o. 15'/4. 
(6) Cc sader. "ditarranean BEpeditioDArJ J'oroa to n~_r 21/10/15. V.O. 
106/l~,6. 
(7) r. De, .... L .... dtOrieg, daM 18 _ "We (19~2). p 6,. 
(8) Braquet to lIU1erand and GuiU .. ia 15/10/15 • .,.. 1341. 
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deprive Germany of access to the vast resources of the Eastern world.(l) 
The radical deputy for the Pas de Calais, Abral!'li, who was a ttaohed to Sarrail's 
Headquarters staff in the Armee d'Orient,wrote to Poincare and several members 
of the government to urge that an iDIIDediate and vigorous effort should be 
made against the Bulgarians. If 8uch action were not taken Ge:naanT would be 
left dominant in the Balkans. Only the despatch of a large arlIT could 8a ... e the 
situation whioh was beco.iug oritioal.(2) Joffre ht.aelf thought that evacuation 
would be the proof of impotence and that the deoision to 8uspend landings at 
Selonica sight expose JTenoh troops alreadT there to the threat of a disaster 
in the e ... ent that Greece went over to the ene1lJ cup. (3) Bat with one eTe 
always firal.y fixed on the weatern front and in the knowledge alao tbat the 
new oamp.tgn was being directed by hia aTowed ene." sarrail. Joffre w.s not 
likely to Tin the extenaion of Pranoe'8 exi.ting ca..itaent in the Balkans 
wi th any great en'thu8i.... Hi. liaiaoll ottioer with the Jlinistr)" of War 
felt that Sarrail'. forces were a. dust oa.pared with ~ araie. which 
opposed hilt, eapeoiallr •• he oould no loager oOUllt 011 the ... iatanoe of the 
G:reek troops, on the baai. of which the expedi tioa bad origiul.lr been 
undertaken. (4) Bat Joffre hi .. elf 'infomed Killerand that it wu iIIpoa.ible 
for hill to .el1d • further inf.l1tr)" divi.ion to SalOlliaa over and .boTe the 
tvo which he had unadr twn troll his on torce. in J'raDoe. (5) m •• ttitude 
could not, hoveftr, be a. extre_ u tba t of the British Geaeral Statf which. 
illpatient .t the l.ok of re.olutiol1 .bon bJ tbe 001Ultr,'. political l .. dera. 
baldlr oonoluded that ther were -enttrel, opposed to the under~ng of a 
oaapatgn baaed on Salonioa- .nd that the dinraioa of Uoo~ troll the "..tern 
the.ta ot war to thia regiOil VU lUljustified f1"Oll 'the .trategical point ot 
Ti." and endanpred the .11ied pro.peot. ot victor, in ibe war u a whole. ( 6) 
Added foroe wu ginn to thi. ars-&nt when the Bri't1ah oo.aMer at 
Saloniaa. General Sir Bri.n !Iaho11. reported at the ftZ'J end of October that 
no aotiOl1 whiob the alli" oould DOW tab would be nttioiHt1r tiM1J to 
8an Serbi •• (1) OIl 22 October the BaJ.carian8 ha. adftlloH acros. the railway 
.outh of Uakab •• ennng the oa.m1aatiou of the Serbi.n I%WI with SalOllio •• 
(1) Pichon to IIll1erand, .0. 45. 18/10/15. 5B 116. 
(2) bport bJ C~Dd .. t Bno1 and Lie.teDUt 8arft1lt 27/10/15. Arch1ft8 of 
a.rahal Gal1i'ni. ~ 41. 
(:5) Avia au cewaeftl Joftre •• 1 .. o~iaa~iou teIepboaiq.a •• Jliniatre 
de 1. Gaezre. 22/10/15. 161 1679. 
(4) Barb1l10D. op. oit •• To1. 1. p 191. 
(5) Joffre w Gnsi.ni .0. 955:5. 17/10/15. 161 ~66. 
(6) 'l!Mt JI11itarr Position ot the Alli .. ill iibe -.u-... ~. lIDClaW. v.o. 
106/13'5. 
(1) JIabon - Appreoiation ot the 1I11i tarr 8i wation '5l/10/15. v.o. '52/5122. 
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As has been observed, however, even at this early date the development or 
the Balkans expedition was being determined by political rather than military 
considerations. 
Edward Grey was therefore being somewhat less than frank when he informed 
the French charge d'affaires that the visit to London of General Joffre at 
the end of October had resulted in complete agreement between the two 
governments. (1) 'lbe Foreign Secreta1'1 merely expressed the opinion 'lhat there 
should be closer oonsultation in future between the French and British military 
authorities and that neither power should be ca.mitted to operations involving 
tht: forces of the other without previous consultation between the respective 
military chiefs. In fact the difficulties of meaningful allied oooperation 
were well illustrated when fitchener, on his way to the Iear East to survey 
the scene and to report upon the best policy, stopped otf in Paris for 
consultations with the new French Government.(2) The French charge d'affaires 
in London warned his governaent ~t Kitchener might well be hoping to find 
the new war minister, General Gallieni, les. favourable to the Macedonian 
expedition than his predecessor.(3) But alter interviews with Briand and 
Gallieni, Jei tohener reported back to .A8qui th in London, reflecting the frust-
ration he so obTiously fel tl ".As regards Salonica it is very ditficul t to 
get in a word. they were both full of the necessity of puhiag in troops and 
would not think of COIling out. They siaply neep all lI11i tary ditfioul ties 
and dangers aside and CO on poli tioal lines, such as saving a reaant of 
Serbs, bringing Greeoe in and induoing RoUllllnia to jOin. I oould set no idea 
from thea as to when the troops would C01M out. they onl7 .aid the7 IlUBt watch 
event •• ·(4) Gal1ieni ad.itted that the relief torot would arrive too late to 
save Serbia. Ionetha1ess, like his Cabinet oolleaguea, be wu unvUling to 
face the oonsequenoes of di.e~ .. nt fro. BII1bn affairs. Bis attitude 
provoked K1tchener to s~8t that the J'rench soveruallt .... d to have no 
plus, 01117 asp1ratiou. 5) Indeed this uuubstutiaW opt1llin was 
apparently shared by .any P.relloh officers out at SalODioa. Jroa English 
headquan.ra the ardent Balprophile, General BoweU, .ellt Lloyd Geors- 8 1iat 
(l) GiL"ey to :Bertie Io. 866, 4/11/15, 1.0. 371/2272/166809. 
(2) See below pp 139-40 for details of tbe IUtV Prenoh goTaraMllt. 
(3) P1eur1au to Briand Io. 2560, 4/11/15, .1. B. 'Qaen-.' Tol. 1032. 
(4) ntohener to .uquith 5/11/15. CAB 42/5/5, .Apptlldix A, Utcbeaer to 
Balfour 5/11/15, Beltour JISS (British XUe.) Yo1. 49726. 
(5) Lablolld: OPe oi t., Vol. 2. P 109, P. J.JauteYI W llen (1959). p 272. 
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of the difficulties to which the French appeared to be blind. Bowell, on 
the other hand, appreciated the central paradox of the expedition. Onl)" a 
great victory over the Bulgarians would be likelr definitel)" to bring in the 
Greeks. Yet, without Greece defini tel)" in, the possibili tT of a great victory 
was remote. Therefore the adherence of Greece was also rellOte. (1) But the 
French Council of Ministers, taking advantase of Xi tChanea presence in PariS, 
decided on 6th November to seek a firm assurance that England would supply 
90,000 men out of the total 150,000 without further delaJ8, (2) and on the 
saae day Xi tchener _t Joffre at ChantillT &Ild gave such an undertaking, 
wi thout, however, telling the :Frenoh Chief that he would soon 'be going 
to Salonica haaelf. (') Only the previous day Sir Willi .. Robertson had 
written a paper on the oonduot of the war in whioh he argued that the 
operations in the Balkans should be asses.ed by the contributiOll which ther 
aade to the defeat of the Central Powers .nd be .... ured therefore in 
comparison vi th the _in effort on the We.tern Front. yet beoauae of the 
line of policy being followed br the British govera.ent, in which expert 
military advioe w •• oontinually ignored, thia .ort of argaaent was quite 
aimplr irrelevant.(4) 
While the British gOTernment continued to pursue. polioy which in the 
last resort would be determined by fear of Prench ~aotioD8, the new Briand 
cabinet in France was bombarded with adTioe on the oonduct of the 8&loni08 
expedi tion. Prell the French Mili t&rJ Mi.8ion in Greeoe Colonel Bordeaux 
ursed 'that it was indispensable that oa.and of the Anglo-Prenoh forces should 
be ve.ted in a French senera!. '!he lack ot noee •• at tbe Dud.nellea wa. 
senerallr attributed to the Engliah .nd it w.s t.portant tbat tb1a experienoe 
should not be repe.ted. (5) General Braquet felt tbIIt 150,000 _n was the 
.bsolute Ilinilmll which oould be cons1gDed to tbI Balkan tbeau.. Bat the 
goT8rDMnt IlUt deoide exactlr what it wanted to .obi .... in the "81"-•• t. 
Be feared. hoveYer. that, whatever v.a decided upon, the alli .. would be too 
lat8 to .ot effeotivelr. The proble. ot the area had Ileftr been ginll 
suffioient .tt8lltion and :rr.noe would now have to re.p tt. traita ot this 
(1) Botea OIl the Salonioa expedition 7)11)15. BOwell ISS IY/C/2/187. 
(2) Poincare. OPe oit., Vol. 7, p 225. 
(,) G. Saaras. op. oit •• Tol. ,. p 1,1. 
(4) JIIHIorand_ br RobertsoD 5/11/15. CO 42/5/6• 
(5) Bord .. ux to GuilleaiD 2/11)15. 7B 1"7. 
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negligence. (1) Guillemin on'the other hand confidently asserted that the 
allies would require at least 300,000 men to face the enelllJ in the Balkans 
and to hold the Greeks in 8we.(2) The French government, however, showed 
an unwillingness to commit i teel1' and, wi thin the broad scope of the 
instructions that he had already received, Sarrail was le1't a large personal 
initiative. (3) His mission was simply to save and reconstitute what he could 
01' the Serbian army in such a way that, joined with the allied contiqrents, . 
it would once again 1'02.'11 a realistic fighting force. (4) But in view of the 
retreat of the Serbian army towards MOntenegro and the progre8S 01' eTents in 
Maoedonia it beoame probable that the Anglo-French forces would have to 
retire to salonica. Cubon informed Grey that in such an eTentuality the 
French government felt that the allie8 ahould hold Sal onica, taking full 
oontrol of the port and .uspending Greek un&B8_nt of it te-.orari1y. (5) 
Within the French administration Gallieni considered that retireaent upon 
8&lonio& was neoeseary. but Joffre re_ined optillist1c that the Serbian &l.'IIIJ 
could yet be .aTed.(6) Joffre appreciated the dangers of the current situation. 
which lett the allied oontingents exposed. but tel t that the best way to 
counteraot thea vas to .peed up the rate at which the BDglish forces arrived 
at Salonioa. Be alao "anted pre8sure to be put on Italy to join in the allied 
expedition. (1) After lengthy di.oua.iona on 13 10000ber tbe !ranch cabinet 
_relr deoided that Barrail should be left the liberty to d.cid. wllther or not 
to retreat to salonica. dependent on his .... s ... nt of the ailitarJ situation.(S) 
On the prerloua dar the lagliah War Coam. twe bad once apin voiced i te 
concern at the uncertainties of the ai tuation. J.aqui th 1Uldera'tood that the 
Prench goveraaent favoured a retir.aent to Salonica &Ad deteD8ive operations. 
while larrail wanted an advanoe and wa. actually approaohi., Tele.. It vaa 
therefore deoided that Grey should infol.'ll 'the Prenoh ... aador that the 
goveraent oonaidared it ea.ential that 'the 1I11i tarr adYiaera of the WO 
oountriee should 00 .. to an underatanding a. to the proper lI1litarJ polioy to 
be adopted in regard to the operatioDS ot the allied torces in the Ba1kana.(9) 
(1) Braquet to Gallieni ,/11/15. 7J 1"1. 
(2) Guilla.in to Briand 10. 143. 15/11/15: ~. B. 'Guerra' Tol. 284. 
(,) Gallieni to Sarrail 6/11/15, 10. 6840, 1* '1~. 
(4) Galli'ni to Sarrail 11/11/15. 10. 6991. 161 3142. 
(5) Grey to Bertie 10/11/15. 10. 879. :r.o. 371/2270/169452• 
(6) Poincare, OPe oit •• Tol. 1. p 240. 
(7) Joffre to Galli'ai 11/11/15. 10. 6407. 51 lSO· 
(S) Poinoare. OPe oit •• Tol. 7. p ~. 
(9) War Ca.itt.e 12/11/15) CAB 42/5/8. 
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'di thin the Foreir;n Office Sir Arthur Nicolson reflected on the flu; di ty of 
the situation in the Near-East but considered that n~arly everyonp no", felt 
that it ','.'as not possible to carryon simulbmeotlsly 'hoth the Hacenonian and 
Gallipoli oT\prations. He realised that the French were very anxious that 
Britain should continue with "the Salonica busjness", but rejected the idea 
that his government had been forced into it in thp. first place by her allies. (1) 
The fault, he belir:ved, lay rather in Veniz.elos' recnest thot the two allies 
should consider his request for aid seT\8rately. (2) Grey therefore nresspd that 
discussions should take pl~ce with the French government - no decision could 
be made w-i thout prior consultation (3) - b1lt tJ..,p \lar Office felt i t ~rudent to 
remind the Pri tish commander at Salonica of the strictI;, limited understr:nding 
v!hich existed wi th the French government. The role of the troons under 
General Mahon's com~and was restricted to ensuring the position f~~m Salonica 
to Krivolak in order to support the French army which alone Dssumed the duty 
of protecting the railway between Krivolak and Veles and of ensuring 
communication with the Serbian army. (4) 
Heanwhile Kitchener had arrived in the Near East on his fact finding 
tour of inspection and had begun to confide his apprehensions concerning the 
Salonica expedition to General Girondon, Gouraud's former Chief of Staff at 
the Dardanelles. He felt that, if the enterprise was going to be pursued, 
400,000 men would be needed. He made obvious his resentment ot the tact that 
the French Government had gone into the campaign without consulting their 
allies, who had been obliged to follow suit largely to preserve the Entente.(5) 
In addition Kitchener had gained the impreSSion that, with the possible 
exception of Cape Helles, Gallipoli should be abandoned. To cushion the impact 
of retirement upon Moslem opinion and to thvart a Turkish advance on the 
Suez Canal, he proposed that the troops released thereby should be used to 
effect a fresh landing in Ayes Bay, near Alexandretta. (6) Cambon confidently 
predicted that this proposal would be rejected by Kitchener's own ministry 
which feared the dissipation of British resources. (7) Moreover the Military 
Attach' at the London embassy believed that the English General Staff would 
be loath to quit Salonica since this would leave the port 'open to use by the 
Germans and Austrians as a submarine buse. (8) As regards the prospect of a 
(1) Nicolson to Hardinge 11/11/15, Nicolson MSS, F. o. 806/380. 
(2) See abOve P.33 
(3) Grey to Bertie 15/11/15, No. 899, CAB 37/137/24. 
(4) Murray to Mahon 15/11/15, No. 9951, w.o. 106/1337. 
(5) Girondon to Gallieni 11/11/15, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 1033. 
(6) P. Magnus: Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist (1958); p 364; 
R. R. James: op.cit., pp. 329-31. 
(7) Cambon to Briand ~TO. 2645, 13/11/15, A.E. 'Guerre', Vol. 1033. 
(8) Panouse to Gallieni No. 1555, 12/11/15, 16N 2967. 
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third oriental operation from Alexandretta, Paris disliked the thought of 
having Bri tish troops so close to Syria, which was already regarded as a 
French sphere of interest. Ac.ordingly cn 13 Bovember the French Military 
Atta0h8 was instructed to deliver a note to the British government which 
ajvised that before British troops disembarked in the region of Alexandretta 
it would be necessary to "take into consideration not only the economic 
interests but also the moral and political situation held bJ JTance in these 
oountriesn.(l) In fact the combined weight of opinion or the Prench government 
and the English General Staff was sufficient to secure that litchenerls 
proposal was rejected by the 'War COIIIi ttae on 15 lovember. 
Revealing the gravi t;y with whioh he viewed the ai tuation, Ii tohener wrote 
to Asquith that the deoision to be made on the future or the Salonioa Campaign 
would have such a momentous effeot that it could prove to be the turning 
point leading to the loss of the war br the allies. ae regarded the chances 
of saving Serbia as non-existant but teared that with attention shifted 
to the Eastern theatre the ottensive arranged tor early 1916 in the west 
would be very greatlr weakened. Then if the war were to drag on through the 
winter of 1916-17 litchener warned that sa.. of the a11ie8, if not England 
herself, would be unable to stand the strain. (2) Moreover X1tohener cited 
the opinions of senior British otfioers newly arrived at 5&loni08 to show that 
the alarm he felt at the situation was not confined to h1aaelt. (3) The 
following day Bitchener was even able to quote General Sarrail's Opinion to 
support hia own contentions. The J'rench seneral was of the beliet that it 
would require 300,000 _n to hold Salonica and seneraUJ contirMd the War 
Jti,nister'. estimate of the gravity of the ailit&rJ po.ition. (4) In view of 
the con.tuaion oonoerning the Salonica si wtion and vi"tb that at the 
Dardanelle. re"ining unoertain the FrenCh goYerDaent requested a conference 
to review and co-ordiaate policy in the .ear-... t. When the delesate. a.s .. bled 
1n Pari- on 17 love.ber Briand found in LloJd Qeorp a still ardent supporur 
ot the 8&10n108 expedition. 'lbe Minister ot Bm1tiou' attitude .ernd to 
counteract the besitatione of his colleagues and the British sonruent once 
(1) Panouae to Gallienl 10. 1556. 13/11/15. 161 2967. 
(2) ntohener to Aaqulth 16/11/15. '0. 47. W.o. 106/1,.'7. 
(3) ib1d 16/11/15. 10. 54. ibid. 
(4) ibid 17/11/15. 1.0. '71/2278/17'9'58. Sir G. Arthur, ut. or Lord ntcbeYf 
(1920), Tol. ',p. 119. 
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again ended up by promising that their full commitment of 90,000 men would 
be sent out as soon as possible, but this time with the addition of two extra 
divisions. (I) The biggest concession that the English representatives could 
extract from Briand was the promise that if junotion with the Serbs became 
manif'estl;y impossible, while to the rear the forces of Greeoe posed a threat 
to the allied t~p8, then the French government would be prepared to ex.aine 
the question ot total evacuation.(2) This was, however, a promise which Briand 
made in a void divorced from the factors which really governed his diplomacy. 
Internal French considerations meant that evacuation vould never be politically 
expedient for the French premier vhatever the military and dipla.atic 
situation might diotate.(3) 
Sarrail now ccneidered that a retire .. nt to Sjonica was ee8ential but that 
it would be difficult tc oarry out if not begun t..8diately.(4) Accordingly 
the English War Co .. ittee deoided on 19 Koyember ~at the War Offioe should 
inform the French Mili tar}' Atta0h8 that Britain vas .ending tresh forces to 
salonic8, as had been agreed two daya earlier, but only tor the purpo.e ot 
giving support to the retiring toroes. (5) But a oopy ot Sarrail'. telegru 
to Pari., which talked ot reoeiving tour French oorpl and which ..... d still 
to be contemplating continuing operatioll8 in ~e Yarder TalleJ forced the War 
Office to raiterate its oonviotion that t..8diate rat~.t VAS 18perat1ve.(6) 
Prom Paris Yarde Baller vas able to qUieten thi. oonoern .a.evbat bJ pointing 
out that Joffre vas stronglJ opposed to al11 f'arther Prench U'oopa learing 
the We.tern Pront and that there va. JlO likelihood that the tour Jlrenoh oorps 
reterred to vould be .ent. (7) But Yarde BW.ler d1d hear tbat Joffre vould be 
present at a .. eting 1n Paris on 25 love.bar to ded.de whether a. a _ttar ot 
prinoiple operations on all extensive .oale should be andertat.n 111 Jaoedonia.(8) 
In fact Gallieni bad already oritioi.ed sarrail tor the oODt1aaal raterenoe 
iD his de.patobe. to the figure ot t01l1" .1'IIJ oorpa .. neoeaear, tor hi, 
operations. Aa the Pranch War )I1auter raa1nded Sarrall, -Juaia 1e go1lT8rne .. nt 
n'a oon.enti( ni .... at. en disoua.ion la ooutintioa de TOtre UIIM nr 
oetie bue.- 9) But General Braquet felt that )'ranee bad tIM choice of either 
(1) Suares. OPe oi t., Tol. ,. p 197, CAB 37/1'7/34. 
(2) Prooi.-verbal ot Puis Conference, A.B. '<;uern', To1. 961. 
(3) See below, chapter 6. 
(4) caabon to Briand 18/11/15, Bo. 2690, 51 150. 
(5) War Co_ittee 19/11/15. r.o. 371/2279/174967. 
(6) War ottioe to Yade BIller 22/11/15, W.O. 106/1'37. 
(7) Yarde Buller to War ott:1oe 22/11/15, W.o. 106/1'37. 
(8) ibid 24/11/15, ib:1d. 
(9) Ga11ieni to sarrail 10. 7278.18/11/15, Ibl 3142. 
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reinforcing the army or of abandoning the Balkans altogether. The latter co~e 
of actinn would, he believed, destroy at a stroke the efforts of four centuries 
to build up French influence in the Near East. It was therefore an unthinkable 
solution. So, like Serrail, he maintained that in the changed circum.; tances 
resulting from the defeat of the Serbs an army of at least }OO,OOO would be 
required. (1) Where exactly these ::mnforcements aight arrive frOli remained, 
however, a mystery aince, in addition to the oppoaition of Joffre and Gallieni, 
the English War Office made it known that General Sarrail could not expect to 
receive any further troops from England. (2) 
Although the i~iative still lay with Sarrail bi .. elf, opinion vas by now 
definitely hardening in ravour of a retire .. nt to 58loDica and on 22 November 
Denys eochin, Minister without Portfolio in the BriaDd goverDlleDt, vho had 
been sent to Greece to view the ai tuation at olose quarters, reported that 
sarrail believed Serbia to be doa.d aDd that he ahould retreat to Salonica, 
vhere nothing vould be poa.ible vithout a roroe of ,ao,OOO .. D.(3) Pro. the 
Bri tiah oap Mahon reported on the growing .enae of futili ty which .1UTOunded 
the expedition. It bad not preven~ the Bulgar1ana r1"01l t18btiDg, nor had it 
encouraged Greeoe to attack Bulgaria, and it va. no longer posaible to think 
in teI'1D8 of .aving Serbia. In raot the vhole .nwrpri .. bad degenerated into 
a "usele.a errand". (4) Mahon und.ntood -u.t sarrail vaa beginning to vi tbdrav 
hia tvo adTanoed diTiaiona, but pbred that be vu .till vlthout il18traotion 
fiooII hia goveraent and that he vu taking thia .tep on bie 0IWIl iDitiatift. (5) 
'.ft1e existing uno.rtainty a. to whether the intention vu to go f'ozvard. to 
reain aUll or to retire arr.oted advers.ly all arra ...... ou and ..a. it 
dif'ticul t to gin d.o18ioDB 00 ..... 0 aioor detail.. Sarrat1 and bi. Cbief of 
statr bad twio. been approaobad vi th a view to f'omalatiag d.tlot w propoaa1. 
about the conduot of' a poe.tble, U ~Ot probabl., ",u.ao~ and to oouider 
iba nr10Wl probl_ iDTolnd. But their atU tude bad __ to d1ni •• 'b 
.ubjeoi with tbe -.oUDctatioo ot a f'ev broad taotical priooipl .. and a ¥aYe 
ot the baod.,,(6) Sarrau dld at 1.a.t alal1.ty tbI .1watlO1l vltb hi. deo1aioD, 
notif'ied to the Pr.ooh goT.rueDi 00 27 lonabar, to _nne back 'to 8alonlca all 
the divi.iona vhich bad adftooad into Sar_ia. '!be probl. DOW, .. s.rraU N1T 
(1) Braqu.t to Ga1l1'01 .0. 163 2'/11/15, 7. 1"7. 
(2) Var ott1oa to 1li11t&r7 !ttaw. JIaria 22/11/15. 10. 10192. W.O. 158/758. 
(,) 0Qi11aa1D to Bria. 22/11/15, 10. 812, .l •••• ~. Yolo 247. 
(4) _OD to War ottloa 20/11/15. r.o. '71/2272/175665. 
(5) ibid 2'/11/15. r.o. '71/ 2272/177992. 
(6) ibid 24/11/15. w.o. 158/755. 
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recognised, was to determine what role could be given to the allied forces 
which had evidently failed in their original mission. The generalb1mself 
concluded that unless a diplomatic or political motive existed for retaining 
Salonica itself, it would be preferable to re-embark the troops as soon as they 
returned there. (1) 
The retreat to Selonica inevitably raised the hopes of all those who 
wished to see an end to the campaign. These ranged from the ICing of Greece to 
the British General Staff. Constantine had already given Denys CocMn a 
rather arrogant assurance that if the allies wished to retire to Selonica 
wi th a view to leaving Greek 80il he would guarantee the seouri ty of their 
retreat. (2) Within the English military hierarchy Henry Wilaon, a former 
Director of Military Operations, pressed for complete evacuation. But, aa 
Bonar Law (3) warned him, the French would not permit this. Their govermDent 
would feel that if the troops were all withdrawn from Salonica atter what 
would be a complete defeat, the position of the adminatration in France woUld 
be untenable.(4) Nonetheless in a paper drawn up by the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, even before Sarrail's definite decision to retreat, the 
conclusion was reached that the weight of military arguments against holding 
Salonica was overwhelming. It was accordingly recommended that all further 
transport of troops to Salonica should be instantly stopped and that the 
evacuation of Salonica should proceed as fast as possible.(5) Reluctant perhaps 
to adopt the oonclusions of the military in toto. Grey informed Bertie that the 
prospective danger to the whole Anglo-French forces being considered to be 
very serious, the )'rench government should take the matter into i .. ediate 
consideration. (6) At the same ti.e the Director of Military Operationa, 
General Callwell, waa despatched to Paris to try to elicit so_ positive 
statement of intention from the French. Grey conaidered it moe t urgent that a 
decision should be arrived at. Callwell conveyed to Gallieni the inforaation 
that complete evacuation was "virtually" Britiah policy. though it awaited 
the final decision of the government. But he warned the Engliah War Office 
that his mission would become useleas unle.s a definite decision could be 
communicated to the Frenoh on the following day. 26 Jove.ber.(7) In faot 
there was no question of the French government agreeing to evacuation. for, 
(1) Sarrail to Gallieni No. 290/3. 27/11/15, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 10},4. 
(2) Guille.in to Briand Bo. 842, 26/11/15, A. E. 'GUm', Vol. 247. 
(3) Leader of the Conaervative Party and colonial Seoretary in ~quith •• 
ooalition governaent. 
(4) Bonar Law to Wilson 22/11/15. Bonar Law MSS 53/6/50• 
(5) Paper by MDrra1 23/11/15. Austin Chamberlain MSS 19/8/11. 
(6) Grey to Bertie 25/11/15. '.0. 311/2278/179370. 
(7) Callwell to ~a7 25/11/15. w.o. 106/1331. 
as Briand told Guillemin on 28 November, the intention was to make Salonica 
a fortified base for future offensive or defensive operations.(l) Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Callwell's mission proved a failure. As Sir 
Archibald Murray told the War Committee on 29 November, Callwell had found it 
impossible to get a definite expression of opinion on the strategy to be 
adopted in Greece and Serbia from the French General Staff, while Asquith 
dejectedly concluded that the War Committee was absolutely in the dark as to 
the French plans. Grey was therefore authorised to represent to the French 
government that Britain was much ooncerned at getting no definite opinion 
from the French General Staff as to the future of the Anglo-French troops 
in Serbia, as to whether they were to retire on Salonica and whether it was 
safe that they should remain at Salonta or not, He was also to press that a 
conference of Anglo-French ministers and military authorities should take 
place in London or elsewhere without delay.(2) 
For the last time for some months to come the British government WBa 
bracing itself for a showdown with the French. As the Foreign Office offiCial, 
George Cle~, co.-ented, "the first thing neoesaary is a deoision by France 
and ourselves aa to remaining at or evaouating Saloni080"(3) In faot the 
inter-allied oonference was to be precipitated at ver,y ahort notice by a 
startling developaent within the Engliah government itself. On the evening 
of 29 Novemher Lord n tchener left for London froll Paris where he bad spent 
the day on his way home from his mission to Gal1ipoli and Greece. 
(1) Briand to Guill .. in 28/11/15, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 247. 
(2) CAB 42/5/24. 
(3) Minute (29/11/15) on Elliot to Grey, F.O. 371/2278/180246. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The First Crisis 
On 29 November Kitchener had had an interview with 
B~d"and had given his views in regard to Salonica and 
the defence of Egypt. Two days later he told the War 
Committee that he believed that Gallieni had given orders 
to Sarrail to do as he thought right about retirement and, 
so far as he knew, Sarrail was gradually withdrawing his 
force. He did not think that such a course was Iair on 
the general and considered that in a matter OI" such grave 
importance the French government should give him a deIinite 
order. He knew that General Sarrail was personally anxious 
to retire, but thought that if the onus of taking the deci-
sion to retire without having sUIfered a deIeat in the Iield 
were left to him, he might hesitate (1). On the same day 
the Defence Council in Paris was considering a telegram Irom 
Sarrail which requested instructions. Both Joffre and Galli-
eni showed themselves favourable to the retention of 
Salonica (2), but Joffre had already warned his War Minister 
that French occupation of Salonica could not be persisted 
in in the face of the formal opposition of the English (3). 
So although JOIIre had prepared a list OI objections to put 
before the English General StaII when they arrived at 
Chantilly on 5 December, if they demanded evacuation (4), 
it was not likely that he would maintain this attitude if 
the British remained adamant. The diplomatic situation 
remained, however, uncertain and Cambon telegraphed on 
30 November that although Grey favoured total evacuation, 
he was not sure whether the English government as a whole 
shared this view. He feared that there was a total lack 





War Committee 31/11/15, CAB 42/6/1. 
Suarez - op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 204. 
Joffre to Gallieni No. 16651, 30/11/15, 16N3014. 
, , '" Note d'Introduction a la Conference du 5 decembre, 
30/11/15, 16N3056. 
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staffs and within these national bodies themselves (1). 
From Salonica General Mahon voiced concern that the mili-
tary situation was becoming increasingly unsatisfactory 
with news of the concentration of Bulgarian forces, and 
urged that a decision as to evacuation should be arrived at 
immediately. Further procrastination might be ruinous to 
both possible policies - that of remaining and that of 
leaving (2). 
After a fresh examination of the problem the French 
Cabinet confirmed its intention of remaining at Salonica 
and decided to ask for fresh English contingents to bring 
the total strength of the expeditionary force to 300,000 
men. Salonica was to be held as a base for future operations 
in the Balkans with a view to keeping Greece neutral and 
persuading Roumania to enter the war (3). Cambon was in-
structed to let Grey know of this new resolve (4), but 
Briand's despatch had scarcely left the Quai d'Orsay when 
a telegram arrived f~om the London embassy reporting that, 
having heard Kitchener's reports, the English War Committee 
had decided, subject to French agreement, in favour of 
evacuation (5). Bertie was told to represent to the French 
government that, Sarrail's attempts to open communications 
with the Serbian army having failed, the agreement that the 
whole of the allied forces should be withdrawn to Salonica, 
for use as the circumstances might require, had come into 
effect. If the French government dissented there should 
be a conference as soon as possible to settle the matter (6). 
Bertie reported that his statement caused great consternation 
to Briand and his Secretary General, Jules Cambon. He added 







Note by William Martin 1/12/15, 16N3162. 
Mahon to Kitchener 1/12/15, F.O. 371/2280/183443. 
Poincarl - OPe cit., Vol. 7, p. 295. 
Briand to Cambon 1/12/15, No. 4093-5, A.E. 'Guerre' 
Vol. 285 
Poincare - OPe cit., Vol 7, p. 309; Cambon to Briand 
1/12/15,No. 2809, A.Eo 'Guerre' Vol. 1034. 
Grey to Bertie 1/12/15, F.O. 371/2278/182529. 
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and French governments would become very difficult if 
Britain insisted on withdrawal, which the French regarded 
as a desire expressed by King Constantine and his govern-
ment on behalf of the German government. The French view 
was that if Salonica were abandoned it would be occupied 
by an enemy force either in collusion with the Greeks or 
in spite of them and that the withdrawal would have far-
reaching and disastrous results throughout the Balkans 
and everywhere in the East (1). Briand trusted that no 
steps would be taken committing the British govennment 
to withdrawal before Cambon had made representations on 
behalf of the French. He warned that if the attitude of 
the English government became known to French public opinion 
the consequences would be most serious (2~ Berthelot there-
fore set about preparing a long and cogent list of the 
diplomatic, military and political disadvantages which 
would result from the evacuation of Salonica. He objected 
to the fact that Britain was proposing to retire even 
before she had fulfilled her often repeated obligation 
to send 90,000 troops (3). But in the meantime Cambon 
had reported that the English War Committee had again 
asserted the need for evacuation and that instructions had 
been sent to General Mahon to co-operate with Sarrail in 
preparations to this end (4), while from the English War 
Ministry the French liaison officer, Captain Doumayrou, 
told Gallieni that for the first time for a long while 
the British government was completely. united in its deter-
mination and that the vote in the War Committee had been 
unanimous (5). Kitchener wanted Gallien! to know that he 
had never seen such agreement in the English Cabinet. If 
(1) Bertie: Diary Vol. 1, ~. 271; Bertie to Grey 1/12/15, P.o. 371/2278/ 82517; Memorandum by Bertie 
4/12/15, Bertie MSS, F.O. 8OO/172/Gr/15/26. 
(2) Briand to Cambon No. 4109,2/12/15, A.E. 'Guerre' Vol. 1034. 
(3) Briand to Cambon No. 4101-7, 2/12/15, ibid. 
(4) Cambon to Briand No. 2818, 2/12/15, ibid. 
(5) Doumayrou to Gallieni No. 3575, 2/12/15, ibid. 
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the French ministers came over to England they should not 
expect to change any opinions (1) 
Nevertheless, the French Cabinet, meeting at the 
Elysee, agreed to back Briand in his resistance to the 
English determination to quit Salonica. The French Premier 
was to leave as soon as possible for London to try to win 
round the British government to the French point of view (2). 
Joffre confidently informed Sarrail that the intention of 
the French government was to remain at Salonica and that 
negotiations were in progress in London to secure agreement 
on this point and on the future line of conduct in the 
Balkans. Sarrail was even instructed to begin immediately 
defence works at Salonica (3). But Grey, while admitting 
that there were objections to evacuation from a political 
point of view, was emphatic that the question was one to 
be settled by military opinion - and in Britain this was 
unanimous. Evacuation, he stressed, was preferable to the 
loss of the whole force, which the British military autho-
rities believed must ensue if Germano-Bulgarian forces 
advanced on Salonica. Kitchener and his military advisers 
believed that, unless the decision to re-embark all the 
troops was made without delay, the whole Anglo-French 
force would probably be lost (4). As long as there was 
a prospect of a military disaster, Grey told Cambon, it 
. 
was not worthwhile discussing anything but military con-
siderations (5). In the face of such pronmmcements the 
French Military Attache in London wrote privately to 
Gallieni to warn him of the serious situation which might 
arise out of the disagreement between the two countries, 
(1) Doumayrou to 'mon colonel', 2/12/15, 5N 151. 
(2) Poincar6 - OPe cit., Vol. 7, p. 303; Briand to Cambon 
No. 4115-7, 2/12/15, A.E. 'Guerre' Vo. 285. 
(3) Joffre to Sarrail 3/12/15, No. 7843, 16N 3136. 
(4) Grey to Bertie No. 2830-1, 2/12/15, F.O. 371/2278/ 
183275. 
(5) Ibid. 3/12/15, F.O. 371/2280/184537. 
so determined was the British government to pursue its own 
policy to a conclusion (1). Indeed, if Grey's statements 
had been a faithful reflection of the ultimate policy of 
the British government - that is, that the Salonica expedi-
tion was to be judged solely on the criterion of its 
military values - then the situation would not have been 
as hopeless from the British point of view as it had ap-
peared a couple of weeks earlier. But in fact Grey's 
assertion was only true up to a point - in the last resort 
factors other than military ones would play the dominating 
role in determining the actions of the British government. 
This then was the situation when the full English 
Cabinet assembled on 3 December and was faced with a bomb-
shell from the English War Lord. Kitchener bluntly informed 
his colleagues that he took so grave a view of the position 
and prospects in the Eastern theatre that he could take no 
further responsibility for the conduct of the war unless 
British troops were at once withdrawn from Salonica and 
the earliest and most certain of the catastrophes which 
he envisaged in the East thereby arrested (2). As he told 
Douglas Haig (3) later in the day, when explaining his 
behaviour, the British had only gone to Salonica to satisfy 
the French and to give employment to General Sarrail (4). 
Kitchener's standing among his ministerial colleagues was 
no longer high. His attitude to politicians, his refusal 
to confide information to them and his unwillingness to 
make full use of the General Staff because of the confidence 
he retained in his own opinions and abilities (5) all meant 
that many figures in the Asquith government would have 
(1) Panouse to Gallieni 2/12/15, 5N 151. 
(2) Asquith to George V 3/12/15, CAB 37/139/7. 
(3) Commander-in-chief of the British army in France. 
(4) R. Blake - OPe cit., p. 115 
(5) P. Magnus - OPe cit., p. 288. 
.." ~------
preferred to see him relieved of his ministerial respon-
sibilities. Kitchener devolved on to subordinates as 
little authority as he could. He sought to manage the 
Great War with the same style of personal control that 
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he had so effectively exercised in the command of the tiny 
Nile Expedition (1). But Kitchener had a value which no 
figure in the country could seek to rival let alone replace. 
The accusing finger of the famous recruiting poster has 
become a legend in itself and has tended to obscure the 
real historical significance of this relic of the mytho-
logy of the Great War. The fact is that Kitchener
' s 
enormous prestige, deriving l~y from his campaigns in 
Africa, meant that his presence in the government, however 
odious to the professional politicians, was vital to 
the continued inflow of men into the ranks and thus to 
the government's continued prosecution of the war. As 
a result, although his cabinet cOllea~es looked upon 
him as an intellectual lightweight (2 , the Minister 
of Warts opinions on all matters to do with the conduct 
of the war carried a disproportionate authority. This 
was not so great as when Churchill had described it: 
"When Kitchener gave a decision it was invariably accepted 
as final. He was never, to my belief, overruled by the 
War Councilor the Cabinet in any military matter, great 
or small. No single unit was ever sent or withheld 
contrary, not merely to his agreement, but to his advice"(3~ 
Indeed movements were already afoot to remove Kitchener 
from the day to day conduct of the war by increasing, to 
an unprecedented level, the authority of the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff. But Kitchenerts prestige in the 
country remained undimmed and it was still unthinkable 
that he could be dispensed with altogether. Moreover 
the importance of Kitchener
'
s recruiting powers cannot 
(1) W. s. Churchi1l - opo cit., Vol. 2, p. 175. 
(2) P. Magnus - OPe cit., p. 374. 
(3) W. S. Churchill - OPe cit., Vol. 2, p. 172. 
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be over-estimated when it is remembered that the principle 
of conscription was one of the last concessions to total 
war to be wrung from a British government which represented 
the death-throes of nineteenth century laissez-faire 
liberalism. It is in the light of these considerations 
that Kitchener's threat to resign should be viewed. Its 
impact upon the government may easily be imagined. 
The Cabinet unanimously concurred in the War Minister's 
views and it was decided that Lord Bertie should at once 
inform the French Government of the crisis which had arisen 
from Kitchener1s statement and point out that the gravity 
of the matter was such as to make desirable a conference 
the following day between the two governments either in 
London or Calais (1). On leaving the meeting Grey told 
Cambon that Kitchener's resignation would bring about a 
general crisis and that it was imperative that agreement 
should be reached by the two governments before the mili-
tary conference arranged for 5 December (2). Meanwhile 
in Paris Gallieni was still conSidering the last communi-
cation of the British government. He expressed his surprise 
that Kitchener appeared to have changed his views from 
those he had recently expressed in Paris, when, Gallieni 
claimed, he had been in favour of holding Salonica to 
prevent it from becoming an Austro-German base (3). But 
soon after 5 p.m. Bertie received Grey1s latest despatch 
informing him of the Cabinet crisis which had developed 
earlier in the day. He went at once to the Quai d'Orsay, 
but neither Briand nor Jules Cambon was present and he was 
unable to see the French premier before 6.30 p.m. The 
(1) Grey to Bertie 3/12/15, F.O. 371/2278/184182. 
c.f. the rather strange statement of Lloyd George 
- War MemOirs, Vol. 1, p. 526: "As yet the British 
Cabinet had not reached a definite decision upon 
the issue". 
(2) Cambon to Briand No. 2829, 3/12/15, A. E. 'Guerrel 
Vol. 1034. 
(3) Bertie to Grey 3/12/15, F.O. 371/2278/184113. 
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latter was very much perturbed at Grey's telegram and said 
that he, Gallieni and Admiral Lacaze, the highly regarded 
Navy Minister, would go to Calais the next morning so as 
to meet the British ministers as quickly as possible (1). 
Prior to the conference Berthelot prepared for his 
master a note in which he forcefully argued that Britain's 
insistence on evacuation should be met with intransigent 
opposition from the French. The effects of giving way 
would, he said, be catastrophic. The confidence of French 
public opinion in the outcome of the war would be shakan, 
the Briand ministry would fall, General Joffre's position 
would be weakened and even Poincare, the President of the 
Republic, might not escape from the holocaust. A long 
series of military and diplomatic arguments must, there-
fore, be placed before the English to convince them of 
the lack of wia~em in their decision. And, as a trump 
card, Berthelot suggested that Eriand might dangle before 
the English the offer of putting the campaign under the 
command of a general acceptable to both the allied powers 
- General Lyauter (2). For reasons which have already 
been examined (3 , however, the supersession of the exist-
ing French commander at Salonica, General Sarrail, was 
the greatest political impossibility which could have 
been asked of Briand, and in fact the matter was never 
raised at Calais (4). 
At the conference a clash of wills was inevitable 
and both sides followed familiar set pieces. Briand 
put forward the views of the French government as to why 
evacuation was undeSirable, and then Kitchener spoke with 
(1) Bertie Memorandum 4/12/15, Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/172/ 
Gr/15/26. 
(2) The Royalist Resident-GeDeral of Morocco. 
(3) See above pp 20-1. 
(4) Petite note pour Ie president du conseil 4/12/15, 
A. Eo 'Guerre' Vol. 981. 
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emotion saying that if it were decided to remain at 
Salonica he must resign for he could not accept the res-
ponsibility for a decision which in his opinion would 
produce a military disaster (1). After a brief adjourn-
ment Asquith read out a statement to the delegates declaring 
that to keep 150,000 men at Salonica was likely to lead to 
a military disaster and insisting in the name of his govern-
ment that preparations should be made without delay for 
evacuation. This declaration was accepted by Briand for 
the French government, which in consequence abandoned 
its own wish to remain at Salonica, although it was insis-
ted that the responsibility for the decision lay with the 
British government (2). Briand said that if the British 
government announced that they could do nothing at Salonica 
then the question was settled. If Britain refused to stay 
there "la France n1a que s'incliner". He considered that 
it would be a catastrophe to leave Salonica, but the res-
ponsibility for that would establish itself later (3). 
Delegates returning to London and Paris on the evening 
of 4 December, therefore, could well have been forgiven 
for assuming that the Salonica Expedition had effectively 
been wound up. Thus when, on the same day, Sir Francis 
Elliot pressed to know whether the final decision was to 
remain at Salonica or not, only one possible answer could 
be given him (4). Philippe Berthelot certainly believed 
that the campaign had been abandoned, for, just before 
midnight (5) on 4 December, he submitted an impassioned 
note to Briand "sous l'impression que lIon avait accepte 
, 
l'evacuation de Salonique". This note underlined the folly 
of capitulating before the imaginary danger posed by the 
King of Greece and the German Emperor, and the perils 
(1) Note by Bertie 6/12/15, Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/172/Gr/ 
15/29. 
(2) Note on the conference, CAB 37/139/15. 
(3) Proc~s-verbal, CAB 28/I.C.4. 
(4) Elliot to Grey No. 1363, 4/12/15, F.O. 371/2280/184890. 
(5) The original note bears the time 11.30 p.m., not 1 a.m. 
on 5 December as G. H. Cassar - OPe Cit., p. 231 - suggests. 
involved in giving up control of the Mediterranean and 
leaving the Germans liberty of action in the Near-East. 
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As the Calais decision would materially affect the course 
of the war, France should make public that no agreement 
existed between the allies and that she was merely follow-
ing the English line for the sake of the Entente. British 
policy since the beginnings of the campaign had been dis-
loyal and had been tantamount to a go-slow strike. The 
English conception of the war, limited as it was to the 
north of France and Egypt, was infantile and selfish. 
They were heading for defeat and were dragging France 
along with them. Wildly Berthelot suggested that France 
should look after her own interests and seize Crete and 
Corfou immediately.(1) 
At all events the impression given by Briand1s bio-
grapher that the Calais Conference had come to no definite 
conclusion is far from the truth (2). As Asquith recalled 
a decade later: "1 soon came to the conclusion that if 
we stuck to our guns we should not only hold our own, but 
the French would on the whole feel relieved. So 1 turned 
(1) Note by Berthelot 4/12/15, A. E.'Guerre l Vol. 1034; 
A. Br~al - "Philippe Berthelot"(1937) p. 144; 
G. Cassar - OPe cit., pp. 231-2. The significance 
of the document is not that it called for the Calais 
decision to be reversed, as Cassar maintains, but that 
it shows that the French had agreed to evacuation. 
Berthelot merely wanted the French government to relieve 
itself of all responsibility for the decision. Cassar 
appears to base his argument on the attempt of 
Berthelot's biographer to exaggerate the role played 
by his subject in reversing the Calais agreement, 
(Breal - OPe cit., p. 145). 
, 
(2) G. Suarez - OPe cit., Vol. 3, p. 213: "Au fond Ie 
, 
desaccordrestait entier. Briand avait obtenu 
llajournement de l'evacuation. Joffre avait sugg~re 
l'installation du camp retranche, mais chaque parti 
restait sur ses positions". For the truthful assess-
ment of one of the French delegates see A. Ribot: 
Letters to a Friend (1926) p. 300. 
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on KitchBner again, who played his part of the sullen, morose, 
rather suspicious, but wholly determined man with good effect 
••• [The French] acquiesced with some show of reluctance and 
regret and we parted ostensibly, and I think really, on excel-
lent terms n (1). Back in Paris, however, Briand was confronted 
by a cabinet crisis of the first order. Ironically enough 
Denys Cochin, newly returned from Greece, had just told his 
colleagues that he had become convinced that no useful pur-. 
pose could be served by remaining at Salonica(2). But Briand 
was faced with uncompromising opposition to the idea of eva-
cuation fro~ the socialists in his government, led by Marcel 
Sembat and Albert Thomas. The veteran de Freycinet, on the 
other hand, did not feel it was possible to remain at 
Salonica without the English and he was supported by Gallieni. 
In the face of this impasse Briand, knowing that the Sacred 
Union could not be preserved if the Socialists left his 
Cabinet, willingly clutched at the compromise offered by 
Leon Bourgeois that nothin, should be done until Russia and 
Italy had been consulted(3. As Paul Cambon appreciated 
this man~e had no other motive than to gain time(4). He 
was conv~ that Briand had agreed to evacuation at Calais 
but that in the face of the objections of important members 
of his cabinet he had gratefully accepted Bourgeois's sug-
gestion. Cambon found lamentable this constant series of 
discussions and the inability to reach a firm decision~5) He 
had seen the Admiralty Chief of Staff, Admiral Oliver, who had 
been present at Calais and who had informed him that the allies 
were in agreement to evacuate(6), but he now received a des-
patch from Briand to the effect that the Calais Conference 
had been between representatives of the two governments, while 
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the two governments themselves(1). Henry Wilson warned on 
6 December that he had already spoken to the man(2) who was 
to go over to England to see Lloyd George and endeavour to 
get the Calais decision cancelled. He stressed that a quarrel 
must be avoided at all costs even if this meant handing over 
the British troops in Greece to Sarrail to do with as he 
Pleased(3). 
After consultation with Briand and Jules Cambon, Bertie 
considered that there was disagreement as to what had passed 
at Calais. He felt that the fault mi~ht lie with Kitchener 
whose memory sometimes let him down(4. Paul Cambon told 
Grey that the French Cabinet was strongly of the opinion that 
the allied forces should be kept at Salonica. He had been 
instructed therefore to ask that the British government should 
reconsider the matter(5). But Grey regarded the position of 
the allied forces with the greatest anxiety. He could not 
believe that the French would wish these forces to be lost 
and could only suppose that they did not share the belief that 
the troops were in danger. He hoped they were right, but feared 
the contrary(6). But the familiar process was now about to 
begin/whereby England's resolution to pursue her own policy in 
relation to the Salonica campaign would be undermined by her 
fundamental adherence to the dictates of French domestic poli-
tics. A recent study has maintained that the crumbling of 
(1) Briand to Cambon No. 4176, 5/12/15, A. E. 'Guerr'e', Vol. 1034. 
(2) presumably Albert Thomas. 
(3) Henry Wilson to Bonar Law 6/12/15, Bonar Law MSS 52/1/15. 
The choice of Lloyd George shows that the French government 
was fully aware of his partiality for the Salonica venture. 
Lloyd George assumes almost the role of a fifth columnist 
in the English ministry at this point. c.f. Private note 
by Austen Chamberlain 29/6/16, Chamberlain MSS AC 12/35: 
"I was afraid that the P.M. would find himself landed in 
considerable difficulties owing to the intrigues of Lloyd 
George with French politicians in opposition to our own 
military advisers"e 
(4) Bertie - Diary, Vol. 1, po 274. 
(5) Grey to Bertie, 6/12/15, F.O. 371/2280/187477. 
(6) Note by Grey 6/12/15, Lloyd George MSS D/23/5/10. 
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British resolve resulted from panic in the Foreign Office 
over a possible threat to the maintenance of the Entente(1). 
The charge, however, would seem to be misdirected. When on 
7 December Bertie telegraphed to the effect that Briand was 
now arguing that to withdraw from Salonica would be a fatal 
mistake, George Clerk, a senior official at the Foreign 
Office, unhesitatingly commented: "I made careful notes of 
M. Briand's language at Calais ••••• and it certainly justi-
fies an assumption that the French Ministers present accepted 
our decision, reluctantly certainly, but without reserve 
and on behalf of the French Government so far as regards the 
main point - withdrawal from Salonica"(2). The real lack of 
resolution appears to have been shown at the highest cabinet 
level, when the old argument of the dire consequences of a 
threat to political harmony in France again reared its heado 
By the time that the War Committee met on 6 December it 
was evident that all was not running smoothly and Asquith 
anxiously asked Kitchener if he had any information as to 
the French government having gone back on the agreement 
reached at Calais(3). Kitchener replied that the Military 
Attache, Colonel Panouse, had informed him verbally that 
he gathered that the French government had decided they could 
not abide by the Calais decision until the Italians and 
Russians had been consulted and also agreed. Asquith noted 
that there had evidently been trouble in the French Cabinet 
after the conference, while Admiral Oliver remarked that he 
had received similar information about the French government's 
change of view from the Naval Attache and he gathered that 
Briand would have to resign if the forward Salonica policy 
were upset. Lloyd George reported his meeting with Albert 
Thomas, who had stated that the unanimous feeling in the 
French Council of War on the receipt of the Calais decision 
had been one of consternation. The effect of the French 
(1) A. Palmer - OPe cit., p. 50. 
(2) Minute on Bertie to Grey No. 968, 7/12/15, F.O. 371/ 
2278/185902. 
(3) CAB 42/6/3. 
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agreeing to the proposal to evacuate would mean the ulti-
mate overthrow of the Briand government. In fact the French 
Cabinet had decided to send over Thomas, ostensibly,to talk 
about munitions, but in fact to work on Lloyd George who, 
according to Thomas, remained favourable to the campaign. 
The two men having ties as radicals and Ministers of Muni-
tions, the French government hoped it might be possible to 
use Lloyd George to win over his cabinet colleagues(1). 
Because of the possible collapse of his own administration 
Briand had been obliged to take drastic measures. The' 
French Cabinet, examining the record of the Calais meeting, 
came to the conclusion on 6 December that the document did 
indeed represent a reluctant acceptance on France's part 
of the decision to evacuate(2). Such a step remained how-
ever a political impossibility, while the conflict of wills 
between England and France had created, in Cambon's opinion, 
the gravest crisis since the outbreak of the war(3). So 
Briand, in his own hand, carefully changed the wording of 
the proc~s-verbal of the conference, drawn up by his 
Directeur Politique, de Margerie, so as completely to alter 
the sense of what had been decided upon at Calais. It was 
now made to appear that the French representatives had 
merely taken note of the British pronouncements ad referen-
gym to their own government(4). As Cambon wrote with no 
small measure of disgust at the way in which the government 
"The whole question is domi-
of Viviani (now Minister of 
of the Republic by the fear 
of his country was being run, 
nated in the minds of Briand, 
Justice) and of the President 
of a ministerial crisis~(5). Commenting on Briand's evident 






Paul Cambon to Jules Cambon 6/12/15, J. Cambon MSS Vol. 1. 
, 
Poincare - OPe cit., Vol 0 7, p. 312. 
as note (1). 
A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 1034 contains two versions of the 
, ' 
proces-verbal with Briand's handwritten alterations, or 
as de Margerie puts it, "corrige par M. Briand". 
aa note (1) 
his failings, would be a more acceptable figure at the head 
of the government than "ce lezard •••• qulil est impossible 
de saisir et dont au fond la seule ambition est de miroiter 
au soleil,,(1). But a Clemenceau ministry, because of long-
standing personal animosities, would make it extremely 
difficult for Poincare to remain as President. The prospects 
of ministerial instability, as well as a radically different 
approach to the conduct of the war, therefore clearly 
existed and it was in the vistas of political chaos in 
France that British resolve to enforce the Calais decision 
began to weaken. As Lloyd George was now asking, could 
Britain afford to see the end of the Sacred Union in France 
with the Socialists resuming their factious criticism in 
the Chamber? Would England allow her ally to be overcome 
by internal strife, the consequences of which would deal 
the Allied military effort a crippling blow?(2) 
Bertie soon heard that the British governmentrs resolve 
was slackening. He gathered that Lloyd George had said that 
if Britain deserted the French over the Salonica question 
he would resign. Asquith might therefore be faced with 
having to choose between Lloyd George and Kitchener. 
Bertie suspected, however, that Kitchener, when he saw the 
way the votes were gOing, would "after trumfettng, fold up 
his trunk and accommodate to circumstances" 3). But 
.. 
Kitchener at the same time, sensing the changing mood, was 
already contemplating giving up the position of Secretary 
of State(4). Bertie himself did nothing to encourage the 
Cabinet to take a strong line when he reported that a with-
drawal from Salonica might cause the fall of Briand's 
government. Britain would be held by French public opinion 
(1) P. Cambon to J. Cambon 7/12/15, Cambon - Correspondance 
Vol. 3, p. 92. 
(2) Lloyd George - Ope cit., Vol. 1, p. 453. 
(3) Bertie: Diary, Vol. 1, 7/12/15, p. 274. 
(4) Kltchener to Robertson 7/12/15, Robertson MSS, 1/13/31 • 
...... ---~ 
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to have left France in the lurch(1). Briand was now argu-
ing that if the British objections to holding Salonica 
were based on military grounds he was anxious that the matter 
should be settled by the discussions currently taking place 
at Chantilly, between the allied Chiefs of Staff, where 
the English representative would have the opportunity of 
hearing Joffre1s point of view(2). 
The will of the British government to hold its ground 
was thus already weakening when General Murray reported 
to the meeting of the War Committee on 8 December that two 
days earlier the question of Salonica had been considered 
at the Military Conference at Chantilly and that he had 
found himself in opposition to the views of the Serbian, 
French, Italian and Russian representatives, whom he could 
not bring to consider the actual military situation(3). 
The French had argued that, despite the temporary setback 
which the allied forces had encountered, the diversity of 
interests at stake in the Balkans could at any moment swing 
the pendulum in favour of the allies, who should be there 
to take advantage of it(4). The Conference had therefore 
concluded that although the decision of the war could only 
be sought in the main theatres of operations, the delegates, 
with the exception of the British representatives, were 
unanimous in requesting the maintenance of the occupation 
of Salonica(5). The receipt of this information had a pro-
found effect OD British ministers, many of whom had hoped 
that Joffre would have revealed his lack of enthusiasm for 
the campaign. In fact there had been considerable confusion 






Bertie to Grey 7/12/15, F.O. 371/2278/185903. 
Briand to Cambon 6/12/15, No. 4208-9, A. E. 'Guerre' , 
Vol. 1035. 
CAB 42/6/6. 
Plan of action proposed by the French to the Coalition, 
W.O. 159/4. 
Proces-verbal of the Chantilly Conference, Robertson 
MSS, 1/10/10. 
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occupation and, following the Calais Conference, a draft 
despatch had been drawn up to inform Sarrail that the allies 
had agreed upon evacuation(1). Following the lead of the 
politicians, however, Chantilly reversed its stance and 
Joffre informed Sarrail that the French government had no 
intention of evaeuating and asked him if he had really told 
Kitchener that he, himself, saw no further purpose in 
remaining at Salonica(2). In reply Sarrail confirmed his 
belief that with the forces currently at his disposal, no 
meaningful result was possible and, diplomatic and political 
considerations aside, evacuation seemed a logical conclusion(3). 
The British Cabinet, however, knew nothing of this hesi-
tation and Lloyd George, in an astonishing commentary on 
his scale of priorities, now announced that he thought it 
was better that Britain should lose all her forces than that 
any serious misunderstanding should arise with the French(4). 
He received support from Balfour who argued that it was 
absolutely impossible to desert France and that, since the 
British were at Salonica at their instigation, they should 
throw the responsibility for co~ducting the matter further 
on the French and ask them to take over both the military 
and diplomatic command. This proposal to the War Committee 
was perhaps too far-reaching a submission and it was 
decided instead that Kitchener and Grey should go to Paris 
with carte blanche to settle the matter as they should 
think best(S). 
Grey informed Bertie that he and Kitchener were coming 
not to press either the retention or evacuation of Salonica, 
but because the military situation had become so serious 
(1) Draft of Joffre to Sarrail, n.d. 16N3056. 
(2) Joffre to Sarrail No. 2967, 6/12/15, 16N3136. 
(3) Sarrail to Joffre No. 6193, 7/12/15, ibid. 
(4) c.f. Robertson's contradictory statement, above p. 45. 
(5) War Committee 8/12/15, CAB 42/6/6. 
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that the British government considered it necessary to be 
in the closest touch and consultation with their French 
opposite numbers(1). But the visit to Paris was in effect 
a tactical victory for France, for as the British position 
had already been made perfectly clear, it could only be 
modified by Kitchener and Grey in favour of the French 
point of view. Kitchener seems to have been rather unhappy 
about the mission which had been entrusted to him. Rather 
plaintively he told General Callwell that the cabinet no 
longer paid attention to his views and always asked instead 
for the opinions of the General Staff. Callwell feared 
that the War Minister's journey to Paris could only make 
matters worse(2). In fact in disc.l).2sions with Briand and 
Gallieni the question as to whether the allies could hold 
Salonica with a force of 150,000 was only briefly touched 
upon, and all discussions seemed to be based on the tacitly 
understood premise that the continuation of the campaign 
was a sine qua non of the conference(3). As Grey commu-
nicated to the Foreign Office, he and Kitchener had told 
the French authorities that the sole object of the visit 
was to arrange with the French government how British troops 
could support the French forces and secure the safety of 
the whole allied force. The subsequent question of remain-
ing at Salonica was left to' be decided by the course of 
events. "Strained feeling," Grey comfortingly concluded, 
"on the part of the French government is, we think, very 
much diminished by our visit"(4). The possibility naively 
envisaged by Grey in this despatch that the expedition 
might yet be . abandoned was in fact illusory, since as 
has been seen "the course of events", to use Grey's phrase, 




Grey to Bertie 8/12/15, Grey MSS, F.O. 800/58. 
Callwell to Robertson 9/12/15, Robertson MSS, 1/8/28. 
" Proces-verbal, CAB 37/139/24. 
Bertie to F.Oo 9/12/15, F.O. 371/2278/188147. 
which exerted ultimate influence over British policy was 
the course of political events in France, and this was 
never likely to make feasible the abandonment of the 
Salonica expedition. 
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Lord selborne(1), viewing the developments from London, 
voiced concern that Kitchener had abandoned the position, 
which at one stage the whole British cabinet had supported, 
that he would resign rather than stay at Salonica. Selborne 
thought it a pure self-deception to pretend that the ques-
tion of evacuation was really open. The French were going 
to have their way again, the Greeks would be turned into 
hostile neutrals or enemies and the exact situation, which 
the British General Staff had always said would be fatal, 
would be produced(2). The reality of the situation was 
revealed by Asquith to the King following the cabinet 
meeting of 14 December. In effect, Asquith argued, the 
French had asked and Britain agreed that the allies should 
stay on for a time, under arrangements which, from a mili-
tary point of view were equally necessary, whatever might 
be the final decision, leaving "as far as the French are 
concerned that final decision in suspense, but our own 
views as to what it ought to be r~maining unchanged. n(3) 
What the Prime Minister did not state, however, was the 
impossibility of translating British views into allied 
actions. When Grey returned from Paris he was able to tell 
the War Committee that his visit had changed the whole as-
pect of affairs in the French Chamber. Conveniently 
forgetting that he had had to go back on a unanimous deci-
sion of the British cab~net, Grey almost congratulated 
himself for having given priority to French political con-
siderations rather than the expert military opinion which 
(1) President of the Board of Agriculture. 
(2) Selborne to Chamberlain 10/12/15, Austen Chamberlain 
MSS 13/3/94. 
(3) Asquith to George V, 14/12/15, CAB 37/139/27. 
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a couple of weeks earlier he had held to be sacrosanct. His 
assessment of his mission was that it had taken place at 
the right psychological moment and that it was "essential 
that it should have been made.,,(1) Briand's position had 
been eased, but perhaps not to the extent which Grey imagined, 
for Bertie heard that the subsequent debate in the French 
Chamber had been much more stormy than the newspaper accounts 
had suggested, and that at one time 150 Radical-Socialist 
deputies thought of abstaining(2). 
The d~marche begun by Kitchener1s resignation threat 
thus came to an end. It was perhaps typical of British 
diplomacy at its most arrogant that this humiliating and 
ultimately costly collapse of policy could be represented 
in this way as a tactical triumph. In fact Britain's Balkan 
policy had been effectively emasculated and her freedom of 
action curtailed. As a result, carefully considered evalu-
ations of the military situation, such as the General Staff 
continued to produce, could in the last resort remain no 
more than pious statements of intent, susceptible to the 
modifying influences of French political pressure(3). 
(1) War Committee 13/12/15, CAB 42/6/7. 
(2) Bertie - Diary, Vol. 1, p. 276. 
(3) Some accounts have grossly misrepresented this complicated 
episode in inter-allied diplomacy. Joffre suggested that 
it was the news of King Constantinets declaration that 
he would not attack the allies and would consent to the 
defensive organisation of Salonica, which made the 
English ministers more amenable when they arrived in 
Paris (Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 425). Herbillon argued that, 
having returned from Calais, the British ministers were 
struck by Briand's arguments and agreed to review the 
question. The episode was therefore 'un beau et brillant 
succes pour notre "Premier"'. (Herbillon - OPe cit., 
Vol. 1, p. 216). This tendency to convert an exercise 
in rather base political expediency on Briand's part into 
a triumph of statesmanship is repeated by Robert David for 
whom the incident was "the decisive moment when he 
(Briand) best understood and served the interests of 
France". CR. David - OPe cit., p. 123). 
CHAPl'ER V 
Franc e. England and the 
Development of the Campaign. 1916 
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~Allies are a tiresome lot", commented Sir William 
Robertson in October 1916 after a year of attempting to co-
operate with France in the direction of the Salonica 
Expedition.(1) Once the decision to remain at Salonica had 
been taken, relations between England and France revolved 
around two major issues. The first was the question of what 
role the Salonica army should now play in the general conduct 
of the war and the second centred on the policy to be adopted 
by the allies towards the government and king of Greece.(2) 
As far as the military campaign was concerned the prospects, 
at least from a British point of View, were far from promising. 
"We were committed to the defence of Salonica for an indefinite 
time ••• We had engaged ourselves, probably for the duration, 
in a venture which at the moment had scarcely a friend among 
our statesmen, our soldiers or our sailors".(3) The British 
commander, General Mahon, had been powerless in the face of 
his country's volte-face concerning evacuation. On 5 December 
he had received orders to discontinue altogether further 
disembarkation of troops, but five days later disembarkation 
was ordered to re-commence and instructions were received to 
occupy and )repare forthwith a position for defence around 
salonica.(4 But while the Times might rejoice that a "complete 
(1) iobertson to Haig 25/10/16, Robertson MSS 1/22/84 
(2) Restrictions of space prevent a detailed survey of the 
relations of England and France with Greece during the 
Salonica Campaign in the present study. The question can 
be examined in the English Foreign Office archives (Series 
FO 371 vols 2266-2280; 260)-2633; 2865-2895; 3142-3159) 
and at the QUai d'Orsay (Series Guerre vols 246-321). For 
an interesting recent study of the earlier part of this 
period see also C. Theodoulou - Greece and the Entente, 
Au~ust 1914 - September 1916 (1971). 
(3) C. B. Falls - Military Operations: Macedonia (1933) 
vol 1, p 50. 
(4) Mahon to Monro 1/1/16, Howell MSS 111/C1/5. 
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and definitive agreement" had been reached by the French and 
English governments,(1) a basic lack of accord persisted 
between the two allies. Kitchener noted that the military 
situation had improved and asserted that the allied armies, 
havinf taken up defensive positions, would be able to hold the 
port, 2) but Robertson, who was now taking over from Kitchener 
the day-to-day direction of the war, had not given up the hope 
that Salonica might yet be evacuated. In response to a 
General Staff paper which concluded that "to employ our surplus 
divisions in the Balkans next spring and summer would not only 
not promise any adequate results as against the Central Powers 
but might possibly ruin our chance of ultimate victory" and 
that "it would be most advantageous to be relieved of our 
present commitments in the Balkan theatre",(3) Robertson 
urged upon the War Committee acceptance of the principle that 
"we are to persuade the French to withdraw with us from 
Salonica".(4) But the British ministers, conscious always of 
the political considerations which had kept them at Salonica 
in the first instance, re~ected this con,elusion at their 
meeting on 28 December.(5 Balfour ventured to suggest that, 
although the original reasons for the enterprise were bad ones, 
it might be foolish to abandon an adventure which it had been 
foolish to undertake. Germany could not ignore the allied 
presence in the Balkans and in any case no offensive on the 
western front would be feasible for several months.(6) 
Within the Foreign Office Sir Arthur Nicolson even thought that 
it would be well to make Salonica a base from which to form, 
equip and organise a large force to operate in the Balkans when 
the proper season arrived.(7) The majority of opinion in the 
(1) The Times 15/12/15 
(2) Kitchener to Hanbury-Williams 14/12/15, No 448, w.O. 
106/1338 
(3) Examination by the General Staff into the factors affect-
ing the choice of a plan of campaign 16/12/15, CAB 42/6/14 
(4) Kote for War Committee 23/12/15, Robertson NSS 1/6/73 
(5) War Committee 28/12/15,CAB 42/6/14 
(6) Note by Balfour on conclusion of War Committee of 28/12/15, 
CAB 42/7/5 
(7) Nicolson to Hardinge 16/12/15, Nicolson MSS FO 800/)80 
British political and military hierarchy was still, however, 
convinced that evacuation remained a desirable ultimate 
objective, although, after talking to Joffre, Major Clive 
warned that there was little chance of getting any divisions 
away from Salonica before the beginning of February.(1) But 
across the Channel declarations by the French government showed 
how shallow was the agreement which existed between the two 
countries. When questioned by the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Commission Briand asserted that any additions to the Salonica 
force would have to be met by England.(2) The English War 
Committee, on the other hand, was shortly to declare that "any 
reinforcements sent must be French troops and sent on French 
transports". (3) 
Whether or not reinforcements might ultimately be sent to 
Salonica or the whole expedition be abandoned, more immediate 
problems confronted the British and French governments. Chief 
among these was the question of a unified command for the 
allied armies. Joffre advised Kitchener of the possibility 
that the Salonica force might soon be attacked. In such a 
situation it was indispensable that all eight divisions should 
be under the command of a single authority.(4) Kitchener 
accepted the concept of a French commander-in-chief because of 
the preponderant French influence in the decision to undertake 
the campaign, but he expressed the hope that a high-ranking 
French officer would be placed above both General Mahon and 
General Sarrail.(5) Briand greeted Kitchener's partial 
acquiescence with gratitude, but pointed out that the only 
generals senior enough to be placed over Sarrail could not be 
removed from the Western Front. French public opinion, more-
over, would find it difficult to understand why Sarrail, having 
(1) Clive to Mahon 22/12/15, W.O. 158/758 
(2) Senate Foreign Affairs Commission 13/12/15, Archives du Senat 
(3) War Committee 15/12/15, FO 371/2?78/192041 
(4) Joffre to Panouse No 66, 23/12/15, 5N 147 
(5) Doumayrou to Joffre No 13, 28/12/15, 16N 3136. Joffre was 
apparently not unfavourable to Kitchener's proposition and 
would have liked to send out Lyautey or Franchet d'Esperey 
to Salonica. But this idea was vigorously opposed in the 
French cabinet, especially by Painleve and Bourgeois 
(Poincare OPe cit.,vol 7. p 362) 
successfUlly organised the retreat from Serbia, should now be 
inflicted with this apparent disgrace.(1) Briand's appeal 
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was, however, unnecessary for the French embassy had already 
explained to Kitchener that his precondition trpouvait @tre 
genante pour le gouvernement fran9ais". As a result Kitchener 
had disclaimed any wish to involve himself in French internal 
politics and had willingly conceded that General Mahon should 
be placed under the command of Sarrail.(2) "Thus was 
instituted, at a moment when the British government had not 
finally decided whether their troops were to remain at 
Salonica, the unified command in French hands which was to 
endure until the end of the war".(3) Mahon was therefore 
informed that he should comply with the instructions of General 
Sarrail regarding military operations for the defence of the 
town and harbour of Salonica, although he would continue to be 
under the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary 
Force as regards administration.(4) This was, however, a more 
restricted formula than that conveyed by Joffre to Sarrail, 
who was informed unreservedly that he was to exercise the 
command of the combined allied forces at Salonica.(5) At all 
events the decision of the British government to waive its 
numerical superiority in the Salonica expedition, which 
included an inherent right to overall command, carried with it 
the seeds of many future difficulties. 
Over and above the question of unified command, however, 
Sarrail's chief difficulty at this stage was to obtain from 
Chantilly the forces which he considered necessary to the con-
tinuance of the campaign. Mahon reported that Sarrail con-
sidered the allied line to be inadequately held and that he 
(Mahon) was being urged to ask for at least another division 
from England. (6) Robertson replied that as Sarrail was in 
(1) Briand to Cambon No 4594, 30/12/15, A.E. 'Guerre', vol 
1035 
(2) Doumayrou to Joffre No 17, 30/12/15, 16N 3136 
(3) C.B.Falls - OPe cit.,vol 1,p 97 
(4) Kitchener to Grey 10/1/16, F.O. 371/2605/6757 
(5) Joffre to Sarrail No 4784,9/1/16, A.E. 'Guerre' vol 1036 
(6) Mahon to Robertson 13/1/16, F.O. 371/2605/8805 
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command of the whole allied force he should apply to his own 
government for a further division, if he thought this was 
required to secure Salonica.(1) But when this was reported to 
him, Sarrail merely used it as an occasion to ask the French 
government to press upon the British the need for a fresh 
division. This, he stressed, was independent of the two 
divisions which he was asking from Chantilly, which were vital 
if the Salonica operations were not to degenerate into a similar 
state to those of the Dardanelles.(2) With rumours circulating 
in Greece of possible reinforcements, Guillemin asked for 
clarification from the Quai d'Orsay. He reminded Briand that 
he had already expressed the view that the allies should have 
300,000 men at Salonica to hold the Greeks in awe and to be 
able to defeat whatever enemy forces might be encountered.(3) 
Briand replied, however, that the figure of 300,000 had never 
been envisaged and that Guillemin should regard a total force 
of 200,000 as the maximunl that was possible.(4) In fact Briand 
had just emerged from a difficult session of the Senate Foreign 
Affairs Commission where he had been obliged to explain why the 
French government had gone back on its earlier assurance that 
no further French troops would be consigned to the Balkan 
theatre beyond the 60,000 originally deSignated.(5) To the 
concern of opponents of the campaign such as Clemenceau, Briand 
had also asserted that Salonica could in the future become the 
base for more extensive operations than those so far engaged.(6) 
Within the French government General Gallieni showed 
himself in favour of large scale operations in the Balkans and 
thus at once set himself in opposition to Joffre. On 15 Jan-
uary the War Minister presented to his colleagues a study of 
possible future military operations, which concluded that there 
(1) Robertson to Mahon 14/1/16, F.O. 371/2605/9264 
(2) sarrail to Joffre No 911/2, 16/1/16, 1~ 3136 
(3) Guillemin to Briand No 145, 20/1/16, 1~ 3162 
(4) Briand to Guillemin No 116, 22/1/16, A.E. 'Guerre', vol 
1036 
(5) Meeting of Senate Commission 17/1/16, Pichon MSS,vol 4398 
(6) ibid. ArChives du S'nat 
was little hope of breaking the German line in France and that 
it would be preferable to seek the final decision of the war in 
the Balkans with a force of twenty divisions.(1) Joffre, of 
course, found an ally in Robertson, who was pleasmto note that 
he and the French commander were in agreement as to ~'the 
limitations which the difficulties of the country, the lack of 
roads and communications and the shipping situation impose upon 
the Army of the East".(2) In conference at Downing Street, 
moreover, the allies agreed that for the moment there was no 
question of other than defensive operations,(3) and that the 
immediate needs of the situation were to reconstitute and make 
use of the depleted Serbian army and to ask the Italian govern-
ment to participate in the expedition.(4) Dissenting voices, 
however, could still be heard on both sides of the Channel. 
Bertie noted that there was still a hankering after giving up 
the Salonica expedition on the part of Kitchener's friends,(5) 
while Clemenceau continued his polemics in "L'Homme Encha1n~'" 
arguing that "even should Sarrail succeed in holding his ground 
in Salonica the strate~c result of the affair would still amount 
to exactly nothing".(6 Nevertheless Joffre defined Sarrail's 
mission in the terms of the Downing Street agreements. For the 
time being the possibility of an offensive was ruled out and 
Sarrail's ~ask was to hold on to the positions which he already 
held. The general conditions of the war precluded, Joffre 
stressed, any further re-allocation of forces as between the 
French and Salonica theatres, and Sarrail must make do with those 
already at his disposal.(7) What Sarrail could envisage for 
the future was a limited offensive designed to have a powerful 
impact on public opinion, which it might be possible to launch 
(1) Poincare - OPe cit.,vol 8,p 28 
(2) Robertson to Joffre 18/1/16, W.O. 106/1355 
(3) Froces-verbal, 19/1/16, A.E. 'Guerre' vol 981 
(4) Conference Conclusions, CAB 37/141/12 
(5) Bertie - Diary, vol 1, P 291 
(6) 'L'Homme Encha1n" 15/1/16, cited Coblentz -
Ope cit.,p 114 
(7) Joffre to Sarrail No 930-2, 22/1/16, 
A.E. 'Guerre', vol 1036 
if one or more of the Balkan states came over to the allied 
side.(1) 
88. 
The character of General Sarrail naturally exercised a 
profound influence on the development of Anglo-French relations 
in regard to the Salonica campaign. In the words of the official 
British historian, 'lin the case of this theatre of war it is 
necessary, as in few others, to discuss the personality of an 
allied commander, because that of the French commander-in-chief 
had here an influence so important not only on operations but 
also on the relations between the French Headquarters and the 
British".(?) With the campaign still in its infancy, from the 
headquarters of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Bell 
asserted that in his opinion Sarrail was "a rotter" and that but 
for him Britain would "never have been landed with Salonica at 
all".(3) At Salonica itself Howell noted that Sarrail was out 
to create for himself a very good press and that he invariably 
spent a whole hour each evening meeting newspaper correspondants 
and lecturing to them on the situation.(4) Mahon's successor, 
General Milne, found Sarrail conceited, eXCitable, ambitious, 
impetuous and unscrupulous. He was resentful of opposition and 
control and this led him to be impatient with those who did not 
agree with him. He was not open to argument once he had come to 
any conclusion, but was inclined to show dislike of those whom 
he considered to have stood in his way. He was prone to drive 
rather than to lead and did not understand or make allowances 
for the different mentalities of the nations with which he had 
to deal. Not surprisingly Sarrail did not inspire Milne with 
great confidence but the latter admitted that he might be 
biased as Sarrail seemed to regard him as Robertson's emissary 
sent to thwart all plans for an offensive.(5) Acting as a 
(1) Joffre to de Gondrecourt No 60-1, 23/1/16, 16N 3014 
(2) C.B. Falls - OPe cit.,vol 1, p 97 
(3) Bell to Howell 21/12/15, Howell MSS IV/C2/193 
(4) Howell to Robertson 16/1/16, Howell MSS IV/C2!197 
(5) Milne to Robertson 20/7/16, Robertson MSS 1/14/27a. Sarrail's 
resentment of Milne may have had some justification for, in 
private conversation with Painleve in November 1916, Lloyd 
George revealed that Mahon had been replaced because he had 
acquiesced too willingly in Sarrail's wishes - Note by Painleve 
on voyage to London, November 1916, Painleve MSS 313 AP 110 
liaison officer for the W'.:lr Office, Lieutenant-Colonel raJrnard 
reported that Sarrail seldom went far from Salonica and that 
the knowledge he had gained from personal reconnaissance at the 
front must be very limited. N:ost of his time appeared to be 
devoted to political matters and to ceremonial functions which 
brought him before the public eye. Subordinate commanders had 
the impression, therefore, that operations were undertaken in 
too haphazard a manner, often without sufficient foretho~ght or 
preparation and that political motives were apt to induce 
Sarrail to interfere unduly with their prosecution, however 
unversed he might have been in the local situation.(1) 
The difficulties of the English command in working in con-
junction with Sarrail were demonstrated at an early date. 
Il.ahon's intelligence service had been weaving a net in w."ich he 
hoped to take all enemy spies and agents in one sweep. The plan 
had been submitted to Sarrail who had given no verdict upon it. 
But at 2.40 pm on 30 December 1915 Sarrail sent ~ahon a verbal 
message to the effect that he intended to seize all enemy 
consuls at 3 pm and adding that, if I1.ahon had any suggestions 
to make, he should make them before then. Sarrail also invited 
the nominal co-operation of a small party of British troops. 
To give an air of unity to the proceedings Mahon sent these and 
the consuls were duly seized and taken to French headquarters. 
!Lahon noted that u.s a result of Sarrail' s unexpected and in-
dependent action the capture of the enemy agents which was to 
be attempted later in the day was not likely to succeed.(2) 
Elliot commented that the incident was the result of a sudden 
brain storm on the part of Sarrail, while the senior British 
naval officer at Salonica pointed out that, as fuahon had feared, 
the lack of co-operation resulted in many important enemy 
agents escaping capture, as the British plan for arresting 
these spies was spoilt by the premature action of the French.(3) 
In a similar incident in the early evening of 27 January ?f.ahon 
learned that the fort of Kara Burun was to be occupied twelve 
hours later by a French battalion and two batteries under the 
(1) Notes by Maynard after two trips to Salonica, Septe~ber 
and October 1916, W.O. 106/1347 
(2) ~ahon to Robertson 30/12/15, F.O. 371/2?8?/~01846 
(3) Elliot to Grey 1/1/16, F.O. 371/::'605/19740 and comment by 
Admiral Stuart Nicholson on same 
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guns of French warships. The garrison was to receive no warn-
ing and, if it resisted, the fort would be taken by assault. 
The British were called upon to station two battalions east of 
Salonica to resist any attempt by Greek troops to march towards 
the fort. In exasperation Mahon telegraphed to London: "I 
greatly regret this step and particularly the methods about to 
be employed ••• but I have not been consulted and the measures 
are now too far advanced to attempt to modify them.,,(1) 
The possibility of offensive operations from Salonica first 
began to be mooted in February 1916. Lloyd George, supported 
by Bonar Law and Robertson, visited Briand to attempt to dissuade 
the French premier from the idea of any real offensive and to 
inducenm~ concentrate all efforts on the French front. Bertie 
noted, however, that the British leaders did not have any success, 
"for Briand remained oraCular".(2) But there were serious mis-
givings at Chantilly about the proposal for an offensive which 
was being placed before the English government. General Pell~, 
Joffre's Chief of Staff, argued that to launch a major military 
effort in the early spring the allies would have to be in 
possession of incomparably greater means of transport than were 
at their disposal. Without the aid of a reconstituted Serbian 
, 
army Pelle felt it was impossible to think in terms of an 
offensive before July or August. (3) 
with Kitchener, reported that it was 
Panouse, after an interview 
most unlikely that the 
English warlord would agree to send a further division to 
General Mahon. The opinion of the English General Staff appeared 
to be that an offensive from Salonica would require long months 
of preparation and the sending of sUbstantial forces from the 
Western front which could only compromise the effective strength 
of the latter.(4) 
In the face of this resistance from England the divisions 
between the political and military chiefs in France became more 
(1) Falls - OPe cit •• vol 1, P 100; Grey to Bertie, No 312, 
28/1/16, F.O. 371/2615/17688 
(2) Bertie - Diary (7/2/16) vol 1, p 299 
(3) Pelle' to '~l. Ie Ministre' 6/2/16, A.E. 'Guerre', vol 982 
(4) Panouse to Joffre No 1858/7/2/16, 16N 2967 
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acute. Within the Quai d'Orsay Jules Cambon argued that it was 
necessary to undertake operations as quickly as possible to 
restore allied prestige and to win the support of the neutral 
Balkan states. The longer action was delayed the more difficult 
the situation would become.(1) But in conversation with 
Robertson on 14 February Joffre expressed the opinion that a 
great offensive from Salonica WdS out of the question, although 
he proposed to increase the force for the purpose of making a 
demonstration on a large scale.(2) For a real offensive Joffre 
considered that six or seven hundred thousand men would be 
required. But he was prepared to bow to his government's judg-
ment that a mock offensive might be sufficient to bring in 
Romania on the side of the allies.(3) Robertson came to the 
conclusion that "the French politicians are at the root of the 
trouble ••• From every point of view to attempt anything big in 
the Balkans would be the height of fOlly".(4) Joffre had 
.' sprung rather a bomb" upon him in suggesting a demonstration 
northwards with 400,000 men to keep the Bulgarians and the 
Germans from attacking Romania. The politicians in France 
seemed to think that if anything went wrong with Romania their 
ministry would be turned out. But Robertson was prepared to 
oppose the project "to the utmost of my power" and was working 
hard to make the English government take a hard line. He felt 
that Britain was not taking nearly sufficient lead in the con-
duct of the war considering the great amount she was contribut-
ing towards it.(5) Taking a firm stand Robertson advised Mahon 
that no change had taken place in British policy with regard to 
the employment of their troops at Salonica nor at that time was 
the question of undertaking offensive operations being considered 
by the British government. (6) Robertson realised that "Sarrail 
(1) Herbillon - OPe cit., vol 1, P 242 
(2) Note by Robertson 22/3/16, CAB 42/11/9 
(3) Note of conversation with Robertson 14/2/16, Fonds Joffre, 
14N 10 
(4) Robertson to Hanbury Williams 16/2/16, Robertson ross 1/35/57 
(5) Robertson to Haig 17/2/16, ibid 1/22/22 
(6) Robertson to Mahon 21/2/16, F.O. 371/2605/34165 
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must be a great -trouble" to rJlahon, but assured the 3ri tish 
commander that he would never be party to any offensive opera-
tions in the Balkans. These w01.!.ld "be both futile and foolish". 
Possibly Mahon might be equipped to SOllie small extent with 
pack trwlsport so as to Make ~ part of his force a little more 
mobile, but whatever was done in this respect would be on a 
small scale unless and until Ivlahon was defini tely told 
differently. ( 1 ) At the same time the Chief of the In;perial 
General Staff confided to Haig that it was his intention at the 
forthcoming inter-allied conference to "knock the S~lonica thing 
clean out". I twas, he flatly stated, utter nonsense. (?) 
On 22 February the War Committee expressed its basic con-
currence in Robertson's views and determined that the adoption 
of the offensive in the Balkans on a scale sufficient to ensure 
the co-operation of Romania and Greece was at present ruled out 
by the lack of mercantile shipping and the struin it would 
impose on British resources, while the adoption of a partial 
offensive did not offer sufficient military advantage. Robertson 
urged upon his colleagues that from what he had seen of the 
French generals and the French staff he thought that the sooner 
Britain got the general control of operations the better it 
would be.(3) On 24 February, however, evidently as a result of 
the great German offensive at Verdun launched three days before, 
Robertsor. telegraphed to Mahon, that, although no large-scale 
operations were contemplated, a portion of the British forces 
would be given transport suitable for offensive action.(4) His 
lonF-term objective remained, nonetheless, to use some of Mahon's 
troops "elsewhere, more usefully than at present". The attack 
about Verdun might have the effect of proving the futility of 
keeping large forces idle when the main decision was being fought 
out on the Western Front.(5) But Joffre, maintaining as ever a 
precarious balance between support for and opposition to the 
Salonica Jdventure, warned Robertson that he could not consent 
to the removal of a single division from Kacedonia. This could 
only be seen by public opinion as a sign of weakness and of 
(1) Robertson to Mahon 21/2/16, Robertson MSS 1/3517~ 
(2) Robertson to Haig 21/2/16, Robertson kSS 1/22/27 
(3) CAB 42/9/3 
(4) Robertson to Mahon 24/2/16, W.O. 106/1339; Falls-op.cit.,Vol 
1, p 109 
(~) Palls - OPe cit.,vol 1, p 109 
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anxiety about the position on the Western Front.(1) 
A t the beginning of March ~i:ahon reported to London that 
Sarrail had received orders to assume the offensive. His alarm 
was apparent as he pointed out that with present forc~and under 
present conditions he did not consider that any advance could be 
made into Serbia or Bulgaria with reasonable prospects of 
success.(2) After further discussion with Sarrail he telegraphed 
next day that it now appeared as if no more than bluff were con-
templated and on that he was not inclined to look favourably.(3) 
Robertson declared himself unable to understand the receipt by 
Sarrail of any such orders, which could not justifiably be 
despatched without the concurrence of the two governments. He 
had seen Joffre only days before and the latter had made no 
mention of any such intention.(4) In fact Joffre subsequently 
indicated to Robertson that he had merely called for an 
appreciation from Sarrail of the Possibilities.(5) Yarde-Buller 
reported that Sarrail had misunderstood Joffre's intructions 
and that the generalissimo had renewed his assurance to 
Robertson that he would take no decision modifying the line of 
policy agreed upon without Robertson's assent.(6) But the 
whole episode illustrates the lack of entente between the two 
allies in relation to the campaign. Robertson was disappointed 
that Joffre still declined to consider a withdrawal from Salonica. 
He found that the French had become "even more tiresome than 
before", and determined that he would not run down the British 
forces in Egypt for the benefit of the French front, while both 
allies had five divisions "sitting in Salonica doing nothing". (7) 
Robertson therefore warned Mahon that in conversation with 
Sarrail he should be careful to avoid giving the impression that 
the British government had any intention of departing from its 
existing policy, which was restricted to the defence of the 
base at Salonica.(8) At the same time Joffre told Sarrail that 
(1) Joffre to Yarde-Buller 26/2/16, 5N 148 
(2) Mahon to Robertson 5/3/16, w.o. 106/1339 
(3) Falls - OPe cit., vol 1, p 109 
(4) Robertson to Mahon No 14108,6/3/16, w.o. 106/1339 
(5) Falls - OPe cit., vol 1, P 110 
(6) Yarde-Buller to Robertson 8/3/16, w.o. 106/1339 
(7) Robertson to Murray 6/3/16, Robertson MSS 1/32/9 
(8) Robertson to Mahon 4/3/16, No 14144, W.O. 106/1339 
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it was not possible to envisae:e any further reinforcen,ents 
being sent by England to Salonica and that o~ the basis of the 
existing forces, supplemented by a rec.)nsti tuted Serbian arr.:y, 
the aim of France's Balkan ;lOlicy was to win Greece and Ror;ania 
to the allied cause and, if possible, to detach 'Turkey a.nd 
BulgariG. froffi the enemy bloc.(1) 
At a conference of the chiefs of st<.df held at Char-tilly on 
1? Itarch the question of operations in the Balkans W':.l.S fully 
discussed. It was agreed that for the time being it was not 
feasi ble ei ther to wi thdraw troops from the Arru~e d' Orient nor 
to reinforce it. Robertson asserted that the whole issue of 
Salonica would have to be re-examined at a later date and pointed 
out that it was difficult for England to make her force there 
more mobile while France, Italy and Russia were making growing 
calls on her shipping in other theatres of the war. The con-
ference determined that the allies should undertake a general 
offensive in the SunIDler of 1916 and that until then the Armee 
d'Orient should as far as possible be organised for mountain 
warfare.(?) Robertson, however, remained unhappy about the 
whole operation and in a paper prepared for the War Committee 
argued that in view of German activity in the west it was more 
than ever important that the allies should use there all men 
who could possibly be sent and not keep them "useless and idle 
in secondary theatres". A force of more than 200,000 had now, 
he argued, been locked up for several months without exerting 
any appreciable influence on the course of the war. It was 
time that "an end was put to this ridiculous situ~tion". He 
urged the government to inform their French counterparts that 
they intended to remove one division from Salonica to ¥rance as 
soon as transports could be made available and to follow this 
with the removal of further divisions as the reconstituted 
Serbian army arrived.() Meeting to discuss Robertson's pro-
posals the War Con~ittee readily accepted his assurance that 
the forces at Salonica were considerably in excess of the r.umber 
necessary to secure the position there and soon adopted his 
conclusions in toto to be put before the French at a forthcorr.ing 
conference in Paris.(4) Doumayrou wdrned the French govern~ent 
(1) Joffre to Sarrail 10/)/16, 16N 3136 
(2) Falls - OPe cit., vol 1, p 11C 
(3) Note on the situation at Salonica 22/3/16, CaB 42/11/9 
(4) 'liar Cor.:mittee 23/3/16, CAB 42/11/9 
of Robertson's resolution and indicated that Kitchener would 
support him. The French delegates, however, would probably 
find the determination of Asqvith and the other British 
ministers less fixed.(1) 
At the Conference the British delegation tried to use 
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Ki tchener' s prestige to win their case and the ','ii:ir Finister 
"expatiated in a hectoring manner on the inutility of the 
Salonica Expedition". He announced the intention of vrithdraw-
ing a British division and then Robertson disclosed that this 
would be preliminary to the withdrawal as soon as possible of a 
second and a third division. Perhaps respondin r - to Doumayrou's 
analysis of the situation, Joffre and Briand ~ave the usual 
series of diplomatic arguments against a withdrawal from Salonica. 
Romania would give up all hope of a combination with Greece, 
Bulgari~ould be emboldened to take up an aggressive attitude 
towards Romania and there would no lenger b$ any prospect of 
Greece joining the Entente Powers. Briand therefore appealed 
to Asquith and Grey to refledt on the diplomatic and political 
consequences of a withdrawal in present circumstances. The 
effect materially and morally would be disastrous. Asquith, 
"seeing that Kitchener and Robertson had not made out a logical 
case", said that he would not persist in the proposal put for-
ward by the British military authorities.(2) The general 
impression conveyed by the French representatives was that they 
were now more firmly oP)osed than ever to withdrawing any 
troops from Salonica.(3 This was even true of Joffre, and 
General Gouraud noted the novelty of hearing from the mouth of 
the generalissimo vigorous ar~~ents in support of secondary 
theatres of operations.(4) Robertson regretted that his 
"heated discussion with Joffre in front of ASQuith and Briand'· 
had again failed to bring any divisions away from Salonica. He 
remained convinced, however, that Sarrail would "get us into a 
mess there before he has done", and expressed the hope that 
~ahon would be careful and not lose any more British lives than 
possible in foolhardy enterprises.(5) On reflection, after the 
(1) Doumayrou to Jogal No 79,21/3/16, A.E. 'Guerre', vol 982 
(2) Bertie - Diary, vol 1, P 327 
(3) Procas-verbal, CAB 28.1.C. 7b 
(4) Gouraud to Berthelot 30/3/16, Berthelot t,':SS 
(5) Robertson to Murray 5/4/16, Robertson MSS 1/32/19 
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war was over, Robertson noted that Bri tish rr,inisterial opinion 
at the allied conferences was seldom deterr.-:ined or ur.animous. 
French ministers, on the other hand, invariably presented a 
united front and came to the conierence well prepared not only 
to meet British arguments against continuing the expedition but 
also to produce new ones for enlarging it. When, as was often 
the case, these arguments were of a political character, it 
would be claimed that they were so important as to necessitate 
military considerations being overriden.(1) Noretheless 
Robertson had no alternative but to inform NJahon that there was 
no prospect of any troops being withdrawn from Salonica. It was 
therefore possible that circumstances might justify Britain 
later on in changing her purely defensive polic~; for limi ted 
offensi ve measures. As a resul t l\~ahon was instructed to furni sh 
the War Office with information on additional transport require-
ments to meet such an eventuality.(2) 
A plan for limited offensive operations submitted by Sarrail 
had in fact received Joffre's approval on 20 Karch. Writing at 
the beginning of April, however, Sarrail warned that with the 
forces currently at his disposal he was capable of no more than 
bluff. The general argued that a unique opportunity existed 
since, in his opinion, a mobile war was possible in the Balkan 
theatre alone - only there could the allies break out of the 
stalemate of the trenches. The only reqUireme(t~ therefore, 
was for substantial reinforcements to be sent. 3 Joffre was 
also becoming impatient with the situation and had urged Briand 
to force Romania to declare herself for the allies, under threat 
of the removal of part of the Armee d'Orient and of possible 
negotiations with Bulgaria.(4) Although Sarrail's n~w plan of 
opera tions was cri ticised in detE.l.il by Joffre, (5) the general-
issimo argued before the Conseil Superieur de 1a Defense 
Nationale on 20 .April that, if Romanian collaboration were forth-
coming, the Arm6e d'Orient would be called upon to play an 
important role in the winning of the war.(6) The council itself 
(1) Robertson - OPe cit., vol 2, p 105 
(2) Robertson to Mahon 31/3/16, No 14979, w.o. 106/1339 
(J) Sarrail to Joffre No 849/3,7/4/16, A.E. 'Guerre', vol 10J6 
(4) Note Sl.1r 1a question roumaine 15/4/16, 16ri 3057 
(J) See below p 151. 
(6) Note sur 1<1 situation balkanique 15/4/16, 16N J015 
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decided that Sarrail's forces should be ready to launch a real 
offensive 
army,(1) 
as soon as they had been reinforced b~' t~e Serbian 
and Joffre informed Robertson offue co~seouent need 
to maintain all forces currently engaged in the Balkar~ theatre. 
He argued that when the reconstituted Serbian army had arrived 
at Salonica there would be a total of 300,000 fighting troops 
and that no other mission could be assigned to the expeditionary 
force than to attack the enemy on the Greek frontier with all 
available forces. Even if it were not possible to obtain any 
important success, the offensive would nevertheless have the 
effect of iw~obilising important Bulgarian forces as well as the 
German or Austrian divisions which the enemy would have retained 
on the spot or even brought back into the peninsula on account 
of demands made by the attacked Bulgarians. The offensives on 
the main fronts would in consequence be proportionately relieved. 
Joffre therefore renewed his previous requests that the British 
troops should as soon as )ossible be prepared for a campaign 
in mountainous country.(2 This was the first time that the 
French Cowmander-in-Chief had "definitely expressed himself in 
favour of an offensive in ltacedonia". ( 3) Robertson thought it 
best in the circumstances to remind fI.ahon of the limi ts of 
Bri tish policy in the Balkans. The British COLJLander could 
hold the enemy under the threat of an offensive by moving his 
troops up to, but not over, the Greek frontier. But he should 
carefully avoid taking any action which he considered might 
commit his troops to offensive operations beyond the frontier, 
more especially as he was not properly orgd.nised for Lountain 
warfare. (4) 
When the V/ar Commi ttee discussed the situation on 28 April 
no final decision was arrived at. Robertson merely undertook 
to furnish a memorandum examining future operations in the 
Balkans and the possibilities of an offensive in that theatre. 
The enquiring Lord Crewe,(5) who wished to know just what was 
(1) Joffre to Briand No 1232, 2/6/16, 16N 3015. 
(2) Joffre to Robertson 25/4/16, CAB 42/13/2; W.O. 106/1)48 
( 3) Falls - OPe cit. , vol 1 , P 116 
( 4) Robertson to 1lahon No 15781.26/4/16, W.O. 106/1'40 , ~ 
( 5) The Lord President of the Council and or.e of ASfluith's close 
colleagues 
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the military purpose of the campaign, received little satis-
faction. Asquith said that there did Lot seeffi to be aLY 
immediate strateric objective; the real j1.,;.stification wus to 
influence the Greek und Romaniar. povernments. (1 )To find out 
how sdvanced French plans were, Robertsor~ asked Ii;ahon whether 
Sarrail had consul ted him adequ8- tely in regard to .ai s Dla.n for 
offensive operations.(?) ~ahon w~s iL fact not eveL aware that 
any definite plan had actually been prepared. He nad not been 
asked to express his views on the subject in a ~eneral w~~, nor 
were the staffs in consultation with re~ard to details.(j) 
Robertson's memoraridum was duly prepared and discussed at 
the War Committee on 3 ~_ay. The general pointed out that Joffre 
had been expecting the intervention of Rorr:ania for more than a 
;rear now and that there were no good reasons for supposing that 
she WCiS any nearer taking the field on the ~llied side than 
she ever had been. The intervention of Greece ';"idS a r.:ore genuine 
possibility, but the Greek army was deficient in munitions and 
equiprr,ent, which could only come from the allies ar.d which 
would entail a further strain on their shi~ping resources - a 
strain which would huve been increased much beyond present 
lilT'its by their own action in takine the offensive in the 
Balkans. Robertson thought, moreover, that there WaS no justifi-
cation for expecting any great success in the Balkans - he 
believed that the operations wO'L;ld soon resolve themselves into 
a state of deadlock similar to that on the main European fronts. 
As repards the advantage of holding enemy forces in the 
Balkans, Robertson believed these would be restricted to the 
Bulgarian army and a small German force, and he was unable to 
see that this would have any material effect upon the decision 
of the war. He warned, however, that if the British now 
insisted on the 350,000 troops of the armee d'Orient remaining 
inactive this would pluce her in an impossible position vis-a-
vis the French and might seriously str~in inter-allied relations. 
The only course, therefore, was not to reject Joffre's pro-
posals but to do the utmost to ensure that the plan of opera-
tions was strictly limited and suited to the size of the force 
(1) CAB 42/12/12 
(~,) Robertson to Mahon 30/4/16, Robertson MSS 1/14/10 
(3) tlahon to Robertson 1/5/'6, ibid 1/14/" 
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available and the conditions of its or~anisation and equip~ent. 
In order to ensure that this was done it was necessClry that 
fI;ahon should, on the assumption of the offer:si ve, :revert to his 
original Eta tus of an independent co[;;rnander. ( 1) The "liar 
Corr.mittee hesitated, however, to adopt Robertson's suggestions 
and Lloyd George argued that Joffre should be told that to 
attempt an offensive with the forces available was impossible. 
In the end il was merely decided that Robertson should discuss 
with Joffre the scope and plan of the proposed offensive in 
order that an estimate might be made of the liabilities involved 
in respect of men, munitions and ships before a final decision 
was reached.(2) Robertson coniided his fears to 3eneral 
kurray that the War Committee would eventually accept Joffre's 
proposals in toto and that offensive operations would be under-
taken in June. In such an eventuality, however, he would 
insist on fuahon regaining his independence. He thought it 
likely that there would "be a row with the French in this 
connection", but argued that it was "preposterous" to suppose 
that Britain should )lace her forces in any sense under the 
orders of Sarrail.(3 
In view of the increasing gravi ty of the situation rr.ahon 
was replaced by the more senior and experienced General Milne.(4) 
Robertson inquired of the new corrmander his opinion of the pro-
posed operations, having regard to "men, munitions, commurlic-
ations, transport, mountain artillery and much additional 
shipping which we might find it impossible to provide". Robert-
son admitted that Britain would have to co-operate with her ally 
(1) "Offensive Operations in the RJ.lkans", 29/4/16, CAB 42/13/2 
(2) War Committee 3/5/16, CAB 42/13/2 
(3) Robertson to &urray 3/5/16, Robertson ~SS 1/32/24 
(4) Fairholme pointed out to Robertson that kahon had from the 
first entirely subordinated himself to "the nasterful person-
ality of General Sarrail", so that latterly he was hardly 
informed, much less consulted regarding what was dcne. This 
would, Fairholme argued, make it very difficult for fLaton's 
successor to take up a stronger line without incurring resent-
ment. The British army having been placed UIIder Sarrail, 
Fairholme supposed "that we have abandoned all claim to a 
policy, at least locally". (Fairholme to Robertson 12/5/16, 
CAB 42/14/12) 
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to the fullest extent possible, but this wovld ~ot justify her 
undertaking "futile and costly operations". (1) He wanted 
Niilne to know that Britain was at present in 1.0 sense COITl1fJi tted 
to offensive operat ions. (2) In reply II.ilne eXLressed the 
opinion that Sarrail's scheme was "ar;,bitious and risky" 8.l1d that 
the chances of carrying it to a successful conclusion were 
small. Sarrail had informed hir.: that he bbd received defini te 
instructions to attack when ordered ar:d that the ,--llies were 
agreed upon this point, but kilne had n;ade it clear th~ t he was 
bound by no such instructions. He considered G clear definition 
of future policy to be essential if Britain were not to be 
drawn into unforeseen operations based on the term "lir::i ted 
offensive".(3) Robertson reparded Sarrail's tactical plan as 
much more than risky a.nd Cin:bi tious, since it proposed an offen-
si ve front of nearly 100 miles. He wanted to krlOw if ri:ilne 
had in any way agreed to this plan in the everlt of the niain 
principle being sanctioned. (4) t.ilne was in fact unaware of 
the extent of the proposed operations. He hao not agreed to 
Sarrail's plan nor could he U!1til the intention of the British 
General Staff and the posi tior:. of the Bri tish arr;:y ur .. der Sarrail 
were quite clear.(5) 
On 10 rv.;....y the 'Nar Comnii ttee he':l.rd that Robertson had been 
un~ble as yet to see Joffre, but he understood that the Italians 
would take no part in the proposed oper,~tions and that, on the 
contrary, General Cadorna was about to remove certain brigades 
from Valona.(6) Developments in Paris, however, now began to 
speed up the course of events. On 11 t,:ay the Fre:r:ch Cabinet 
decided unanimously(7) to ask Britain to send two of her div-
isions in Egypt to Salonica.(8) Briand told Carr;bon that for 
the second time the question of Salonica had arisen between 
(1) Robertson to lilne 8/5/16, Robertson KSS 1/14/16 
(2) ibid 12/5/16, ibid 1/14/17. 
(3) ~ilne to Robertson 12/5/16, ibid 1/14/18 
(4) Robertson to kilne (undated), ibid 1/14,'23 
(5) ~ilne to Robertson (no date), Robertson t.SS 1/14/24a 
(6) CAB 42/13/6 
(7) with the exception of Denys Cochin who re~arked that Joffre 
and de Casteln~u wunted the troops to be sent to France 
(8) Poincar6 - OPe cit., vol 8, p 214 
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the two allied governments. 'fhe AmIte d' Orier.t had already 
achieved diplomatic results sufficient to justify its continued 
presence in the Balkans but with its fighting strength about 
to reach 350,000 men there could be no question of its remain-
ing idle at a moment when the allies were about to atter.;pt con-
certed action on all other fronts. The French government 
therefore requested that the British forces should be supplied 
wi th all necessary n;aterial. l\.oreover a reserve of 50,OCO rr:en 
offered the prospect of much greater success than ~dS likely 
with existing forces and would, in all probability, pull 
Romania and Greece into the conflict. Cambon should therefore 
urge upon Gre;)' the necessi t;), to divert two divisions 1 rom Egypt, 
originally destined for the western front.(1) The Quai d'Orsay, 
waiting for a response from London, heard that the English 
government was totally opposed to an offensive against Bulgaria 
and that General l\:aurice, the Director of II.ili tary Operations, 
who was coming to Chantilly, would put this point of view 
forcibly to the Grand Quartier Gen~ral. This, Paris suggested, 
would be diametrically opposed to the "ententes intervenues 
relativement a l'offensive du corps expeditionnaire franco-
anglais a Salonique tt .(2) Cambon reported that this information 
was not accurate. The English government and General Staff 
were not absolutely opposed to the idea of an offensive and 
fI:aurice had no such instructions. As to the suggested agreeItent 
regarding offensive operations, Carr:bon expressed total ignor-
ance.(3) 
Having obtained more precise details from Joffre as to the 
scope of the proposed offensive, Robertson prepared a fUrther 
paper for the War Con~ittee. Supporting hi~self with the 
observations of General Nlilne, Robertson gave as his opinion 
that the campaign should not be undertaken. He did not think 
that even Joffre himself believed the allied forces were strong 
enough to achieve success. Robertson added "with full respect 
to the Committee" that he could take no responsibility in 
regard to the plan and that he considered it "entirely unsound 
from every military point of view".(4) In the War Committee 
( 1 ) Briand to Cambon No 1585-8,1?/5/16, A.E. 'Guerre', vol 1036 
(?) Briand to Cambon 15/5/16, No 1619, A.E. ' Guerre', vol 1037 
( 3) Car: bon to Briand 15/5/16, No 585, ibid 











on 17 I\,ay Robertson asserted than ar,y r:.an who was tn iDE'" to 
get 350,000 men to attack 30(',000 in a restricted and highly 
entrenched country It was a madman". He WhSi: ~nerefore most 
anxious that Milne should be put on the S8.n.e footir.g as Haig 
1020 
on the Western Front. Robertson's arguments were readily 
accepted and it was decided that Iv:ilne should "be inforr:.ed that 
he was to continue to comply with Sarrail's orders for the 
defence of the town and harbour of Salonica, but that as far as 
offensive operations were concerr.ed the British geLeral was in 
every respect an independent comn.ander and not bour.d by any 
instructions except those received froDI Robertson. At the same 
time a memorandum was drawn up for presentation to the French 
government based on Robertson's paper. (1) Paul Car:1bon, in 
full knowledge of the attitude of ChantillY,(?) had expressed 
the hope to Sir Arthur Nicolson that the reply of the British 
government would be precise and that, if it were a refusal, it 
would be supported by clearly expressed military reasons.(3) 
He was not to be disappointed. In the British despatch it was 
pointed out that Joffre had himself previously laid great stress 
on the inevitable effect upon French reserves of the prolonged 
fighting at Verdun and the oonsequent need for strengthening 
the Western Front and that the British government felt that 
the security of the Franco-British forces in the autumn might 
demand the services in France of every available man. The 
British authorities were convinced that it was not feasible to 
undertake such a stupendous task as that involved by a campaign 
in the Balkans at a time when the Entente forces were so vitally 
corr~itted to fighting on the main fron~ The general policy 
in the Balkans must therefore be defensive ru:d the allied troops 
then at Salonica be reduced to the number reauired for the 
defence of that place. (4) In transmi t ting the n,en:orandum to 
Cambon, Sir Edward Grey emphasised the overwhelming diffic~lty 
of the shipping si tuation and said that it ?rdS most importb..nt 
that, pending further discussion, no forward movement should be 
made by the troops at Salonica. He did not wish to discuss the 
memoranduDl since he did not feel competent to comrr,ent on 
(1) CAB 42/14/1 
( 2) see bel ow p p 151 - 2 • 
(3) P. Cambon to J. Cambon 18/5/16, Jules Cambon l •. SS vol 1 
(4) War Comrrittee 17/5/16, CAB 42/14/1; Falls - OPe cit., vol 1, 
p 117 
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military matters, upon which the British refly had been 
exclusively based. (1 ) CaHlbon reported to Paris that, although 
the request for two divisions had been rejected, the Bnglish 
military hierarchy was less opposed than in the past to the 
idea of offensive operations and that useful discu~3sions were 
r,'ore likely to ensue between the allied ger.eral staffs than 
between the two governrnents. (2 ) 
Robertson fowld it "very difficult to de~l with people 
like the French". He expected that there would be "rather 
serious trouble about this matterM , but felt that "we really 
must stick to our ground on this occasion". If Britain er:barked 
on a Balkan campaign the result mi8:ht be very serious indeed 
in regard to the war as a whole. (3 ) Before Briand had even 
recei ved the comn;unica tion of the British governrr.ent he urged 
upon Cambon the need to obtain the assent of London to the 
French proposals. French opinion w01.;ld be ILOst unhappy if the 
sizeable forces e;athered at Salonica were left unerr:ployed and 
the government would be in a difficult situation in relation 
to the press and to the Chamber if the British reply proved 
negative. If the British government was still not convinced 
by Cambon's entreaties, Briand was ready to meet Asouith, Grey 
and Kitchener at Boulogne or Calais at a time wnich sated their 
convenience.(4) Cambon duly followed the instructions of the 
Quai d'Orsay, but was not prepared to allude to the possibilities 
of a hostile reaction in the French press since the power of 
government censorship was such that this would be tcmtamour.t 
to saying that the administration itself had fostered the news-
paper campaign. Cambon believed that the sine qua non of 
Bri tish adherence to the French plar.s was th~t the Western Front 
should not in any way be weakened. Yet the two divisions w~ich 
France cla.imed for SalO!:ica had been urgently requested by 
,-T offre for France. Had the general-in-chief changed his mind? 
~oreover were these two extra divisions really indispensable 
to the launching of an offensive? Questions such as these 
were bound to be raised by the Enf,lish representatives at the 
conference which Briur.d had proposed and the Frer.ch governn:ent 
(1) Grey to Bertie 19/5/16, Grey lSS, F.O. 8rO/59 
(?) Car~bon to Briand 19/5/16, No 504, A.E. 'Guerre' vol 1037 
(3) Robertson to Haig 18/':)/16, Robertson hSS 1/~2/36 




must be prepa red to answer therr.. I t was no t .£'ene ral observa-
tions but precise reasoninp; which would induce the British to 
change their mind.(1) 
On receipt of the British response, ~owever, the Conseil 
des [;' inistres authorised Briand to provoke a l':".eetin,c- of the two 
governments as soon as possible. (2)· Briand infor::ed Carr.bon 
that the French cabinet rer;:ainecJ ur.::u:.ic,ot<s in its o.;inion and that 
the atti tude of the Elli::lish authori ties was likel~' to cause a 
parlian.entary crisis in France. He stressed to Cari-bon that 
General Joffre shared cornplete1J,' the vi e'?,S of the governrlient on 
the necessi ty for a vigorous offensive [ .. nd that he (Briand) was 
still ready to defend the French project at a confereLce of the 
two a11ies.(3) The English War Cormittee heard from Grey of 
the "great en,otion" which had been caused in the F'rench Cabinet 
by the English attitude. Lloyd George believed that General de 
Castelnau and others now approved of the question being left 
to the military to decide. If that were the case it w~s to 
Bri tain' s advantage. ( 4 ) So Cambon now forwarded a r;-.emorandUln 
from Grey which emphasised the British government's conviction 
that the question of operations at Salonica was one in which 
military considerations must be decisive and that if political 
factors were allowed to encroach all hope of success in the war 
might be lost. But in deference to Briand's request the idea 
of a conference was accepted.(5) The French ambassador was 
instructed to reply that the French government had never 
weighed poli tical considerations above r:ili tary ones, even 
though, only days earlier, he had been warned of the political 
repercussions within France of a British refusal. Briand, as 
an earnest of his intention to give priority to rLilitary factors, 
suggested that the matter should be discussed between the 
mili tary authori ties of the two powers. He rr.aintained, n:ore-
over, that the resolution to undertake offensive operations 
from Salonica had been taken by the combined chiefs of staff of 
both Britain and France and that the present French proposal 
(1) Cambon to Briand No 624 and 624 bis, 22/5/16, it.E. 'Guerre' 
vol 10J7 
(2) Poincare, OPe cit., vol 8, p 233 
()) Briand to Cambon No 1724,2J/5/16, A.E. 'G~erre', vol 1037 
(4) War Committee 26/5/16,CAB 42/14/11 
(5) Cambon to Briand No 649, ~6/5/16, I,.L. 'Guerre', vol 10)7 
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was based on the formal o)inions of General Joffre and the 
Grand Quartier G'en~ral.(1 Cambon aga.in took the opportunity 
to correct Briand's interpretation of the facts. It was possible 
to take up the question a("ain, but it wa.s not possi tle to cite 
the resolutions arrived at during the Chantilly Conference of 
the preceding r .. arch as en{"ClP:ing the Bri tish .f!overnmer.t to rein-
force the Arme~a'Orient nor to undertake an offensive. He 
I 
suggested that "avant d' entamer une discussion se'rieu se avec les 
autorites militaires ang1aises, i1 iLlporte de se reporter i3. ces 
textes".(2) 
Robertson now appreciated that the issue was no longer one 
for rdli tary opinion, since the two allies a'pareEtly disdgreed. 
The solution to the problem rested with the governments. The 
British War Committee therefore replied to the latest French 
appeal that it had never acquiesced in any decision of principle 
in favour of an offensive from Sa10nica and that in the opinion 
of the War Committee no useful purpose would be served by a 
further military conference. On the contrary it wo~ld be 
necessar~ for the leaders of the two governments to meet once 
again. (3 Robertson hoped that II.ilne now understood that the 
British government had not agreed to any offensive operations 
in the Balkans. Sarrail, if he thought such an agreement 
existed, had been misinformed and rdlne should "put this right 
at an early opportunity". The British corrmander would be 
informed i,:unediately if his government's policy were changed. (4) 
Taking advantage of the freedom of expression which his 
seniority in the diplomatic corps permitted him, Camben sent 
Briand a secret despatch containing his own views on the whole 
affair.(5) It had been carried out, he argued, without method. 
It had been well known that the British military chiefs were 
opposed to any offensive and that the British shipping situation 
was extremely grave. Yet instead of trying carefully to rerr:edy 
( 1) Briand to Crur.bon 1\ 0 1758, 27/5/16, A.E. 'Guerre', vol 1037 
(2) Cambon to Briand No 653, 28/5/16, A.E. 'Guerre', vol 1037 
(3) War Committee 30/5/16, CAB 42/14/12 
(4) Robertson to Milne 28/5/16, W.O. 106/1340 
(5) For Cambon's reluctance to play the role of the puppet of 
of the Quai d' Orsay see W. K. EUbank - Paul Car.;bon I t.:aster 




these factors, France hud gone straight in aNi i:::sJ..~ec5 for two 
di vi sions from Egypt which had already been promised to Joffre 
in France. In adC: i tion Prance had ci ted 2.greerr.er_ ts whi eh had 
never been wade and had comrnunicated 3arrail' s plar. of operations 
which needed half a r.!illion r.:en to be carried out. In such 
circumstances a refusal from Britain was or.ly to be ex!=,ected. 
Corning as near as he possibly could to telling Briand what he 
krew of Joffre's true attitude,(1) Cambon said that whatever 
the premier was told he should know that at heart the Grand 
Quartier Gen~ral wanted the extra divisions to be ser.t to 
France and that this was appreciated in Er.glar.d. The best hope, 
therefore, was that Enplish approval mi,ht be secured for a 
plan to undertake offensive operations witho~t the two divisions, 
and it was along these lines that Briand should direct his 
attention with a view to the forthco~ing conference. (2) 
Pressure was however building up on the French government 
to force their British counterparts to agree to the offensive. 
On 2 June Joffre rerr.inded Briand that the lon,;:er a decision 
was delayed the more difficult the ensuing operations would 
become because of the opportunities afforded to Bulgaria to re-
inforce her defensive Positions.(]) On the sa~e d~y Briand 
himself had riven an undertaking to the Cha.r::ber Foreign Affairs 
COLli,ission that he would insist upon the l!:nglish sending their 
two divisions from Egypt to Salonica. (4) The Er~glish attitude, 
however, showed no in~ediate sit~s of growing weaker. General 
Haig had requested that, in view of the proposed offensive in 
France, every availatle division should be brought there from 
Salonica with a view to supporting his operations which were 
likely to be of a prolonged duration.(5) The War Committee 
W!:1S in no posi tion to COl'Jser_ t to thi s but it did remind the 
French government that kilne had beer. informed that, apart from 
the defence of Salonica, he was to confine himself to co-opera-
tion with Sarrail in accordance with his own judgement based 
on the instructions he received from London. Reports received 
(1) see below p 152. 
(2) Cambon to Briand 30/5/16, No 666, A.E. 'Guerre', vol 1037 
(3) Joffre to Briand 2/6/16, No 1232, ibid; Suarez - OPe cit., 
vol 3, p 285 
(4)Parlinmentary archives, C 7490 
(5) Haig to Hobertson 1/6/16, Cr.B 42/15/6 
()f.~.;ll;jivc ()p'.}r~ti(lll;";, but ~he l.ri[;i,-;h forco::; wOl~l(: tc.k ..... no p_r: i!l . L~c ;3uch 
l'Li'~ti"l!G.(l) ~;o.rl'c.il'0 l'rusollL cdsl'()sitie.,n,3 'wi,;J.'t) "no:" .L ~::'J. :::~.;"i.:;;'c.·..;tcr..:" 
thL t :<i1no chould llliJ.ko his posi tio11 in reJ.i.c tiUll tu oJ~:,r:..iJ PQr.:\::c:"::'~· cL,:-r 
to t.he lu.ttor. (;.) ;)ut whc,n ;:ilnc confronted the ~:rcnch ";8n2:;.-:...1 he h,::. :'d ~.;:.,'c.in 
rcccntl.r i.~G ~) JW1C :~nd thu t he declined to \{i thdrc.:.w ;"'ll~ ()f hi3 '-Qv~';lceci 
pociUonG, which "will S00118r or lc:tcl' cir:..w us int0 o:'fcnsive o.i.~urc.tio;lljll. (5) 
Grey inforLied C[.IaOOn th:.:, t thc membcl's of the ·,iz..r Com;~;i t tee h:..d hc~ l'li. vi ih 
crec.t ~;urprise and conoern th:. t 3uch order::; h::c. bc(,;!: ::;ent whc:1 th,; Hi:ole 
'iue::;tion of bon ol'fcn:Jivc w:.:.::; lll1der' diGcll'j::;ion. 'n1C:ir feLr w<.s til~ t c.:. cii:..;<:stcr 
\{Quld be pre cipi t<.: ted. (4) \lihen repor LinG back to Paris, CSJ:.1on comr:lCnted on 
the lack of uGreement between the two goverru:;ents which rcpro[;.checi one ;.:nother 
wi th 3endinc contradictory intructions tc their re::;p(;cti vo .:;ener~.ls - [. 
situ;.:tion which would only cease when the ,-!uestion of (;;.11 offensive h~,d been 
settled.(:'» .iJertic now informed Grey thut Jriund denied sandin{; order:.; for 
an offensive to ;.iarro.il. Il1le l.'rcnch premie r h-d, howevor, 
ilritain failed to couperate in the measuros propo~ed., which were of vcr:' 
1imi[;ed extent, the French forces Would hE-vO to opercte £.lone, since it would 
be o.b::mrd to take no action when there Were 350,000 aL.icd troops ht Jt;lonic<.i.(6) 
Bertie hud urGed Bri:.Lnd not to press for an offensive When he caLle to London, 
but the latter contended that the }"}'cnch proposuls were lluite fec.sible Lnd 
safe and th;..t he would endeavour 30 to convince the :;;ritish covemr...:mt. (7) 
:}ut While the british government continued to preserve an ir;;.pres:;ive 
face of resiotencc to the blandishments of France, the actual di:.>cusoions of 
the ',{ar Conuni ttce had revealed the return of that ovcrridinc concern with the 
:3tability of the French body politic Which hl"d so puralysed 3ri tish diplomucy 
(1) i.O. j'lomorandum, F.O. 371/2619/106998. 
(~) iiobertson to di1ne 3/6/16, 1".0. 371/~619/10699d. 
(5) ;:11no to Hobertson 6/6/16, Ho. G. C. 149, ~.J.C. 106/1340; 1"(.l1u; OPe cit., 
Vol. 1, P 125. 
(4) Grey to .Gertie 'r/6/16, No. 1238, 1<'.0. ,'{1/2.619/110200. 
(,:)) C,-.mbon to Briand No. 'lOB, 7/6/16, J.. • .r.;. 'Gucrre', Vol. 11...1:"7. 
(6) ~Ultio to Grey 0/6/16, 1''.0. 571/261~/1l0911. 
(n ibid u/6/16, iJortic iJ:j;j, i.U. OOO/161Jji.'r/16/59. 
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c.t the end of 1915. (1) "':::J~luith pointed out that -JrL:nd would. 1;e L::-ri"lrinc 
a t the inter-allied conIcrence in the ImC1l.cd.ce the t his fJ.ini;::; tr~, woulli 
fall if he fuiled in hi3 mission. Politically the ;.)clonica offensive waG 
[:. [Jatter of life and death for the i?rench. l3e-lfour voiced the or-inion that 
Joffre and Briand - indeed the whole ~i'rench peol,le - oust be :nc.d. i~athcr 
nore re£.listically Grey commonted thL.t for their own political purp03es the 
1<'rench were prepUred to force a disClster. Ls :w.oyd Georbe explained, 
the men who Were cri ti cisilG Briand were the friends of Gem rul ~;:;,rrail, 
and, as the Prime Hinister observed, "if Bri&nd went then Gene 1'<:.1 Joffre 
would go too and then General :::;c.rrail would h,,-ve the cOliJIlland in Fra."1Ce.,,(:2) 
Such "- prospect was sufficient to send a chill down the spine of any 
13ri tish politician and Gre;:! c.nxiously asked :aertie for his opinion of the 
consequences of u British refusal to cooperate in the }1rench offensive. 
itself were endangered the situation would be "most If the elliance 
critical". (3) :Bertie replied that it was quite possible that Briand m4;ht 
fall as c. result of the Secret Session of the French Chamber in the f01lowinc 
week, but the real reason would be the unpreparedness of the Verdun defences. 
IIe miGht c1aiD. thut Britain's refusal to join in a Salonica offensive had 
o-eatly hampered his policy, but Bertie did not considerthat his resigl1o:ltion 
on such a plea \0 uld in any way endanger the entente. If ~lish troops 
were wi thdrnwn from Salonicn the effect on French public opinion would be 
very bad, but Bertie did not think that the French public Would uccuse 
Britain of desertion if she made it clear thnt she would continue to 
coop~rate in the defence of Salonica and only cbstained fron an offensive 
in order to use her military pcwer for the cocoon interests of the tvo 
allies in the defence of French territOry.(4) Reassuringly Bertie ndded. 
that there was no dangor of Caillllux being a member of 8l;,' ca.bire t which 
replaced the oxisting one.(5) l-loreover if Clemcnceau ca.me to p()lor he 
would work strongly with England andtbere would be no question of an offensive 
from 3alonica. Both Clemenceau and his close associate Pichon regarded 
Joffre as "run out and not up to his work" and Sarrail as a "rue de ValoiS 
(1) Lloyd George even insisted that the minutes of the War Committee should 
be changed so as not to give the impreSSion that the British £overnment 
was opposed us a matter of principle to the idea of an offensive, but 
only in present circumstances. Lloyd George to Hankey 8/6/16, Lloyd 
George 1<5S, D/l1/3/31. 
(2) War Committee 1/6/16, ~~B 42/15/6. 
(3) Grey to Bertie 7/6/16, Dertic I'~S, 1".0. 800/l68/Fr/16/3S. 
(4) Bertie to Grey 1/6/16, Bartie ltlS, 1''.0. aOO/168/Fr/16/38. 
(5) ibid 0/6/16, ibid li'.O. 80U/160/1?r/16/40. 
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On 8 June Milne had a further difficult interview with Sarrail. The 
French general "was much excited and only kept his temper with difficulty". 
He adhered to his earlier statement that he would attack without the aid of 
the British army and that he had received these instructions from his 
government, who had informed him that both governments were agreed on this 
point. He declined to make any suggestions for cooperation as he said that 
he was no longer "allowed to command the allied forces". Milne found it 
very difficult to cooperate with a commander who adopted such an attitude. 
He thought it absolutely necessary to "free this army from his ill-concealed 
intentions to force an offensive". Sarrail wan..ted to bring about a situation 
which would force the British army to give active support to the French, 
for which it was not prepared or bring upon it the stigma of leaving the 
French unsupported. Milne felt that he would have to choose the first of 
these alternatives. (2) Meanwhile Sarrail complained to Paris that he had 
heard from a reliable source that Milne's instructions were to oppose the 
idea of offensive action in the Balkans with a "force of inertia". (3) The 
French colDlllal1der confided to the Naval Attache, de Roquefeuil, what he had 
not been able to Ba:3 in his official despatch. He had heard that the order 
to Milne resulted from an accord between the British government and a section 
of the French High Command. He hoped that de Roquefeuil would pass this 
information on to Guillemin so that eventually it would reach the Quai 
d'OrBa:3. (4) 
The prospects for agreement when Briand, War Minister Roques and Joffre 
came to Downing Street on 9 June were obviously not good. Joffre argued that 
it was inadmissible that at Balonica alone, of all the theatres of war, the 
(1) Bertie to Grey 9/6/16, Bertie MSS, F.O. 8oo/168/1'r/16/41; Lloyd George 
MSS, D19/7/16. 
(2) HilDe to iobert80n No. G.C. 159, 8/6/16, w.o. l06/1y.o. 
(3) Sarrail to Jogal No. 1034/3, 8/6/16. l6N 3143. 
(4) Surail to de Roquefeuil No. 303. 9/6/lb, Marine archives xf. 2. When 
this suggested understanding between the British goverament and a section 
of the )'rench High Command was revealed to a Secret Sitting of the French 
Chamber on 1 Dec .. ber 1916 by the deputy, Charles Chaumet, it caused a 
sensation. ''J:et-ce qu' il est tolerable qu' il y ai t une partie de l' etat-
major pour cloDDer son avia au gouvernement ou a l' etat-major anglaia 
indepenc:laaDent du cormneDd_ent en chef, du gouverDellent franiaia?". 
[Parliamentary archivea C7649] No gemti.ne UDderst.aDdj ng, probably existed, 
although England vas aware of the lIi-sLvinga felt at Chantilly concerning 
the Balonica I:xpedi tion. 
..I...L;"" • 
troops tilOrc, but he thoUCht that thosc wi~G wert' thc:ro !t"n,Ju:;'u be UDcd.. -).1:'io.:ld 
pointed out th~,t it wns thl] British C;OVCrl1L1Gl1t which h;;.0.. L;Jkod ".'renco to fU'CJ:1 
i'or It::.li<iu troQpG to be sent to dalonic&.. .uvid.cntl~. 3O;~,e 'cWC vlc:.3 c;jntc;:p]J. tQU 
beinG m.::de of them. Briand beccccl tllc 1ritish GovexLLle::1t to join in 3. ctio lJ. 
«t ;S<J.lorlicn and to furnish their troops with the neccssc.ry supplies. ;"'ut 
;.squith counteed th<" t lUlsucccsSUl or indecisi vo c' ciion would he. ve < bE;d. cffee'" 
and the :;)ritish milit:cry L.uthorities ,.,ereconvincca. the:;; fb-ilure w~; Dorc 
probable th8.n succcss. 'l'ho J..'rcnch Llili t<J.ry chicf uX'/:,llecl th::. t <- loca.~ succes;::; 
wa::; possible with onlJ c. minimUJ;1 risk, but .i;;<:.lfour b8li~vccl it WE.S crimin3.l to 
diGsi~c. te energy at ;Julonicn in thc pre :;;cnt circUlus tL.nces whel" cvcr.: otlle:>:' 
theatre of w<.:.r was cryinc out for reini'orcCLcnts in [.len <.:.r.d. r:c..te:d'.l. ~"or 
~~obertGon the question ww not one of merely loc<::.l lliportance but of cene::.'[,l 
policy. lie thought the operations were not likely to succeed und :jwdionod 
the possibilitJ of a 'limited' offensive. !'~Squitll i.:onceded thc:.t there was 
no que::; tion f()r the preGent of any wi thdraWCi.l from 3ulonica nor of un~- reciuction 
of troops us hG.d boen sucgeoted at Paris in l·;UTCh. :u.ti8.nd, 'wi tor.. his ora tOTicnl 
pa.rorG, had pointed out the absurdity of koepint; ):'>0,000 ilien idle, but this wac 
not a true description of the situation since they werc immobilising the 
Whole of the 1ulgari&n amy, 100,000 1'urko and Saile GGrmans and Lus~rit.l1s. 
3rit.nd retorted thut this was not a question of oratory. Ii.'he opinion he 
hc:.d e).:pressed was the deliberate, reflected and fi..xed opinion of the P:r'C.ooh 
govClrm:Jent based not only on political but on ui1itary reasons. Ee ure-eel 
tho :Dri tish goverWllent tlthink aeuin. ~'he Pronch hM prepared an offenGi vo, 
,sarruil hud takon his measures. :i3riand could not conce&l the extremely 
delicate position in which the British attitude was placing l~.(l) 
A Situation of complete impasse thus existed when the conference broke 
up. lIaig was "surprised and sorry-II that after all the talking the Salonica 
question ht'.d still not been settled. But he Ul"Ced Robertson to IIstick to 
it" and assured him that he would win in the end. (2) On the Friday eve nine 
after the conference, however, Cambon came to visit Grey and explained to 
him that Briand was in a very difficult position in view of a debate to be 
(1) 
I.) \ \.- ) 
Prod~s-verbal _ Cl.B 37/149/19; ChB 28 I.C. - 8.; A. ~. 
989; ,ibid Vol. 10)7. 
He.it; to Robertson 16/6/16, Hobertson H:i;;), 1/22/48 • 
'Guerrc' Vol. 
-: ., 
_' ••.• L n 
~'rcn0h c.ubc.GGc.dor tl~(~rcforu urced th2.t tile cioor shOU~Q te , ~, 1.e.::. -:=. opc~~. 
replied the t the JJri tish lli~d a lone; his tor;:. o:n conI o::';'1i::.L; ~c tile i/EJ. 0: 
~,'rC..lcc. 1:0 rer,lindcd C::~Llbon tlv,t in ;';<:"1'ch 19:1.6 "'s(:uith~ }:itcjlenc~' c.ni hilJ . .;:.;li' 
had b(~en instructed by the C8.binet to den&nd the wi tildrllw::l of two Jritish 
divisions .frOI;) ~n10nic~:, but h~,cl Given WE..~ to illC objections 0'.: J:::-i"nd c.~rl 
Joffre de8pito tho very Crc:.·t reluctr.nce of tilC re8t of the Jriti::;i1 cc.bia:t. 
',Hth a measure of irony he pointed out that, when LSqhlth ilc::.d said r:t the 
Downinc Street Conference that up to this Llo;nent there hE-a oee:1 no clifi'iculties 
between the two Governrlcnts, he h8.d spoi:en the truth, since vlhenevcr there 
had been a difficult;) the ~ritish hE-d Ci ven w[,~,-. But, G 'e~' br6. vel:r 
,.sserted, it was not fair that this ~;hould 2.lwa,fs be c:>..-pected nor WfS it 
possible. (1) J,t the sane tiJJw, however, after obtai~inG tr.e :::.uthorit~' 
uf J.S(lui th to d.o so, Gre;)" uccepted. J!'rench &,jJendmen Ls to [;. Sri tL;h r.:cl.10randllLl 
on the DowninG Street Conference which Gubstantially Dodificdtn.e s"(;·nce 
t[.,ken by his govermaent. '1'ho oricinal docul:I<.mt h&d t,ss8:J'ted the opposition 
of the British mili taljr authorities to an offensive frow Salonica at the 
presen'.; time, which "r:lUst be prejudicial to the of.:.~ensivc in l?ra.r.ce and r:£'.J-
even be f2. tal to the allied chances of success in tl1e whde warll • Cs-wbon, 
however, secured the insertion of paragraphs to the affect that the British 
covcrl1rlent would not refuso at a future date to exanine the question oi' an 
uffensi vo fro III Salonica an soon as circUDs tances and tho cono ti on of the 
troops allowed und that it would hanten the equipnent of its amy with a 
view to such operations. C·) ~l.'his addition obviously gave the }"rcnch 
advocates of an offensive encouragement, since it appeared that the British 
Covernment now condemned it not on eeneral prinCiples but for ten~or&~J 
teclU1ical re6.::;on:J. nobertson considered thc.t it "knocked the botton" out 
of the Har Committee's memorandwa of 17 Hay, which had given the impreSSion 
of opposing the uffensive on teneral grcnmds and because it was flmdar:lentally 
unsound. (3) lIe was therefore not surprised when the }'1'ench " Cot once 
weiGhed in" with a memorandum Which sUGGested that they would be ready far 
(1) iiote by Grey 10/6/16, CfcB 57/149/20. 
(2) :3ur.unary of British Views, 9/6/16, L • .!:,;. 'GUerre', Vel. 1057; note by 
Grey 10/6/16, CAD 37/149/':'7; Palls - OPe dt., Vol. 1, p 13u. 
up. cit., Vol. 2, p 116. 
to "Le roc.dy for it. r.l'h:L:J~ ;~obert::;on (;ol.'.plc.:.in.:::c., W,'<!J n0~ 
0'::' whG.~ h~(l p<:sGcd [.t the C()lUOrcnce. (1) Cr..;:;bon hL.13el: 
the ~·'rench j'ler:wrUl1dur.1 stretched the Jri tish cm;c;::;sicl~::; bC~·Ollc:. ji.lCtL'i2.b::"c 
liJ:;iLs Gnd dill his be::;t to [:dGpt 13ri<lnd t ::; clcspc.t,;h to the t8TI,C; 0:: t1.0 
o.dcii tions which he h2d ::;ecUTed il': the oricinc.l ::3ri ti::;h Clocw.lell t. (:~) 
-:., , 
..J.....1 "_ • 
Under:J tand[,bl;y enouch Hobertson felt it w[.;;; title to strenGthen the wil.l 
of the :Dritioh t;overmnent "';0 resist o.nd in 0. pc.per d.rG';lll up for the ',/;..:::: 
C oI:lnit toe poinLcd out th", t the Jri tish lller.lOr[.ndu;;: of 17 .".L;.:, h;:~d c.rL"wu 
the. t c.lliod troops at 0ulonica should be reduced to the lltmbe::' required 
for the defence of th~, t place. 'l'11e Ie. test British cOIiu:;unicr, tion, howover, 
hed Ci von Joffre the inprcs:.;ion that Jl~i tc:in hc.Q Dore or lese a~ceptc!d. the 
~'rcnch po] icy end that the pruposed offensive W£<:3 Iael'ely deferred ':or the 
tine beine. l~obertson thought it desirable th£.t thcl'e should be no further 
J:lisundcrctalldince. l·'rt:.ncG w£.s unlikely to agree to an;.' reduction in 
forces unle os it waG made cleer to he r tha t there walJ no pro3pc c t oi' 
Britain being reudy for an offensive for several 1:1011th9 to cuae. It 
would be little less than a criLle to maintain more troops at Gc.lonicz. 
than were needed for defence at a time when Douglas Eeig wns cryine out for 
n.ll 2.vail~ble c.ssiste.nce. I?obertson therefore asked the ',/o.r Cow:dttee for 
£.n assurance that preparations for an offenaive in the Balkamwere not to 
be undertaken until the rosult of the offensive in Prance had been seen 
and the General oi tuation again reconsidered. (3) 'l1Jle ·w&.r Committee agreed 
thut Grey, in concert with Hobertson, should draft a further coI!ll:lunication 
to Cunbon layinc; stress on the fact that the British government ha.d never 
yet accepted the principle of takine' the offensive in the Balklins and that 
in any case the British forces could not be fully equiPI,ed for offensive 
operations for some months.(4) When completed the document made it Quite 
clear -tha t no acti vi ty from Salonic8 could be entertained if' it had the 
effect of dcprivine the British unay in France of any p::.rt of its resourcs3 
(1) ilobertson to Haig 22/6/16, Hobertson r·~s 1/22/4ge 
(2) Cambon to Briand No. 621, 14/6/16, L. :8. 'Guerre', Vol. 1037. 
(3) 'Policy regarding operations in the Balkans', 14/6/16, ':';014::/15/3. 
(4) \la1' COlllinittee 16/6/16, CAB 42/15/8. 
in m)!l, rjurd tiona or IV: tcrir.:l, which ."or e t},ell or i..ifht lc- "cor 0e re,:; .. ,drccl 
Bl'i'~i3h 3c.lonic& force for nount8.in wurfr,rc could be cO~;lpleteci be,~'o:::-L: 
..;cpteraber, n01.' 'in'-.s it nt 0.1.1 certe.in thc.t the difficulties in ::.'ef:~El'dto 
chippinc '''auld b;y then h'-i.vC lessened. (1) 'Jh; t the e:fcct of thic 
cOr;'u.;unic<~ ticn would be ll.obertson could no"c L'1.WSS, but "the .Thole 0::.' the 
fn t [we,sJ in the fire once [lOre". ( 2 ) 
Joffre, in a letter to TIriand, handled ~hc whole correspond~lce 
in o. ::lL.nnor very d£d;JG[;inG to the logic of the :iJ:::-itish case. ::0 8.rc;uod. 
til& t the ne'd' ffienornndULl conto::.ined inc.dnissiblc r.lOciific~ tions cf tn.;: t oi.' 
11":;. 
9 June und suid thc-d; he could not accept the propositioi1 tb.'..t the ~~[.l(mia: 
offensive should 011.1;:/ be undertc.kcn after thct on the ','le:::;J~c:::n ::;x,nt. It 
wes durinG the cOlJbined plan of offensi veG ti1C t the si tuo::. ti en would be 
:::-ipe to <..~ttack the DulCnriun farces, 1:e considered the e~rl~- ontr:: of 
l:o'LXlL.nir.. into the w[cr to be n distinct possibili t~t und stressed th~t in :.:;udl 
:':'n OV'entuD.li ty th~ allied arraies should be rend;/, irJLlcdia tol~: to beGin 
oper[:tions. If the 3ri tish governr:JEmt did not Give up its cc.sc Joffre 
wanted. I',nnce to renounce her ncrecnent not to start offensive oI£ratiGns 
without the consent of both Govemmcnts and he intended to aGk ..iarrcil 
whether he Gould 8. ttnck the BulGarian forces with the 7rench and SEU'biF.n 
c.roics alone. (3) In the I.leuntime the Chc.uber I'oreien Lffl:d~~s Cor.Jlnission 
ho.d ill'God the F ~'cnch goverrunent to s ccure us soon as posGible uni t;-/ of 
coomund on the Sabnice fro~lt with a view to preparinc for action, (4) 
while 1.1bert Thomas was in coramunication with leading figures of the 
::;nclish PIt) SS, who wcm tryinc to arouse a camp:.:ig'l1 ar:long beth Liberals 
und ConseMtives in fuvour of v. SaJ.onicn offensive. (5) 
l'hc J..':r'ench G'overnncnt was nothine if not persistent ['.nd on 28 June 
CurabO!l suceen ted to l..ord IIardil1{;c ( 6) that, the dip 1 ooa tic and mili tnr;-/ 
nituation havinc chancod, the 1ll01aent had come to exooine agai..'1 the 
question of an offensive fran 0ulonica. TIut tho French UI:lbassador w(.:.rned 
(1) ~13.r Committee 21/6/16 I OLTI 42/15/10. 
(:~) li.obortson to :;Iaig ~)2/6/16, Hobcrtson l·S:::; 1/22/49. 
(3) Joffre to Briand Ho. 18699, 25/6/16, 1 .• i:.:. I Guerre l , Vol. 10),{; Joffre 
to SUrrail Ho. 3215, 25/6/16, 16~i 3136; Herbillon: OPe cit., Vol. 1, 
P 300. 
(4) lo;/[,'11eo to Briand 24/6/16, 1-... ~. 'Guerre', Vol. 1037. 
(5) lJottOl' from p. Hillet 19/6/16, Thomas H3S 94 l.P 146. 
(6) Earlineo succeeded Sir Arthur IUco1son as Pcn.1ti.nen t Under Jecrc tary 
G t the Foreicn l,if fice on 20 June. 
C~~f();13ive WciS i~' ;.""'\'; /'(, ;.: "'C..l."U"-c," • ..1.'+ \'lu""J''; :l"C' 'oc' -, . ".,. 'C' -'-") 11:·"'''J.. 
- ""-' ...... .L ... 1I ... _ ~ '" l,.4 .-..4.. ..... ..:. ... ' i 1.. ......... ~ o,Jl.. .. ,J:... V'- ... J~Ul.;L.J LJ 
we,,:,; '~c work on l(ob(ort;:;on, ivIlO[)e in:i.'luc:1cc pcrvticd. t:i:c ~j:::i~i.:;j1 Covo::::;..,c:r:;, 
to cOllvince i1LJ 0:.' the rCl:son::..blu:.cGs O:"~llC .l"ru;.ch cc.~.;c. (:.) :"1: ~. l.'':;:''TILl 
CO~ll.;Ul1ic [. tioll on tho 50 JW1C, th(~ref ore, ti:.c ~"1'C~1Ch GOVCl'rU.icn t COll. ~UJ. ·~ccl 
thcl.l;'el veG with llointirl{,' out the. t thc si tUb. ti 01: 11<.. ... 1 been ~.l 'vc .. ::cc:. b.y c 
~~U:::;Si~ll victory Unr1 un Itc:.linn coulrtel'-o':~·en::;ivc, ~nd. thc. ... t it wc.:.c ciurinC 
elw sttCl.ck on the ;:)ollmc thut allied actioll in tll(; ~:J:c.:.ns would. co ;l(;.:~t 
cfficl:cioUD. (:.:) Gro;:,- Gave Car;lbon the llllpreGsiv!l of c.:.pprcci<:'"dnC ~:~(; 
/~'unch [.rL1.Ullcnts but uCain insisted upon the ovcrl:iclill(; diffic'Ul t;;' iLlposed 
bJ" the shippinG s.ttU2 tion. (3) L t the 38Le tine Joi.'i.'rc iri' o:r~x;ci ...i£.rrc.il 
~hw.t the l,:,',tter miGht roceivo now instructions either iIl the event uf 
J...:nC1:.:.ud f.lodifyinC her policy under too pressure of clevclop;;J.en~s or il~ 
J.,'.:'unce decided thut ~hc in-:'or08 ts of the Cocl i tion d.aL1~'nQ.eQ. urd.:, c. te:"ul 
~.ctiJn on her p.',rt. (4) 
llobcrtson, however, WLlS already actirlG to cut tho crouna. ;rc~ under 
thi:J latest :r'l'cnch illi t::tlti vo. GOLlt18ntine on C<:..mbon' s mcnoranciULl, he 
arGUed the t nothing h[~d lluppened to chance the view he hr:.d c:.lweoys held 
thc.t [.n offellsive i'rt).Tl1 the Bv.lkans, befol'e the conditions essential for 
succcs.s he.d been re£1li~ed, would be "a useless ,-nd W1just:ifir-ble sacrifioo 
of 3ri ti sh lives end was teful expenditure of war lJ[:' teriul" • .i~c noted that 
j,'rench tactics hud chullGed in recent weeks und thE.. t theJ" weTe noW trjinc 
to arGUe on mili tc.ry BTo1ll1dn and WOTC sUCgestil1(; thu this opposi ti on r-lore 
stoed in ~he WLl;i of offenGive operutions. I\obertson hoped. thc.t tho 
cuvernment would make clcur that the views they cOllvcJ"ed to .Paris wore not 
on1;,' thooc of the Gener~l Jtaff but of the entire ',Jar Com::dttee. (5) Thi.;:; 
bod~- while B.G'rceinc with Hobertsoll tl1Ii t recent devolopnentG on the main 
frlmtn l~d not creuted such c: row situat.ion as would justify revGrninc its 
previous deciSion, cond udod that tho actual cntr.! of ~~ownania into the 
WC.r would erN,te sUl:h n situ[.tion. Grey and ~{obcrtson were the:::cfQ:'c 
(::.) Car.lbon to Briand Ho. Oll, 29/6/16, r ... B. 'Guerre', Vol. 1037. 
\2) Palla , OPe cit., Vol. 1,p136. 
(3) Cruabon to Briand Ho. 690, 1/7/16, L. Z. 'Guerre', Yel. 1038. 
(~) Joffre to Sarrail 1/7/16, 16H 3015. 
()) ;~ote for the \/8r Conullittoo 5/7/16, C1.B 42/16/1. 
"n thcccl'i;litc 2CCUl': .. nce that lcolli.I::niL. wouJ.c. cn-:;cr 'eilc We.:', ~):;.'L:,il1 in:.:: 
li:C'CPo.::"OQ to oxpcdi -'co "ehc equipUOl1Jc os.' llC.' :;:'0::'008 L -'c ..... ~:10:1i8[, fur :;1 
offcl1Si VC, tllC objp-ct of Wl1icll WOlllcl be to :1016. [ .. G :_-- =-~-.'o ::,. tJ: .... cI'Crtio~1 2.8 
(~ \ 
pCG siola of tho 13ulCariQ;l al'I:l~r on the Grock froil-'cicr. , .... J .c'L:: -.u<:.i <II 0:;:3::::.': 
'1 , r 
. .L .t . .J • 
noreover, heard tha"~. llobert::;on WGS 80li.inC rc,uilcl to £.cccpt the L-.cvi"cc::.bilit:.: 
of Q11 of':ennive, althouCh 118 l)erGistcd i:l 11ic 'liew t11c.t it ·wcu.l(: be L 
risky enterprise. (2) Joffre now confidently cc:EcQ upon J8.rr<:i::' to pr~:.:rc 
:.:. plan of opora tions \"hich air:lOd to tie the Lulg<:ri:::'ll forces to the Greek 
frontier, Elakinc it iupossible for ther.l to lc::.unch Co serious cru:rp8icn 
[;Guinet BoumaniD., and which included in its cClcul<::.ticns the whole of tIle 
8.llied ~·.rmee d'Orient, includinG the LnClish divisio!lS. U) "..'wo dc.ys later 
-:,11e <.:ctu<:l dntes of ;3arrc.il's a·~tacks Were irnpc.:;ed upon Ide"]., 'iit:nQut, 
C.:3 the General 1<: ter rOr.J.nJ~ked, £..11;)' coneor11 for the possi'oili'vies :.1' -:'11(; 
situt::.ti Oi1. (4) 
On 18 July, however, the 1,kr Cor.unittee deterwined that there must be 
(;, ehE,nce in the aGrecL1ent rCG<.:rdi11G the rele tions:nip between 08rrc.il ["end 
iiilnc. So iiardince handed to the French charge d'affaires a note whicll 
streGsed that the British government were unable to dCiJrive themselves 
entirely of control over their troops When ene-eged in offensive op:;rations, 
but,in the event of such operations beine undertaken from ::>e.lonica, Hilne 
\ ... ould be p"bced on the same footing with regard to Sarrti 1 as that 0: HaiC 
in reGard to Joffre. In other words Eilne would be instructed to support 
and coopers-te with the French commander 8.&-ainst the enemy in the execution 
of such pl8.n of o~ rations as might be agreed upon by the allied I;J.Gh 
coomcnds.(S) Two days later Robertson was authorised to discuso and conclude 
u military convention in F'ro.nce regardil1& the operc.tions of the allied 
forces at ~alonica, with the sienificant modification of earlier statcn<*.ts 
that the British goverrunent would be prepared, as soon as they were 
satistted that l10umania had definitely entered the war, to authol'ise British 
(1) \/ar Committee 6/7/16, Ci~B 42/16/1; Cambon to Eriand i;o. 73;), 11/7/16, 
.... E. • Guerra' , Vol. 1050; Pulmer: Ope cit., P 72. 
(2) P. i·allet t.o de I-largerie 11/7/16, A • .c:. 'Guerre', Vol. 1058. ~' .. furtl.r 
pressure on the British goverruaent to consent to an offen3ive WaG the 
knowledge thAt the Italian government would send e briGa.de to 8alonica 
only if it were to take part in a reul offensive rat!~r thar. c. 
dcmon3tration [Grey to Hodd 12/7/16, P.o. 31l/2606/1)905:2~ 
(j) Joffre to ;J8rruil No. 4970-80, 15/7/16, 1 •• ,s. 'Guerre', Vol. 10::;8. 
('i) ;jurreil: Ope cit., p 131. 
(:;) 1,'e11s: Ope cit., Vol. 1, p 137. 
;.'C.i'CC:::; to cooperate with their ::::2.1ies in suc;~ E:.ctiC;l ::::'3 :Ui..;11-;; 0C l1CCCSCL::C'~' 
: , \ 
t(, contein tIl(; l.3ulCG.rialJ forces on the Creek i'rontiB:!:'.I..1.; Jut Jr'io..nd WUi 
;"'<':1' frol~l happy with the fOrl.lUlr:. ~Cor unified. cO;;U;lencl produced b~/ -:'il(e 'Jc.r 
Co);:r;littoo. It was not. he sUGGested to C::~I:lbon, udcqu: to to en~JUl'O thl..' 
success of the i'orthcominc offensive end wc.:..; cel't,-:.in to cree.tc diGC01'C: 
bct\-reen ·~lte two ceneral::;. CUf.1bon wc.s urGod t;c press upon G:rc
v 
the need. 
tc o..::"low Eobertson 301.10 lco-wa;y' in his diccussioEG with Joi'i.'re c'r.d no~ to 
be tied to the wording worked out by the Bri t.i 3h governr.:en t. In c.ddi tion 
1 
there appeared to be c. possible dL'ficul t:,' in the ~ while the Jri tish ~utho:!.'i tic: 
were subordinating their participc~ tion in a Selonic.:" o':fonsi vo to .i(QI:1c.niCl1 
interventLn, the HouraL.nians demanded es a Gine ;~uu. non ai' intervention 
an [, t tack b;;.T ;)<lrr;.:il t s &rr.1Y on 1 l~ ugw:.> t. (:::) 
CnlHbon, 011 le[.;.vc in Paris, noted D. J-iorvf:dill£' nc::--,\uaGr .. CSG c"t the 
~uai cl t Orsay but wus ple£..Ged to he<.:.r tho. t :1obertson }lIld been Ci VO{: 3(; ~:t':) 
rOOD to la8.noeuvrc and discuss the cor.lWund fO:;"'llulu. 'l11c :'.'Gl:ch £;;.lbc:,:::;"c.dcr 
Gave President l'oincD.ro "une veri tLble le~on" on the wa~t in which 
fo:;,,'ciGners, and p....rticul~i rly the l::nglish, shculd be spoken to and on the 
d,tnCcrs of ~xpecting too much. U) J3ut he was annoyed at the ~f<i~, in which 
the discussions betweon HobOl'tson and Joffre ignored t};e inhc:rent ciif-
ficulties at 3alonic8. such as the climate. (4) The acree1:1ent on the 
COllll"lUnd Which eventually eJ:loreed wr..:3 'lb1'\t instructions rclatin€ to tile 
initial offen:.3ivc would be settled by cgreeoent between the Britich and 
~"rench Hieh Command::;. In the execution of these instructions KLlne would 
Give :3:::-.rrail support and cooperat:ion "proportionate to the nunbro:s ['.nd 
equipment of the troops under his orders". In addition he would be 
responsible to the British government for the employment of his forces. 
;3arruil would consult Hilne us to the emploj"tlent he proposed to nuke of 
the 3ritish foreet) with tho reservation that he would have the latitude 
to decide upon tlC missions, the objectives to be gained, the zones of 
uction und the datos on which each operation vas to cOIamence.(5) 
(1) Ivar Committee 20/7/16. CAB 42/16/lO. 
(2) Briand to Cambon 20/7/16, A. L. tGuGr1'e t , Vol. 1038. 
(.3) Cumbon to de I,'leuriau 21/7/16, P. Gacbon: Correspondnncc, Vol. ), P l1. 7. 
(4) ibid ~5/7/16, ibid, plIO. 
(5) Joffre to :,J""rrail (undated), H .0. lOG/135;~. 
t..; be tile ~ecLl COIllI:l~ .rulcr (l t .s8.~ O~licc., r!.o·~ lC2.8 t bc C~;" 'J.C C i: t}"l(; 0rcrG. tiO:l~~ 
\'[O}.'O ;10t L' SUCCC~G~3 it would be l1C who Woa:"d. be j,c::'cc re::>p0r:;:;itlc. ( 1 ) , • 
"0:1 c::. scc::.le cor:1l.l0nsurt', Lo wi tIl the strenr;th ~.n(:c::i:.U1)r.18nt oi' our f'orcc ll • 
Jc':"fre, l~ob(Jrtson wL.rned, ht.d no in ~enti-,n of rein.forcinc :Jr.GTc.i}, wllilc 
~.i] ne could not o:lJect un.)' further f:lG1J.inC troopG fran ":':nc::,and, :,'u:::ther;;ore 
~(oU:"~niLn p.::rticiputioll rcmnined on1~ u possibi::'i ty. (2) ~'he ',Inr Co;,;r.Iittec 
reinforced l(obertson IS word s whcn on :::8 July it <:[,"recd to imorm l)aris 
the drott convention Qri'ived &.t by hobcrtscm and Joffre diGC.ppc&rcd ['end the 
nili tur,:; £',ction of the ;Julonico. .forces would not exceed th:; t of observinc 
und containinc the IlulGurian forces on thc Greek frontier. O) 
Un 11 ,hugtlSt the nEVi Jccretary of ,jtL~e :'.'or ',far, Dc.vid ~lo~rd GeOl'Cc, 
aGreed Elt the French Foreicn l'd.ni:::;try to a revioed protocol ~rdinc 
l{oW;1<:ll1ian intervention and the launchinc of un offensive, (,n f:.1 th:.mGh 
Poincare felt that this still did no more than Llask the lack of <::.grecucnt 
which persisted between Ilric.nd and the British cabine t. (5) lloun~:.nia 
would declare war tm dn,,:J cftcr the opcl1irl{; of un allied offenn i vo, but 
iiobertoon wanted it made known that c.2::' he would con::;ent to l':ilneln :;.rra;;.' 
a tteI:1ptinc W1J.[; to do its best to hold the BulCarian forces whm'c the~r then 
were. (6) l'Qlne hec.rd that Sc.rraills intention We .. :: to make un att~ck on 
( \ 
3ulGuric even if HotUnanin onl;; declared Wc.r aGainst Lustri&-liuncary, \ 7) 
but l(obcrtso n stressed t.hn t the Dri ti sh Governnent hud never :::pproved of 
tbeir troops beine committed to offensive action until they were satisfied 
thD.t l~oW:1ania hud joined the Entente. (0) Eritnints hesitation despite 
the aGreement si&'11ed by 110yd Georee caused much discontent in Paris c.nd 
hi:; observe,', 1,0 Hoy LeWis, heard from cOrIVcrso.tions in ?rench politico1 
(1) Eerbillon: Ope cit., Vol. 1, p 321. 
(:.:.) Hobcrtsoll to Hilne 25/7/16, 1;0. 19962, \l.0. 106/13)). 
0) CII.Il .~:'::/16/11; }'alls: OPe cit., Vol. 1, p 138. 
('f) ;;otc for do HarCcrio 1l/D/16, L. B. tGucrro', Vo:. 1038. 
(5) Poinccr6: Ope cit., Vol. 0, p 312. 
(6) ::obcrtsun to llnrdingo 1:;/n/16, F.O. 371/2607/160);;";-3. 
cn ::11no to Hobcrtson 14/r./lG, ibid. 








vic;orolls1 ,- ()!'lce :::.. nilitur'\ 
C:C;lc!':. UclCd" 011 17 ".UL;u~t. (1) 
, 1 
' .... '. 
~--"rr.~;- c.L~c.i!1Gt ;-us·tri[:.-:~un~~l'J "wit110Ut prej-J.Uice to L~-:~' ftrr·~!-lt~.;l' (;l~~cctiv03 
which [li~h~ pl'\J3cnt thcneclves for o; __ msiccT2;;i0,i late::', 'h:v-2.:-::..' roCr.::'o 
~o o.vE.ilable rCGoUJ:ccs incl udinC tranGport". C) Jut s t jlc~_rt .~01::rtsc::. 
n:;.lc,.inod ns dubious LS evor about tho W: ole opcr::ti, n. :ic Ll::;i3'~Cd. to 
Dcrenco :2orc03 wJdul.:," week. 1'his \-1;:;';:; irrcspccti ve of ~!lC crirdinc.l need 
to send ovel:; po:.wiblo ;:1nn to the French i'ront. 'l'ho '1111018 e;~peG.i tiO)l, 
~:Obcl·tson rc;1cctca, was L l'rench enterprise fnm start to ':inish and the 
.i:'cnch oUCht to sec it throuGh. In addition Britain OUGht r.ot to put 
norc troops wlder Jarl'c.il oven if ;:;he had the):, to spa;-e. () .:obertoon 
found tho. t he cUd not dare turn his beck on the politicians for in u 
uor.~ent thc.:,' would be Gendine out another expcd.i tLnar~ force - is tiley 
could find onc. It was" a queer busillesn" for hirJ to coad.uct, but ho 
W<'G Clad to nay the. t he had "no difficulty in G!; t tine [hi~ own WL.:/", even 
thoUCh the situation demanded eternal viCilL.nce.(4) 
~ven with Houmnnin in the war Surrail seemed unwilline tc &. t t~:cck tho 
Bulcc.rian nni:y despitc Joffre's persistat entre£.ties to do so. (5) ~'hc 
ceneral retorted that he would attack as soon as he l~d secu... .... d r.dcqu<:. te 
forcen on his left flank. 'i'he :important thing was to avoid the defcE t and 
failure which ~uld be caused by inadequate prcparn.tion. (6) .But Can/bon 
confided to his son that c.ll the orders in the wculd would not put mart into 
u t;cncral who h.:..d none. In i!:ncland confidence was totally lackine in the 
}'rench cOITU;lCJ.ndcr. (1) 'With the Hussian forces fully extended CUobon felt 
(1) Lc :~oy Lewin to L1o:ld GeorGe W/8/16, Lloyd George !~;,) :; 3/14/ i t. 
(::) l{obertsou to Hilne 19/8/16, F.U. 371/2607/165092. 
(5) ltobertson to ilankcy 23/0/16, Cl.B 4~iw/16. 




Joffre to Sarra.il No. 8903, 30/8/16, l6n 3136; ::lee below p 163. 
~nrrail to Joffre j.!o. 145,3/9/16, I:.~. 'Gucrre', Vo:. 1052. 
Cnwbon: Correspondanco, Vol. ), p 123; 
"1 ' (', 
"':'_-./ . 
T'u.1v the ci:lbns::-.;ndo:.:: WD.~1 ~urc tIlL:. t he wC1J.ld e:i thcl"' ~-... ~ t de .so 0:'-- e18c ·C!:..L t 
(" ) 
:ne vlcul(l C:lrrivc too lLtc. \.1. In the 11l',Jv<:,ilin::; lli,ce£'L"i!:"~~- "rllliCh ~;u;'::'°ounlG(l 
...l<.:rrrilt::; intentions tho ~;::1Cli::;l1 Ho.T COTlr,:i:;tcc JroG.uccJ. , eU -;;':;;"C.'llt 0';" 
polic;;- to the effect that the --rnce cltGl'ien~ ShCl'cl2.C1, cxc::.oJ~ i~:.; ~·".ll::" pQ'.lC:::'~' 
to prevent a :3ulcaTic~n c.tt"ck on .:O'LUl2nia, (:) wlli::'c 3ri::':':-lQ ~lrl.;c(l th::::.~ 
It~-"ly SllOUld be reclU8Gtcd to tic-ke a contrii.mtic:1 to the cC~;::1)c:,iC;1 cGT&r:"ulc 
to ~ho:;e of ~nc;l2.nd, :?rG.nce nnd :Sorbic.. (3) ;:;~":'C 3c;>Lcr,;bcr :3e:::tic hcc-rel. 
tlwL :..Jprrr.il was now definitc12/ ton the T.10VC fcrw; __ rdt,(.i)but tl',e c::~':::'ort ~j) 
llclp }~Olli.H':l1iL.:. W2..S to pro\re <"'8 ,rGirl as th[:t -:0 Essist Sc-:r1)i£... :::.t tLc C11~~ of 
l~'l:;. (5) 
in the J:lOS t [a vourD. ble circumG tUnceG, the c lir;.inL tion o:~ ?'"..llCu::- ie. froc the 
cnnflict and, at tho ver;;" bast, the ir:llilobilisation of he:- forcQG in the 
DobrudJ':' alld i"loce'-dOl"l;D.. (G) r n ", W ..... J '" J • r " - 1"""" ~ :"cu""ve, v .= _..... .J.J.1C r;k ... lpo er ..,~~u~ . .;~on ren",~ncu, lvn_VC ... , -
c..nd in the Hur Comr.:.ittec on 9 October lJloyd Gcorcc expl'CGseci the hope thG.t 
additionul forces could be Dent to Gave thc iloUf.;c.nians fror. the ,:,'atL' which 
il<:.d ulread:J' befullcn Dclcitull <:.m1 ~erbia. i:ie ropor·tec. th"'- t :J.1ne bG:;'ioved 
thut he would be able to break throueh the :aulGcl'ian front if he received 
(.11 extra eiGht division::;. nobertGon countered thct these could onl:r 2.rrivc 
too late and that he C()uld not in all conscience o.civiGC thc Covem::-:cnt 
to Gend marC? troops to the Balk<:.ns. (7) liobertson now acc.:u.sed lJloyd GeortF 
of r;howinc IIwan"~ of coni'idence" in his udvice by r5.isinC the question of 
reini'orccnentG bofore the Hm' Gonuuittee, and hinted at resiQ1utivn. :;"'ho 
"Jar ;:inister replied by Sllccostil1(; that one of Hobertson's dosest 
r .. :::wociatoo had revealed the differences between theu on the Salonica que3tion 
to the pro 00 und he claimed the right to criticise llobertson in the ".Jar 
Ca.binot. lie concluded by w[~rninG "Y0U !aust not o.sk ue to pla~/ tho part of 
U Gore dtu:lr.1Y. I nm not in the least Gui ted for the part". (8) ',..'he C. I.G';') • 
(1) Cru:Jbon: Corrcspondancc, Vol. 3, p 124. 
V) \la:' Committee 12/9/16, CAn 42/1")/6. 
()) CLT:1bon to Grey 5/10/16, F.U. )71/2623/1'99306. 
(i~) Bertie: Diary, Vol. 2, p 32. 
(:;) r'. J. Doyens: 11Lrr .. Oo d'Orien't dUns 1t.. GtLrrc Eonci;iale, (1=)3:), p 121. 
(6) Joffre to SUrrail lio. 3484-6, 6/10/16, 16J, 3136. 
en e:'.. I3 ,r.!.l~ 1/ 3 • 
(0) l{oborlson to LJQ'd Georce und L.loyd GoOT£}: to :{obe:·tson, both 1:../10/16, 
:klbert:.>ol1. 1~:'; 1/19/6. 
-~ ,-, ' . 
be p:,oduced before the wiatcl' L:nd how i.l<::' 11;) " LCldi ti ,m<:.l ui visio"lS Wuu..:'d be 
l'0,~uired. (1) Clive otL.ted Joffre's belie';" th"J.; :'ccont ovc,:~s !,~'C. GTDLl<;l.,r 
of 3UCCCSC, tll.C ['101'C So as there were nuuerous indicc. thms ::y[ de.iJorc.li:.;a tiOl' 
in "uhc DulGarian 1'0;:'003. (:::) '';'110 '.lur C01:J.:littee discu.Jsed Jol'f:re's views 
on 12 October u,ld noted that it hud never been consulted or, the cxten:.;Lm 
Jf the role of the Lrmce d
'
()ricnt, now [,ppcrent:l.y envisuGcd b~" Joffre, 
involviJ.16' cooperation with HUGsia in the decisivc dci'cuL 0: the IluJ.Curian 
forces. llobertGon's opinion waG that the reinforcorJcn'.;s of four divisions 
contcLlpln ted by Joffre would not be suffici ent to enable tho nlliod £.rr.lic::l 
to register a Genuine victor;;,-, but that the risk existed th<:t, if not 
l~inforced at all, they miGht prove Wlablc to fulfil their oriGinal role 
and U1US ponlit IlulGarian troops to be withdrawn for cper~tions aCainst 
Houmania. (3) Consequently RobertS) n replied to Jof:re thut al tilOUbh he 
was f~- alivo to tho importance of civing l{oumanir, evor.:- possible IJ.ssistcncc 
it was not possible to send two divisions from .l~gypt without pre juc.icinC 
tho defence of tht: t cOUller;:.,' and the situ< ... ti on in the ~~st Gonere. :l~/. 
'I'he '.i£.r COLunittoc would, however, Gandion the despatch of reinforca.1cnts 
CCiuiv<:.lcnt to e.bout 21,000 men, so uS to enuble liilue to sust<:.in and 
intensif~; the offensive action he wns then t£..k.il1{;, but this woc the uttlost 
that could be done. 'l'ho hope waa expressed that Jo;Lnre wot;.ld d.o £.t le£.st 
us ;lIllch to ;J troll.(;then the French force end that Ita~;; shouJ.d also o.:,ntributc 
two divL:;iOl1s. (4) 
Crunbon was annoyed ut the tone of the despatches he received frow 
3riand, urGing him to sUPiiort Joffre's request for two British divisions. 
'i'hcsc "<lomonatrations oro.toires" were illusions Which bore no relation 
to ref-Ii ty. Cca.Jbon propoGed~o nuke no cOlilIllent, bu~ sl.r:iply to pre son t ti.t;; 
(1) ~lobertson to Joffre 9/10/16, F.O. 371/262.+/202300. 
(:::) Clive to Robortson 10/lO/16, Hobel'tson };3S 1/14/46. 
( ,) ""l :'''/''1/6 J ~·lJ '" '" '. 
(/,) ~i()bcrtsO!l to Joffr!) 
:;0. 1)00, 14/10/16, 
] "/' ./, r J'. ~"l/r,r",/nc}' -, ., 
.<.. 1U .lU, '. u. )' ._0 ..• , ~ 4;;'~id 
A. ;:;. 'Gucrrc', Vol. 1059. 
Cw:;;oun to 3riWlcl 
i.;:,pl~in . .:.; til:'" tthe rcilll0rCCJ:lCncs \voulci 0(; ::;i:;;];lJ fil::'inC [;<:.p:::. '~j:c ~"':"C:1Cll 
l'O(.l.UO:.;t, tho:;'oforc, "ne ticnt pr.s dcoout". (1) ::ot s1ll'P:; . 'isillG2.~- C[=OC:l 
cOllsiclom tile :Uri tish o.s:::"'cJ.' of &11 nddi tion<::.2. :.1, cee ccn 2.::: t~~c ;:CXJ ';; tho. ~ 
could be a::;ked 0.:: them. (~~) ll.obol'tson on tho Oti18l' hL.nd ;our,u the TICW 
;:;ituo.Lioll of havinG to racist the pressure not c;nl~- of tho :i.·'roncI~, oct of 
his own ''':0.1' Eilli~3tor, a tD-xinc OllO. It h~d boenJn::- "with tilo [,TOe.tOGt 
difficul ty" thc.t he hc.d mane[:;od to Cet his own W2;; c.nd, he l'cvc;:,lecl t(1 
.;Ul'::,'c.y, he had boen obliGcd to writo 11o;;"d Georco "e: strGicht letter" 
indicc.. ~inG thu. t he could no loncor cc.rr;;- on ill his pos t ulllcs::; his c.dvicc 
Were accellted. His tactics hQd been successful but he reCOGnised that 
"the SIlJ:ilC thing [woUld] occur aGain lator"(»). The stace was tliu;:; set 
1 ' -: 
..... 1_....L.1I 
for tho re£;ir;]e of Gonpletc mistrust which W8J to chc.racterise the relations 
of the two men until Robertson's f£.11 in i?ebruHry 1918. 13ut in tho ';[::r 
Cor.n;littce on 17 October Lloyd GeorGe dcclt::.rcd that he ;;.nd ~{obertson were 
in ucreeo.ent; either a very larce force should be sent to the Balkans or 
nothinc at all. Brituin hud done'flhat she could in the circ~tances und 
he felt that it was ITunce which miGht do mare. (4) 
L further allied conference was held at 13ouloVle on 20 October. 
Cambon predicted that the British would be well prepared with argumentG 
und statistics as to why tho;)- would be unt,blc to comply with the French 
requests, and tli.ttthey would be opposed in Joffre and Briand by men 
"sans notions precises sur rien". (5) In the event i"squi th pointed out the 
British government's objections to a.n extonsion of the cission of the 
,':.rm90 d'Orient to which they had never agreed. To the best of his 
ini'amation an addi$ionul ten good divisions and adcqUllte artillery would 
be required to Give the ullied forces a reasonable possibility of drivinc 
back the enemy, while with the nddition of fifteen divisions the odds would 
(1) P. cambon to J. Cwnbon 14/10/16, Jules Cambon H:iS Vol. 1. 
(2) ibid 15/10/16, ibid. 
(3) Hobortann to Hurruy 16/10/16, Robertson H3S 1/32/48; iiobertmn to 
iiaiC 16/10/16, ibid 1/::'2/03. 
(4) C;:..:3 If::/??/l. 
(5) P. Cambon to If. CUlubon ~~O/lO/16, Cc.mbon: Cop'cspon4c:.nce, Vol. ), p 130. 
G :c,:a~n~~ Ol' ~lurk::;. Jri:...nd ccunl;(;J.·(~d t11:.: tehs ~tci viGh p~'c;:~lic;:::';:; L.3sc;,:;C:2te,l ~ 
0 -:' ;,1'1" ;c~+U;'tl'()n W~,!, Olll- ()f' d:",+'.,. ';j1C" tl1r, lr t r' r.L' n .I.' 'j' 
- v '-' --L. v - -.~ v ~ - V~ ':'l-L. C '-' ... ~.~, c::~,r:;l:1-. "lcn 0':' vil<.; pO;;:!. ~:!.()fl 
;"L ,,:,;,lonic& the ..oG.lkcn the[:trc h,',d bcco;::o of crer:tl;J' incl'<.;;csc:d L."i:'Ol·t[;.~1~:C. 
~;c himscli.' \.;::...;.:; op'pos(;)d to the conccpt of ,; [;Lin thee. trc of W,~r ~,:_d. thoUl,'ht 
th~', t tho D I.dus' dispo3i tion of forces shoula be diet:... tcd b~' ,,[iH:. t~:tlC 
Ememy did. (1) i.,lo;yd Georgc rf.Lher er"b&rra",scd his colle"bu83 by r:;~"ki.c{,· 
I" 1 
u strol1[,' plea in favour 01.' GendillC' l&rge reini'orCCI:1lmts to .::ialonict:::. \"-; , 
but the coni'erence broke up without any firr:l 8greelJent beine re&.ched. 
'.ille11 the '.>/::.r Conunittce considered the situo.tion on 24 October Lloyd 
GcorL,'e cOllfesGed tha t the Whole S;:,lollica enterprise h,. d broken down boco.use 
it hdl been treat,ed us u poli ticul question - by the lo'rench as political 
on r.ccount of ;:)&rr<:.il und by jjri tuin as poli tic[.l on CiCCOunt o[ th,o: ~'rGnch. 
It hLd neV0l' been treLtod as ro&.l. Ee noW Greued thc.t the only anSWer 
which could be Given to the French propoGuls W2.S thut it was too 18.to • 
.i.obertGon said that on pw.'ely military &rounds the sendint; of one di vi3ion 
\()uld havo no effect. But, on the other hClncl, if the Gonnnittce considered 
that it would have u Good effect on Rouruania he could send a division froo 
Pr&'nce and replace it later by one from i!.:ngland. lie insisted, however, that 
he should bo able to withdraw this division in the sprine. Grey reported 
th .... t thel'e would be n row in the l,'rcnch Chamber if Houmania collapsed and 
that ull tho blam.e would be put on Bnc12.nd. Ee was anxious for an imr.ledic.te 
decision since J\lbert Thomas awaiteq a reply. With these political 
considerations once aGuin to the fore, the Committee decided that the 
l''rench proposal to increase the British contingent at ;58.10nica to seven 
divisions and the French to six should be accepted.(3) ~e subsequent 
communication to Paris showed tho extent to Which military s.r~eruts 
were being pushed into tho backcround(4) for it W~3 stcted that the ~Clish 
(1) Proces-verbal, lU:.B ;,,'1:3. I.C. 11; L. D. 'Gul;;lrre', Vol. 989. 
(2) iir.nkay: Ope cit., Vol. 2, p )36. 
(3) Ci.E 42j:)~'/5. 
(4) /.]bort Themns reported th<.;.t, whatever decision wa.s s.rrived £.t, the 
~ri tish government had u t lue.st ubc:.ndoned ita ote.nce th~, t in ll1ili tsry 
matte~s the~pinion3 of ~he m~litnry experts must be 8c:ept()d,~~~thout 
qucahon. Cl'homas to Br~a.nd 24/10/16. L. J.!,. 'Guerrc', ';01. IIJ»~ 
~_"CVCI"l:J.le~lt 1f~~:J C~ ~J..'"'Cbf of their dc;.::;ire Jco ;;~cct tl1c ·'l·isll.'~·:...j (;1 ~}lC s.~ .. i0~; il~ 
cvcr2- w"-::- po;:;si~)l(; ••• 1}12.C~ dcc:iuocl to wc.ive flli~thc1' (~iSCU33i(~n c." tc 
Hhe thel' tilis E<onld] prociucc uBci'ul r.:ili'U 17 effects u"lC to '-.c,;epJv )"he [.'rench 
fru~ou,-~l" • (1 ) 
;....l~d -;;llC forsonc:.l inte:rvention of the '.;':3;:'1' &nci J:TOGicicn t POillC<:.:'C, [;.:~ci IJa:..; 
1'crdndcd the. t this did not 1.1odify tho i3riti 8h view Jvh" t -'.;i:c ,~cci::;icI: of :'hc 
'_~:"'l' ;:lUst be SOUCht on the \le:;tern front. (2) ;(cbc.::-t::;on sti:l h-ci "ne) intsntiull 
of 2.c.optinc the Dulk&ns e::8 c, l;)&in thec.tre". I:c fcJt th[J~ '...he :l:iec ·dore.: 
WldoubteG 1;/ winninG" on the ,'rench front end the:: -'.; it wc ..... ld. be feL.j- to WCe.kC:l 
their effort there in the futile hope of Caillin5 cicci:.:;ivc re3ultG in the 
~;alkcns.(3) The Hr.r Committee held been "ve:cy eeod e::bout the r,:.ttE::r G.;:d c;.uiie 
rcc.liscd the uselessness of sendinc, the divisions", but hud been ob2.iCc:d to 11 eiC1:. 
"tho r.rilitc.ry disadvantC:CGs aC:.:.inst the political <.ind J;lornl cClldi~i;)l13" • 
• (obcrtson con::;idercd the proviso '"-bout withdre:winC the divisiO!" in:'he sprint; 
to hc.yc li tUe value, but was anxious to Get JoffJU on his sicic to p:r:'evant 
o.ny ~alk crl' the :&:.lko.n3 becoming r.. major thcr..tre. (4) nc.ic: alsu .fc::.t stronGl:r 
tIle fol~.y of detEchil1{; troops from tl18 decisive &nt to one of secondary 
:iJ;]pol'tc.nce, but hLvil1{; on several occasions spoken very stroncly :i.C£.:in3t 
this policy ho could do nothing further and hed to obey Orders. (5 ) 
In :IaiC's opinion, however, us in thut of many othar observers, it Wl...D 
not 'men' who Were wanted at :JolonicD. but 'e. raun'. "i-'rol1 all accounts 3errail 
••• is quite useless ll .(6) At the end of 1916 l-Tancels allies made conscious 
efforts to (jet rid of the 1"rench commander in the Balkans in whom they had 
proGres~ively lOGt ell confidence. In the middle of October the ~(us:3ian 
(1) Grey to Granville 24/10/16. No. 2)8), F.O. )71/2624/21})o7. The oric;ino.1 
\Tar Office draft reo.d: '''rhe \vur Committee do not consider that the 
proposed addition would be capable of producine; any useful military 
effect, but as u proof ••• ". 
(2) 1''3.11::;: Ope cit., Vol. 1, p 20:2. 
0) iiobertson to i-dIne 25/10/16, liobertson 1·;SS 1/14/47. 
(,~) l:obertson to Haig 25/10/16, ibid 1/22./84. 
(~) Blake: Ope Cit., p 173. 
(6) ibid. 
1 '1! 
.!.. ,.~ {, • 
i'or8ii.)1 ~1iniGtGr c0nsultcd with tho ~;nLlish ,.~bc·3sud():.:' in ;3t. jJotcrsburc 
on '~hc conduct of ;3nrrail. \lhi1e the [cnoro 1 We,3 r~()t 28 Qctive c:..s he should 
for eXUl.rplc, 'ihen he had officially WC1COLWQ 'j nizeloG on the l=.·ctc):"~'c 
~~rriv~l ~t Sc.lonicc.. rlno l~ussien GovernJ:lont hoped thee: 5rito.in \1(;U2.o. u;:;e 11e3' 
in.fluence wi th I'r8.nce to prevent the l~ecurrence 0: such incidents in thu 
future, since Snrrail had no business to take an:' 3.ction of c. poli tic&l 
char<::.ctor cxce)t in close accord with the represcnt2tivcs o:fthe 3.1::"icd 
c;ovcrnments. (1 Joffre was wnrned that c joint repre::;en~::-:;ion r.lit;ht be ::lc.clc 
by the i3ri tish and 1~us3ian covernments to secure the. t the .. rr.-,cc d' Gricm ~ 
,10.8 p1.r;:ced in the hands of a man Who was exc1usivcl;,' f". ~i::'it~:r:; louder. (2) 
In fect ::::n official cOl:lp1aint was delivered by the Russi&r. <?T:1bC'..Gscc.or in 
Pc,ris, Iswolsky, which arGUed thet it wcs unacceptc.ble the t political end 
laili tnry 'lucGtions should be confused snd th2. t l:lilit4' lesder;:; s:wuld. be 
trr.nsformcd into political ucent::;. U) CriticisI:l of S2..rrail was c:..l:::;o i'orth-
CO[,inC fran :iolnc where comp1r.ints Were m~de concerninG the disproportionc. to 
burden of responsibility which the cenere1 placed on the Itali:::.n 35 th 
division. :;:)8.rrail' s behaviour, it was pointed out, W£.:..; sc&rccly desicncd 
to pronpt a favourable reply to the request for on increased Ito.1ic.11 
contribution to the calJpaic,n. The Italian Generc.l Staff miGht indeed find 
itself obliGed to recommend the total withdrawal of Itbli&n troors fron 
:..ialonica if no chance was effected in the l::iGh COIIlt1and. (4) The:L3ri tish 
wnbo.ss2.dor in Rome h~ld for some time noted in the Itt..lian foreicn rninictcr 
Co. strone feeling aGainst Snrrb.il, whom he reGur' ded &s beinc p:re occupied 
wi th politics in Greece rl:'. ther th<.cn with ndli tary ope re. tions, (5) and a 
protest at Sarrail's attitude towards the Italian contingent under his orders 
was delivered to the Quai d'Orsay in the middle of HoveIaber. (6) 
::;ven Kine GeorGe showed con:: ern at ::)arrail' G behaviour but le&.rnt the t 
the ~-lar Committee hud cane to the conclusion that it would be better not tv 
interfere for the moment because of the wlsottled politiccl 8!1d r.lilitery 
situation in l'Tfmce. H.obertsol1 hed, however, been authorised. to obtain fro14 
(1) Juci1r.nan to Grey 13/10/16, Ho. 1583, F.O. 371/'2628/207054. 
(2) J£.nin to Joffre lio. 171) 18/10/16, L. l;;. 'Guerre', Vol. 1e3:.? 
(;i) i,otc frQlJl lswolsk.y 10/10/16, ibid. 
(I~) Gondrccourt to Joffre 1iu. 6'{6, 20/9/16, 16il 3137. 
(5) ;:lodd to Grey 2/10/16, l·'.O. 371/'26'.'.7/196241. 
(6) .;ote fror.l Italian CJ:1bassador 1S'/1l/16, ..• ~. 'Gucrrc', .'01. lC.~O. 
')" 
L .... j ,,;uch &;.] ho properl;;" could ~o Joffl'f! b~ w::" of CI10i-riuL.- -;;h," ~ 
Would Got bcck to the French Gover:ll.lCnG. :.e ix;lieved "';i~t ti.o letter wailii 
(l )" 
like Jco Let rid of ~arrc.il bu".; Wore Ul'rc.id tu cic ::x'. \-'-
future pl~'.n::; of ope 1'8- tions. ;,dlne replied. ~hu."~ ~he de".;aiL:; (;f ;"c:rT~ ... L~':3 
earlier GcheIac of the spri1lG were not properly ccn:..;idercd. ami t!i.i... t nei tiwr 
tho tc.ctic8-1 nor the adminiGtrHtiv8 difficulties hed been cone in~o before 
it we:.:; cnllllcited. L.uduci t~· was certainly not lr.ckil1£" in ,Jurrail., but 
prior consideration of difficultios;:concentrc..tiC1ll of effort :.nd c.ctivi ~;~t 
of execution w~re. Jurruil's army att<.;cked "on the pl'inci~lps ti1c~' l:.:::.rnt 
befor.e the w~~r". '.i.'he eSGenticl condition of succe:.>3 in the Jclk;..ns, : .:ilnc 
.1., :.,:. 
concluded, was the coordinr.tion of effort b~/ the :iiei1er COfJIJtind. ~.r.d the 
ullo~J;J,ent bj' it of zoneS of action to each nc. tionali t;y engaGed. 'The LUl1ClinC 
of the e.llied forces 1111dcr no considered plull wvuld lcc.d to friction as it 
/ ". \ 
hc:..d done in the past end would seriously detrect from the result:::; obtaincd.~~1 
' ... 118 whole problem was discussed in the '.vL.r Comt:li t tee on 31 (,ctooer when it 
WE..:3 decided that Grey should authorise Bertie to make informal represen-
tationo to the Prench eoverruoont on the unsatisfactor'.f ocnduct of operations 
b~" SUrr!lil and the lack of confidence which the a:i lied force3 had L'1 hilL. 
l.f thene proved of no avail Lertie should concert vi th his Italian and 
~(ussian colleae,ues to produce a fomsl complc:.int. (3) Bertie tackled bri[.nd 
about the subject on 3 ~iover.Lbcr and subsequentl;)' sent a ooDorandun sctti11{; 
out the Grievances of the Italian, Russi&.n and British governments. (4) en 
receipt of this document Poincare "sniffed a Good deal", but :Briand reninded 
hir.1 tha t, in so far as the 8Il(;lish hud U larGe number of troops under 
;jurrail, they WCJ'C fully entitled to make friendly observations to the 
Frlmch Government respectinc him. Ilric.nd promised to read ihe meLlorG.ndur;~ to 
the COlu>eil dC3 !d.nistres, but ::laid thatille ~"rench Govc:r'1unent could. take no 
c.ction eGainot :3arro.il vithout precise facts and charGes beine laid. before them. 
(1) :i.obortson to ..itamfordhum 27/10/16, l1obertson r,~s 1/33/65. 
(2) :J.1nc to J.obcrtson 30/10/16, Ci\B 4?/~:3/11. 
(5) Ci.n If2/::'!1). 
(4) Eertio to G.;.-ey i;o. 11)1, 5/11/16, P.O. 371/2624/?~-1l)::'. 
Ccnor~l :;o,~UCG, 1:10rC0VCr, W~,G Ii~kint: c. clctC::ilocl, :irst-}"~.l1c. c::c..:.lin&tL,n cf 
"tilC pro1:>ler:l. (1) \'111on Bertie sc..w ilin £icc..in, howey::;:', 3ri"ucl ;,2.;10 no bC:ltici1 
:Lii frau Gencrc.l ~(oc:ucs c. t .j:.::'onico _lOre no ~ uni'cVOlU'[. blo to .Jarr~'.i:;' ['S i'C'.r 
(0 ' 
LS the la t ter l s mili tv.r.i clisposi tion:...; ''';0 re concc:;:necl. ".) Ii' ..;;: IT&i~. coulc: 
l'[,rry the thrusts of his encnies inside l,'j:&.nc0, he could cert&.j.nl~· cope ' .. /i~i1 
those cOlline from a1:>roo.(l. In fr.d on 6 :Tovcuber ~lo;y(l Gcor.:;e Q,Jl:'e3:';0c. '~o 
l'c.inlcve ·the. t he had nevel' rccei vael prcGisc cOf::plaLl"ts c.bout Jar:'z.iJ.. ~~C 
''';;::'S convinced that l?oberLson hall Gicpl~- been pCl'suadcd b~l his :i?rench i'l'icnd3 
tha'~ .:3&rrail was a bad aener&1. ()) 
Shortl~; ,,:fLer the dcciGion to incro&so tl1C Jri tish continGent at 
..lc.lonico. hid 1:>oen J:lc.dc, i(obe~.'t::;on drew up a c[.reful review of the whole W<:-'I' 
si ~u<:-. tion. Ls fc..r uc the l)<:lk&no Were concernod LJl •• ddi tion c:: fiftcc!l 
divisions would be necesGary decisi vel;:,' to Cicfca t the 3ulC£.:~·ir..r! forces. 
Such 2. reinforcement waG out of the question until the Viar COLm.ittee 
decided th:,t the Bo.lkc.ns c.nd not l;'r&nce was the nain front. There w£.s 
therefore no sa:tinfactory mili ta:.'y al terua tivc between continuinc on 
npproxim& tely the present scale and maJdng the I3D.lk8.ns the l:'.ein ther. tre of 
war. Bad str£.tel:;Y, Hobcrtson argued, had never ;{ot proved to be Good policy 
c.nd he reGretted tho sonding of £:.nother di vioiou to 3e.lonica, £.1 though he 
reCOGnised tho reasons which had prompted the deciSion. :re reGretted it not 
only because of the dissemination of forces but bec6.\lSe it broUGht £.;ncle.nd a 
step nearer emb::.rkin6 on extensive operations in the })aIkens, where, 
I A) 
Robertson believed, decisive results were impossible.\~ lbe reinforcements 
had, in fact, been obtained without any clear view of the uses to Which they 
would be put, for at the end of October Joffre called upon Sarruil to tell 
hicl whnt his plans were andWhat he envisaeed the possibilities and 
objectives of tho Armee d'Orient to bo.(5) Joffre nonetheless pressed 3riand 
to ensure that 1-:ngland kept the promise she had made at Boulogne and broUGht 
her contil'lGent up to seven divisions. (6) Lt the sene time he tried to 
(1) 
(: ) 
Bertie to Grey Ho. 11)5, 4/11/16, l".0. 371/2624/222017; l;ote by 
Briand 3/11/16, A. ~. IGuerre f , Vol. 1040. 
Bertie to Grey 7/11/16, Bertie H3S 1".0. 800/162/Bal/16/0. 
0) iiote by painleve Hovember 1916, pain1eve I'~S, 313 Lp no. 
(4) IGeneral Heviow of tho Situation', October 1916, C:.13 24/2/0:;. 
(5) Joffre to SurraH Ho. 6307-9, 31/10/16, 161~ 3136. 
(6) Joffre to Briand lIo. 228, 1/ll/16, L. E. fGuerrc', Vol. 1040. 
l ,,~ 
_L , ,. 
COllVillCC >lobcrtson thnt the entJ~~r of ~~o1.mc.LiL into the w,':::, IlC.G. Ch'C:l t:nc 
30.1k~.n:.:; C-n entirol;y new siGnificance Hhich tj,e~' wOl~lci. iLTIOre 2t t.'l.8i.r !?:ril. 
.::he ~'C Lions of the /~rnee d' Crient would only be ;u.L.~ cfi.'ecti vc i..f the scc;pe 
of its mission Were onl;:.rced unQ JofC'rc urceci 1~obe~'t3Jn to ful':i::. the 
oblicc.tions entered into nt 130ulOC:~lC. (1) j(coe::::,tscn co;,3iU.crccl tii t Jofi.'::.'C 
'-Ie,s unduly optlllistic in his assO:::;sL1ent of the capnbili ties of 1-.'" • , vne "rr:£: e 
d'Crient without massive reinforcements nnr. he lrr'[;ed ::ilm:: tc b~.·iC no doubt 
:U1 the wind of General llOCil18S as to thc true situ2tion. (2) ~;othillC, ~lobcrt:3on 
told the 'h.r Com.lnittoe, could be wor:.:;c thcn 2ddinc a few divisions to til03C 
ulrcady at 3ulonicn and, while Joffre niGht talk in terns of an ['dvc-nco 
towards Sofia, there was no roulistic alterIlutive for the Lrmee d1u:dent 
to its present limited role. (3) Joffre learnt thE:. t the Italio n ::iCh 
COIl'J:l::i.nd hc:.d also set its face against further reini'orcencnts unless tho 
u11ion nhould decidc to make the Balkans the decisive 3renr.: 0f their wt:r 
effort. (4) :;:{onetheless on 8 ;Jovembe:..' 1-;ilne sucgested the. tit W':Juld be 
undesirable to give the Briti:,11 forces a purely defe~lsive role in 1917 ar:; 
they would deteriorate in these cirsumstnnces. Either they should COr.JC 
back - which illeant a loss of prestige - or else GO forward - which neant 
[' lareer operation. In brief while Hilne agreed with the General Staff that 
no decisive action could be taken without large reinforcemonts, he cave 
weiGllt to the French case by envisaGing far greater prospects, even witl1 
the troops 1l1rca~y in Hacedonia, than Hobertson had been prepared to concede.(5) 
Inter-allied relations regarding the Salonica C~n~~icn were thus at 
their customary low ebb When the politicians of both countries assembled 
in Paris on 15 ihJVember. Prior to the conference Lloyd George prepared 
a paper for Asquith in which he argued thLt the Salonica ~pedition 
illustratod the tvo fatal defects which had pursued the Entente - tardiness 
.. nd lack of cooperation. T'ne equipment of the arm~ in e,"'Ul1S and tra.nsport 
WIlS ludicrously inadequate, even for the modest role which it W3.0 supl)osed 
to play. 'rhe whole state of the forces gave the impression that the GeneralS 
a 
in COlllDund had lias a mutter of policy been deprived of every tenptntion to 
!.lake too effective 8 use of the armies under their control". (6) 1.t the 
(1) Joffre to Uobertson :10. 1656, 3/11/16, ibid. 
(2) Hobertson to 11i1ne 4/11/16, Robertson HJS 1/14/50. 
(3) 'Jar Committee 7/11/16, ct.B 42/23/9. 
(4) GrusS to Joffre ~~o. 795.13/11/16, lG~; 5161. 
()) Falls: OPe cit., Vol. 1, p 206. 
(6) Iiote by Lloyd GeorGo, CLD 20 I.C. l~. 
CCy~\~=-'cncc itself, h(;',/Qvol', "GClluth llluekl;:.,' c; CC811-;;cd. JrL'!ld'::: l'e:,,)l u:,ior:. 
-'ell:', t [o~.'~llC conine win~or the l..lulkc.n '~hcr: trc :..;:ilOuld be rc co.:.;;:is cc. ~ t:Jlc; (, \ 
r-rincipc.l front of the [~llicd wnr cffort. 1.) ~'hi:..; Ll f;;.~t w,s ; SLC:l".;lil10 
ci.cpc.rtw.'c froLl thc policy which l3ri t<..in ~(l c. tte:J,Ptcd tc p-...:.'c>uc since til() 
VOl';; bc(,,'in11inc of the ca;.1pai[;n. i. t the G~r..c tiDe thc :;1i1i ".;:::'r;:.,- chi0';"s Were 
m .. ' ctinG c. t Chr:.ntilly. :~o:. . .'e 11obertc.on vc.inl;;" at tcnpted to rcaict the 
prcssUl'c of the }'rench, but in the end aGreecl the. t the size of the ,.rD08 
d' 01'ic11t s:i10uld be incre8.sed 2.s soon as possible to twerl'~y-three di viciGllS 
includirlS ceven Lritish, with the air; of seekine thc decisive defc::. L of 
tho l)ulCCtri[.n D.ruy. (=') 
Despi te this clinbdown ~l.o bert son , by tile becinninc of Dc ceuber, was 
a1'Guinc that it would be incurrinc undue risk for the .)ulonica fOl'CC;S to 
D.tte4Jp~ to hold the front they then occupied [.b'sinst suell &on att",ek c.s niGht 
be broUGht aGainst it. lie therefore advised Lloyd George t}-l(:.t a dcfensi'/e 
front should be selected adequnte for the size of the c::.v'::.il:iblc forces. If 
this were done, and if the allied forces woro efi'ecti vely coI;JWC:.llded, 
:lobcrtson considered that the Armec d'Oricnt should be able to hold its own. C)) 
":~ t the same time he wrote to Joffre urgine tht. t the coUapse of il.oumflnia. 
altered the whole situation and inviting him to consider the possibilit~r 
of an attack by Bulgaria, Germall;>" , ri'urkey and 1. U'3 tric::., coubined Vi th hooti le 
action on the part of Greece.(Ll) lo'rance, however, was thinking in altogether 
different terms and on 5 December the Council of hinisters decided thf.t in 
view of the worsening ~ituation in Greece, where allied soldiers ~d been 
6.Iilbuahcd, the total contingents of the allied an:;y should be raised to nine 
Znclish diviSions, eiGht l<"rench and five Italian. (5) Once asain tbe task of 
securill(; reinforcemento flOm London was left to the unwilling cambon,(6) 
while Joffre telegraphed that if there WGS a probability of the cn~r 
diverting tlore troops to the' Balkans it was all the more necessary to b1~nc 
the allied force up to twenty-three divisions and to continue tho offensivc.(7) 
~hc French request arrived, howaver, with the Lnglish political situation in 
(1) Frocas-verbal A. E. 'Guerre' , Vol. 990; CAB 28 I.C. 
OPe qit., Vol. 4, p 6. 
(2) Decisions taken at Chantilly 15-16 Hovember, CA::a 28 
Clemenceau 6n 68. 
0) Hobertson to Lloyd George 3/1':'/16, \:.0.106/1355. 
({;) l~'o.llo: Ope cit., Vol. 1, P 252. 
(5) Hoquos to Joffre No. 226. 5/12/16, 5~; 145. 
l2b ; Juarez: 
I.C. 12e; Fonds 
(6) ilriand to Crunbon iIo. 4094, ;/12/16, i •• ~. 'Guerre', Vol. lO~O; Cat'lb·;m 
to Gre;:.,' 6'/12/16, 1~.0. 371/262:/247100. 
en J ffre to i~obortllon 7/1'::/16, \1.u. 106/1:5)); Jeffre to 3ertier .;0. 55-7. 
7/L/16 I 16:; 3161. 
I:ilnu lu'centl~- ·~o sond all~' Ob:JC1~VL.tions l'Cc;G.l'uin:.; ti18 
r,..,\ 
Cl-.C. UC.ill·~Cr..C..i.1CC of tho propo:: 00. rcini'crceucll"v8. \ ,,-) 
u.J~ili ~~', ~,:"r:c·~ic8.oili .Jv:.~ 
end whon :ilC? ·.Ier C<.:.binc t l.lct =iobertson Wc.s ;c8:::.d~ ~~. clc£.:i. wi tIl tLis 
"difficul t busine:Js". (i't) 
c...:wirl(; to thc dofet.t of tho Hown~nic.ns and. the E.t:'itude of Greece, he 
arcued, the situation in the Bcll~.ns hoel ui"lde'cconc a co .. lplete C!l£.ncC and. the 
plan C'Cl'occ. upon :::.t the Chantilly Conference, to knock out 3ulc;c:.rin b;r 
sir;.ultc.neou[3 opcrc.tions fIrm the Danube and 0"-lonica. wus noW out of the 
question. In u tour do force, which epitomised the 3.·~ti tuc.e he h£.d. 
unfailincl;;- held throuGhout 1916, ilobert::;on summed up his c.dvico b~' 3[..~'inG 
that "none of the objects for which we went to und rencin in tho ualkans can 
now be attained. It is irJlpossible to maintEiin and eoploy the~ a sufficient 
force '~o exert a decisive effect on the war in our favour. He oush t thorefare 
to wi thd.r&W al together fron the country, but C.s this proposal is probably 
not practicable for the moment for polm.cul reasons, we should &t the !:Jo~t 
definitely adopt the policy of holdine ;.:>alonica defen:..ivelJ·II. (5) Ee adc.ce. 
that the Whole question was difficult and complicated beca.use c foreien 
General over whom Bnglo.nd had no control was in cOllll;land. ::0 had no confidence 
in Garruil.' s ability as a oommander, but considerable misgivincs bec&w:;e of his 
(1) Cambon to Briand Ho. 1624,7/12/16, A. i!:. I Guerre' , Vol. 1040. 
(2) liobertson to I-iilne 8/12/16, W.O. 106/1351. 
(3) ililne to Hoberteon 8/12/16, ibid. 
(4) Hobertson to irai€; 7/12/16, H.obertson l·iSS 1/22/94. 
(5) War Cabinet 9/12/16, C\B 23/1/1. This is quoted in Lowe and Dockrillr 
The ~'fira6e of Power (1971) Vol. 2, p 204, but is juxtaposed wi th & 
statel:lent by Robertson which really belongs to a meetine of too ·ilr.r 
Cabinet on 26 Decembor. Noreover the quotation is terminated abruptly 
to eive the impression that Robertson was advocating evacuation, When 
the full trs.nsoript of his speeoh reveals that he too, the arch 
proponent of the priority of military factors, had been influenced by 
"political reu80ns". 
, ',-
_ ... 'jv. 
iCnoC'ance ( , \ of .surrc.il' s reGl intcntLn3 2.r.d those of the .21'0nch COVOl'11I.lcnt •. ~) 
rille nctual reply to PL.ri::l we.:::; rc.thcl' I.lore discreet than :~obcrtso:1's Gutbu:c:J"v. 
Ce.;;lbon Derel;}, reported th~:t difficulties 01: trE~nsport [.nd sup!t· Wcre 
:::uch e.s to rule out acccptrJ11Ce of the l·'renc11 proposal. ::::ri h.in e:r.vi::;c.Gecl 
l'Ltner, in the event of a strol1{S offensive in the no::'th, the neec.. to retire 
( ,', \ to [; ;:101'C defensible pOGition, where 8xtr[. divisions would be .3u:peri'Jwu::;. '-I 
:-iobeltx·n 'Lold Joffre th~t thc '.In;: Cabinet IDnsidercd. th:::.t the whela 
situ:::.tion in the ;':oar-J::nst. hud croatly Cho..lll:;ed ux that the defence of 
;:ialonica had noW become the primurJ objective of the force. It was 
desirable the. t the French and Dri tish nc..val and mili tc:.r;,: Luthorities should 
review the whole case before takinc any D.ctiO!1 rcec.rdir-c the dC3pe.tch of 
further troops und the \'l&r Cabinet hoped thLt Jof'i're would obtain 3c.rr<..:.il'::; 
views before 3uch a o..'.ni'erence assembled. (3) ;';,ilne ent:i..:'el~ LG::,cQl wi th 
l(obcrtson's opinionq but pointed out thu t Sarrr..il declined even to di:3 cuss 
the ~uc3tion of r.. retircment.(4) 
Unce uCai n, thcrcf ore, ltobertson had been su ccessful in wi ths tandinc 
the prcSDure of l!'l'ancc to carry out plans which he regaded as n:ili tEJ'ily 
nonsenaical. A recent study has suggested thl:i.t nobertson exercised 
"n virtual dictatorship" over the direction of British strateGY in 1916. (5) 
The Sulonica cumpaibl1 seems to illustrate cruite clem'ly that this is an 
exa&eeration. It is certainly true that Robertson vas appointed to succeed 
iiurraJ as Chief of the leperial General Staff with unprecedented powers so 
that he ~cht act as a counterweight to Kitchener. It was strong prezsure 
from a Lloyd GeorGe - Bonar Law - Cur::.on alliance which fi n&.l1y nerved 
Ls~uith to take advantage of Ki tchener' s temporar.r absence at the Dard&nelles 
to create an alternative source of military authority. But, when the lo.ot 
word in British strategy so often lay on the other side of the ChaMel, it 
is absurd to sUGgest that anyone in this countr~y cxarcised a dictatorship. 
If ll.obcrtsonts will had been final,thc Salonico. campaign V)uld never hevc 
been allowed to draG on ~J lonG as it did, involving ever larl)or nutlbnr's of 
british troops, with no obvious advantage to theatimate determination of 
(1) "-far Cabinet 9/12/16. Cll.B 23/1/1. 
(2) Cambon to Briand Ho. 1136, 9/12/16, Paul Cambon 1-SS, DoSSier 6. 
(3) Robe1'toon to Joffre 10/12/16, \>/. O. 106/1355. 
(,i) hilnc to aobertson Ho. 207, 11/12/16, \{ .0. 106/1351. 
(5) V. II. Uothwell: War Aims Pe 'Ce Moves and St te in Bri tisb Poli 
1916-18 {Leeds University .D. thesis, 1 9, p. 151. 
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the conflict. \'/hat is perhaps true is that Robertson's power appears 
unnaturally magnified by an effective abdication of authority within the 
Foreign Office during 1916. In this process the person of the Foreign 
Secretary, himself, is of crucial importance. It was Sir Edward Grey's 
firm conviction that the r8le of diplomacy in the war could, by definition, 
be only very limited. (1) Diplomacy had failed or else the war would never 
have broken out, so Grey believed that primary responsibility must now 
devolve upon the military leaders. In the particular situation in which 
the conduct of the War was in fact being determined as much if not more 
by politics than by military considerations, Grey's grossly inaccurate 
assessment augured badly for British diplomacy. 
The situation WaS further exacerbated by the collapse of Grey's 
health. In the course of the year his eye-sight began to fail with obvious 
consequences for his capacity to read official papers. But his pathetic 
attempts to resign were met by Asquith's insistence that the two men, who 
had been in office when the war broke out, should see it to its conclusion. 
Warned that only complete rest would save him from total blindness, Grey 
arrived at the unsatisfactory solution of vacating the Foreign Office for 
up to ten days in each month or six weeks, during which time, while he 
was isolated in the Highlands of Scotland, his office would be filled by 
(2) the Lord President of the Council, Lord Crewe. It was clearly 
unsatisfactory that a great office of state in time of war should be held 
by a man suffering in such a way. Until the middle of 1916, moreover, there 
was a distinct lack of cohesion inside the Foreign Office since Arthur 
Nicolson never ranked among Grey's intimates. (3) Then the unusual step 
was taken, presumably with Grey's approval, of bringing Hardinge, the 
Viceroy of India, back to serve once more as Permanent Under-Secretary. 
Cambon found that the new head of the Foreign Office had a far greater 
influence over Grey_ It Was rare that the French Ambassador found Hardinge 
in his own office, since he was so often in consultation with the Foreign 
Secretary, whereas Nicolson had often gone more than twenty-four hours 
'th t ' G (4) Sim'l 1 PIP 'nl ' Fr h M" "t f Publ" w~ ou see~ng rey • ~ ar y au a~ eve, enc 1n~S er 0 ~c 
Instruction and Fine Arts, was told that Hardinge was "Ie Berthelot du 
M inisUre Anglais". (5 ) 
(1) Grey: OPe cit, Vol. 2, p 154; K. Robbins: Sir Edward Grey (1971), p 301. 
(2) Robbins: op. cit., pp 323-4. Hardinge, the permanent head of the 
Foreign Office I found Crewe "very weak", [Hardinge to Bertie 2/9/16, 
Bertie MSS F.O. Boo/172/Gr/16/14.J 
(3) Z.S. Steiner - The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898-1914 (1969~ p 122. 
(4) P. Cambon to J. Cambon 1/7/16, Cambon: Correspondence Vol. 3, p. 116. 
(5) Note of conversation with de fleuriau 7/11/16, Painleve MSS 313 AP 110. 
for tho now kJrG::dcr c, lCYlCth,Y c:;:~ose of tho wu=.' siturticn. ,;jalc:;.icu w<:..s 
ce. usinG him a (,Toa t do(ll of anxioty "be cause (.f t1:o ver~' LUlse ti~f3.o;;o~~;; WT,~ 
in which the situ<::tion [~.1t~8] dealt with by tilC :'1:'onohll. ~,'i Lhout cntcrirl(:; 
in to the wi:Jdom of tho :Galkan opere:. tions, he could. ",3801' t the. t Lhe lcrellch 
huel novel' had uny real plan und thorefore no GOoCi '::0-..L:d pccsibly 2.ccr-ue. 
:Gri~,llCi wont there .for poli tic:;..l reasons Gml did nu" .. W2.nt to ClX.10 c.wu~,· fort.l1c 
SCJ;,O rCGSOiW. It was now llccoss£'.ry to teko SaLle rec.li.y definite ::~oe:.suro s 
to put the 3ulonicu mattel' on a proper footinG end thus rCJ:lOVC a IIhideous 
nichtluuroll. Dri tuin had novel' hUd any 2astern policy, but hGd :::~i;-Jpl;;r 
IIdanced c~ttondance on the Pronchll • It was perhaps tho most GlarinG exc.ople 
of ti.le ineptitude of British diploIllD.cy durine the war. 7nrCM{;hout tile 
conflict ~{obertson had sensed a "sud luck of courll{;'o and ma3ter£ulncss" in 
the }'oreign Office end yet it was there that the basis of :aI'itain's position 
in the eyes of tho world rested. (1) At all events, in the fr.ce of ,i:\,obol'tson's 
intrcnsiGElnce Joffre was obliffOdlio inform 3arruil that for the title beinc 
the ni06ion of tho Anuee d'Orient in inflicting a decisive defeat on 
BulB'aria was suspended. (2) nut Hobertson was still not happy with these 
instructions since they envisaged the possible rosumption of offensive 
~ction at a later dcte and required Sarrail not to abandon, except under 
military neceSSity, the territories Which he gCld.(3) Joffre stressed that 
the offenSive aGuinst Bulearia provided for at the Chentilly Conference should 
continue to be part of the plans of the Coalition. France would therefore 
go ahead in sending Sarrail two extra divisions and with the arguments for 
doine so having been presented to the British ad nause~, Joffre could see 
little purpose in a further alliod conference. (4) The docision to sond two 
udditiona1 divisions was indeed maintained by the Comite do Guarro ncetirlg 
(1) Draft memorandum 8/12/16, Robertson a5S 1/19/9; final veroion is in 
Hobertson: OPe cit., Vol. 1, p 280. 
(2) Joffre to Surrail Ho. 576, 11/1'2./16, 16:; 3136; Falls: OPe ciL., P 253. 
(5) War cabinet 15/12/16, CLn 37/16/30. 
(4) Joffre to Hobertoon 16/12/16, \'1.0. 106/1353. 
1)). 
on lG .Dc cCf:lber, even thl);'1.[;h JoL.'1'e W[l,S now :reI;1oved f:'O}. [.12. e':fo-.:-;;i YO 
c.utllOri t;:,-. (1) In the Cho.Llbe:' :~r];I;:/ COLXli3sion .. be2. ~~e!':::::,- c:::-.,!'8csccl caccl'n 
th2.t tile uci'cat of lioUIilC'.nia mieht have left the -'-rr:ice d'C:rient without <. 
rolo, ( 2) but all the cOue day Briand waG enthusi2.sticall;:, rocci ved b:" Q 
secret cession of the ~enote when he c.sserted that [~lthoUCh current plans 
hc.d ftiled he was not prepared to ['.dr:;i t th£: t the strucclc in the =;e~i.r-':":c.s t 
had been settled in favour of the enemy.(3) 
'.Ii th :'lo;{d Georee, Glways the mas t S~T:po. the tic of Iiri tish politicir.ns 
towards the Galonicc. campaign,at the head 0: the G0vernr.ent Gnd with the 
l;'rcnch, now supported by llussir., once aCain "bonbc:rclinc" :::>ri tain to send 
Gore troops to SalonicD., Robertson wr.s tU1certain as to whet would result. 
On 23 December the Ivar Cabinet discuGsed the problen [it a meetinc at which 
Robertson was requested not to be present. lie sensed a "ver~- dancerous 
tendenc;,)" for tho \var Cabinet to direct militar.r operations. (4) Given en 
opportunity to state his case three days later, Robortson produced anoth~r 
bombastic orction dcsiGl1ed to leave the piiticians in no doubt ~s to where 
he stood. Hankey found him in a very disGruntled state and threateninc 
to re8i01. lie felt that the new vJar Cabinet had no faith in Robertson's 
western front policy, but that they would never find a soldier to carry 
out 'U1eir Salonica policy". (5) Hankey was inclined to think the Cabinet 
would "come a cropper before long". (6) llith his futue career in the balance 
Robertson stated that Salonica was one long sto~r of the British G~~ernment 
acting against its better judcement in the interest of the other allies and 
beine impelled thereby to rejoct the advice of the British General Staff. 
Reviewing the histor;y of the campaign and the successive submissions of the 
Bri tish goVernment to the will of France, 110bertson concluded that on every 
occasion the a~ice given by JOffre had proved to be wrong and that given 
by the llritish Genernl Staff had proved to be right. t.'very diviSion sent 
to Salonicn meant a reduction in the chances of obtaining a favourable 
decision on the western front in 1917. Britain could no longer afford to 
continue ninking men into SalDnica and Robertson thought the time had cane 
when the Cabiret "really must act accordinc to its oWn judgement". (~() ~;ot 
(1) Comit' de Guerre 16/12/16, l6N 3058. 
(2) Parliamentary archives C 7497. 
(3) 3ecret :;08sion 22/12/16, lcrchi ves du S~na t. 
(4) itobcrtson to Eaig 24/12/16, Robertsun H:;S 1/22j97. 
(5) The dis tinction WL.S perhaps loss clear-cui than I:<i.nkey pain ted. 
(6) licnkey: Ope cit., Vol. 2, PP 595-6. 
CO \~nr Cnbinet '26/12/16, Co'.D 37/162/17. 
content with this tirade Robertson wrote privately to Lloyd George to express 
his hope that the cabinet would decide that they oould not send two more 
divisions. The French attitude was exactly the same as it alw~s bad been 
when the question of sending reinforcements was under consideration. They 
painted everything in the most lurid co~ours and sought to persuade the 
British against their better judgement by veiled threats as to what would 
happen if they did not agree. (1) The Salonica affair, Robertson confided 
to the French officer, Colonel Billotte, would remain for him a vexation 
and an annoyance until the ~ he died.(2) 
Pressure on Robertson was, in fact, immense, for on 26 Dec_ber 
French delegates arrived in London for yet another inter-e.llied discussion. 
These few days WEme the worst time for him in a "very bad year". The 
French reoognised the strategic factors which argued 88&inst their 
proposals, but "in order to save their own political posi tions ~ were] 
prepared to go to ~ desperate lengths no matter how futile they ~tJ 
be". (3) At the conference Lloyd George and the War cabinet were not averse 
in principle to sending two more divisionB to the Salonica front with a 
view to an offensive there or at least to securing the line then beld. (4) 
It was made clear to Haig that no British divisions would be released from 
Salonica for the Frenoh front(5) and Lloyd George gave Ribot a catesorical 
assuranoe that there was no question of abandoning the expedition. (6) In 
between sessions of the conferenoe the War Cabinet _t aeaf,n and beard 
Robertson reatfim his oonviction that the Salonica forces should nov have 
a primarily defensive role. The shipping difficulty and the insecurity 
of the lines of oommunioation would in all probabili1i1 become IIIlOb greater 
in the future and by sending more divisions Britain would greatly' iDoreaae 
the chance of eventual disaster. (7) Bo final decision vas in fact arrived 
at regarding the proposed reinforcements and the matter vas deferred to a 
further oonferenoe to be bald in Rome. It was provi8ional17 agreed. that 
the allies should Conti1lU8 to bold the line then occmpied, .. long as this 
oould be done without exposina the force to deteat. :BIlt a aborter line 
(1) Robertson to Lloyd Geor. 27/12/16, LlOTd Qeorp MSS "/4413/5. 
(2) Record of oonvereation 26/12/16, 16B' 3138. 
(}) Robertson to Ba1s 28/12/16, Robertson MSS 1/22/100. 
(4) Bankey. OPe oit., Vol. 2, p 604. 
(5) ~oe: Ope oit., p 77; Suarez: OPe cit., Vol. 4, pp 100-1. 
(6) ProMs-verbal, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 990. 
(7) War cabinet 27/2/16, CAB }7/162/19. 
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'.1 i '~11 fI C:;1.'CL J~ difficul Jc~r-" ::obc:.:.,J~SOll 11:-(: u-C:~ :-·Cc. in "G:..:::-tl-'i ~.,·cc. t .. ~ il:,cvC'j~..Ie 
[the =>i~itiSl:J C'ovCrnI:l€nt t;ceoc:.inc tc the ~·'r0:,C:' rccl'ucst." r.:;:~rc C0ulcl lCC,',)l' 
:';8 ~'.n~: object ill SC11di11C r,:~a..'C Lroops tc~ -:llC ~>[~.1~[~'!3 u..nlcs0 i~ wcs -~c -Lc:.:~c 
'~jw oi'fcnsi vc [,(;~illS t .JulCGri['. or 'l'nrkoJ, cad Lhis we.::; ~J.o'~ c. p::.'< cticc.OJ.e 
proposition. (::) :CuI; hiD ~riUJ.lph hud been ct tl:c oXi'tn:3c :;f [.1': .. incl'ecci:l::;l:: 
1-. \ 
',pi,c:rcat rift between the :British civil ,nd Dilit.:..:r:: cc,utl:.oriaoc;. \j) 
'l.~G.'oUGhout 191G 1he leek of trLl1Sport had been conGtr.ntl.~- cited ":::; the Llajor 
WGS t~ ~[.jor con:::;idere.tiun, but unde:;:l~inc it wc:s ::1obor".;30:1'S person.:..l 
hostili t~' to the whole caLlpr.iGn. 'l'he expedi tiol1 WLS the cres.tion of the 
'froele:;1 and the l:'ronch, j~obert~wn's two mnin enenies. .0&::::'1;; in 191~ 
he Cr..vc n succinct stntcmcnt of his policy fo:' victory: "There in ol1l~/ one 
way of endinc thi3 war satisfactorily £'.nd that in by puttir.c our troops w11cre 
the'," cun kill the most GartlanD und by trustinc t::: ourselves and not to o-!-hor peo~le". (4) 'i
'
his fo:mula ruled out the then W1born Snlonica e):lec.ition 
on two croW1ds: the omamy involved w£.s primarily non-Geronn and. the 
directinc voice was that of Parin end not Donelon. Lppointed to his office 
on terms which effectively us\ll-pcd the fW'lCti.ons of tho Secreter;; for \:[;.r 
and which I:1Lde him the only .ouree of professional nili taIJ' advice to the 
Government, il.obortnon rejected the notion that he should simply advise and 
then leave it to ministers to accept or reject his advice. lie considered 
rather that the politicians should accept his views since he occupied in 
practice [l senior position in the liar Committee, although never foroall~' 
c.ccordcd such status. But Lloyd GoorGe WIlS not prepared to alloW nobcrtson 
[. .~ree hand. Under l .. squith the structw.'e of control in Britain's forei01 
relations wun relatively simple. Policy was directed by Grey, workinc on 
friendly, if slightly distant, terms with the Premer. Grey, mG'eover, took 
b very narrow view of the r610 of dip10mucy in wartime, thus ler"vinC wide 
(1) Conclusions of Conference, C:.:l3 20 I.C. 13. 
(2) liobortson to Dclme- Hadcliffe 20/12/16, Robertson I:SS 1/,)5/:?5. 
(3) Ln.nkoy: Ope cit., Vol. 2, p 60J. 
(4) ;'~obertoon to ~"l.llwoll 22/2/15, ilobertsu n ;;3~ 1/0jc). 
1:;6. 
of' the jiol'ciGn 0ocrctnr;,r in the inner cor • .ncil::; of [,"cver:"'J:lont heel GGeuJ."]. evon 
before IJloyd Georee took office. .!.lthoUCh he continued to [.tte~lel ;.lee:tinc::; 
of the \:El' COJ:u:dttee, G::.'C;]"S waG no lonco::: tho prc,do;:;in::tinG voice in 
foreiGn Effcir::;. Known us 0110 of l'.squith':::; lO:)"111 col 10[<[,-<10:::; , he LlGvit:.bl;;-
Ghr-.red in hiG leader'G declininG prestiGe. (2) '.:rne ne''-[ 70:reiCn :Jccr:::t[::.:.'~-, 
R:.1four, on the other hand h .. d cooe to believe in the need for ~, Cl'C C ~CT 
uni ty of political decision end that Llo;/d Geo::'co was the proper persor. 
to h~:ve oontrol of it. (3) =~ol'eover Llo~'d GeorGe f s desire to c01: J';1'01 the 
diploTil11CY of the wnr spilt ever into the field. of str::::tcGic diplot:ncy, 
which Robert30n hs.d c:Q1ilC to reecerd e.s his preserve. l~is concept (.f the 
best !:lenns to win the we,r differed stcrklJ- fro;.;. thct of l~obert30n. Ls 
;~niG put it "the one bleck ~ot in the Whole picture of the wer is cur 
Prir.;c Lini3 ter f s de::; ire to C1:'-in eraund in so condary theatre s, L.£; if he did 
not believe in otU~ abili t~r to bent the Gerw:.ns theLlSe 1 ves [enG. winh;::; to 
t;cin Gor.:ethin.c with which to barCain at a peace conference. ,,(i~) '.fi th such 
diVergent views bitter conflicts within the hiGher direction ofihe 
British w&r effort were incvitnble in 1917. 
(1) Rothwell: OPe cit., pp 4-6. 
(2) D. Col1insz Aspects of British Politics 1904=19, (1965), p 142. 
(3) Collins: OPe Cit., p 191. 
(4) Haig to Robertson 22/8/17, Robertson ISS 1/23/46/2. 
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The Political Background in Prance (1916) - Joffre Teraus Sarrail 
From the early nineteenth centurJ there developed under Leopold von 
Ranke a school of historians who preached the prt.acy of foreign over 
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domestio policy - a philosophf of history which suggested that the latter 
could best be explained in ter. of the fomer and not noe ftraa. It is 
unnecessary to remark that auch an approach i. no longer taahianable, no~ 
would it be oontributing lIUeb to the developaent of historical th01l8ht to 
argue that the pre.ent research reveal. Banke'. idea. to be taulty. Thia 
has been shown _Dr tiMa already. Bonetheleaa, it proof' were atUl needed 
that Ranke'. &nal78i8 of hiatory vaa the inverae ot that which 1:.; 1I08t helpful 
to ita underatuding, an examination ot the Salonica CUpaigll mi8bt provide 
it. 1'0 other diploutio episode ot the Great War vaa so startlingly a 
reflection. ind .. d a oalculated funotion, or Jrench internal politios than 
thia ';ear!nt punet of llili tar, operatio .. in the _ill '\Matre of 'UIe war. 
Bothing elae mealed so olearlJ the intemal politioal .tre .... ot wartime 
PraDoe, which oontinued unabated the interneoine stragl .. of 'UIe 'lb1rd 
Bepablio. nbMrpd onl,. to the extent of proriding a oh1Mra of _iV in the 
taa. of the anellJ. 
When the cOllPlioated 1I&Iloeuni. ot Rene Tiriani to eDlarp the baaia 
or his gov8rDMnt in October 1915 tailed to produce the req111red renl ta 
and he vu obliged to haDd Oftr the tuk ot ooutraotiac a oa'binet to h18 
lUoiater ot JUstioe, .&.r181.de BriUd(l). power pu •• d into the band. of the 
.tauDoheat upholder ot the Salonioa kpadition in the outaoiac SOftrllMnt. 
Barlier in 1915 Briand had unsuoces.tull,. pre ••• d upon h18 lliniaterial 
oollatllS'las the de.inbili ty ot launohiac a dinraiODU'J ...... t in the 
.1Uns (2). aad hi. an'Uluiaa. tor pamiac an ... ten .uate&7 bacl bean 
ODe of the factors re.JOUilt1a tor oarzoN tbe )'ft •• Qoft~t iato 
the salOilioa 'ftn'ture in the wake of J1Ilpr1aa ."bU1aation at the and or 
Saptaaber. • upedi tiOil. hJ' poIIpt1q tM "!patiOil of £onleD 1lin1.tat 
])elouM, .. alzMdJ N'oqbt don ftrtani'. IOftrDeat aacl Briand'. pitton 
on ....... tbe Pl"8!arah1p vas tar rro. .acnare. • aiataaanoa ot the 
salonioa aqeditiOll VU W ..... a ,_Itt_ of faith qoa wbich Br1ad'. 
(1) .All ubiq1litoua tipn in ... JOlitioal b1aWrJ of Pnlaoa ill tbe tint 
three cleo.e. of tbI MatUla oallt1&rJ. BriaDd. a .ooialiat vbca. riwa 
had baOOlll iDoreuiacl,. neotiOllU'f ... _t .... t OODlltraot1a&' h18 
fUth II1a1Itrr. 
(2) Sea aboft. , 14 ft. 
-~- - - ------------------ ---~.---,---,---- .. ------
ministerial survival depended. SUrrender to the opponents of the campaign 
would mean his own political ~emise. 
Briand's entDuaiasm for the 8&lonioa expedition bad been confronted at 
the end or September 1915 br the passive opposition o! De1e88s8. The latter, 
having a1readr groas1r mistaken the intention. of Jerdinand o! Bulgaria, 
nov hoped to abandon the proposed e .. tern expedition and to ooncentrate all 
resouroe. on the Western Front. (1) At the hei&ht of the cri.i. the French 
miDister in .1theDl had found hiaeelr without intcr.ation fro. the Quai 
d'Oraar, which had not replied to aDJ of hia ~l.graaa ain08 26 Sepwaber. 
De10aaae'a apparent paral)'8ia prOIlpted the Po1iiical Director, de Margerie, 
to .end iutructioDB on his ovn iniUative. (2) 'l'be Fiuance finster, Ribot, 
ccno1uded that Delc.ss' was frightened to .. aocate hiuelr wi tb the reaponaib-
Ui Uea which the lOftra8nt was •• aUlliac, (~) ad ind .. d the latter offered 
his reaisDation to Viviani on around 10 October. (4) Ribot and ItUlerand 
were de.ignated to make repreaentationa to hill with a view to persuading 
hill to withdraw hi. re.igDation. 'lh1a, alwr all, w .. DO tt. for the 
Viviani goveraeDt to be coDfrol1wd with intemal ccxmU.iou. Deloua' 
Jielded to their .ntreati •• , but tvo d.,. lat.r •• l1t the ~ I1niater a 
categorical l.tter ot reaipation. '!bi. drw troa ViYiaD1 a repl7 oouched 
ill hard ad Uenoharlt terB. (5) The J'ore1sa llini.ter, who bad previous17 
aought to retire on the grounds of Ul-heal til, nov arsud tba t he could not 
agree with the policr of hia coU ...... (6) .. could DOt .aooate hmaelt 
with the SaJoll1ca .xpedition nov that it aeeaecl doubthl wM1iber tbe b8lp 
and collaboration ot .ither _lud or GorHce would be torthoolliac. (7) 
Poincare could DOt but .xprea. hi ... toDiu-nt that Del .... ahould nov aPHk 
of diaape •• nu ot which he bad 8howIl DO iDkliac ill tbI •• ti .... of the 
Con •• U d.s Ministrea.(e) 
'b n.ipation of .. di.tiopiahed a politioiaa as fbHJ!hil. DelOUH 
in.vi tabl,. ahook the Tivialli gonralnt 10 ita tCNDdatiou aDd oauaed rid.-
apread lliagiviap throuPout )lrao.. ~ ODe aJllPltbetio olNl.rnr .lII(U1red, 
(1) suar.s. OPe cit., Yolo 3, p 146, Poincare. OPe oit., Tol. 7, P 158. 
(2) Poinoare. OPe oit., Vol. 7, P 148. 
(,) ibid, p 168. 
(4) Jote 1»7 the Jelc1.11 _Daaa.do:r. Gu1llaae, 10/10/15, eorreapoDdanoe 
Po11tiq_, Wcatiou d. mace, Uobina of 1Il.ciU Jr1Il1av, of :Joreip 
Aft.ira. 
(5) tibet. LItten to • m.ad. p 122. 
(6) ])1er .'''Z'J, 1/11/15 • ..snan d. 11u,. 1188, cartoD 2. 
(7) lott b7 G1Iilla .. 14/10/15, 1Ilc1u azohi .... hrrr. OPe oit., p U7. 
(e) Poincare. OPe oit., Tol. 7, p 176. 
"ou allons-nous pour que vous abandonniez la barque?M(l) It was })9rhaps 
a prophetio oomment on this ill-fated venture in Anglo-French oooperation 
that the first victim of the Balonica Campaign should be the man who had done 
more than any other over a decade earlier to oonstruct the Entente Cordiale 
i tsel!. Viviani. who himself took over the Foreign Affaira portfolio, 
explained the situation to ansious senators in the Foreign Affairs Commission 
on 15 OctOber.(2) but six days later Clemenceau. Pichon and d'E8tournelles 
were still pressing for additional information on the resignation and for 
clarification of the ourrent position at the Quai d'Oraay.(~) On 19 October, 
Viviani, while still refusing to give details of Deloaas'·s letter of 
resignation, admitted that the Foreign Minister bad not been an aotive 
supporter or the Balonica Ex})edi tion, but aaaured the Chulber Cc.aission 
that Delou.' had told Ribot, Millerand and h~elt that there vas no rift 
in the cabinet and that he had resigned because of his health. Indeed 
Delous8, on hia own initiative, had pressed upon one ot Prance's allies the 
need to senel troops to support the Balkan C8IIlpaign. TiTiani went ao tar as 
to confirm caillaux's analysis of the situation to the etfect that if 
Delcasse'a resignation letter .pote of disagree .. nt in the 8Overa.ent it 
distorted the truth in doing so. (4) All this 'tho~ prorlded oolr teaporary 
relief to TiTiani' •• inisterial aiafortane. and b7 ~ end ot the aoath be 
had been forced to abandoa the att.apt to reoeutrllct hi. goftra.ent. In the 
enning peli tical _noeUYre. the IRlch aaligne4 mllerand yu couidered 
deadweight and an obYiou liabilitJ to al17 ainiatzy. '1'0 iupire pablic 
oonfidenc., General Gallieni, ottioial17 deSignated .. Joffre' •• ucoessor, 
vas oalled to be Jlinister ot War, al tbollgb. prote.aiDg that be had neither 
the political fiae ••• nor the health to .tead ~ .train.(5) 
'lbe parli_nUr7 sination at the end ot GItober yu extreMll g%'&'ft. 
It vas ~.nt that the .. lcontent. in the Cbaabera bad Dot be.. .atisfi.d 
and Briand w ... oon .ubj.ct.d to 'b ._ .ort of pera.cnatiOll as had jut 
drivea hi. pred.ce •• or out of office. OIl. ot his lINt aft.at ad duproua 
cn tio., George. Cl •• Do .. ", v .. aiae hi. Denpaper L'_ bbetll. 'to 
hold up adairiag pionre. of an _laud vhich bad •• t liar tace .. iut fUrther 
Balan .ntaDgl .... t.. IIDreonr tile Jlrench toreip aWatrr. which Briand DOW 
(1) K. BraibaJat to Dalca •• ', ~/10/l5, Da1oaa.' .a. Tol. 9. 
(2) Picholl lISS, 4~98. hoOa.-WZOH1. archi.,. .. 41l .... t. 
(~) Piohou ES, 4~98. 
(4) Parli_atarJ aroh1'ft., 07488. 
(5) B. B. L. ~I OPe oit., p 94. Gallienia C!fP!ta. p 210. 
determined to keep within his own hands, already possessed evidence from its 
London embassy of attempts by French and English opponents of Salonica to 
join forces in a combination vhich vould have as one of its objectives the 
destruction of the Prench govermaent. The cOitte d'Aunay, a close associate 
of Clemenoeau, vas oonduoting secret negotiations in London, vhere he had 
expressed the desire to .. et Lloyd George and Balfour. 'ltle English minis ters, 
however, had been warned that their stat_n-a might be exploited against 
the !Tench oabinet.(l) Briand's reaponse to this latent cri.i. vas to enlarge 
his governaent by the introduotion as ~tera without Portrolo of several 
prestigious elder state ... n, vhose inclusion vould, he hoped, serve to 
butreaa his regiae against the attaoka ot disaffeoted seotions of the 
Chamber and Sena~e. 'l!lua, for eDllple, the fOl:Mr P.ri-. II1I1ister. Preyoinet, 
despi te being alllo.t ninety yeara or age, vu reoallad for a further period 
of ministerial .arrioe, vhila Cl.an08au va. left to nmiaa that. in his 
mid .... T8nti •• , ha vas a. yet too yo'aDg for ottioe. (2) Bot 8T8ryone vas 
satisfied with Briand'. expedient. Tbe influential depaty Tardieu wrote 
oontemptuouely or the old .. n and chatterers to vhoa goTerDMntal decisions 
would now haTe to be 8Ubj.oted.(~) 
Briand's governaent' then, inherit.d fro. its predece •• or a ailitary 
oampaign on the other side ot Drope, which bad al.readJ aroued great 
passions in politioal oirola.. ViTia.i al.o bequeathed to h1a auooe •• or 
the oonoapt ot the saored union, b)' which the poli t10&1 partia. ot PraIloe 
had agread to .ubaarge their OW dUtareao.. tor the d1Inti_ of boatlll tie. 
to the hisher caue of winning the war. Bo otber a1111'1a taotor .0 stra1aed 
the fragi11 ty of this patriotio oonoord thaa d1d tile m1l tE7 axped1 tion to 
Sa10nioa. Briand tound hi.alt faced vi th the .i~ *t b1a ow nrriftl 
together vi th that of the saored UIlion i t.aU were 9,.lI4eat 1IPOD the 
proeaoution or a ailitarJ 'Y8nture, hU Oft taith 1a the Yal_ or which 
rapSly dilliniahad. Yat he aew that II1li tarJ t&11 ..... a,..,.,. vi th 
(1) ]'lnriau to w. Martin 16/10/15, J.. B. 'Qaerre', To1. 1031, Poincare. 
OPe 01t •• To1. 7. p 190. 
(2) p. c.boD to H. C_bon 26/11/15, caboll. eomaJ094Mo,. Tol. 3, p 89. 
(3) 1J.'Ud1n to l81'tbelot 31/10/15. Berthelot JISS. I8ribe1ot did DOt d •• troy 
hi. prints ,.,.ra u .78 __ t10&117 .. :I. D. Cballe.r 1apl1e. 1n 
G. ~. Craie all. r. Gilberi (ed •• ) • .". PltlMM (1953), p 65. J. 
nN'YIltial, it trapelltarJ, 0011aottOD z.- u in tM peaa .. 81OD or h1a 
Depbn K. DaIlial Laaclo1. leribalot. vbtle a oolleotion of a .. -otti01al 
do~nt. deal1ne vith I8nhelot'. V01it 1 ... f1e1d or propapDda 18 
held at tbe Qu1 d'0raa7. 
his own destruotion 8inoe in a very real 8ense Balonica was "his personal 
affair", while his politioal enemiea la~ in wait for hi. in the event of his 
military brainohild proving abortive.(l ~ fact that Briand oould neither 
live with nor without the Balonioa oampaign proved ultt.ately to be a paradox 
which he was unable to resolve. 
Critioism of Briand's oonduot of the Salonioa venture or outright opposition 
to it was liltelJ to 00 .. from three basio aouroes t the Prench Parliament, 
Pranoe's Bngliah alliea who, .s has been .e.n, (2) had be.n dragged with a 
total l.ck of oonviotion into aupporting the oaapa.ign, and the Grand Quartier 
General under the hitherto .ll-powerful. Joffre. .1t the riB of OYer-
aimplification it'aight be s.id that the mo.t YOCiferoua voioes in the Chamber 
were in faTOur of the expedition, whia 'UIo8e in the Senate were spinst it. 
Briand had to puraue an awkward oourse betw.en thi. • ••• nti.l polari •• tion. 
In the Upper Hous. Cl •• no •• u -iioolt .dnntage ot )'reJOinet'. recall to the 
goverllMnt to •• oure tor lr1uelf the pre.iden07 of the two intluential Senate 
Ca.1a.iona on foreip affair. and the 81'IIJ'. '1'he.e be uecJ .. a paver bue to 
.ttack the goveraent'. poli.i •• without .reJ. OD 21 October the Senate 
Poreign .lff.1ra Ccaaia.ion had .xpre •• ed oon08rn .t not beiag kept intoraed 
of the de ... lopaent. in the saloaioa oaapa1gn .nd YOioed grave au:l.e1;J .t the 
pro.peot ot .n7 weakening of the .lli.d force. on '\be v •• tem IProat to auppl7 
the DeW .nterpria. in tile :But. (,) whil. tour d.~ later Tiri.aa1 bact been 
pre.ented with •• eri.. of probi ... questions by tbe Chaaber c-is.iona ot 
the J.:I:fq and BaTJ. which t.lt tM •• .1.,.. equllJ 111 the 4uk .a to what vu 
goiag on in the new theatre ot war. (4) Cl_noeau did aot l .. e the opportunity 
of ain'taining parli_ntarJ pre.nre on the ~at .. OIl 19 Ioftaber 
prea.llted Bri.nd with a ho.til. oonoluion .doptecl 'b7 the senate k1SI C~.ion 
which ori t1018.d the goftra.nt tor the laak of pl.-iDs. pnpuatiOll aDd 
int.r-allied oo-ord1nation w1 th which the oapaip had beea .acqecl. (5) .1 
fortnight lat.r the Chamber JIoreign Ufairll Ca.ia.iOll va calli. tor the 
•• ouring ot the )Tench poaition at Salonioa. the retelliioa of which 1fU stated 
to be •••• nt1.1. bJ. b 1aH4i.te proTi.ioa of J'rench aDd allied reintoroe_nt'~ 
(1) p. cabon to J. CUbon. 21/10/16. Jul •• C_bon IISS, Tol. 1. 
(2) See .bo.,., PP 37-38. 
(3) ()rdre du jour. 21/10/15 • .1. I. tG1lerre t • Tol. 10,1. 
(4) PaWm to Tinaai. 25/10/15. ib1d. Vol. 1032. 
(5) Ol ... n08.u to Briand, 19/11/15. ibi4, Tol. 10". 
(6) LaJ,.. to Briand 1/12/15. ibi4. Tol. 10:54. 
The folleving day Briand'a confidant and chef de cabinet, Philippe Berthelot, 
urged upon the &JIbassador in London, Paul Cambon, the undesirability of the 
parliamentary consequences in France which might ensue from any decision to 
evacuate Salonica. But Briand removed this remark from the final draft of 
the telegram to Cambon, sinoe the importanoe of a military operation could not 
justly be impreaaed upon the English government on oonsiderations or internal 
French politioa.(l) 
Parliamentary difficulties o~ously weighed heavily upon Briand, aince 
he vas in the las t resort dependent upon a favourable Tote in the Challber for 
his own maintenanoe in offioe. But Prance vas not fishtiag the war in 
i801ation and a pOtentially more serioaa tbreat to both Briand and the 
Salonioa Campaign arose at the beginning of Deoe.ber 1915 with the deoiaion 
of the British goverament, under the threat or Xitcheaer'a resignation, to 
stage in the oourse of a oonterence at calais a showdown with the !Tench over 
the question ot evacuation.(2) Briand onl7 extricated ~elf trom the 
crisis which aroee b7 resortinc to the type ot dubio_ political expediency 
vhich vas to charaoterile the whole of h1a wart_ ld.niltrJ. (,) 'lbt pattern 
had already been set, ther4bre, vhereb7 the dipla.a07 of 'the SalOllioa 
oaapaign vould be deoided on oonaiderationa or Jrenoh d~stio politios. The 
1I11i tary rights and ¥r01lp ot the expedition had ...... d7 been lost siBbt ot. 
All Sir Willi .. Robertson, soon to b..a C.I.G.S., pat it, bllllltl, aad without 
the nioeties of diplouUo verbiapl "'!he tact is it is all JOlitical. It 
the French call av&7 troll Salonioa Briand and Co. vUl tall MC1 Cl.-noeau 
-7 suoc .. d hill and then Poinoe.; llisht have to 80."(4) M B.oberUOD 
reo08ll18ed, the recent politioal history ot '\be ~rd bpllblio .ade it IIOst 
unlikel, that Cl_noeau and Poincare would be attle to "om ill hamoaJ. Wi th 
a presidential crisis in wart1ae the .pectre of OOII)1e. ohao8 loc.ed large. 
:But pem.,. the II08t seriou tilzMt of all to BI:1aD4'- nppori of tbe 
sal0l110a oaapaip 0 .. fro. the taot that tbe lreaoh 1I11itarr hierarch7, 
with General Joffre at lts head, vas alIIOat V .. an1I1Ou17 OPJlOllR to the 
venture. In 1910, when a nn s.pre_ o~der tor vart'1..a bad bad to be 
.-d to replaoe Geural J'Oau, the ola1M of GeDeral Pall bad appeared tM 
(1) Briand to Cabon 10. 4101-7, 2/12/15, .A.. B. 'GUam', Vol. 10'4. 
(2) See aboY e, p 66 ft. 
(,) See above, p 7'5. 
(4) Robertson to Cal1"el1 11/12/15, lloberiaOil ISS 1/8/39. 
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strongest on the basis of his existing functions. But the Council of 
Ministers would have none of him "because he went to M88Sn .(l) Joffre 
moreover had walked into a position of growing stature. Between 1901 and 
1914 there were nine ministers of Foreign Affairs, eight of finance, seven 
of the navy, nine war ministers and twelve Presidents of the Council. But 
\ . during the same perl.od there were only two chiefs of the !.nITts General 
l 
starf. This stability and concentration of supreme responsibility in the 
hands of two m~n served in itself to restore prestige to an institution 
" 
which had so greatly suffered during the fur7 of the Dre7fus Affair. The 
question of the high cODlllUlnd in wart1.lle, howeTer, bad been raised ahtost by 
accident in 1911. '!be enquiry of a rigbt-wing senator, M. Provost de Launay, 
was answered by General Goirand, Minister of Wara "In tt. ot war the 
SUpreme COIIIIII8nder is the MinisterJ the personae- who beara this title is, 
in peaoetime, only the Inspector General of the A;J:rq and in wartime Cogaander 
of the armies ot north and ea.t."(2) But Jof'tre'. coabination of functions 
in the years before 1914 when be was both vice-president ot the Conseil 
SUperieur de la nefenae Iationale and Chiet ot the ArIJT General Staff gaTe 
him extensiTe, almost absolute, powera(3), and when war broke out ViYiani 
soon stated that the soYsrament had no intention of' intsr.tSri~ in the 
coaaand ot the troops nor in the direot oonduct of' operatioas. 4} 'lbe 
underlying basis for Joffre's a11lOst total oontrol ot Prench war plaas and 
polioy lay in the taot that during peaoett. the war bad .... r been oonoeived 
ot as anTthing other than a abort, eharp olash ot .,... O1I1ainaU,ng in a 
quick viotory. '!!Mre vas a deep-a.atea beliet in Prenoh aili tarr oircles 
that victory v .. reaerved tor anr 8DIJ which a.i_d 1ibe ill1 tiatin anc1 opened 
vi th a Tigorou offenai ... e, vi thout due OODce1'll tor atrawgic or -gotioal 
principlea. !bare exiated an e.pbs_is on lapoleoDic aadaoitJ andl1ttle 
appreoiation of' the dstenai" atrea,th of' entrenched r1t1_n. .l nritable 
IIJ8tique ot the trontal ottensin bad replaoed .0000d 1I111tar)" suategr. 
'lbua, vi th the outbreak at bost!l! tie. the :mIlCh Pftraent Tirtuallr 
abdioated it. direoting authori tJ and lett Joffre uatet.red to achien a 
quick viotory. '1!ba on. reatriotioll on the oc-.nder-in-chief va that his 
enntaal Roce.sor baa beell ott101ally ctes1pated. QUt trCII this, tile 
pftrDMDt tODdl, t.qiud that 1 ta taU va _nl, to a1 t back aDd watch 
(l) La Qorce. OPe oit., pp 86-7. 
(2) Ibid. p 108. 
(,) J. B. !OUrS-iii Go!!!ptI!D' .t 0OWa4""t (19~), p 2'9. 
(4) P. Renounnl '" JIo!!! of Xar Gcmp"'B~ 11 lr!po! (1927). P 81. 
what would be no more than a duel between armies. Governments prior 
to 1914, moreover, had made no provision tor creating a body similar to the 
later War Council in England. that could serve as a link between civilian 
and military leadership. Consequently ]'rance at var vas to grope by trial 
and error fr01l the 1I11itary rule ot Jotfre to the miniaterial tirmness ot 
Clemenceau. Jotfre conceded in 1915 that "the commander-in-chief is 
respouible only to the government, who can replace hia 1£ they do not approve 
ot his action-, but he realised that, after hia victory of the Kame, hie 
poai tion vas inviolable. (1) 1'0r most of 1,16, even, Jotfre re_ined strong 
enough to resiat all oppeei tion. War X1nister, Gallieni, took a V'igoroua 
stand againat hilt and on 7 March read to hi. colleagues a long indictment ot 
the Grand QQartier General, it. encroachment. into ciTil affairs, ita 
rePQSD8nce of control or even inepection, and it. neglect of proper preparationa 
at Verdun. But on 17 March it vas Gallieni and not Joffre who resigned. (2) 
Joffre's power in the early days ot the var vaa coneiderably increased by 
hi. deoision to rellCmt the gcmtrnmBnt to Bordeaux. WbateTer the motive for 
this action it could only pla7 into the handa at tho.e v.bo already scorned 
the poli tioi8l1a. The iJlPOrtant point to note, however, ia that this q1l8stion 
which should haTe been arped out in the Council of Ministera vas decided in 
etteot D7 Jotfre.(') From nov on the governaent watched the vioissitude. of 
the battle like a distant apeotator. 
Joffre'. ob3eotion. to the Salon1oa .dTeDt11:re lf~ 011 both personal and 
lIIilitarJ grounda. Be reMnted • ., diTeraionary exped.it1on vh1ch drew • 
• ingle eoldier ..,.,. fro1I the we.tern bont, tor vh1ch he !duel! vas directl7 
reaJOll.ible and be tel t • strong personal antipatbJ toward. 'the DeV1y deaig-
nated Co.ander-1n-ohiet of the .iZM. d'Or1ent, General sarrail. (4) II1dMcJ 
SarraU'a appointllent haa been noted a. the tint ooouion in the war OIl which 
• 1li1itBry _tter va. deoided againat the vi .. s ot the ft'enoh oa.ander. (5) 
S111i1ar17 the despatch of ~ps to Sa101lio. to .... tM torces at Serbia troa 
dea1lnotion had been buti1,. deoided bJ the BOTe~nt vi tb 0Dl7 0Ur80l.7 
ret.rene. to General Jotfre. (6) Indeed Joffre ..,.. oareful. to 1apress upon 
(1) Cassar, OPe oit., p 39. 
(2) ~. I. ChDbers, • Jar l!b1p.4tN y,,~~ (19'9). p 247, Bertie 
to (ke,. 18/'/16, oJd Georp D • 
(,) Boarpta OPe oit., p 246. 
(4) See abcmt, pp 21-2. 
(5) ibid p 28. 
(6) ibid P 34. 
Millerand's successor, Gallieni, that the oriantal theatre vas only a secon-
dary field of warfare, and that a decisive reaul t in the European war could 
only be obtained in France and Ruasia.(l) Tbus when Paul caabon had noticed 
an apparent warming in Joffre's attitude to the Salonica ca.paign, this 
was dictated by considerations or personal survival, since he considered that 
a goverDMntal crisis illTolving the fall or Millerand could also andanger his 
own po.ition, and not by any oonver.ion to the military po •• ibilities of 
the expedition. (2) Joffre o~d therefore threaten the Ebgliah with the 
breakdovn or the EDt.nte it the occupation of Salonica vere not _intain.d, 
vhile at the same tiM doiDg everythiDg he could vi thin J'rance to obstruct 
att •• pts to render the expedition successtal. 
In view or this baCkground Bri.nd'. deoision on 2 Dace.b.r, immediat.ly 
before the Cal.i. Conferenc., to extend Joffre'. jurisdictiOll to includ. the 
~. d'Or1ent would ••••• t the l ••• t .~hat s~i.iDg. Bat Bri.nd v.s 
in f.ct .ak1ng • c.lcul.t.d gaable. Joffre bad been chagr1a.ed b'J the ract 
that Sarrail had be.n tUing his ord.r. directly trc. tbe War JI1nistry rather 
than trc. the Gnnd ~ti.r aeural. BJ .nlaqing Joffre'. authority tc 
inc11l4. the SalODica foro., Briand could be Are that Joffre's own supporters 
would be pl •••• d that their hero bad be.- purali88i11o. Jlarthe1'llOre by 
..tina Joffre re.po1l8ibl. for the .u.M d'Ori.nt the pneral would be sinn 
• peraoaal c~ tMnt in tile aDIJ'. succe •• anel tblrefore be coald be expected 
to 'take an intere.t in it which va. noubl, laaId..Dg 80 1-. .. thi. UIIJ'. 
pre.~ va. ti.d priMr1lJ to tba repa_tiOll of Sarrail. It oould .tunber 
be 81I1"II1 •• d that the SUnil taotion, d •• pi te iIl1 ttal 1rri tation .t their 
faTOurite'. sub~.ction to Jotfre. oould be WOR over eftnt'aally wban they 
reali .. d tbat Joffre would be .. Ilcliac 8Ul»ataDtial reiDforoaenta and -ter1.al 
to the puq ~. d'on.at. (,> Indeed Briand vent ao tar .. to ill8tr\tct 
Joffre not to u. hi. DeW author1v to ob.tnot or ~ Sarftill. operati01l8~4) 
In tact there is erid.no. 1ibat Brianel'. ad.rl7iDB intention was. by -k1ac 
Jotfre overall o~nd.r, to relien )Wa of the dar to daJ control ot 
o»8ratiOll. on all trout.. Bat Briand'. calculation baakt1red, aince Jotfre 
(1) Joffre to Qalli.ai )0/11/15. 16 • )014. 
(2) p. cabon to B. C-boa 18/10/15. CUboila C9!!! ....... Vol. ,. , 86. 
(,) l1acl 0,. oit •• , 85. 
(4) Bouet to Painl." 21/12/15. Painlm ISS ,1, AP 109. 
kept direct command on the western front, while using his authority over 
Sarra1l to interfere in the course of operations in the Balkans and to deny 
to Sarrail the forces be needed to carr,y out any militarily meaningful campaign 
trom Salonica.(l) In retaining direct control over the western front, Joffre 
could only supply Sarrail's army to his own detriment, an~le his conception 
of the war remained fixed upon the idea of the main theatre of operations, 
this was so_thing he was hardly likely to do. The great cr, of the supporters 
of the Salonioa expedition became, theretore, throughout 1916 that it should 
recover its autonolD7 by being re\lOT8d trOll the hostile tutelage of Joffre's 
headquarters at Cbantilly.(2) Joffre oonsistently begrudged each single 
French soldier sent to salonica - the one man whom he vas pleased to see 
removed to this distant theatre ot the war being sarrail himself. 
Sarrail. then. was ver, much the bOte noire of his lIilitarJ chief and 
this relationship inevitably ooloured trOll the outset the light in which 
~tilly judged the Commander ot the !rm&e d'Orient. As early as December 
1915 the G.Q..G. was en ticising Sarrail's conduct of operations (,) and at 
the beginning of the new 18ar the opinion vas expres.ed that the situation 
in the Balkans demanded the appointment ot General LJ'aUte7 to supreme coaDllnd 
in that batn. (4) Pelle. Jotfre's chief of start, t.ediateq gave his 
weight to the idea ot sending out LJauteJ on a special mia.ion.(5) It vas 
in this atllo.pbere of IlUtual distrut and napicion that relations between 
Chantilly and salonioa developed tbrougbout 'the next twelft _nb and that 
Jotfre e.barked on a 8J8teutio caapaip ot iIlpediDg IlDCl ... C1Jlating the 
authority of his rinl and ult1aately of trying to replace hill. 
Jotfre-. t1rat .1pifioant iDfr1aanent of sarrail'. Iibart)' of action 
vas to .. Dd out in ])eceaber 1915 his anlJ appointed dePlV. General de 
casteluu, on a tour of inspection, oateuibly vi 1;h a T1w to reportiag on 
the deteuive arranae .. nts ot the lIilitarJ cap at SalOllioa. Be _cured 
(1) lote bJ Painlm, 1000000ber 1916, Pa1nlm ES, ~, J.P no. 
(2) See, for u:aple undated lote bJ captain GiaDDotti. ibid, ,1, J.P 109. 
U) G.Q.G. note on SUftil'. coapte-na.4u of 10/12/15, 161 ;,056. War II:lnister 
Qall1elli vu al.o cr1 tiO&1 of Sarrail'. 11111 tuJ ooaduot and cOllcluded 
.. eul, •• 22 .,...ber that sarrau va. -1D4eo1 •• t ell de •• ou de .. 
taw. . 11 _ .oap tu.a oOllV'J:1r ... napoualdli..... Vn ~ ou _ 
Qo\Jrawl aura1 t d'~l a ttaqua 'fisoureuMaellt le. Balprea-. [Galliea.i I 
gemt •• p 221]. 
(4) orpniaatiOll clu Bau1; Co.allcl_llt ell O11.el1t 4/1/16, 161 ~6. 
(5) UDdatecl, ma1pecl note, ibid. 
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approval from War Minister Gallieni for a mission to oonfirm his impre.sion 
that the entrenohed oamp oould be held vi th a force of 150,000 tully 
supplied .. n.(l) The mission immediatel., aroused an outcry among Sarrail'a 
supportera in Franoe and Sarra!l oould not have viewed de Caatelnau's arrival 
vi th aDT great enthua!an. Aa far as Sarra!l vas conoerned, de Casteluau was 
a olerioal aympathiser of quaai-royalist tendenoie. and thus an inspector 
trom whom a republioan general and 1I1.1i tant free-thinker oould expeot to 
reoeiTe little 8JIlP8thy. (2) When de C •• teluau retarDed to Pari. the report 
which he pre.ented to the gonrament va. in .0. reapeots di_trioall., 
oppoaed to the tenor ot sarrail'a deapatches to the Grand QUartier General. 
Be oonoluded that sarrail's foroe. were suffiCient, that the oommander oould 
not haTe had the oppat;uni ty to asse.. the utility ot the reintorce.nt. 
which he ".. de.nding, and that Sarrail'. pneral atatf va. aecond rate and 
lIhould be replaoed. (}) Dallagingl., for Sarrau, de Castelnn alao noted that 
poli tioal aft.ira .ee .. d to occupy the tomer's attention .ore than did 
m1litarr utter •• (4) Sarrail olearl., reaented what he reprded as de 
ea.teluau'. and Joftre-. interferenoe and he wrote privatel., to Gallieui 
oOliplainiag that under the orders which be received trOll his inSJeotor he 
was deprind ot all initiative, while re_iDing responaible in tbe event of 
tailme. (5) OIl tile ... d&J be wrote to hi. political ooatnre, Paul Painleve. 
tllen II1ni.ter or fine ut. and "'blio Ina1iructiOll in the Briand BO'ftrDent, 
uking hila to reaton order to a .i tuatioll in which otbera "re atteaptina 
to oreate d1.0%der. (6) De CUtelnau'. 1Ii •• 101l .. a the 00_1011 tor fears to 
be upreHed to the :mnch :roreip ltlD1.try 'tbat Sarft1l was about to beo .. 
the ob~eot ot a political Y1tabballt, ill vb10h hi. outa,... 1ett-willg vi .. 
woald aem to ouiMiBh 8117 cOll8icleratiOll or hi. Tal. .. a IIili tarr leader 
and to bring about hi. de.truotioru -La nite de. M ••• llu a 1IOI1tN qu'on 
De ,ardorme pa. au ;eneftl. SUft11 et pton ftut md_t _ pen._(7) 
{l} Jottre to Qallielli 1'/12/15, ,. 147. 
(2) .. meixa Jotm ,p 195. 
(3) suns. OPe oit., To1. 3, p 225. 
(4) de caate1uu'. repori 31/12/15. 1'- 5142. 
(5) Sarrail to Qal1ieai 26/12/1'), sunil. -)t. oit., P 72. 
(6) Sarrail to Jlai1llm 26/12/15. III1Dl.eft JIBS. 313 D 110. 
(7) VA.1pe4 letter to the ])irectioll Poli tt..- 26/12/15, J.. B. 'Guarre', 
To1. 1035. 
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It vas not long before the day to day effects of the decree of December 2, 
extending Joffre's authori t7 to the Selonioa front began to be felt by 
General Sarrail. On oommunications addressed to him by the Grand ~tier 
G8neral he found that the vords 'en chef' had been 87steutically scratched 
from his title to remind him of his subordination to Chantilly. This 
deprived Sarrail of a statue accorded to h1a by a govera.ental decree of 
5 August, which bad not baen canoelled b1 that of 2 ])ecember. A fev dB1'a 
later Sarrail waa forbidden to oorrespond in future with the government, 
except through the interaaediU'J' of Joffre. Then in JlUluary 1916 the Grand 
Quartier aeneral deprived h1a of the right to be.tow the Legion d'honn8'U1' 
and croix de gaerre upon hi. soldiers. A deooration for sarrail'. subordinate, 
General Lebloia, w.a held up for four IIOntbll topther with all deoorationa 
for the two diTiaions which t..bloia o~ded. In th18 reapeot Sarrall vas 
reduced to the status of .n ar.J o~der on the ve.tern front.(l) Then 
in Jul7 1916, in the .iddle of the hot .... on. Joffre retuaed the SUD-hat. 
which Sarrail had had the te.r1 '\J to req •• t for hi. .oldiers. who were 
'being deo1Mted b7 IIUD-strob. Joffre felt obliged to remnd his subordinate 
that the oonqueat of Borth .&£rica bad been .oooapliahed without the aid of 
suCh 1uxurie •• (2) 
In faot General t..b10i. beo .. the .capesoat through ~ ChantillJ 
pereecuted Sarrail hiuelf. (:5) V»n both Gall1eni aDd Briud pre.sed Joffre 
to CO .. ad with t..b10i.- decoration, the pnerali .. iIIo re.tated 011 the 
...what iJaprObab1e grollDds bt Lebloia- 'brobr nb.1di88d Cl_noeau-a 
HoP! ._W aDd that Leb10i. h1uelt npplied that ... :paper vi th 
oOllfidential intonation. (4) Paul Painle"" .teacltuU7 re.iated the ettort. 
of Sarrail -. .MIIi.. tn the OOllDot1 of lI1ni.tera to reoall Leblou aDd 
(1) .ote bJ }tainlm on the .pplication of tile decree of 2/12/15, .on.ber 
1916, PaWe'" ES. ,1, J.P 110. 
(2) Cob1ents. OPe oit •• p 171. ~n ~ rwYaal.d tb1a episode to a secret 
.... 1011 ot the Cbaber of Depat1e. there vaa, 1IIl4IerII"a'b17, oonaiderable 
uproar aDd repeated criea of -.mo auvered ---"-, 2'/U/16, 0 7648. 
(,) It i. walkh not1ac that Leblo1a had been re11eTe4 of hill o~d on the 
W •• tem P=nt in the apri.ac of 1915 on tbe ~_.t of General de Lang1e 
de car, OIl the croun4a of tbe lack of enerl7 8bowD. in hi. attacta aDd 
the c1oc.r nature of hi. foreca.ta. ( .. dated DOte on the A1We d'onent, 
A. •• 'Quem-, Vol. 1040.) 
(4) Lou1a t..b10ia to 01_IlO8a. 512/16, ,.iIllm JIBS, ,1, AP 5'. 
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extracted a promise from Briand that Leblois would be promoted.(l) ~. 
Fainleva prouva par des temoignsges decisifs que ce general n'avait pas 
cesse de montrer la plus grande activite et que son enduranoe atait notoiren .(2) 
But although Labloia' deooration was reluctantly conceded by Joffre, the 
general continued tolB the victim of a hostile campaign on the part ot the 
High Command. ~n atter Sarrail'. successful oftenaive of 1916, Jotfre 
telegraphed to Sarrail that young and aotive leaders vere needed to follow 
up this victory and that Labloia, inert and exhausted, waa no longer up to 
the oOllllBnd with whioh he was entruted. (3) On the basis of a report b7 
General Cordonnier, the Grand Q,uartier ceneral castigated Lablois with inertia, 
incompetenoe and softness. (4) Sarrail, however, continued to stand up tor 
his subordinate and congratulated the troops under his cOlB&lld "des BUCca. 
reaportes sous l"nergiqua impulaion du Glneral Labloian .(5) Joffre, though, 
was not to be thwarted and, despite Painle"' a unceaaing efforts, La blois 
waa rellOV8d from the proviaional c~nd of the ]Tench contingent at 
Salonioa, whioh he bad exeroised sinoe the disgraoe of Geaeral Cordonnier.(6) 
It was ruaoured that de Castelnau would have resigned if Lebloie bad not 
been relM)V8d. (7) But with Joffre hiIlaelt exoluded traa power and consoled 
onl7 vi th the replia of a .arahal, Sarra11 returned to the defenoe of hi. 
favour! te and .. eurad the approval of the Counoil or tinistars tor a plan 
whareb7 Lablois va. to be plaoed with TagUe11 defined powers directly under 
bDaelt. (8) Horecmtr when Painle" arriTed at the rae st. DoId.n1que Labloi. 
was giTen the tallk of reportiD6 on the .u.e. d'Orieut and it. requireMnt. 
in teru of Mn and nni tion8. Bis report, oa.pleted in -1 1917, iaplied 
that the Jlrench ao .... raaent had in no V&J faoilitated sarrail-. 1li88ion, 
which the pneral had been ob1iced to e&rr7 out to the be.t or hia abili v. (9) 
... a reward tor hi. 10J8lt1, IIOre ..med perha,. tiMID. hi. lIilitarr prove •• , 
Lebloi. va. then naMd b1 Painlm a. pn.ident cha Couell saperieur de. 
0010nie •• (10) 
(1) Painlm to Sa:rrail 8/1/16, I'Iinlm ES, 313 U 110. 
(2) 1JD.datad oontidential Dote OIl the .. moe. or Geuanl LelU.oia dunDB the 
war, ibid, 31' .&P 109. 
(3) Jortre to sarrau .0. 4036-7, 11/10/16, 16. ,016. 
(4) COIloluioD 1 ti1"er du rapport du G45ural Cor4OG1lier 10/11/16, 16. 3058. 
(5) :nerollpaoDt to Joffre .0. 78, 22/11/16, 16. 3144. 
(6) !alnlm to Sarrail 2/12/16, !ainlm IISS. ,1, AP 110. 
(7) Loui. Leblol. to x. PnTo.t 3/12/16, ibid, 313 jp 109. 
(a) ])acrai. W Sarrau .0. U5, 18/,/11, Pond. cn.-uoeau,~ 200. 
(9) "pori bJ X.bloi. 10/5/17, I'oDd. C1_noeau, * 209. 
(10) Derai. w Sarrau .0. 291, '1:1/6/17, ibid. 6B 200. 
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Jotfre's regulations were obvious aftronts to Sarrai1's dignity and 
prestige, yet they wwre self evidently in the nature ot pin-pricks which, 
though irr1 tat1ng, did not materially artect his authority and the strength 
ot his command. It was not long, however, betore Sarra1l realised that the 
control ot Chantilly would impinge upon more important matters - and in 
particular upon his capacity to wage a mi1i t&r1 campaign in the Balkans, In 
the middle of January 1916 Sarra11 appealed tor two further French divisions 
to be _10 1 .. tiately to salonioa as reintorceMnts, pointing out that it 
earlier requeats had reoeived satiaraotion he might haft been succ ••• ful. in 
the original aill ot the expecti tion and saved the Serbian army tram destruotion. (1 
OIl the .... dar, ha.ver, Jo£tre telegrapbed to saloaica to say that he regarded 
exiating toroes there a. ntfic1ent and req_st1ng sarrau to look upon thi. 
deolaration as definitive.(2) Jottre's 1iai.on o£ticer at the M1nistrJ or 
War noted that Sarrai1'. reque.t va. 008'8nt1y argaad, but lw feared trca the 
reactions lw had heard at ibe annd Quartier ce_ral that Chantilly'. response 
would be soaeWng 1 ••• thaa benevolent. (,) :rrca Sarrail's lwadquartera 
Abrai- .u.s.ed that the general would only dnand noh torces as vere 
striotly neoe.sary for his needa, (4) but Joftre vas 88 1810 too povertal to 
brook arq ministerial interference and, in re.poue to goV'8rDMntal 
ngpstiOils that certain reinforoe.ent. abould be aooorde4 to sarrau, he 
haushtilJ :reainded Gallieni that the apportiODing ot the ftench amed toroes 
between the various theatres ~ war va. uniquely the prerogative or the 
oommander-in-ohief.(5) 
.All vas usual when Joffre resisted the :mnch BOftrtment's attempts to 
tUe _n from the Western :r.ront, Pari. 100bd to LondOll to npply the 
necessary toroes. But Joffre, stU1 the pre-ea1nent "sterner', approached 
Robert. on vi th nob an evident lack of enthuiua tor the projeot, now pat 
t01'VU'd by the P.renoh BOft1'DMnt ot incre .. 1ag the Salon1ca force b7 100,000 





fai th in it. He found that Joffre "i. really rather tire ... in this _tter i 
beonae be know. that the operation. w01lld be toolish ad uele •• , Jet apparentlrl 
vill not .0 tell hi. pnm.nt openlJ"'. (6) • the tiM the q"StioD ca. , 
(1) sarrai1 to Joffre .0. 927/2, 17/1/16, 16 • ,1,-rJ ,. 147. 
(2) Joffre to sarrai1.0. 606, 17/1/16, 16. ,1'7. PoiDcaftl OPe oit., Vol. 8, 
, 34. 
(,) sarbilloal OPe oit., Vol. 1, » 2,1. 
(4) Iota lt7 Abraa1 4/1/16, Pa1D1eft ES, ,1, D lO9. 
(5) Jottre to Gallieni .0. 1262" 22/1/16, 51 147. J.. B. taa.rn', Vol. 10~. 
(6) Robert.oll to Baic 17/2/16, Robert.OIl ESt 1/22/22. 
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before the British War Committee Robertson vas able to tell his colleaeues 
that Joffre waa relieved at Robertsonl• oPPOsition to an extension of operations 
in the :Balkans, since he hillael1' did aot approve of the pro~ect but was 
afraid to aal ao. (1) BT the beginning ot Karch Robertaon vas convinced that 
Joffre nalll van ted SalO1lica to be evacuated but could not admit to this 
aince he vas in the handa ot the politicians. "!be ¥.hole thing" Robertacn 
dejectedll concluded, "is a JrenCh politicalraat".(2) ~ 
Ionethelesa in April 1916 Sarrail, iapatientat his own enforced inactivity 
aftiraed that he conaidered an ottenai .... , it properll prepared and supplied, 
to be both JOaaible and desirable. (3) But hia plan ot operationa, aa Feaented 
to Joffre, vas criticised bJ tSe l.tter aince it was constructed ~n the 
premiae ot the pron,aion ot reinforce.nta vhiCh Jotfre v.s not Fepared to 
countenance. (4) sarraills .... rtion that a var of movement va. possible 
oull on the :Ba1bpt front- 08ued quite • .tir at ChantUll, vhich replied to 
the general I • plan. in no 1IIlcertain terms. Herbillon could not tul17 
underatand this reaction ainoe Sar.ralla proposala, granted reinf~e .. nta, 
aeemed teaaible.(5) Iot aurpriaingll Jotfre and de Caatelnau v1gorouall 
reaisted the atta.pts ot Ribot and Boars-ois to secure additional ~GrOes 
for sarrail, arguing that it vas iIIpossible to denude the )trench tront 81lJ 
~er. (6) Yet Jotfre ,allowed his noainal npport to be ginn to a requeat 
bl the J'rench SOTernMnt that, with • new to atf'enai .... operations, tvo 
EDgliah divisions in Eppt ec.arked for the P.t'enah trout should be sent 
inatead to Salonica.(7) Pa~ c .. bon refleoted on Joftrela laCk ot reaolve 
and veakneas of character in allowing it to be said tilat the government and 
JI1gh Coaaand vere in agreeaent on thia issue. To uke _tars vorse sarrail 
vas an incOllJl8tent general vbo cUd not want to take 8117 riata, but preterred 
to pl&)" "the eternal gae ot the politicians", caplain1Dg about everrone 
elae and ahitting re.ponaibili tr OIl to others. C .. ~ then discovered, however, 
that at the same tiM a. the off'ioial r8Clua.t vu being made in London, General 
Pelle bad sent onr an officer trca ChantUll to the EDBliBh G.R.Q,. to inform 
(1) War Cowmttee '22/2/16, -CJ,J 42/9/3. 
(2) Robert.on to JDJrray 6/3/16, Robertson ES, 1/32/9. 
(3) sarrail to Jotfre 7/4/16, .16K 3136• 
(4) Joffre to sarrail BO. 9476-7. 6/5/16, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 1036. 
(5) s.rbUlon. OPe cit., Vol. 1, P 269. 
(6) Poinoare. OPe oit., Vol. 8, p 208. 
(7) P. C_bon to J. ODbon 15/5/16, lales C_bon ES, Vol. 1, Briand to 
P. cambon 12/5/16, Ho. 1585-8, A. E. 'Quem', Vol. 1036. 
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the Br1 tiah authori tiel that in fact the request _nated aolely trom the French 
goveraent and had not got the npport ot the military. (1) As Cambon correctly 
antioipated thil vas enough to out abori aD7 possibUi tr that the English 
might accede to the :rrenoh demand I flJe te ~~te qu' 1 Chantilly on eat 
oppo.e 1 l'envoi des deux diTiaionaangla1.e. -du Caire 1 Salonique et qu'iei 
on le Hit-. alars rien 1 faire". (2) He had, DeTertheless, to go through 
the oMrade ot preHnting and repeating Brlandtl requestl to tb8 English 
government, without teeling able to tell- the, ]'rench preaier what he knew of 
Jotfre's 1'8al attitude, nor that this attitade was known to the _lish. (,) 
Briand· appears to have been tba onl;y person unaware of the tutili tr ot the 
exercile tor in the _liah War Co.! ttee on 17 Ifa7 the Director of 1W.i tarr 
, 
Operationl Itated hil be1iet that Jofb:e vas not at all keen about the 
proposal. but appeared .s i.t be had got tqbab the beat ot it. (4) Lord Orne 
'. 
found the whole thing sa.ething ot a bo1'e, sinoe ail1 ter, opinion on both 
.ide. ot tile Charmsl val apinat the plan, and oonc1uded that it deriTed 
"troll Geural surau plu :mnch politic.". (5) _onethe1e.s the Jlrenoh 
gonra.ent insilted that Joffre should oontOrli his attitude with that ot the 
lliDi.trr. 'l!» purali •• t.o ~ 1'8luetantly to do .0, but atUl protested 
that he would preter to se. Sarrau .ad. goyerDOr ot Indo-Chinal (6) At the 
])OVIliag street Conterence in JUne, tiMt1'efore, Jotb!e warned ])ollgl88 Blig in 
priT&te oonT8r .. t1on that the -oODt!nued resistance ot the British goftrlDl8llt 
to tba idea ot an ottenlift would oaue the tall of Briand's gonraaent aDd 
gaTe B&ig the iIIpre •• ion of BinII&' his support to it so .. to aT01d thi. political, 
oriai •• (7)' : 
(l)P. -cabon-to -J.,-C_boIl-1715.._"Jl' - -Jale. -0 .... -ESt 'To1. -1, o.f. -Hote -by . 
PaiDlen on Decree of 2/i2/15 {~r 1916) • '"!'aDdis que 1e f>1ZV'8rDII-
.. nt franvaia fait ael effort. d •••• ,.re. pour obtenir des allies del 
reatort. en JIIo8cloine, le Q.'l.G. tai t oOllaaftr8 .on ml technique qui 
e.t oppo •• l ce11l1 q:.til clomae O~ orgna ~Iltalfl. Painlm 
IISS ,1, AP 110. 
(2) P. Cabon to J. C&IIborl 18/5/16, J'ales cabon ISS, To1. 1. 
(,) Cambon to Briaad Io. 585, 15/5/16, and .0. 504 (letter), 19/5/16, 
A. B. tGaerre-. Tol. 1011. 
(4) war 0a.1ttee-17/5/1'. CD 42/14/1. 
(5) creve to Jeriie ,/6/16, lent. 88, :r.O. SOO/168/ft/16/'50. 
(6) Po1lloaftl OPe o1t., To1. 8, P 224. 
(7) Blake. OPe ci~.t P l48. o.t. t1Ie obanation ot L;i.o;yd Georgel War lp!OirII. 
Tol. 2, pp 5,""1 -...at 81...,. 011. thi. oooaaion - [Jo1't:J:eJ sp0k8 with 
all the 01ltva:N n.1bl....u ••• tiOll8 fd earne •• s.. and sincerity - , 
• •• it va. dittiO'll t to bel18ft. that be ... courinced b7 his ovn eloquence 
••• It va. eu of tile ""OJIl1oal pe%'~oes I haTe ever listened to". 
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Joffre thus paraued a doable gaE of supporting the salonica Campaign 
in so far as this was necesHrJ for goverrmental stabilitJ, while continuing 
to be chee~esparing in the supplies which he W&8 actual17 prepared to send 
tc Sarrail's arDI7 •. It would be mistakell to searoh too deep17 tor Jotfre's 
lIOtivaticn. Hi. guiding prinoiple was allfll78 one of personal. survival. In 
this context the words of Liddell Hart are perhaps instruotivea "Reluctant 
to believe that a man in so great a position could be as simple as he appeared, 
that his superh'uDlan calll could COlll8 from insensibili t7, his silence from 
ignorance, even the allied leader. who .. t hill at clo.e quarters tel t there 
must be unpl'UlIlbed depths in tiMt apparent shallow .... {l) Sarrail's .triads 
attributed to the generalissiao the legend which vas circulating in Paris 
b7 the early 81DIIIler that Sarrail vas being urmecesaari17 iaactive sillce he 
had an &1'117 ot halt a million tiBbting men, when the true tigure ot actual 
combattants was in fact much lover. )'rom Salonica headquarters Captain 
Mathieu thoUBht he could discern a oaretul.17 laid plot 8B&inst Sarrail, tirstly 
to plaoe him in a situat.ion vhel:e, deprived ot material,he would inevitab17 
sutter a military di.aster, and 88cond17 to present him as being in revolt 
&pinst the polioie. ot the goveraaent. (2) Of the interests ot the coun'tr7, 
be concluded, the Gnnd Qaariier aeneral oould not give a dan - the 01117 
i.II,pOrtant thing vas to destro7 SUrail. (3) lJot aurpriaing17, therefore, 
sarraU'8 request for extra 1IlQI1ition. in Ju17 met with a bluk re.tuaal frOll 
ChaDtil17. (4) 1!le ChaIIlber JIoreip Affaira COIDi.sioD heard that the .A;J:mH 
dt()rient was in no poaitipn to ... a serious .Uitar, effort - it had D8ither 
the troops nor the equiPl8nt to plq a uaefa], role and the coua.trr 1IUSt be 
80 intomed. (5) The uncoapromi.iaa attitude of Cbaa:til17 had to be lIOdified 
&8 the prospect of a .. jor offelUlift to be sJllohroDised with the intenention 
of ROUII&D.ia be.... accepted polic7, but £rom Pari. Lord Esber reurked on the 
malicious interest with whichSUftil was beiDg watched and auaested that 
a serie. of .light cheoks would lead to hi. ~cliate nparaession. "I am 
not sure", he concluded, "that a 'brUliaat victorr at his hands would be at 
all welca.. in hisb quarters. Be ia not 01117 disliked but tearedn .(6) 
SiJlilar17 the hi.torian .A.lIlari confided to Poincare hi. tear tbat Chantil17 
va. not fa1liDg o .... r i t .. U to .... SarraU' s taak in case it therdJ7 cave 
him the opporiunit7 to .ecure a ricto:q. (7). Thill ilqrJ!e88ion was contimed by 
(1) ·B. B. -L. artl 0'1. 'oit., 'J "9. - , . -.' " .. 
(2) ltathi811 to ~aUle. 10/5/16, hil11eft JISS. '13 AP 56. 
(,) ibid 5/4/16, ibi4, ,1, AP 109. 
(4) Sarrail -.0 Joffre 10. 5119. 19/7/16, Jof'b:e to Sarrail Ho. 554'. 22/7/16, 
ibid, ,1, AP 110. . 
6 J:abar 'to JlQbUtaOD 21/8/16. lloben8Ol1 IISS l/21/40e t5~ ... tiDB. 26/7/16, C 74:90. 7 Poinoarel 0'1. oit., Vol. 8, 'I 22,. 
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Baarret writing to Tardieu when he re1l8rked upon the desolation felt at the 
Grand Quartier aeneral when the news of Sarrail's substantial victory at 
Honastir became known. The patriotic desire to-see Sarrail flung into the 
sea would have to be postponed sine 4ie'<1) 
Sarrail's independence of action was continually restricted throughout 
1916 by a series of liai80n officers sent out from J'rance by Joffre. '!!he 
first of these, Colonel Aleandre, was appointed as -early 88 ])ecember 1915, (2) 
but inste.d of merely executing a diplomatic brief they tended to become 
"de8 oontroleurs du general en chef, lequel ignore les rapports qui sont 
faits sur son commandement au Grand ~ier ceneral".(3) As a means 'of 
lessening Sarrau IS authort ty stUl farther Joffre hit upon the idea of 
appointing a separate oommander of the Jrench contingent in the Armee dlorient, 
while leaving Sarrail in nominal averall command of the allied forces. Joffre 
first mooted this suggestion -on the return of the de castelnau mission, but 
it was not until July 1916, with the imminent prospect of offensive operation8~ 
that he managed to secure the apprOTal. of the new War If;lDister, General 
Roques, for his proposal. (4) A list of three I1&III8S was presented to Sarrail 
for a post which would effectively deprive him of the dar to dar command of 
the :French forces under his authority, (5) and although Briand let it be known 
that sarrail need not feel himself re.tr1cted to Joffre's Sbortlist(6) the 
latter's will prevailed and QeDeral Cordonnier lett to take up his new post. 
DUring the ensuing offensive Cordonnier found Sarraill • strategy unacceptable 
and repeatedlr disobeyed orders. Joffre was irritated by' the way in which 
sarrail attempted to deprive Cordoaaier of all effective command(7), but 
sarraU reported his version of the si tuatiOl1 to Joffre and by October was 
threatening to send Cordonnier back on the first boat to Prance if he continued 
to ignore his directives. (8) on 17 Octo'ber the PL'enoh councU of Ministers 
decided to recall COrdonnier(9), and Joffre, no~ng the decision to 
sarrail, urged as Cordonnier's successor General Guillaumat rather than 
Leblois, who, as one of Sarrail's henobmen, was being favoured by the latter. (10)' 
(1) Bourl.'etto -!ardin -20/11/16, -!ardieuJlSS,324AP5. 
(2) Joffre to sarrail 110. 53'3,10/12/15, 1611 3014. 
(3) Report b7 l4'8unier-5urc.uf 25/10/16, Painlm ES, 313 AP 109. 
(4) Joffre to Roque. 110. 19540, 27/7/16, A. E. 'Guerre t t Yo1. 1038. 
(5) Joffre to sarrai1 :10. 6179, '50/7/16, "ibid. 
(6) BoUlt to sarrail 31/7/16, ib1d,Sar.ra1ll OPe cit •• p 140. 
(7) Poinoma OPe oit., Tol. 8 t , ,21. 
(8) sarrai1 to Joffre Ho. 440. 8/10/16. Painleri ES, 313 AP 110. 
(9) ])eoni. to sarrail 17/10/16, ibid, Roques to Joffre 17/10/16, 5 N 110. 
(10) Joffre to sarrai1 110. 4915, 18/10/16, A. E. 'Guerret, Yol. 1039. 
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Meanwhile one of Joffre's train of liaison officers had reported that in 
the Sarrail-Cordonnier dispute the latter was not wholly in the wrong and 
that the IIi tuation called for a full-scale enquiry which would probably 
lead to a substant*l reorganisation of the command at Salonica.(l) S8rrail's 
method of command in the offensive had been gravely at fault and he was 
found wanting in the qualities of leadership. Similar conclusions were 
reached at Chantillr following an examination of Cordonnier's own version 
of the wrangle with sarrail. (2) .As will emerge later, however,' Jot£re was 
no lonpr strong en01Jgh to -enforoe his will and, when Sarrail £1at17 
retuaed the appointment of Gu1llnmat as Cordonnier's BUccesaor, Joffre 
could not but accept the situation. Sarrail's liaiaon offioer at Chantillr 
encouraged him to think that he had oonsiderable latitude in the choioe of 
a replacement wi 1.h the result that the cOllllllnd was lett for the time being 
in the banda of Sarrail'a croll7, Leblois, whom the GDDd Q,uartier General 
had repaatedlr condemned aa iD8Pt.(') 
Joffre's contempt for Sarrall'a ailitarr prowess and suspicion of his 
penchant for political intrigue 0_ in the oouse of 1916 to be shared at 
the Quai d' orsa7. Here Briand had taken on as his chief oollaborator and 
chef de cabinet Philippe Berthelot so as to ciroavant the authori tr of 
Jules Cambon, whoa publio opinion and the insistence of the President of the 
Bep1iblic had imposed upon biJI in the extraordinarr position of Secret&rJ 
General. (4) Briand's confidenoe in Berthelot vas ocapJ.ete and he so 
UDawerviDBlr followed hia adTioe that br IfII¥ 1916 cambon vas confiding to 
the English ambassador that he vas disgusted with his own position, since ;1-
Briand never consul ted biJI. (5 )1n AFil Briand repn.anded sarrail for II 
I 
wr1 ting pr1vatelr to the Prinoe lleput of Serbia and expressing personal views II 
an the use of the Serbian a:t'IIJ' and also or1 tioised opinions which he claimed II 
were being bandied about in Barrail's eutourap of ~th1 towards thai, J_:l 
]lUl.sariaD ....... (6) SUftil a.Died tbat tile". ... alIT foundation in these ! 
(1) Bequin to Joffre lio. '42;15/10/16. -1'1' -,1'7, -16.3058. -
(2) Conolusions 1 tirer du rapport du aen8ral Cordonnier 10/11/16, 
16. 3058. 16. 3loW. 
(,) J)eoraia to sarrail, 19/10/16, 21/10/16, and 22/10/16, Painleve !SS, 
'13 AP 110. , 
(4) A. J'errr' OPe oi t., P 128. 
(5) Bariie to G1:'87 12/5/16, L1074 OeorP IJSS, D 19/7/13. For an interesting 
aaae._nt of the extent or Berthelot'. paver and influence at a rather 
later date ae. the e.tIq -b7 :Jl. D. ~ener. "",. lr!!'1oh lorfign 
~noe. I: rii=-:i~. ~lot" in G. A .. "~:l& "~n~ "~. ,~~~bert .~~ . .ll. _ _ __.. .. r:::" u_ 
(6) Briand to "Gu111n111"l'o. 460. 7/4/16, A. B. 'Qaerre', Tol. 1036• suarez: 
Ope oit., Vol. " p 275. Poincaze. OPe oit., Tol. 8, P 128. 
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accusations. (1) Then in Ifa7 "the radical deputy Abrami beoame convinced 
.that Briand vas creati~ ditticultie. tor Sarrail over the question ot 
240nist sympathies aJlODg the general'. subordinate o1"fioers. (2) Returning 
froa the tuneral of General Gallien·Berthelot allowed a rare outburst to 
break his usually passi.,. e:s:tertor when he cOlilplained bitterly that Sarrai1 
1BI10red the ordera which he received ana that he va. evidently in reTol t 
against the P.rench goveraent. (,) At the War M1nlstrl Her'bl11on sensed that 
Briand, annored at Sarrail's cOntinual vJW. and complaints, waa beginning 
to 10 .. his patienoe. (4) 'Per political nasons, however, lt was not 
expedient tor Bt"iand to be as openly hostile to S&r.\':aU a. ".. Joffre. If 
he were to dlspose· of the SalODica c~d.r 1 t vould ha.,. to be beoauae the 
latter had manUe.tly shown b:l.8elt not to be up to tba tuk DetOl.'e kim and 
not beoau.e he had been 878te_tioally .tarved by the pveftIIent ot the 
torces nece.sary to prcmt his Jdl.i tary worth. Paul Caa'bon theretore noticed 
a arke4 difterenoe ot taotlos between Joffre and BriaRd in their approach 
operation. tlOUlldered, and thea 11:1am1 would be able to .. t rid ot tim. The 
J',rench premier, baton, COlltilR1e4 to pns. the BDaliah BOftZlUD8nt tor _n 
and 1lOr8 _n tor Sa~OIlica to :-tSn_. tor the toroes vIala JoUre .0 
.,..te .. tic81ly deoli.eel to .. d. S) JrDre subtle Br1aDd'. approach 1Da7 haTe 
bee., but the tact reatu that 1q' tba a .. WIIIa ot 1,16 saran had torfeited 
the confidence of both the ~li~ and political direotors of Jrench policy. 
Xe va. now to become increuiDBlr dependent tor lis _int8DaDC8 in his cOIaand 
on the support ot _. vho.. iratluenoe in the cOI18truction ot sove~nta1 
poliCY vas at best .eoondarr. COIlaeqaently Jottre founa hiJuelt starved ot 
information by Sarrall a. to' bp:t'0Br8s. ot operations earned out by the 
.ArMe dtonent. (6). .' 
(l)sarrail -to ·Pailllm'l/4/16,-htaleri-RSS. -:51,AP no •. 
(2) I'ote 'b7 .lbrami 11/5/1', ibid, n, AP 109. 
(,) lJIldated priftte Dote,. Pa1ra1ef4 &IS, n, AR 109. 
(4) BerbilloDI Ope oit., Yol. 1, P 276. 
(5) P. Cambon to J. Caabon 21/10/16, Ne. Caabon lIS6, Vol. 1. 










Joffre's continued vendetta against Sarrail was in the long term subjected 
to a primary desire to replace him. Failing some obviously grave misdemeanour 
this could only be done if an in8peotor of high rank were to report that 
sarrail was unfit to exercise his command. With this end in view, therefore, 
Joffre telephoned on the evening of 24 August to the President of the 
Republic to inform him that he proposed to raise the following day the question 
of sending out General de casteluau on • seoond mission to Salonioa with 
wri tten author! ty from the gownment to relieve Sarrail o.¢ns oommand if he 
considered this neoessary.(l) De Caatelnau's instructions, it mar be 
surmised, would haTe lett little scope for any other conclUSions being reached 
as a 'reaul t of his mission. Joffre argued that it was no lonser possible 
to know wmt was going on at Salonica. sarrail'8 comptes-rendu gave no 
indication of the progress ot military events and what was known of bis 
activities was not such as to inapire ~ great confidenoe. Joffre was 
perhaps ill-advised to forewarn Poincare of his proposal sinoe 'the President 
ot the Republio .ee.. to have been strongly under the influence of SarrailJhJ 
political aS80ciates. Bertie noted that Poinoare bad been eleoted by a 
combination of the moderate parties with the object ot preventing the 
eleotion of H. Pama, a rich cigarette paper 1I8ker, who was supposed to bave 
extrell8 poli tioal views. The reaal. t bad been vert diaappointiDg to 
Poino.re's supporters of that 'time tor, troll tear of disolosures by the rae 
de valois faotion about the past assooiations ot his wite, he had leant much 
on and favoured the bdical-SOcialists. (2) Joffre.l1ao euured that Briand 
would know in .dnnce ot his planned demarche. (,> '!!2e council of Ministers 
deoided, however, that de 'c.stelaau's masion ehould be del&J8d and that he 
should not have the risht to ohaDp -the oOlllDlUld in the .,Jc:ana without first 
reterring baak to Paris. All that happened wu that Roques pve bis baclt1ng 
to Joffre's request tor aore aetaUec1 intonation f'rca sarrau. (4) 
several dBJ8 later at a .etiDe or the ConaeU SUp8rieur de la D&fense 
.ational.e, Joffre 1'eturned to the attack and read out a list ot Sarrail's 
allesed defioienoies - an inadequate sar,rison at FloriDa, recently captured 
(1) Poincare, op.oit.,Tol. '8; ,;p "24. . . ..... 
(2) :Bertie to (key 21/.2/1.1 .. Bertie JISS. JI.O. SOO/169~/17/8J ibid 9/11/16, 
ibid.JI.O. 8OO/168'/ft/16/S,. :Bertiele 8D8l.Jwi.a 1po1'ed. aome of the 
aubtletie. ~OUD.ding PoiD~'. eleotion to the Presidency. 
(3) Pelle to ?Berthelot 24/8/16 • .l. ·E. 'Guerre', Vol. 259. 
(4) Poillcm. OPe oit., Tol. 8, PI '24-5. Joffre W Sarrail, Bo. 8619, 
27/8/16, 16. ,1,6, Roque& ·to Zoffre, .0. 5689, 26/s/16, A. E. 'Guerra', 
Tol. lO,a. " . 
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by the Bulgarians, disobedience in the·face of Joffre's oommand to take the 
offensive on 20 August, Mggling over orders, misunderstandings with France's 
alliea, conatant complainta about the insuffioiency of troops and supplies.(l) 
ODce again Joffre demanded that de C&stelnau Should be sent out on an 
inapection trip, but the Counoil being only a oonsultative body could not 
take a decision on this point. Joffre though was not to be thwarted and, 
having disous .. d the _tter on a train journey with Poincare,(2} sent Colonel 
HerbUlon on the night of 16 October with a latter tor Briand complaining 
that S&rra1l did not act in aocordance with his directives, that bis actions 
were inetfective and that it vas absolutely 1JIperative to send out an 
inapector with full powers. tia renewed sal17 by Joffre ooaarred at the 
height ot Sarrail's quarrel with Cordonnier. Herbillon refiected privately 
upon the justice of Jotfre's acouaations and yonderat whether Sarrail had 
ever been given the equipaent Deoe.8arr to act effeotively. (:~) A similar 
c01llllUl1ioation was made to War XLniater Roq1leS in which Joffre argued that he 
would be tailing in his duty before the government it he continued to leave 
the .A;r:ra8e d'orient under the untramlDe11ed coaand of General Sarrail. (4) 
SUbsequent to the meeting ot the CO'DDcU of Jf1nisters on the tollowing day, 
b.oV8ver, Roques curtly infomad Jotfre that not only would Cordonnier rather 
than sarrail be relieved, but that a ai8s1011 of inspection could only be 
regarded aa an 1nf'rinse1D8nt ot General SArra1l'a authority and as such oould 
not be countenanoed by the govexom.nt. (5) Wi thin a tew daJ8, however. the 
government had apppinted Roque. hiIIIIel1' to carry out an inspection of the 
Arm8e d'Orient and its command, but the origins ot thia decision were such 
that the chanoes of this ~ting a oonolus1on such aa Joftre desired in 
terms ot the removal ot ~il vere negligible. Joftrehad in fact already 
lost his 101lB atraggle with S&rJ!'a11. )'rOIl now on it would" the generalissimo 
hilUe1t, reelillB under a aerie a of .. tbacka on the western f'ront,- whose 
position 1I&S threatened. Qer.aeral Sa:raU, for the time being at least, was 
.ecure. 
It must be evident that it Sarra11 had enn1es he raust also have had 
friends. Sarra11's parl1_utarJ 'bao1d.ng in the group contemptuously referred 
to as the rue de valois pac hu -already beel1 examined, (6) but he would in all 
(1) nag. -o,.01t., pp1,,...., -a.t.CJ. -.OW -8/9/1'. -161f ':5057. 
(2) Poinoarel OPe cit., Vol. 9, Ill. 
<,) lIerbil10111 0]). cit., Vol. 1, p :549. 
(4) Joffre to Roques Bo. 13605,16/10/16, ,. 110, A.. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 1039. 
(5) Roques to Joffre 11/10/16, iW. 
(6) See aboft, pp 21-2. 
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probability not have been able to surmount the combined assaults of Joffre 
and Briand, but for the assistance of certain powerful individuals. Sarrail 
aee_ to bave oorresponded direct17 with maDJ' parliamentary s11llp8thisera, 
inoluding caillaux(l) and ~in Bouillon(2~ while inside the French 
Cabinet he could oount on the wpport of Halvy. L80n !om-eeois and Painleve('). 
lfalvy, the Minister of the Interior, ia unal17 rega:med as the missing link 
between Caillaux'a parliamentary following and the influence exercised br 
the B,adioal-Sooialist J*rt7 in the direction cf the gonrnment. Leon 
BoUrgeoiS vaa one of the elder stateaaen introduced b7 Briand to bolster up 
his ainis1ir7 and held no cleper_ntal ottice. But the aost important of the 
three was unqueationab17 Paul Painleva. Thia noraal17 retiriDg. extremelr 
di.tiQgUiahed mathe .. ticiaD could be roused to outbursts ot great emotion 
in his defence ot General sarrau. (4) To understand his near fanatioism in 
this utter one nat uke a oOl1scio_ 'effort to place oneself in the milieu 
ot :prance during the ~at War. C~tiTelr near to the ]lreBent da7 this 
-7 be, but it vas nearer still to the very foundation ct the Third Republic 
and there vaa atill mi.sing in ~ce a basic ccns.D8U8 as to the oorrect 
r01'll of the bodr politic ncb .. perhaps ansts 100<1&7. '!'here exiated, 
therefore, in lett-wing oirole. in vart:lme JInrlce a constant tear that a 
Jdli ts+.0torJ might prOft b occaa~Oft or -a righMiag, possible olerioal, 
/ 
coup d"~t b7 the viotonou pnerals, vhich would eff.ctivelr sound the 
deatia-kneU of the Republican inatimtion. (5) It vu as sur to assooiate 
the 8l."IIJ with tile perHC1lti01l ot Dre7fu and -the 1ibre&t of BoUlanger as it 
va' with the defenoe of the patrie. Relative17 emf on in the war Joffre 
beo'" acquainted vi th the tear. bald b7 (leneral Sar.rail. ayes-, Sarrail 
told a dePUt}r, .... are headed ataght tor a dictatorahip. When the Germans 
gift in General Joffre rill De proIIOtU JIIrabal and 11111 band over the reina 
to General :roch. i'hat -- the ftt1u:D or 1IIperialia and the end of the 
(1) Circua.tantia1evidenoe in 'the Sazn.U-Decrais -oor.t'espondance, ,61' 200, -
the majeri t}r of Call1a'\1%'. papera were d •• tro)'ed on the ordera or hia 
•• cretarJ in 1954 &Dd what i. l.tt re.ain. clo •• a.(Into%m8tion provided 
bl the Sernce de • .lrOh1 ..... Prim •• Arch1:ns fttioul. •• ). 
(2) ]loVell to Robertson 16/1/16 • ...,.U ISS IT/o/2/l9'i. 
(3) Bertie • .I&!at.... To1. 2,p 55'. ,:arti. to Gre7 12/11/1 ... 6, :Bertie HSS,F.O. 800/l68~fl:tiJ86. Qal.lie1li ~ was not hillftlt ~Dg the miniaters olosely 
al1Sned to surail [»-A. LeblfMld, op. cit., p 62] -.a Painleve. ·Doumergue 
ana Cle.n't4 .. pruare4 to .. reM. pae2r8l -quoi qut 11 fasae". 
[ibid, p 199]. Bat the lilobad- of DouIaerc- 1n this group would not 
gpear to 'be jua:tU1ed [lei 'below p 163]. ' 
(4) P. Cambon to H. Cambon 20/'/17. ~ QEabon, Correspondanoe, Vol. " p 153. 
(5) c.f. L. Villari, The -O!!I!a1ep C!!P1.p (1922), p 114. 
Republio. You are going to Parts for 'the opeDing of parliament. You IllUSt 
re_in there. do not 00lllt back. It ia •• a.ntial for the Chamber to remain 
in ... sion and to •• e that no ooup dtetat take. Place ••• "(l) The 
auapicion of the political loralty of the top aili~ leaders was shared 
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br no one out.ide a ... 11 ,roup ot parli ... ntariana, a tew dozen senators 
and deputies at the IIOSt. PUblic opinion waa indeed tar from sharing their 
t.ars. The victor ot the Jlane vas naturallr one ot the moat popular men 
in Prano •• (2) But for a 11&11 like Painl ..... Sarrau had a crucial importanoe 
aa a general whoae adherence to the principle of republicani .. vas as ardent 
.a bia 01Il1. (,) .u L1.oJd Georp fta l.ter to be remind.d, "Sarrau standa 
here ... tor the Republican id ••• ·(4) In his own work IC0188l1t j'ain~ 
lOch et Pita1nl lainle"" tabs great credit tor the appoin_nt ciuriDghia 
tenure of the war ainia'trJ in 1,17 of two generala who w.re to prO'l'e UlOng 
tbe leading architecta ot the a11itarJ victor, of 1918, (,) and J. c. nag 
in bis atudr ot pol1tico-a1l1taq relat10na in nrtiM J'rance writes of the 
'love t.a.t' 'between la1Dl ...... Ild N_iD. (6) In ml.'e iatiJlate circlea, 
hoWever, lainle"" confid.d that he had l'lOII:l.nated petaiD because be was the 
least treaoberoua of 'the .. ural.-';' "18 lIOiDa tratt;re d •• pae.rauz". (7) 
painlm IS auspioion of th8 aili tarJwu 1n t.ot um_ .ad one longs 
... tw. for an umrri tten Htue1 to his on work, euti Ued puhapa 
lo_at jlai souteuu SamU • .(8) 
(1) Joffre .... tn.Yel.2. p'7' -(7oGh -to -Joft%e '/12/14).' 
(2) La Goroel -op.oit., p 107. 
(,) JetG'e .nteriDg parli .... t .1ale .... hM toqht t1l:81anl1 tor a revi.1on 
of the judpaeDt on capta1u J).reJfu (Jllrae1x. 11!!lle e' la1Jle;tC. (1919) 
p 4'). ___ ,_ 
(4) B •• 01.'ll8n to L1.o}'d Georp 7/6/ 17. L1.ord Gearp ES ., 41/6/ 2• 
(5) P. la1Dl.wl oGP!nt jta1 UId' ,:"h at "-ill. (In,), pp 126-7. 
(6) nac, OPe oit.,pl91.'· - , -- " 
(7) Conftraat1on wi'th M. Jean ,.ial..ft 8/5/7" 
(8) :aeftr .. au.pioious ot the illteRti.ona of ... laft-riac ai11t&rJ were alao 
Dot laok1ql "~11%' [tile ~cl1,.J..II)01al1.ts·) Mule pte~c;upation 1 
l'heUe actueUe .s" dt'tn &11JOQTOir JO'1%' 1. jO\1r dea eleotions et 
d. stillpoHr au JI878 per r...t aetas. 11. Hra1ent capables, 001llD8 
les e.anuti._l. ll •• · ... lta ft .. "'Z'ftr d ... 1& proohaine cbambre 
lei a.= t1.rs aa •• 1ip.. Je ,1 .. en1. O&J8111e. de tout, mhe dluu 
18 r.nctidor dOllt ~il ~t 1 t ean'hu:r·. [P. CUbon to X. Cbarraea 
28/'/17, P. caabola. P.'Xi1'.e: Tol. 3. p 15$]. See alao P. Cambon 
to J. C:_boa 21111/1 .• ", . )4JiIIJ, ,. __ ". ,as Tol. ,11 ·ee Sarrai1 eat l'ho ... 
du parti. rad1o&l .~1a11ste tal nut tuoiqutll arrive'conaerver le 
pcAmtU: ... qui ... a'. 18 )lftct1dC"'. 
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To be etteotive in his support ot the Republican general Painleva needed 
adequate ohannels ot oommuni~~tion with him. A direot correspondence existed 
between the two men, but becauSe ot the military censor matters of extreme 
deiioacy could ouly be included in this if the letters could be entrusted 
to an interaeclar;y travelling between Paris and Salonioa. Sarrail had, after 
all, been forbidden to ~orrespond with the government except through J~ftre. (1) 
To oircllllV8nt the oensor, theretore, Paiule", in ne.d ot a sater method of 
correspondenoe, seoured the appointment to Sarrail's headquarters ataft ot 
Faul ~l.urot, a .unicipal coancillor in the fifth arrondiasement of Paris, 
which Faiule" repreHnted in the Chaaber. (2) ~leurot then proceeded, acting 
as sarrail's mouthpieoe. to oorrespond in code, 'but through the normAl. poatal 
aernce, with FaiDleT8'a trusted print. secretary, Jean Bourguignon. 
painlm and sarrail were thus able, at one reaove, to aintain a regular 
interfiov ot inforation and ide.a. -artce au code secret que nous aTons 
etabli, Bourguignon et aoi, il e.t tras tacile de d'router la censure postale 
et de dire beaucoup de ohosea-. (,) Faiui", wa. also kept 1q) to date on 
avents on the Balkan tront through tl:eq118nt nait. from Louia Leblois, brother 
of sarrail'a subordinate pneftl. ad right-hand _n. b arrival of Leb10ia 
at the Faiale" household t.edately created ,,10011 tor Faiola""'_ young 
aon, who realised that becauae hia tather would be 10ac engapd in intimate 
conver_tion dinner would be Doh de1qed that eveniDg. (4) 
sarrai1 8fteted. PaiDlm,. apJOin_at to Bl:iandts mniatry in october 
1915 witia g:L"eat en'* __ - ter :rranoe, tor the Repalt1io and tor the A:rrJe 
d'orient, and pointed out tJlat !aU F8&t lUleel waa tor reinforcementa which 
be tnated FaW ..... would help to .. cure. (5) Jut i-t,... not long betore 
serrail vaa cOllplainiq to NDlm that Jettre ..... d to have aet hia tace 
spinat .. ndine 8D7 .re -..a _ to . '*- .lb. front. (6) PainleT8 advised Sarrail 
to do hi. beat to ipon the 1Jz1tationa ud }d.Dprioka with which Joffre 
con.tut1r oomplicated his lite ad Sarrau aaid that he would follow thia 
advice. (1) Fainle~'. tirst,~ar BUCcess fo~ Sar.ra1l vas in aecuring for 
(1) Joffre to Saft'8i1, .0.60', -17/1/16, 16.,1,6. 
(2) latnle" to sarrai1 1~/2/l6. Nlll.e"" ISS, ,1, JP 110. 
(,) P1eurot to Ja1nl..e 8/18/1', ibid, .313 AP1.,. 
(4) oonnraation with K. lean ~~eft. 8/5/7'. . 
(5) sarrai1 to laWm 12/11/15, lainlevl ES, ,1, J.P 110. 
(6) ibid 21/11/15. ibid. 
(7) 1ld.4 19/1/16, ibid. 
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the general overall oo_nd ot the allied forces at salonica in January 
1916. This, he assured serail, had involved a day long struggle with 
Joffre, but the latter had given way and, haTing given way once, he would, 
Painleve argued, be oblipd to give way lIpin and again. Sarrail should 
not, therefore, hesitate to let PaiDleve know his full needs in men and 
muni tiona. The general had triends in the government vho would not let 
anyone lay a finger on him on aDJ pretext. sarrail's future achievements 
would, Fainleva asaured him, glorify his position still turther. (1) 
Paiule," aeeJls to have been a oonstant thorn in Joffre's side and. as early 
as Pebruarr 1916, General Pelle was requesting that Painleva should be 
restrained from presenting plans of operations to the Council of Miniatera, 
without Joffre having prior knowledge of thell. (2) Later thatDlonth 
Faiulen vas able to tall Sarrail that the latter'. position was now 
excellent and that Chantilly vaa losing its war of attrition against ,Barra11 
and vas haTing to retreat to liolt its wounds. (,) But in April Painlm was 
.t~ll reporting daily battle. to get Sarrau properly reinforced. (4) In 
July FaiDlew and Bourgeois launched an attaak to reoover for Sarrail his 
108t riBbt to deoorate and ~te hia CMl officers. Whatever happened. 
sarrail v.. not to despair. Bia friend a retained ooai'iden08 in hill and the 
J;J:rMe d'Orient a. the only o<8binatiOll likely in the fore .... ble future to 
..a an iapaot on the oti»wi .. futile atal __ of tbe 1tV. sarrau lIUSt 
concentrate on the task 'be.ton hill d •• pite the ditiDulti •• with vhioh he 
v.. SlZrounded. Painleri oOllol_e. wi til posion, ""o't;re, be'Uft viendra et 
.11. Mra belle, pluMlle et pla srand. que TOU. ,... •• Verdun". (5) 
Later that IlOnth Paiuleri ........ tiataetion OIl VIe ca:aestion of decorations 
and 1fU alao able to f01'W&Z.'D sarrail of the likelihood of' a aeperate 
o~nder _iac appoilltecJ fer b JlzH.oh OODt1Dpl1t 111 the allied forces. 
Be tnat.d that _tten v01ll.d, tua-nt tor the beat and that sarrail vould 
be able to plq a (I)at role :I.a BJite of the pet1;J' pera.outions to whioh 
he vas 8Ub~.oted. 
Bot all )'reaoh llildatera, .... ~ of a left of oentre persuaSion, 
abaze4 ]laW ..... a o01lT1otion' that Sarrail ".. harra ••• d because of his 
(1) PaiDlm ·to -sarnil ·'/l/l6,.;-Pai~ -JilSi '~' -JP -110 •. 
(2) Pelle to IX. le tinia'" 6/2/1'_ .1. B. tQuemt • Vol. 982. 
(,) lainle," to suza11 11/2/1'. aWeft JISS.' '13 JP 110. 
(4) ibid 14/4/1', ibid. 
(5) ibid 6/7/16, ibid. 
(6) 1Me! rr/1/l6. Pa1nleve ISS, )13 D 110. 
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poli tical view. and at a _Nting of the Qabinet on 27 August. when sarrail"s 
friend. objected that it would not be aooeptable to replace the onl;y trul;y· 
republican seneral. the bdical Sooialist Gaston Do1Ulergue (1) felt obliged 
to remind hi. oolleagues 'that it was preoi .. lr because Sarrail was a 
republican that he had a o~d at .11. Bi. politics had served rather than 
hindered him. A1J.r other selleral 1n hia plaoe would have been relieved a 
long tiJle before. (2) Le Ror Lewis reported to IJ.o;yd Geers- that opinion 
in the )'ranch osbinet v.s beoOlliDe inore.aiDBlr heated. For three weeks 
sarrail had .ent hardlr .nr o~ications at all to the Gnnd Quartier 
G8neral and the J'rench .uthori tie. vere being apt in isnorance of what va. 
going on .t Salonio.. Lewis thoqilt that if Sarrail onl7 gaTe a re •• onable 
pretext he vould be reli ..... d of hie fUIlctiona. (:5) Be found 1 t strause that 
sarrail was being per.i.tentlr _illtained br Painleve. a moderate republican. 
78t effeotivelr att.cked b;y :ow.rpe. one of the le.ders of the rue de 
Valois faotion. Lord Bertie. however. attrt'buted this paradox to the fact 
that Dowaergae. in hi. oonte.pt tor Sarrail. diapl.ared a measure of o01lllllon 
sen ••• (4) . 
Painle""'. gr ..... at cri.ta __ with Joffre' •• tteapta to send out de 
castelnau on. a ai •• ion of inap8otiOil. Berti. nported that. Joffre' 8 first 
propo.al of 25 August had been tlatarted vhen Pailllm ob~eoted to de 
caatelnau as a olerioal. Gen.l Gouraud had then been 8UB&8ltec1 but he vas 
con.iderablr junior to SarraU. Jerite ac1.ratood that the OOIlpromi.e 
arrived at va. that Gouraud 1bo11ld be kept 1n resern for 1UI8 if sarrail did 
not hurr7 up his oft.nai..... BriaRd told Berii. on 5 Septnberth8t Sarrail 
would be recalled if he did not taka the ott.n.ive in a _tter of days. (5) 
WbU. sarrail stalled. CbaRtiU,. f1med and proclaimed that tbe .A.l.'m8e d'Orient 
bad not kept the e~_D.t ..... 111 ita DUe Tis 1 rt. bUMDta, "ell. a 
faUli 1 .a lIi.lion-. 6) Joffre oallea aaxioul, tor iatormation regarding 
sarraUt. 1ntentiou. (7) nt Jerti. lIeari that notidac o01lld be extracted 
!rOta the pn.ral •• to vhat he had cl .... ".. doiac and aeant to do. (8) But 
. ; 
(1) Xln1.ter ·for ... O.loai •••.. 
(2) .meix, ,loft'!! p 207. Blrti., Dim. Vol. 2. pp 21-2. 
(,) La ]lor Levi. to Llop Qeerp 'JR./9/l'. Llord Qeorse ISS E '/14/10. 
(4) Berti. to Bardi. '/9/16,. Jeril. ES" P.O. 8OO/l68/ft/16/70. 
(5) i'id 7/'/1', ibi4 aoo/172/~'/24,~Ji1tq4 Qeorp JIBS. E '/14/9. 
(6) GoftDd Quarti.%' aeaml '.r.O.B •• ote 8/'/1', .1. B. 'Guerra'. Vol. 10'58. 
(7) Joft'!! to sunil .0. ",., .... ll/'/16. 5B l48. 
(8) Bertie. D1W' 1'01. 2,p 27. 
by 16 Septe.ber sarrail's opeDiDB of offenaive operations had, Painleva 
belieTed, relloved all danger to the general for the time being. The minister 
.ent out Fleurot in oonfidence with a detailed aocount of the way in which 
he bad undeDl1ned Joffre'. carefullr laid plans. (1) Fleurot conveyed 
sarrail'. thaDka to PaiDl.en for e'Y8rything the min1Bter had done for the 
general and .aid that Sarrail "a. going 1;0 follow Painleve's advice and 
attempt to ettect a rapproobe .. nt with the Pre.ident ot the RePUblio.(2) 
Painlen. perhaps aware ot the grip which the Radical Socialists bad over 
Poincare, .aw in the latter a uetul. le .... r against the intrigues of Briand 
and Jotfre. neurot wa. al.o able to report that sarra11 was furious with 
General Cordonnier and that the latter YU eulogising General Gouraud, whom 
he obviously .aw a. 'a more suitable oommander of the Arm8e d'Orient.(3) 
PaiDl.m'. greate.t .ervioe tor Sarra1l reuined. however, .till to be 
perforaed., As hu been .ee'1)Jorire ftnewed his attempt. to secure approval 
tor a de Ca.telnau ai •• iOll ill the oourse of october 1916. On 28 ot the 
lIOnth Bourpipon "a. able to tell )'1..,t how PaiDl.eve had auoce.shlly 
parried this latest and .o.t clanprou _noeare b7 the generali •• ilIo. In 
the tace ot Jotfre'. in.i.teaot on de Ca.telnau aad ot a series ot allied 
cOilplaiDts again.t sarrail. ~ted. Bourpipon auapected, by Briand and 
Berthelot. PaiDle~ .ecure. aooept&aoe by the ~nch Cabinet ot the principle 
tilat the que.tion of illllpeoti" wa. the 1lWRrTe or the government and not 
of the High co_nd. • 1I1 •• iOll ot General Roque. waa. theretore. the 
brainchild of Painle~. aad BoarpipOil reported that Joftre and de Casilnau 
"ere turin. at the aiaiaterta nooe... Boq'U. should the_tore be greeted 
by suraU with oonf'iden08. pod lmaour eel in a aentael1t of genuine 
.J1IP8--. (5) Colonel BerbiUOIl. Jo£fre'. liai.on ottioer at the lf1niatry ot 
war. thoupt that the i1lJlllrtWiV of General Iloques "as such as to remove 
all objeotions to his appoiDwnt. (6) but the enthuaia_ with which Painlava 
and the sarrail taotion viewed hi. .t.sion YU .0 gr.at that the conclusion 
i. ine.oapable that Roque •• UDder the intl.1Ienoe of PainleT', was as certain 
(1) Pain1m toSU'J:ai1 "1'/9/16. PainleTi MSS, 313AP 110. ' 
(2) JIlnrot to PaiDleri 26/'116• i1»id '13 AP 109. 
(3) :neuot to BoVpipoa 28/'11'. i\id. 
(4) See above p 158. 
(5) Bourpignon to .nrot 28/10116. Painlm IES, 313 AP 109. Painleve 
to sarrail 28/lojl6, ibid, 31, AP 110, Saaras, OPe oi t., Vol. 3, p 463. 
(6) B8rbillonl OPe 01t., Tol. 1, p ",. 
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to report favourably upon Sarrail as de Castelnau would have been to 
recommend his recall.(l) Spirits at Ohaatil1y were depressed in th8 conviction 
that Roques was bound to be deceived bl Sarrailts CUDning.(2) Before setting 
out for Salonioa on 28 October Roqaes oonfided to Poincare his concern at the 
intrigues against Sarrail which be had discerned at Chantilly.(~) 
Painleve instructed Sarrail to tarniab Roques with preciae and minute 
details of the true strength of the .A:rll88 dtOrient in order to demonstrate 
to the Minister of War the8J8tematic starvation wbCh Chantilly had inflicted 
upon the Balkan tront. (4) :neurot reported that Sarrail was very haPP1 at ths 
prospect of the ministerial vi.it(5), and Sarrail wrote personal1, to 
Painleve to 881 that he reoeived Roqu. with a 8JIIlPlthr and oOllPlete 
oonfidenoe which went back to the dal' when both men had worked together at 
the miniaU7 of war. (6) Pa1n1m 1nfomed. Llord George on 6 November, with 
something less than total fraDlaless, that he had fUll confidence in the 
iapartialitr of Gel18ral Roque •• that be had no ide. what Roques' first 
iapre8sions were in SalOilioa ed that he hiIlaelf would be botuld by any report 
which the General bro1J8ht baak to Paria. (7) "aDVh1.le Joffreta oWn liaiaon 
officer in Salonioa had retamed to JTance and reported to Poincare, Briand 
and Joffre that :1D hi. Tin - diftriiOil of oparationa boll Salonioa oOllld 
01111 iIIproft graatea a radi-.l bautoaatioD of the ohancter of General 
suraU. tia lie oouideftd to-. a cJoubttal poa.ibUity. (8) But thi. report 
".. quite a1apll an 1n'eleft1lq saGe Jotfre-.apllte Are 11_ aoting ill a -
wid - their ahie£ bad "Il depr.1:n4 of etreotive nthor1tr eftr the 
salonioa capa1cn b7 the oa1daett.-cleoi.iOll to aend out ROflua. (9) u the 
Galld Qaartier aeniral .... Dlipcl -to adllii OD 6 I~, YMn drawing up 
a paper on Italian ob~"T1'ons to'tM zeiDtoroeMnt or tbeJzlli. d'Orient, 
Jotb:e 001l1d do nothinc abo'at· ltalia 4ial1ke of Gfteral BarRil. - The q118stion 
of the o~4 f4 the .AnM 4..,._1; VU DO loapr v1Won Me jurisdiction. (10) 
(1) o.f. saeeSI OPe oit.,Tol.- '4.,-" 1+-15.-
(2) a;rbillODI 0'. oi .... 1'01.,1. J '55. 
(,) Poinoaftl 0,.011;., ftl,. 9. ;,-1,. 
(4) ]?aiDleft to sa=au ,o/U/l'.J?aiD1 ..... IIJI. '13 uuo. 
(5) neuro .. 1;0 JourIa1IDOD 4/UI1'. ibid. '1~ AP 109. 
(6) sar.raU to !ailllm 5/11/16, ibid, '13 AP 110. 
(7) Bot. bJ PaiDlm of OOll .... t1oa with LloJd Qeorp 6/11/16.ibid, ~13 AP 
110. ' " 
(8) Requin to -.on 001 ... 1- Jl./'10!1', 161' '144 •• eport OD the A.rIlH a'orient 
2/U/16, ~W ES, ~'.' -- , 
(9) o.f. BoW bJ Pa1Ialeft OD. "eone or 2/12/15, Ioveaber 1916, Painleve MSS 
,1, AP 110. 
(10) G.Q.G. DO'" OD. I'tal1aa niDforoaenta, 6/U/16, 16I 3058. 
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All that ChantillT could nov do vas to protest vaiulT that Sarrail's conduct of 
operations displa}"8d "une "connaissance c~ete de la guerre actuelle", that 
in view of allied complaints his continued presence at the head of the 
Salonic. command dailT became less opportune, and that his plans for future 
operations seemed merel,. to be constructed vi th the aim of justifying the uae 
ot a given tigure of reinforcements, the number ot which he had alreadT fixed. (1) 
'Dle governaent.s instructions to General Roques prior to his departure, 
although signed br Briand, were drawn up at Chantill,.. The document read 8S 
an indictment ot Sarrailts activities although the government continued to 
stress that Roques was leaYing tor Salonica siJapl}" on a fact tinding mssion 
and without 'idees tiDs'. (2) Briand also gaTe Roques his own private 
instructions, stressing that sarrail's involvement in Greek politics was 
unacceptable to the Jrench BOvarDm8nt.(}) In his memoirs Jotfre implies that 
be oulT ccnsented to Reque.- mission when Briand explained that his 
appointment would be useful~and "a. the plan which he, Briand, had devised for 
getting rid ot sarrail. (4) If' Briand and Joffre reallT did believe this theT 
vere to be grievousl, disappointed. At an,. rate Joffre seems to have cver-
stated his capaci tT to chaDge the course of events by this date. 
Immediatel,. upon arrival Roque. remarked upon the defioiencies in the 
suppl,. of the salonica armrand oalled tor immediate reinfOrcements.(5) Two 
dars later be vindioated Sarrail's role in the revoluticnary uprising in 
!taterini, although Sarrail's explanation did not satisfJ Br1aDd.(6) Reques 
next reported that in view ot Sarrail's eztended front, the unfilled gaps in 
the French forces and the need to graat leave to ezbausted soldiers, nothing 
great.r than t.eble oftensive operations could be .xpected from the ArmSe 
d'Orient. (7) Roques' 8UgpstiOD that Sarrail's armr needed thirty-six 
diviaions prompted 8hr1eka of aapish at ChantUlT(8), and the ~d Q,uartier 
c;eneral hastily prepared aupple.ntarJ questions on which Roques should 
obtain sarrail'a explanations.(9) But the exercise was now tutile since the 
(1) G.Q..G. notes. -25/10/ 16,12/11/16, '18/11/16, 1611,058. 
(2) HerbUlon. OPe oit., To1. I, p '55. Briand to Roque. 4/11/16, 16N ,144. 
(}) Briand to Roque •• 0. 15, 4/ll/l6• 1611 }144. A. E. ta.erre l , Vol. 1040. 
ibid, Tol. 287. . " 
(4) Joffre. "MPI' Vol. 2, P 5,2. 
(5) Roque. to 'We -Xlni8u-, 110. 4, 4/11/16, 5. 152. 
(6) Roque. to War lllnia'trJ 110.; 8, 6/11/).6, A. E. 'Qaerre t , Tol. 1040, Briand 
to Roques 110. 29, 7/11/16, ibid. 16]( '144. 
(7) ibid Ho. 21, 12/11/16, J.. II. 'auerra', Vol. 1040, 1611 '144. 
(S) lle:bUlon, OPe oit •• To1. 1, P '58. 
(9) Projet de questionnaire aupp1e..ata1re 10/11/16. 1611 ,275. 
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likely tenor of Roquel' report was beooming evident to all. Early hopes, suoh 
as that expressed by Robertson to Milne, that Sarrail might be reoalled were 
quickly dispelled. (1) Around 15 Hovember Briand reoeived Roques' report 
which conoluded in favour of the retention of Sarrail at 5&lonioa. Sarrail was 
doing his best in a diffioult situations ".1u point de vue politique, il fait 
ce qu'il peut pour oonformer son attitude l celle du gouvernement, mais la 
situation oomplexe et mal definie rend sa tache diffioileH.(2) The extent to 
which the conolusion of the report vas detemined by Painleve hiIlself is 
impossible accuratelr to ae.e... One would pa~ps be erring on the aide of 
excessive cautiGn in susgeeting that Roques was an entirelr free &Bent. 
Joffre's own dara were in fact now n_bered. Painleve's succe •• in making 
sarrail answerable to Roques rather thaD an offioer of·tbe Grand Quartier 
c;eneral bad effeotivelr de.troJ'8d the deoree of 2 Deoember 1915, which had 
plaoed the ~e d'Orient under Joffre'. oontrol. Briand now besan to auspeot 
that Joffre had outlived hi. uaehlae •• and, a. the orippling losses ill :r.ranoe 
and :rlanders Wilt up, that the We. tern front too should De reIIoved fra his 
grasp. Sinoe the outbreak of ho.tilities the direction of the war had been 
almost oompletelr in the haRda of Joffre, oloistered in irrespon.ible isolation 
at Chantil17. He had oonsiatentlrrejeoted the advioe of tlae govemaeat, bad 
demanded the riBbt to pursue hie own .trategJ. and bad created what amounted 
to a second government for :rranoe at Chantillr. All oftb1s, irkao_ though 
it was to the politicians, mi8ht have been tolerated had it oalr been the 
F81ude to viotorJ. But it bad not and the laurels of the 'saviour of.ihe 
HarDe' were nov permanentlr tam1ehed. B1 the end of the Jear Joffre would 
have lost all his authol:1 tr ucl De left with nothing except the· pre.tigious 
but ellpt;v title of lfaraUl of P.raIlce.(5) . 
(1) Robertson to .1jIUDe ·4/ll/l'.llobertaon lISS ·1/14/50. 
(2) suarez. OPe cit., Vol. 4. pp 12-13. 
<,) R. X. Watta D!!! C.ll it TilM8W (1964), pp 128-9. 
CHAPTER 7 
~ce, England and the Development of the Campaign, 1917 
As 1917 opened the position of the allied Arm~es d'Orient 
based on Salonica appeared almost ludicrous. "A writer of 
fiction who introduced the political and military complications 
(of this campaign) would be reproached with disregard of 
Plausibility.-(1) As even the Grand Quartier General was 
fo~ced to concede, if the military results obtained by the 
expedition in the course 0 f 1916 had been l1.JBi ted, this was 
because the military possibilities of the army were themselves 
very lim1ted(2). In England the situation had been confused 
by the accession to power of Lloyd George, who had long shown 
himself to be the most favourable of leading British poli-
ticians to the Salonica Campaign(3). He brought with him, 
moreover, a style of government which represented a reassertion 
of civilian control over the war effort and a reversal of the 
trend which had characterised 1916, in which the mili ta:r;y, and 
in particular Robertson, had exercised a dominant voice in 
British strate'gy. As Robertson himself was later to reflect, 
-the constant aim of the new Prime ~ister was to take the 
military direction of the war more and more into his own 
hands and to have carried out military plans of his own devis-
ing, which, more often than not, were utterly at variance 
with the views of his responsible military advisers.·(4) In 
the course of 1917, however, the difficulty of finding shipping 
to support the Balkan campaign became so extreme that Lloyd 
George and his War Cabinet somewhat reluctantly found them-
selves compelled to fall in line with the strong views 
expressed by the military chiefs in favour of reducing the 






C. Falls - The First World War, (1960), p. 217. 
G.Q.G. (T.O.E) note, IResultats obtenus en 1916 par llArmee 
d'Orient', 24/2/17, 161 3138. 
At the Paris Conference Gf May 1917 Lloyd George reminded 
his fellow delegates that he had always been tn favour of 
the Salon1ca Campaignt often in opposition to the entire 
English Cabinet \Proces-verbal, A.E. 'Gue~, Vol. 994). 
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at a time when shipping was so valuable and men in short supply, 
France and England should each have around 200,000 men im-
prisoned in a distant theatre doing next to nothing. But he 
was becoming resigned to the fact that this was a permanently 
unsatisfactory feature of the campaign. "The two governments 
would agree neither to the troops being brought away nor to 
their being reduced to the requirements of passive defence 
••••• and therefore the inactivity complained of had to con-
tinue.,,(1) 
At the beginning of the year Robertson let General Lyautey, 
the new French Minister of War, know that in his opinion 
nothing new had happened to make him change his mind on the 
question of reinforcements for Salonica. In any case the 
matter would be discussed at the forthcoming conference in 
Rome(2). The French Naval Attach' in London reported that 
there persisted in English governmental circles a distaste 
for the whole campaign and especially for its enlargement(3). 
Briand's reorganised government in Paris was also far from 
Wlanimous in its support of the campaign. At a meeting of 
the Coait$ de Guerre on New Year's Day Lyautey, who had dis-
cussed the .atter with military authorities including Requin, 
Billote and Douglas Haig, expressed his anxiety and the feel-
ing that the whole thing had gone wrong. At the same time, 
however, he recognised the impossibility 'of evacuation both 
from the practical and the moral point of view(4). It was 
therefore in a mood of considerable uncertainty that the 
delegates to the Rome conference, this time includingSarrail 
himself, assembled on 5 January. 
On the first day of the meeting Lloyd George distributed 
a memorandum which, according to Briand's biographer, dis-





Robertson - OPe cit., Vol.. 2, p. 138. 
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Mllitary Attache to Lyautey No. 783, 2/1/17, A.Eo 'Guerre', 
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Lostende to Lacaze 4/1/17, cited in Lieutenant Guiot: 
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Poincare - OPe cit., Vol. 9, p. 45; Suarez - OPe Cit., 
Vol. 4, p. 105. 
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ation of the problems involved and a generally puerile 
approach such as the French premier had never encountered in 
Asquith(1). Lloyd George invited the delegates to accept 
the British contention, reached after exhaustive examination, 
that the grave shipping situation provided an overwhelming ar-
gument against the despatch of further British divisions' to 
Balonica. He envisaged, nonetheless, reinforcements from 
Italy since the sea transit from Italy to the Balkans was 
a comparatively short one and a considerable portion of the 
route was well protected(2). Briand modified the tactics he 
had employed when trying to extract extra men from Britain 
in 1916 and, sensing perhaps that he was more likely to make 
headway with Lloyd George than with Robertson, argued that 
the question of Balonica was not really a military question, 
but one for the governments. He appealed that the French should 
not once again be referred to Robertson. The latter's answer 
was known in advance and his power of refusal was incomparable. 
But there were times when governments should by-pass their 
most authorised advisers and judge and decide for themselves. 
When it was a matter of transporting merely two or three 
divisions Briand could not believe that it was a physical 
impossibility. If the British government were to insist upon 
it, he was sure that transport would be found. Wi th wild 
optimism he asserted his belief that with three more divi-
sions victory on the Salonica front was certain. But to 
continue in the present manner might be to run into disaster. 
Briand felt that a very considerable responsibility was 
being incurred in rejecting the proposal for three divisions. 
!he problem should be re-exaa1ned and not &nswered by • 
simple negative. If three divisions could avert a defeat, 
could the allies really say no? In addition Briand pressed 
that the allied generals at Salonica might all be placed 
completely under the orders of Sarrail for military operations. 
On the field of battle it was absolutely necessary that the 
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In the interval before Lloyd George replied on behalf 
of the British government, Robertson dropped a broad hint 
that his resignation would follow from any decision which ran 
counter to his advioe. He did not know what effect Briand's 
powerful language had had on the Prime Minister "in regard to 
the wretched Salonica business", but he thought it right to 
tell him that he could never bring himself to sign an order 
for the despatch of further British divisions to Salonica. 
He told Lloyd George this "as a friend", and expressed the 
hope that he would not be compelled to say it to him "as Prime 
M1nistern .(1) What effect this scarcely veiled threat had 
on Lloyd George is impossible to assess. Briand's appeal to 
him to ignore Robertson's advice must also have had its att-
ractions for Lloyd George, anxious as he was to curb 'Wully's' 
authority. At all events he was not blind to the French 
premier's powers of oratical persuasion, which rivalled his 
own, and he replied, when the conference reassembled, that 
if eloquence alone could transport divisions to Salonica, 
Briand's speech would already have accomplished the task. 
Regrettably, however, boats were needed and England had none(2). 
Inevitably, therefore, the discussions ended in deadlock as 
far as an increase in the size of the ArmJe d'Orient was con-
cerned. Lloyd George reported to the Cabinet that the 
conference had been impre8sedby the arguments of the British 
representatives that the required shipping was not available 
and that the first step to active operations in the Balkans was 
the opening up of communications in the Balkans themselves 
and the improvement of land transport facilities from western 
Europe(3). But in private conversation Lloyd George had 
been much impressed by the general who was anathema to almost 
the whole of the British and French military hierarchies -
(1) Robertson to Lloyd George 6/1/17, Lloyd George MSS F44/3/6. 
(2) Suarez - OPe cit., Vol. 4, p. 109. c.f. Lloyd George -
War Memoirs, Vol. 3, p. 1429: "As a piece of oratory 
It was the finest exhibition I have ever heard at any 
Conference." 
(3) War cabinet, 10/1/17, CAB 23/1/31. 
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General Sarrail (1). Accordingly the British agreed that 
Sarrail should henceforth serve as Commander-in-Chief of the 
allied armies, with all the national commanders accepting his 
orders for military operations, but retaining a right of refe-
rence to their own government(2). Sarrail had not obtained 
all the powers he would have liked but his command was no 
longer in danger; despite all the criticisms of the preceding 
months he had secured a further lease of tenure from the allied 
governments(3). Although disappointed at not being reinforced, 
Sarrail was pleased that the united front of Robertson and 
the Italian Commander, General Cadorna, had been resisted. 
At least nothing had been decided, which was better than being 
obliged to retreat(4). But beneath everything Sarrail still. 
felt resentment that the affairs of France were not being 
conducted by men who would support him to the hilt. He con-
finded to his patron, Painleve, his dissatisfaction at the 
outcome of the conference. Robertson, who "had no guts: had 
combined with Cadorna to prevent any reinforcements being 
sent. Sarrail's frustration was evident: ~En tous cas je 
retiendrai du monde, je rendrai ainsi service pour les autres 
th6atres d1op'rations - je ne peui faire plus, jlai toujours 
'te et je suis encore Ie parent pauvre."(S) 
Following the Rome Conference Sarrail was issued with 
fresh directives. These represented a considerable distortion 
of what had been decided upon by the allied delegates. In 
the first instance it was suggested that Sarrail had been 
created Commander-in-chief of the allied armies, without 
reservation. Although told not to count on any additional 
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his allies. On S January Harold Nicolson noted in despair 
"General Sarrail is hopeless", F.O. 371/2870/4327. ' 
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instructed to push ahead with preparations for an offensive 
in the first days of,April. The scope of this would depend 
upon whether the Russian High Command decided to launch an 
attack on the Roumanian front, which would offer the {OSSibi-
'lity of a two-pronged assault on the Bulgarian forces 1). By 
contrast Milne was informed that although he was required to 
conform to Sarrail's directives in regard to military operations, 
he would nevertheless remain entirely responsible to the· 
British government for the safety of his troops and for seeing 
that they were employed in accordanc~ with the general policy 
of the British government, as'communicated to him from time to 
time. This policy was for the present defensive. Where 
Milne considered that Sarrai~'s instructions were not in accord 
with British policy or would jeopardise his force, he was to 
refer to the .War Office before complying(2). In fact the 
military possibilities of the expedition remained remote. As 
Bertie noted, it had quite simply ~ailed as far as joining 
with Roum~a and severing connections between the Central 
-
powers and Turkey were concerned. He understood from "soldiers 
of intelligence" that the expedition could by sham offensives 
,. 
hold a considerable enemy force fro. moving elsewhere, but 
that a penetrating offens~ve to get to Vienna was out of the 
questiQn., It seemed that not auch good could be done from 
Salonica, but that politically it would do much harm to with-
draw(3) • 
With yet another allled~onference arranged for Petrograd 
in February, at which France would be represented by General 
de castelnau and Gaston DOUDlerrue(4}, a meeting was held at 
the French Ministry of War on 12 January between Lyautey, 
Lacaze, Thomas and de Castelnau to determine the French line. 
It was decided that in order to hold the present position 
two or three supplementary divisions would definitely be re-
quired and that this question would have to be taken up again 
wi th France' s al.l.1es. !he be'st result would' be obtained from 
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allied offensive on all fronts(1). After Sarrail had been 
invited to prepare for an offensive at the beginning of April, 
de Castelnau was urged to press upon the Russian government 
the need for a corresponding action by the Russian and 
Roumanian armies on the Roumanian front(2). As it turned out 
the Petrograd Conference decided that, in the existing cir-
cumstances, the Balkan theatre no longer offered the .advantages 
and possibilities which had been attributed to it at Chantilly 
in the previous November. As a result the mission of the 
Arm~e dlOrient would now be to resist any attack the enemy 
might launch at it, holding on as long as possible to the stra-
tegically important town of Monastir, to immobilise" the forces 
which opposed it and to be ready to go over to an offensive 
in the event of any substantial reduction of the forces of 
the enemy in the Balkans(3). Nonetheless France still showed 
a lingering unwillingness to accept that the Salonica a~y's 
role must be limited rather than extended when she pressed 
throughout February for the "·occupation of the port of Volo to 
the south of Salonica as a base in add! tion to that of the 
entrenched camp of Salonica(4). While the Petrograd Conference 
was in session, moreover, Sarrail produced a plan of offenaive 
operations, which envisaged an advance as far as the Vardar 
river, and, if the development of events permitted, having 
Sofia as an ultimate objective{5}.. 
Al though Lloyd George •• y have been impressed by the 
general, the SUle was scarcely the CHilse with the representa-
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whom Lloyd George had invited at the Rome Conference to express 
his .own views on the situation, reported that the most strik-
ing thing was the unpopularity of the French and particularly 
of Sarrai1. This seemed to be quite universal among all the 
nationalities represented. In fact Granville felt that the 
British military authorities, much as they disliked Sarrail in 
their hearts, actually got on with him better than did anyone 
else. The Italians and Russians hated hi~, the Serbian Crown 
Prince had no regard for his military prowess, the Venizelists 
complained bitterly of the nonfu1filment of French promises, 
while even among his own troops Sarrai1 was lOSing his popu-
larity. Granville, "like everyone else", had fallen victim 
to the general's personal charm, but this could not compensate 
for Sarrail's obsession with political and commercial affairs. 
Granville wondered whether it would be possible to try again 
to persuade the French government to recall Sarrail, since 
this would "very greatly improve conditions and prospects" at 
Salonica, and the relations between-the different·nationalities(1). 
Since his return from the Rome 'Conference, moreover, Sarrail 
had given Milne no information of his plans and no indication 
what his intentions were(2). Lord Derby complained to Paris 
on behalf of the British government, but when Lyautey asked 
Sarrail for an explanation; the lat~er retorted that the 
sole wish of the English was to remain on the defensive. At 
heart they wanted to be completely independent and to do nothing 
on the Bulgarian front. Sarrail asserted that he would get 
them to march, but would need to revert to his "old methods" 
to do so, since Milne'sforces--considered themselves purely 
under the erders of the War Office(3). Sarrail was also dis-
satisfied with the equip.ant of his army. If he did not receive 
add! tional heavy artillery he would.attack with what he had, 
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diminished(1). But Lyautey worked on the principle, which he 
had explained to Sarrail at Rome and expounded before the 
Army Commission, that whereas on the Western front the aim 
was constant - to conquer - and the means to achieve it vari-
able and capable of being increased, in the East a maximum 
expenditure in men and equipment had been fixed and the aim 
of the army would have to vary in relation to the extent to 
which this maximum could be maintained(2). Sarrail was 
therefore informed that only a small part of his requests 
could be satisfied without reducing the strangth of the armies_ 
of General Nivelle. As a result he should adal>t his plan of 
operations to the resources available to him(3). His chances 
of launching an effective m1lit~ry operation were further re-
duced when it became obvious that the Russians were not prepared 
to launch a major campaign on the RoUJll8.riian . .front and that the 
Roumanian army itself was greatly weakened. The Grand Quartier 
General therefore determined that the elimination of Bulgaria 
in 1917 by the combined efforts of the Arm6e dlOrient and the 
Russo-Roumanian forces wa$-no longer a feasible proposition(4). 
There was thus some chance of inter-allied agreement 
when the delegates of England and France met yet again, this 
time at the Hotel Terminus in Calais, on 26 February and 
heard Robertson declare that he and Lloyd George were ~ious 
that the first thing that should be settled and defined was 
the scope of Sarraills mission. Robertson pointed out that 
Sarrail's present plans envisaged as an ultimate objective 
an advance to Sofia. He cOnsidered that this was most 
unlikely since it had always been agreed that such a movement 
would have to be combined with an offensive on the part of 
the Russians and Roumanians. ~~tson therefore proposed 





'Sarrail to Lyautey No. 1401, 19/2/17, 16M 2991. 
M6te on the/2/reo
1 
rgan~!ation of the artillery of the Armee 
d-' Orient 11 7, 1 w.30.58. 
Lyautey to Sarrail No. 392, 17/2/17, 16M 2991; 16N 3139. 
. '''' Q.Q.G., T.O.E. Note - IResultats a atteindre de l'Armee 
dlOrient en 1917', 25/2/17, 16M 3139. 
177. 
against Bulgaria was not yet possible, the Conference shculd 
confirm the impression of the Rome meeting and decide that, 
for the present, the decisive defeat of the Bulgarian army was 
not a practical objective and that the mission of the allied 
forces should be to keep on their front the enemy forces then 
there. This formula was accepted by Briand and Lyautey, 
although they insisted on adding that Sarrail should take ad-
vantage of striking the enemy if the opportunity offered(1). 
But as the forces which it was Sarrail's mission to detain 
were unlikely in any case to make their presence felt in any 
other theatre of the war, it is with some justification that a 
recent observer has commented that "the end result •••• of 
allied Balkan policy was to create a Salonica front which 
served no purpose whatsoever."(2)-
It was scarcely surprislng,therefore, that a study carried 
out at the Grand Quartier G'neral at the beginning of March 
concluded that, when everything had been weighed up, there was 
, 
little chance of the Armee d'Orient achieving more in 1917 
than it had ~e year before(3), while a subsequent study sug-
gested that the maintenance of such large forces in the 
Balkans was scarcely justified by the mission they were to 
pursue. This note argued for a resumption of the role of 
politico-military lever in Balkan diplomacy which Joffre had 
envisaged for the Arm.e dlOrient during most of 1916(4}. Yet 
surprisingly enough Lyautey told Sarral1 on 9 March to be 








Proces-Verbal CAB 28 I.C. 17; A.E. 'Guerre', Vol. 993. 
Falls - OPe cit., Vol. 1, p. 296; Palmer - OPe cit., p. 116. 
C. J. Lowe - The Failure of British POliC,rin the Balkans 
1914 - 1', (canadian H!storleii Journil, ,69, p. 99) 
G.Q.G. TOE Kote on the Araee-A1li'e d'Orient 1/3/17, 
16M 3138. . 
, " 
'Conduite a tenir an Orient', 23/3/17, 16K 3138; 16N 30S9. 
Lyautey to Sarrail Ho. 616, 9/3/17, 161 3139. The origins 
of this decision remain obseure. Naurice Hankey, Roskill's 
'Illan of secrets t, when drawing up a suaary of the whole 
compaign for the War CabULet in July 1918 could not date 
it with any preciSion inside the period between the Calais 
Conference of 27 February and that at St. Jean de 
Maurierme on 19 April (CAB 28/2) • 
178. 
War Offiee, as hostile as ever to offensive operations in the 
Balkans, viewed the situation with dismay. Without Russian 
cooperation no allied offensive in Macedonia was likely to 
effect important results. The nature of the country, the co-
ordination of operations by forces of six different nationalities, 
the numbers opposed to the allie s and the fact that the enemy 
was operating on interior lines and CGuld concentrate on the 
front with greater ease and rapidity than the allies, rendered 
it wimpossible to attain results in any way commensurate with 
the effort involved. W(1) Similarly the British observer, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Plunkett, r.ported that the effect of any 
offensive that could be delivered fro. Salonica would probably 
only be temporary and would cease with the arrival of enemy 
reinforcements or as soon as it was clear that the offensive 
had come to an end. An offensive would only be decisive 
when the railway to Constantinople was cut or immediately 
threatened, and all military opinion at Salonica was agreed 
that this would be impossible in 1917(2). Above all elsEf, 
though, Plunkett had got the impression from Milne that Sarrail 
represented a stumbl~ block to effective cooperation between 
the different armies(3 • ' 
Sarrail himself scarcely gave the impression of prepar-
ing for the offensive with any degree of method or applicationo 
There was "no coordination of command, no allied general 
ataff and no real preparatian". When the Serbs asked Sarrail 
what his plan of campaign was, Sarrail said he was studying it 
and would infor.. them indue course. Sueh slackness prevented 
any of the allied armies ,fro. constructing the necessary roads 
and communications. Loaae~ aIIGDg the French forces, whioh 
bad not been made up, aeant that five English divisions were 
e~ui valent to eight French~" GeI'lHn aeroplanes were bombing 
the dumps and oamps outside the ',town of Salonica with impunity. 
Sarrail may have had exouses for h1salo~esa and lack of pre-
paration. But he had none for the syat~tic way in whioh he 
ignored his allies. In this chaotio situation Alfred Stead 
found Milne unequal to his' task. The latter would have made 
Ian excellent Sootch Divisional Coaander, 'bUt (had) no apti-
tude for CD_ending an anay.- His relaticms with Sarrail were 
(1) 'A ,en~ral review of the situation in all theatres of war' 
20 3/17, CAB 24/8/2~9. . , 
(2) Plunkett - Military Situation on the Salonica Front, 
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practically non-existent and Stead thought it would be best 
to change hoth generals and send out,if possible, an inter-
nationally minded British commander-in-chief. Otherwise 
-everything (would) fall into the water.·(1) Stead's views 
were considered by the War Cabinet at the end of the month 
and gave rise to a discussion on the higher military command 
of the Salonica force. Robertson, cooly assessing the situ-
ation, suggested that the time might not be far distant when 
shipping considerations would demand a reduction of the force. 
Indeed there was general agreement that the army should either 
be diminished or that much greater military activity would 
have to be displayed to justify its continued presence. 
Lloyd George finally undertook to discuss the question with 
Painleve, who was by now installed at the rue St. Dominique.(2) 
Intent on following up the favourable reception which 
his views had had in the War Cabinet, Robertson drew up a 
fresh memorandum on the situation at Salonica in which he 
reminded the government of the allied policy as agreed upon at 
the Calais Conference and approved by the War cabinet on 
25 February. With the air of a man who had at long last been 
proved right, Robertson pointed out the obvious - that the 
expedition had been a fail~re from the start. This had-been 
foreseen by the General Staff of the day and he, himself, had 
lost no occasion to assert that the campaign had no military 
justification and would probably never produce military re-
sults in any way commensurate with the expenditure of force 
entailed. The Admiralty, he noted, found the strain on 
shipping resources unendurable and thought it better to have 
the enemy established at Salonica than to be co.p.ll~~~o pro-
vide the naval force required for the maintenance of the 
allied armies. Perhaps sensing that Lloyd Georgels restless 
spirit, anxious as always to secure a Victory somewhere, was 
beginning to lose faith in Salonica arid to look around for 
alternative possibilities, Robertson argued that there was 
Stead to Lord Ranksborough 11/3/17, Balfour MSS, F.O. 
800/202; Stead to Lloyd George 12/3/17, CAB 24/8/249. 
War Cabinet 30/3/17, CAB 23/2/109. 
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.-ple scope for the profitable employment in Palestine(1)Qf 
any British troops that could be got away and that the results 
to be obtained there were likely to contribute far more to 
w:1rJning the war than anything that could be achieved in the 
Balkans(2). Two days later the War Cabinet had a preliminary 
discussion as to the possible effects of withdrawing a portion 
of the forces based on Salonica to reinforce the Palestine 
Expedition. The arguments of Plunkett and Robertson were 
both considered, but it was agreed that no final decision 
could be made until after Sarrail's offensive(3). . 
, As the days passed, however, the spectre of political 
bhaes in Paris as a result of Britain's refusal to toe the 
'~rench line was again brought into p1ay(4). Robertson was 
anxious that this old argument should not once more be used 
to paralyse British initiative and he wrote to GeneralSmuta, 
whose attitude in the War Cabinet approximated most closely 
to his own. There was no coapro1l1.sing now as Robertson 
stated that the expedition had been wrong from the start and 
wOuld be wrong until the end. It had always been and still 
was for purely French political purposes. If Britatn was not 
careful she might lose the war in a vain atte.pt to bolster 
tlp the French government. Ribot was not, he thousht, likely 
to r_in Prime Minister for long and it. would be folly to 
undertake further commitments in the Balkans aerely to save 
hill. For more than a year Robertson had been eacleavouring 
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effort, but to "attempt to win the war by constantly giving 
,111 '. to unsound French proposals was folly." The proper ~hing 
to do was to come away from Salonica altogether. Perh~ps this 
was Dot possible for the moment, but there was DO need on that 
.~COUDt to increase British liabilities there(1). At all 
e~eDts the Foreign Office was at least anxious that events 
ahould be precipitated and Bertie was instructed to press upon 
,~e French t~vernment the need for Sarrai1 to attack as soon 
as possible ). , 
....:~ 
Robertson was uncertain of what he could expect from 
Lloyd George, but his own tactics were clear. When Sarrai1 
1aUDched his offensive and when, as Robertson confidently pre-
dicted, this failed to achieve very'much, Robertson would then 
-,0 bald-headed for a reduction of the forces in Salonica", 
confident that he could count on the support of the Admiralty"). 
!be problem, however, a8 he recognised only teo well, was that 
the British were "tied to the tail of the French." Robertson 
~U8t did not believe that the French nation attached the 
Bert of importance to the campaign which its government 
claimed. "It has been a goveruaent blunder from the start 
and I have no doubt it will be the end of the government.,,(4) 
When the War Cabinet met on 18 April Robertson reported that, , , 
according to Milne, PaiDleve had taken aeaaur •• to quicken 
up Sarrai1's arrangements and that an attaekiD the near 
tuture might be anticipated. Ada1r~ Jellicoe provided the 
aert of support Robertson was look~g for when he said that 
owing to the submarine d.anger in the JIed1 terranean it was 
iapracticable to continue to supply the Salanio. Expedition 
wi th stores or' to evacuate sick and wounded. !he liar Cabinet 
therefore took the deciaien ~at, after the impending attack, 
Britain should withdraw her forces fro. the field of operations 
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Even Lloyd George was coming to look upon Sarrail1s 
offensive as the last chance which could be given to the Arm~e 
d'Orient and at Saint-Jean de Maurienne he informed Ribot that, 
if considerable success were not achieved this time, the 
British government would be forced to consider a reduction of 
their troops in Macedonia, owing to the shipping difficulties(1). 
In the conversation which followed Ribot and Painlev~ had 
shown less opposition to this proposal than Lloyd George had 
anticipated, provided that Britain assisted France to clear up 
the situation in Greece, including if necessary the removal of 
King Constantine from the throne. The British premier had 
formed the opinion that a bargain might be made along these 
lines for the reduction of tbQBritish forces in the Balkans(2). 
It had eventually been agreed that the whole question should be 
considered at a further conference to be held two weeks later 
and for the first time Robertson was optimistio that-this would 
result in getting some troops away from Salonica, wif not all 
of them in due course...... The great thing (was) to make a 
start. w(3) With confidence he informed the War cabinet that 
it would take six or seven months for Britain to withdraw her 
troops from Salonica and that it was therefore necessary that 
she should begin at once. He proposed that at the Conference 
the French government should be informed that Britain could 
not possibly maintain her presen~forces at Balonica and that 
she intended to bring away two brigades of mounted troops 
and one division iDUllediately, this to be followed by the whole 
or greater part of the remainder as soon as shipping could be 
made available. Anxious lest the politicians should once 
more fall victim to French persuasiveness, he suggested that 
the preliminary orders for shipping for these moves should be 
issued at once. Lloyd George, aowever, preferred to act more 
circumspectly and the question o£w1 thdrawal was again post-
poned for further consideration(4). Cambon knew that Britain 
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continue to supply Salonica without depriving the al11es of 
the transport needed to feed themsleves. Such cons~derations 
were, the ambassador surmised, beyond the intellect of a French 
government whose vision was limited to the corridors of the 
parliamentary chamber. Ribot would therefore find himself in 
a difficult situation and Cambon wondered how he would try to (1) . . 
extricate himself • 
When the Conference met in Paris on 4 May, with Sarraills 
offensive against Bulgaria apparently just getting underway, 
prolonged discussions ensued on the questions of Salonica 
and Greece. Eventually Lloyd George presented a series of 
resolutions to the French which represented the maximum con-
cessions to~ards the French point of view which he and Lord 
Robert Ceci1(2) felt able to make. The British government, 
he stated, had been forced to the conclusion that the assentia1 
needs of the civil populations of the allies could eJilly be met 
by a reduction of the force at Salonica to that required t~ 
hold an entrenched camp surrounding the harbour. The method 
of reducing the army could be settled later, but Britain con-
sidered it imperative to make immediate arrangements for the 
withdrawal of one division and two cavalry brigades beginning 
on 1 June. Predictably Ribot and Leon Bourgeois discussed 
1 
the political question involved. They urged the impossible 
position of the French government towards its parliament and 
the French people if the British troops were w~thdrawn and 
the French troops left. If the British troops were taken 
away the French would have to fallow. This meant-that Serbia 
would be irretrievably lost, King Constantine and Germany 
masters of Greece, and Bulgaria and Turkey encouraged beyond 
their wildest dreams. Nonetheless the British delegates 
remained for once intransigent and their resolutions were 
reluctantly accepted ad referendua to the French cabinet(3). 
Thus the usual roles of the allies in the diploaacy of the war 
had been reversed. The French had been presented at an inter-
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of a decision which had been reached prior to the meeting. 
. , , 
the Grand Quartier General did not like this trend and warned 
that, if it were repeated, it mi:ght lead-to the political 
direction of the war passing increasingly into the orbit of 
the British government(1), but in fact the agreement was depen-
dent on a tacit qUid pro quo for France in her assumption into 
her own hands of the diploaatic affairs of Greece(2). . 
Robertson was at least plaased to note that the French naval 
end 1111i tary authorities had expressed the same opinions as 
himself and Jellicoe. He could not predict what the reaction 
of the French Cabinet would be, but if the reduction of the 
Balanica force was not carried out the French government alone 
would be responsible and he did not think they would like 
accepting this responsibility(3). 
The Quai d'Orsay was indeed not at all happy at the pros-
pect of a systematic reduction in the strength of Sarrail's 
forces and attached considerable importance to Lloyd George's 
assurance, given in PariS, that if Sarra!l's offensive was 
sufficiently successfUl to open the way for peace negotiations 
w1th Bulgaria, the situation would be reViewed. Jules Carabon 
was therefore given the task of letting Barrell know l,lll0ffi-
oi81ly how much importance the Ribot cabinet 'attached' to the 
defeat of the Bulgarian forces by his army~ Sarrai1 "aura 
aiDsi bien m&ri te de la coalition.' neer&. Ie grand hOlllllle, 
s'il peut, par une marche victori~se appr'ciable, nousan~ 
. . . . !' 'i ) .' " 
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noncer que les Bulgares sont dispos~s a la paix. n Cambon ex-
pressed an admiration for Sarrail which he scarcely felt at 
heart, but at all events., Sarrail ~ s liaison officer in Paris 
was impressed by his vigorous insistence(1). At the same time 
the Foreign Office was informed that Paris insisted that any 
additional withdrawals could only take place after the repre-
sentatives of the two governments had again conferred and in 
any case, if such a measure were decided upon, it was a French 
division which must be withdrawn, so as to maintain an equi-
librium within the Arm'e d i Orient(2). The Admiralty were not 
happy with the tone of this French despatch and Jellicoe 
insisted on the urgent necessity of informing the French 
government that England had no intention of abandoning her pro-
posals for the immediate reduction of the force at Salonica. 
He noted that the ~rench rep~y had entirely ignored the dif-
ficul ties of the shipping si t'.lation, which were fundamental 
to the British case and that the whole question had been side-
tracked by bringing into prominence the military and pol~tical 
difficulties that would follow reduction or withdrawal. The 
War Cabinet, in arriving at its conclusions, had been fully 
aware of these difficulties, but to start again a~ the begin-
ning and discuss these results. ·would Simply be to work in a 
circle. Jellicoe hoped, therefore, that a decision would be 
reached not later than 1 June as to whether the next group 
of troops to be withdrawn should be British or French and that, 
if by then the French government had not Signified its inten. 
tion of withdrawing a diVision, an arrangement would at onee 
be made to withdraw a second British division(3). Jellicoe 
was supported at a meeting of the War Cabinet on 22 May by 
Robertson, who stated that withdrawal was a matter of impera-
tive naval necessity, irrespective of any conditions., With 
Lloyd George's will any longer to defend the Salonica Campaign 
now a thing of the past, this line of argument was accepted 
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arrangements for the withdrawal of the next contintent of 
troops and to report the result to the War Cabinet 1). 
Meanwhile Sarrail responded to uules Cambonts appeal for 
/ 
a military success by reminding Painleve that of the 15,000 
; reinforcements promised him on 26 April only 9,400 had arrived 
or were on their way(2). He nonetheless launched his attack, 
, 
but was warned by Painleve not to incur losses out of proportion 
to the goal he might attain. Sarrail was therefore left to 
judge when to cal~ a halt to his operations(3). Painleve 
wanted to know Sarrail's views on the general situation, 
bearing in mind the likely progressive diminution of the 
troeps under his command(4). The general replied that the 
important thing was to strike a knockout blow against the 
King of Greece and his dynasty, so as to leave him with a free 
hand to face Bulgaria(5). Lord Derby, following a visit to 
, 
France, was able to convey Painleve's views to the War Cabinet. 
The French government had consented, much against their Will, 
to the withdrawal of some British troops, but they did not 
intend to withdraw one of their own divisions. But the 
members of the War Cabinet were agreed that the shipping 
situation absolutely precluded Britain from modifying her 
declared policy in regard to the reduction of her forces(6). 
, 
On 24 Kay Painleve gave his approval to Sarrail's deci-
sion to call a halt to his offensive in view of the inaction 
of the Russo-Roumanian forces(7). The whole thing had been 
an abject failure. Milne reported that throughout the oper-
ations there had appeared to be a lack of coordination in 
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preparation had not been taken into account( 1) •. '. T1.e·:-·S·enate-· '. 
Army Commission was told that Lloyd George had described the 
offensive as a lamentable fiasco and that it had given rise ·to 
renewed calls for Sarrail's replacement(2). But this ill-
conceived attack looked like a minor setback ~hen placed against 
the magnitude of Nivelle's defeat in France, and while the con~ 
sequences of defeat for a commander on the Western front 
seemed automatic, no such writ ran in the Balkans. Rennell 
Rodd reported from Rome that Sarrail had sacrificed 2,500 
Italians who were left in the lurch, not having received any 
notice that the French on their flank 'were withdrawing •. With 
the force at his disposal, Rodd asserted, Sarrail could have 
I 
been master of the situation.and have recovered a great part 
of Serbia, if he had really been a s9ldier and not a politician. 
The ambassador's personal view was that Br1 tain should demanci 
as a guid pro guo for the deposition of King Constantine the 
removal of General Sarrail and the appointment of an allied 
General Staff. "Otherwise I think the outlook in the Balkans 
warrants a very peSS1mistic.yiew-.(3) According to Captain 
Stead Sarrail was a "public danger" and ought to be removed. 
But the offensive's prospects of success had not been improved 
by the behaviour of Milne who "ahel ters hiaself behind the 
orders he receives from Sarrail" and who, before starting the 
offensive, had announced that the task allotted to him was 
impossible. Milne regarded the whole expedition as a fiasco 
and, accord~ to Stead, his onl¥ desire was to clear out of 
the country(4. y~t even after the failure of the May attack 
Milne declared to Robertson that he still thought the Bulgarians 
could be beaten, if only the means were provided(5). 
I .. 
When, in accordance with previous agreement~, an inter-
allied conference was heli in Downing Street on 28 May to 
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the unanimous opinion of the French cabinet that they could not 
consent to any further reduction of the forces at Salonica 
until the Greek question had been settled. If the British 
decided on further withdrawals this would have a very adverse 
effect in France. Ribot was sure to be questioned on the sub-
ject in the Chamber and he considered that if Britain insisted 
on withdrawing troops before the Greek question was satis-
factorily settled the political effect would be disastrous(1). 
With equal predictability Robertson stressed the shipping 
situation as the overriding difficulty. He did not think 
there was any necessity to give up tbe present line in the 
Balkans until the troops 'tIere actually compelled to do so. 
Then, if forced to retreat, the army could hold Salonica it-
self ~ith a smaller force than was then being employed(2). 
The War Cabinet, meeting between sessions of the conference, 
determined that the shortage of shipping made a steady reduc-
tion of the Salonica army essential whether or not a regime 
offering every guarantee to the allies had been installed at 
Athens(3). But by the following day the same body was prepared 
to concede that no further reductions should be made for six 
weeks after 1 June and that a further consultation on this 
subject should be held between the two governments on 1 July(4). 
Ribot was careful to stress that this new conference would be 
to discuss not the method of further withdrawals, but the possi-
bility of them, thus showing that, as far as he was concerned, 
no systematic reduction of strength had been agreed upon(S). 
Both he and Painlev' were anxious that Francels other allies 
(1 ) 
(2) 
Ribot had already had some indication of the trouble Which 
might arise when the Chamber Foreign Affairs Commission 
had discussed Salonica on 23 May. Then, de Chappedelaine 
had described the situation of the Arm'e d'Orient as pre-
carious and had led the call for England to be made aware 
of the need to hold on to the SalonIoa front. The Greek 
question would have to be liquidated and this would make 
the problem of supplies, whioh England put forward as the 
major factor in favour of withdrawal, less intraotable 
(C 7490). 
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shou~d know that any further withdrawals would de)end entirely 
on the situation existing in Greece at the time(1 • 
The failure of Sarrail's spring offensive inevitably pro-
duced fresh efforts on the part of Francels allies to have 
the general relieved of his command(2). At the beginning of 
June the Italian ambassador in Paris called upon Jules Cambon 
to protest at the way in which Sa~rail was treating the 
Italian contingent at Salonica. Fearful of Sarraills interest 
in Greek politicS, the ambassador voiced his government's con-
cern that. he was heading for disaster, wen cherchant en Gr~ce 
les lau~i~rs qulil n'a pas oonquis en Mac/doinew.(3) In the 
English Foreign Office Harold Nicolson produced a survey of 
the recent complaints that had been made against Sarrail. 
The Russian F0reign Minister considered him umtru$tw@~y 
owing to his p~litical aabition, the Serbian Prime Minister 
had stated that all the allied armies were critical of his 
conduct of the offensi ve, while the Italian cOllDlander-in-chief 
accused Sarrail ·of "unqualifiable irresponsibility·, being a 
serious threat to wa situation already sufficiently grave •• (4) 
It was Robertson who brought the matter up at the War Cabinet 
pointing out that the consensus of opinion was that Sarrail 
had concerned himself more with the political aspect of the 
campaign than with the actual conduct of military operations, 
The members of the War Cabinet concluded that whatever inst-
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could not be relied upon to carry out the allied policy in 
Greece in a conciliatory manner. They effectively adopted therefore 
the advice which Rodd had offered to Lloyd George a fortnight . 
earlier that Sarrail1s removal should be demanded as a guid pro 
guo for the deposition of.King Constantine(1). Lloyd George 
undertook to write to Ribot on behalf of the War Cabinet to 
express its unanimous view that Sarrail should be replaced in 
the command 0f the Arm'e d' Orient. The Prille Minister noted 
that reports received on the recent offensive reflected very 
gravely on the fitness of Sarrail to command a great force. 
Competent judges on the spot were generally agreed that with 
proper leadership there had been an excellent opportunity of 
dealing a heavy blow at the enemy. Yet the operations appeared 
to have been a fiasco. This result was due, Lloyd George sug-
gested, to no lack of courage or determination on the part of 
the troops engaged, but entirely to failure on the part of the 
High Command. In these circumstances the British government 
had come to the conclusion that they were not j~stified in 
continuing to leave large British forces in the Balkans under 
Sarrail's command. Lloyd George made his re.a~s ~ith the 
deepest regret-, since he had "by no means been an opponent 
of General Sarrail" and had been favourably impressed by him 
when they had met in Rome, but after reading all the reports 
he could not but associate hills elf with the demands of the 
War Cabinet that Sarrail should be replaced immediately.(2) 
On receipt of Lloyd George '-s despatch Ribot admitted to 
, 
Poincare his own lack on confidence in Sarrail and appeared 
willing to relieve him of his command once the operation in 
Thessaly, which was the necessary ~ilitary preliminary to the 
deposition of the Greek king, had been carried out(3). The 
French War Committee considered the problem on 7 June.. As 
usual Painlev( sprang to 'Sarrail's defence and stressed the 
difficulties of any general placed in command of troops of 
different nationalities. But he too agreed that the question 
would have to b. reexamined after the T.hessalian operation to 
(1 ) 
(2) 
War Cabinet 5/6/17, CAB 23/3/155. 
Lloyd George to Ribot 6/6/17, A~E. 'Guerre' Vol. 1042; 
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see whether the British demands should be accepted(1). Ribot 
apparently considered making Sarrai1 Military Governor of 
Paris, but the idea of placing so politically minded a general 
in such a sensitive post would certainly have created diffi-
culties for the French government, with the result that Ribot 
chose the less controversial course of d~ing nothing for the 
time being(2). Ribot's argument was that it would be politi-
cally inexplicable for Sarrail to be replaced at the very 
moment when the allied agreements on Greece were about to be 
put into effect and when the commander of the Arm'e d'Orient 
needed all of his authority. The French prsmier could not 
take it upon himself to explain such a step to his parliament. 
The French government would agree to give Sarrail a fresh 
command when it could do so in safety, but Ribot begged 
Lloyd George not to insist upon an immediate action which 
could only produce the most deplorable consequences(3). Cambon, 
reporting the English reaction to Ribot's stance, noted that 
Robert Cecil could not accept that Sarrail's replacement was 
actually 1mpossible(4), but at all events the matter was 
allowed to drop for the time being. Through unofficial chan-
, 
nels Painleve had used his influence with Lloyd George to 
impress upon the English Prime Minister that he had chosen 
the worst possible moment to present an ultimatum to the 
French which, if it were accepted, would bring down the Ribot 
ministry with a crash and the: alliance with it. But Painleve 
stressed that onc.> the Greek question had been settled the 
French government wou~not continue to impose Sarrai1's leader-
ship on British troops against the wishes of the British 
government. They could then claim that Barraills mission was 
accomplished and that he could be withdrawn without disgrace. 
, 
It may be surmised that what Painleve really envisaged was 
the triumphal return of Sarrail to Paris to take over some 
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all events Henry Norman p who was acting as intermediary between 
Painlev~ and Lloyd George, was evidently impressed by what 
amounted to a delayed French promise to recall Sarrail, and he 
argued that this was all that could possibly be asked of them 
and that they were meeting Lloyd George's wishes "in every 
possible way". It was "really impossible for them to drag 
out their General by the scruff of the neck in the very middle 
of these operations". Futhermore the position of the Ribot 
government was so difficult that Britain should "refrain from 
doing anything to add gravely to their difficulties"(1). As-
suming that it was Lloyd George's wish tha~ the Salonica 
command should eventually be entrusted to General Smuts, 
/ Norman asked Painleve how he would react to such a proposition. 
Provided that Sarrail's recall would in no sense be tainted 
with disgrace, that he would be decorated by the English and 
that Smuts would aSSWDe the cOJlJDand of an army in which English 
. , 
forces predominated, Pain1&ve undertook "to get that arrange-
ment swallGwed by the French government and by the Chamber·(~). 
L1 ttle then had changed since the very beginnings of the 
campaign. In June 1917 as in December 1915 the internal poli-
tics of France were determining the course of the Balkan 
expedition and now as then Lloyd George was among those who 
were prepared to let alarmist c!~es about the dangers to the 
Entente override all military considerations. On 11 June the 
War Cabinet authorised Lloyd George to express the British 
government's satisfaction at the willingness of Ribot to trans-
fer Sarrail from the Macedo~ian command and to agree that this 
transfer should not be carried out until after the present 
critical situation in Greece had passed(3). Admittedly there 
was a vague promise that Sarrail1s recall had only been tem-
porarily postponed. But, as Bertie warned, the situation was 
far from clear-cut since if, when the acute stage of the Greek 
difficulty had passed, the French government acceded to the 
British demand, there would be a great outcry from~the Socialists 
(1) Norman to Lloyd George 7/6/17, Lloyd George MSS F 41/6/2. 
(2) ibid 8/6/17, ibid F 41/673. 
(3) War Cabinet 11/6/17, CAB 23/3/160. 
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and.a portion of the Radical Socialists at the generalts hand-
ling of the Greek crisis being rewarded by recall(1). According 
~ 
to Henry Wilson the probability was that Pa1nleve was merely 
trimming and that when the Greek affair was over he would find 
another reason for not bringing Sarrail back, such as that 
public opinion in France would not sanction the recall of so 
suecessful a general(2). The French War Minister certainly 
took the precaution of asking Sarrail to send a liaison officer 
who would provide him with information concerning the recent 
offensive and the difficulties the general had encountered from 
the allied contingents(3). In fact Pa1n1eve had no need of any 
additional excuses, since the English War cabinet, meeting after 
the deposition of King Constantine, conceded that this was a 
policy which Sarrail had consistently recommended and that its 
success had eased the pol~tical situation in France. No. steps 
therefore would be taken for the present to remind the French 
government of its engagement to transfer Sarrail from Salonica(4). 
The Foreign Office had itself attempted to take a stronger line 
and on the instructions of Cecil a long indictment of Sarrail's 
military ineompetence had been drawn up by the junior official 
Malkin with a view to presenting it· as a memorandum to Cambon (5) • 
The veto of the Prime Mlnister appears, however, to have been 
imposed. But this did not stop the Italian ambassador in Paris 
from raising the question .of Sarraills removal when he again 
called upon Jule. Cambon. Was it not pOSSible, asked Salvaggo 
Reggi, .. to dispense with an officer who continually created 
tension between France and her 81lieS?(6) 
But for the time being, at least as far as Britain was con-
cerned, the Salonica campaign was to continue as before. Within 
the War cabinet Lord Milner complained that English policy 
seemed to be drifting. After all, the allies still had more 
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,nish British forces there might be a good one, but, by itself, 
this was not a policy. Milner argued that it would be good 
business to free the 200,000 British soldiers, if in doing so 
BulgariQ could be detached from the Central Powers. But simply 
to withdraw and leave the French and others in the lurch either 
to surrender or to scuttle away as best they could would be 
"a d'bacle of the first magnitude". It was no use going on 
living from hand to mouth in the matter, dealing with five 
or six different aspects of the case one by one as they hap-
pened to crop up. What was needed was a systematic analysis 
of the military and political situation in the Balkans as a 
whole to put before the War Cabinet a coherent plan. Such 
a review should not start from a dominating id'e fixe, but 
should examine impartially the possible alternatives and 
their respective consequences. Ultimately the decision 
would have to rest with the Cabinet, but the Cabinet could 
not decide until the subject had been thoroughly threshed 
out and all possible courses put before it in a comprehensive 
review(1). In fact, after the 'deposition of Constantine and 
the return of Venizelos, the Cabinet's newly created War 
Policy Committee found itself in complete unanimity that the 
changed situation in Greece, now converted from a suspected 
neutral into an active ally, rendered it no longer necessary 
to cling to the policy of withdrawal to an entrenched camp 
surrounding Salonica. It was decided that the best long term 
course was to withdraw from the fighting line in the Balkans 
as many divisions of the British army as possible, replacing 
them with Greek or other allied troops(2). Paul C&mbon went 
so far as to say that the conference arranged for 1 July was 
losing its raison d·atre as far as Salonica was concerned, 
since the British no longer spoke of withdrawal (,). The 
/ French Military Attache in London had got the impression that 
the War Office had become less militant since arrangements 
had been begun to create a supply line between Cherbourg and 
Tarente, thus alleviating the shipping situation(4). 
(1) Note by Milner 7/6/17, CAB 23/16/159a. 
(2) Hankey'- OPe cit., Vol. 2, p. 684. 
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Milner, however, was concerned lest Lloyd George should 
go to France without the War Cabinet having formulated a policy 
towards Salonica. If he were to go "without our knowing our 
own minds" he would be "as wax in the hands of any French 
~ister". As far as Milner was concerned the whole thing 
was still "the most hopeless impasse and muddle imaginable". 
He appreciated that France was opposed to further withdrawals 
of British troops, while Robertson was as determined as ever 
to effect them and that the French were as resolved as ever 
not to remove Sarrail. Milner thought that some sort of bar-
gain would have to be reached. If Britain agreed to leave her 
troops, she should certainly make it a condition that Sarrail 
went. On the other hand if the French insisted on keeping 
Sarrail, they could not also insist on retaining the British 
troops'(1). In respanse to Milner's concern Captain Leo Amery, 
an expert of Balkan affairs, drew up a paper on the milita~y 
possibilities of the campaign which concluded that a decisive 
strategic result was only possible if the enemy armies were 
so hard pressed elsewhere that they could not make use of 
their superior system of commUlications to prevent Bulgaria 
being overwhelmed and Turkey cut off. It seamed better to 
t 
concentrate on strengthening existing defence, improving com-
munications and creating a reserve available either for 
operations elsewhere of for defence in case of a serious enemy 
offensive in the Balkans(2). Milner himself considered that the 
Balonica theatre offered great possibilities, but he informed 
the Cabinet's War Policy Committee that there app~ared no 
prospects of success as long as Sarrail retained the command(3). 
Similarly Plunkett, returning from a further tour to Salonica, 
reported that the removal of Sarrail was as necessary as before. 
The lack of confidence of all ranks in their Commander had 
discouraged both officers and men and only his replacement by 
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Milner realised that the French, whatever they might say, 
would be most unlikeley ever to remove Sarrail. He was there-
fore thrown back on a policy of withdrawal. He felt convinced, 
however, that, when it came to the crunch, England would not 
be able to resist the combined pressure of her allies not to 
evacuate completely. There was probably no other subject in 
the world about which the French, Italians, Serbians and 
Venizelists could all be induced to see eye to eye. But assum-
ing that the assistance of the Greek army materialised, the 
allies would have more than enough troops and it would be quite 
a reasonable thing to anticipate that some months hence England 
might be able to withdraw the bulk of her own troops to some 
quarter where they could be actively employed to greater pro-
fit. Milner hoped that at the very least a British political 
officer would be attached to the command of the Armee d'Orient 
in order to exercise some restraint upon Sarrail. It would 
also make it easier to induce the French to acquiesce in the 
withdrawal of British.troops at a later date if they "did 
not continue to have them, so to speak, for nothing,,(1). 
Milner advocated telling the French that Britain would have 
to remove her troops unless there was a prospect of a large 
offensive in conjunction with the Russians. By the autumn 
the Greeks would be able gradually to replace the British con-
tingents, although the government aight "leave a division or 
two to show the flag". But to leave the whole allied army in 
the Balkans was "a terrible waste of effortn(2). 
Largely under Milner's influence, therefore, the draft 
report of the War Policy Committee recommended that British 
policy in the Balkans should ala at the gradual withdrawal of 
the British divisions from the fighting line with a view to 
the formation of a reserve, which could be used "i ther to 
support a great offensive in conjunction with a Russian attack 
on Bulgaria or preferably for transfer to some other theatre. 
No opposition should be offered to any French proposals for 
the withdrawal of part of their Balkan army for independent 
operations in Syria or for any other purpose, provided they 
{1} 
(2) 
Memorandum by Milner 8/7/17, CAB 27/7 /wp 35; Lloyd 
George MSS F 38/2/20. 
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did not involve the use of British troops or Shipping(1). 
Robertson gave the weight of his authority to the findings of 
the War Policy Committee when he advised the Cabinet that he 
saw no reasonable prospect of carrying out an offensive cam-
paign in 1917 which would bring about the collapse of Bulgaria. 
He considered that the correct course was to limit the forces 
in Salonica to what was necessary for defensive purposes and 
that it would be possible to hold the present allied line with 
three divisions fewer than the number then under Sarrail's 
orders(2). This policy, including the immediate withdrawal 
from Salonica of one division as a reinforcement for the 
British Expeditionary Force in Egypt, was adopted by the W,r 
Cabinet on 20 July. It was realised that the British repre-
sentatives in Paris might find themselves in a very ,4ifficult 
position in pressing this policy, so the War cabinet decided 
that some latitude would have to be left to their delegates at 
the Conference(3). , 
As the time approached for IJ.oyd George once again to 
consul t w1 th his Frenell al11es thera ansted., therefore, 
increasing subt~t1es in the po11c1e. of the Eng11sh adm1D1a-
tratiQn, which were not fully appreciated in Paris. Rather 
misleadingly Paul C&abon confirmed Ribot's declared suspic10ns 
that the En gliSh attitude was conforming increaaingly with 
that of his own governmaDt(4). Similarly Decrais reported 
that while Salonica reaained a nightmare tor Robertson, the 
latter was no longer master of the 81 tuation and that the 
English cabinetls own 1deas about Sarrailts command had 
changed(5). In fact the British delegates were aore than 
usually well prepared when the con.f'erence assembled in Paris 
on 25 July. The Bri Ush govermaent announced 1 ts intention 
of removing at once to Palestine one diVision and a proportion 
of heavy artillery and of withdrawing further troops as Greek 
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centred almost entirely ~eund this question of whether dne 
British division should be removed, a proposal which evoked 
considerable opposition from all the other allied governments 
represented at the conference. Robertson stressed that the 
allies were making very bad use of their men as there were 
600,000 troops at Salonica as against some 400,000 of the 
enemy. He surveyed all the ground which had been covered by 
the War Policy Committee and stated that an offensive from 
Salonica had no practical advantage unless it was combined 
with a Russo-Roumanian attack on Bulgaria from the north, of 
which there was little prospect. Foch was less sanguine 
than .. the British of the possibility of the early arrival of 
~ Greek reinforcements. The strength of the Armee d'Orient 
could not at present be reduced owing to the extent of the 
front and the difficulty of communications which prevented 
the rapid movement of reserves. Once the Greek army had 
materialised in 1918 it might be possible to'sett1e the Eastern 
front once and for all, but to do so it would be necessary to 
retain the means to carry this out. Foch argued that the new 
British proposal could only be considered towards the end of 
October, when the situation would have stabilised(1). Ribot 
felt obliged to remind the British that when the question of 
withdrawing a further division had been discussed at an earlier 
conference it had been agreed that it would be a French divi-
sion which would be withdrawn first. In the face of such 
deadlock, therefore, all that could be done was to postpone 
a decision until yet another conference had been held in 
London(2). The question of Sarrail1s command did not even 
arise. Private conversations before the conference between 
Painlev$ and the British representatives had the effect of pre-
venting all formal discussion of the issue(3). 
(1 ) 
(2) 
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Robertson remained as dissatisfied as ever with his 
government's performance. The only policy he had discovered 
at Paris was to hold the ground then held at Salonica, keep 
all the troops there and wait until the £ollowing year to see 
what would happen. This was "a poor apology for a policy" and 
he begged the Cabinet to try to arrive at a clear strategy 
for the future in the Balkans. He could offer no advice save 
to repeat what had always been his conviction, that the 
Salonica force would never materially contribute to the winning 
of the war, while the Entente might lo·se it if it failed to 
have sufficient strength an the Western Front and sufficient 
shipping to meet all requirements. The expedition had £rom 
the £irst been strategically unsound and, if the apparent 
Russian collapse continued, the allies must be prepared for 
a prolongation of the war and be ready to put more men on the 
western Front, "where undoubtedly the issue o£ the war will 
be declded".(1) The general's patience was evidently begin-
ning to wear rather thin. Scathingly he noted that at the 
Paris Conference 43 men had talked about the Salonica issue 
for three days, eventually arriving at no decision except to 
have another conference. It was a bad case and had been so 
from the start. Robertson did not think it an exaggeration 
to say that the soldiers and politicians in France and England 
had spent at least hal£ their time in the war discussing and 
worrying over "this wretched matterw(2). Discussions with 
Plunkett confirmed his impress10n that nothing constructive 
would.ever be done at Salonica as long as Sarrail remained. 
He had even heard that the French general had got married on 
the very day the last offensive had begun(3). Not relaxing 
his pressure for one minute Robertson induced the War Cabinet 
to adhere to their previous declaration in favour of withdrawal 
of one division and some heavy artillery from the front. The 
question was raised as to whether the removal of Sarrail 
should be pressed at the London conference. It was suggested 
that, if this were insisted upon, Britain would encounter 
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the point was made that as no offensive appeared likely in the 
Balkans there was less objection than formerly to Sarrail's 
retention of the command for the present and that it might be 
better to postpone the matter for some more favourable oppor-
tunity. The Cabinet, in fact, took no definite decision 
regarding Sarrail and the 'matter was left to be raised or not 
according to the course of the discussion at the Conference(1). 
Robertson, however, considered that it was impossible to sepa-
rate the question of the withdrawal of the division from that 
of the removal of Sarrail. In his opinion if the troops were 
not properly commanded there would be a risk in taking the 
division away. Sarrail might, for example, still insist upon 
the remaining British divisions continuing to hold the 90 miles 
of front which they had held hitherto. While ministers pro-
tested that Sarrail's removal would provoke a serious crisis, 
leading possibly to the fall of the French government, 
Robertson persuaded the Cabinet to reverse their earlier deci-
sion and definitely to raise the question of Sarrail's 
replacement informally, either before the conference adjourned 
or afterwards(2). . 
As the conference opened Lloyd George announced that the 
British determination to withdraw a division for use in 
Palestine had not wav~red. Ribot countered by saying that 
the French government too had not changed its mind. If 
Britain acted against French adVice, the French premier would 
be obliged to say so to the Chamber. Would a serious dis-
agreement between the two governments, he asked, be worth the 
single diviSion in question? Somewhat astonishingly Ribot 
announced that he would prefer Britain to reinforce her armies 
in Mesopotamia and Palestine at the expense of the Western 
Front rather than Salonica. It was not acceptable that Britain 
should gradually withdraw her forces leaving France sole res-
ponsibility for the expedition. The first effect of the 
British action would be to discourage Greece and to impede 
her efforts to provide a useful addition to the allied armies(3) • 
(1) War Cabinet 3/8/17, CAB 23/3/204 
(2) War Cabinet 7/8/17, CAB 23/3/205. 
• 




The War Cabinet retired to consider what appeared to be an 
unpromising situation and prepared draft conclusions to be 
put before the second session of the conference. The imme-
diate withdrawal of one British division must be confirmed, 
while two French divisions should be taken from the front 
and retained in the Balkan theatre as a general reserve for 
emplo~ent in any theatre in accor~ance with military develop-
ments 1). While the British were in consultation de Fleuriau 
- / 
was suggesting to Ribot and-Palnleve that it would be impossiDle 
to tell the French Chamber that England had been advised to 
weaken the French front in order to keep that of Salonica in-
tact. His advice seems to have been taken, for Ribot made no 
further mention of this idea(2). Indeed when the conference 
reassembled and the British proposals were presented to the 
French, Ribot changed his tactios and pressed for an under-
taking that no more British troops should be withdrawn beyond 
the one division. He expressed the conviction that Robertson 
certainly did intend a systematic reduction of the British 
force. With perhaps something less than frankness Robertson 
denied that this was the oase and, on the suggestion of Lloyd 
George, the conference adopted the conclusion that the British 
government recognised the necessity of maintaining the strength 
of the allied forces at Salonioa and undertook not to withdraw 
any further British troops unless unexpeoted events occurred 
in which case the question would be submitted for discussion 
by the allies(3). Thus the Salonica question had at last got 
itself in some way settled. !he withdrawal of the British 
division had been agreed to, but in order to secure this con-
cession the British government had virtually committed the 
remainder of its forces to the Balkan theatre for the duration 
of the war. The proposal to create a reserve force from-two 
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Committee issued its iRterim report which appeared to owe 
little to the decisions just arrived at. It argued that the 
proper course to adopt in the Balkans was to limit the forces 
in Salonica to what was necessary for defensive purposes. The 
immediate policy should be gradually to withdraw the English 
forces from the front line, replacing them with allied or 
Greek troops. If there was any prospect of an offensive at 
Salonica in conjunction with the Russians, then the gover.nment 
should insist, as a condition of British cooperation, on the 
replacement of Sarrail(1). From now until his dismissal in 
December Sarrail would, in fact, be the chief obstacle to the 
smooth I'1wning of the campaign. After the May offensive no 
further operations of much account were attempted during 
Sarrail's tenure of office. This was the result of the heavy 
fighting in Flanders and Italy during the late summer and 
autumn, the collapse of Russia and the intervention of the 
Uni ted States, which combined to fix the final military trial 
of strength aore and more in the Western theatre. The whole 
Macedonian front once more lapsed into a state of stagnation(2). 
IneVitably, therefore, attention focused more on personalities 
than on policies during the olosing months of the year. 
Lloyd George had not "found an opportunity" to raise the 
I question: of Sarrail's replacement with the French ministers 
while they were in London(3), but in the middle of August 
Milne reported that Sarrail had refused to take over any 
portion of the front held by British troops, who were holding 
, 
a length as great as that held by the remainder of the Armee 
d I Orient(4). Robertson took the matter up with Fooh, since 
Sarrail's intransigence was preventing the despatch of the 
British division to Palestine(5). Fooh instructed Sarrail to 
carry out an equitable repartition of the front, according to 
the strength and value -of the allied oontingents,(6) and 
(1) Interia report 10/8/17, CAB 27/8/WP46. 
(2) Robertson - OPe cit., Vol. 2, p. 144. 
(3) War cabinet 20/8/17, CAB 27/3/219. 
(4) War cabinet 13/8/17, CAB 23/3/213. 
(5) Robertson to Spiers 13/8/17, CAB 24/23/1795. 
(6) Spiers to Robertson 14/8/17, ibid. 
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Painlev~, while renewing the expression of his confidence in 
Sarrail and acknowledging the difficulties inherent in the 
command of a multinational army, asked him to be as concili-
atory as possible towards the allied contingents and commanders(1). 
Milne, however, was informed by Sarrail that the latter was 
unable to relieve any portion of the English front with French 
troops. Milne would go ahead with the withdrawal of one divi-
sion, but did not consider that the troops remaining at his 
disposal afterwards would be sufficient to hold the front 
allotted to him in the event of a determined enemy attack(2). 
, 
At 10 p.m. on 19 August, therefore, Painleve urgently told 
Sarrail that he should help out the English so as to avoid 
difficulties between the two governments(3). Before the news 
of Painlev6's d6marche reached London the War Cabinet were con-
sidering the situation and concluding that Sarrai+'s refusal 
provided an additional reason for pressing upon Paris the 
necessity of his removal, or at least the appointment of some-
one of political status as the head of a mission to investigate 
and report on the situation(4). Pa1nleve, after telegraphing 
to Sarrail, tried to shift the focus of the incident, sending 
for the British liaison officer, Colonel Spiers, and suggest-
ing that underground attacks were being made against the 
general(5). Sarrail informed Pa1nlev' that for the moment, 
·owing to special difficulties" he could only place two cavalry 
regiments at Milne's disposal. Robertson asked Milne for 
precise details of the stretches of front held by each of the 
allied armies, in order that he could put the case to the War 
Cabinet with a view to government action(6). But General 
Maurice told the War Cabinet that the French contingent at 
Salonica was considerably under-strength. No less than 20,000 
troops had been Withdrawn and sent on leave to France. Such 








Pa1nleve to Sarrail No. 5668, 17/8/17, 16K 3139; 
A.E. 'Guerre', Vol. 1043. 
Robertson to Spiers 19/8/17, CAB 24/23/1795. 
Pa1nlev' to Sarrail No. 5814, 19/8/17, Fonds Clemenceau, 6N 256. . 
War Cabinet 20/8/17, CAB 23/3/219. 
War Cabinet 21/8/17, CAB 23/3/221. 
Robertson to Milne 23/8/17, CAB 24/24/1848. 
204. 
understand why Sarrail said it was impossible for him to take 
over any of the British line(1). 
Once again the matter was allowed to fall into abeyance. 
Harold Nicolson suggested that the answer might lie in the 
appointment of an allied military council to be attached to 
Sarrail's Headquarters. The French government "could scarcely 
refuse such a suggestion" and the institution of such a 
Counci2 might carr) with it the automatic resignation of the 
French commander(2. The English War Minister, Lord Derby, 
even reported that if Lloyd George were to write unofficially 
to Painlev6, Sarrai1 could be persuaded to resign of his own 
accord, whereas if the matter were put forward officially 
there would be opposition(3). Lloyd George appears not to 
have responded to this suggestion, perhaps because he had a 
greater appreciation of Painlev'ts loyalty to Sarrail than 
did Derby{4). Painleve had certainly spoken in praise of 
Sarrai1, arguing that the only decisive victory which had been 
won during the war had been the general's victory at Monastir(5). 
At all events the fall of the Ribot government made it still 
more difficult to broach the question and even Robertson sug-
gested that it would be best to wait until the French political 
situation had been cleared up(6). No mention was made of 
Sarrailts position, at least in the formal discussions, when 
English and French delegates, including Lloyd George and 
Painlev~, consulted at Boulogne towards the end of September. 
But Decra1s was able to report to Salonica that Painlev~'s 
private interviews with Lloyd George and General Cadorna had 
produced a favourable effect as far as Sarrail was concer.ned: 
"Les allies ont trouve une fois de plus en lui(Pa1n1ev') Ie 
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What certainly seems to be true of the last months of 
1917 was a progressive waning in the influence of Sir William 
Robertson. Robertson's fortunes sank steadily, like those of 
the Western offensive of 1917, into the mud of Passchendaele, 
and he came increasingly to be outshone by the former Director 
of Military Operations, Henry Wilson. As Robertson's continuous 
struggle with Lloyd George moved increasingly in favour of the 
Prime Minister, the most consistent and vehement opponent of 
the Salonica Campaign was gradually pushed into the wings. By 
contrast the Quai d'Orsay heard that Milner and Smuts, two 
influential members of the Imperial War Cabinet, fully recog-
nised the importance of the Balkan front(1). But for the time 
being no one was prepared to countenance the resumption of 
major operations and Painlev& defined the mission of the Arm'e 
d'Orient as to protect conquered territory against any enemy 
attacks(2). Sarrail, in fact, remained dissatisfied with the 
reinforcements which he received, even with Painlev' at the 
rue St. Dominique. He had been inundated with promises and 
official telegrams, but had been sent "rien •••• ou presque 
rienne He would continue to make something out of nothing, 
but was not ~repared to be duped by the redtape of the French 
War Office(3). The French government had at least decided on 
7 November to replace losses in the Armee d'Orient so far as 
this was compatible with the needs of the western Front, to 
send the material already rromised and to speed up the orga-
nisation of the Greek army 4). 
For the most part the close cooperation between Painleve 
and Sarrail was such that the general's actions at Salonica 
were shrouded more than ever in mystery. Robertson complained 
to the French that Britain had for a ~ong time been entirely 
in the dark as to the real situation. He found that the French 
War Ministry staff knew nothing of Sarrail's views, that the 
, 
general received his orders directly from Painleve and that 
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to be allowed to do as he wishes and apparently no soldier 
aares to interfere with him". Robertson invited the War Cabinet 
to compare the knowledge they possessed of the general situ-
ation, of the Commander's intentions and of the feasibility 
of attack and defence in other theatres with the knowledge 
they possessed in regard to Macedo~ia and to note how defective 
their knowledge was. Robertson thought it only right to insist 
upon a first class general being appointed upon whom the War 
Cabinet could rely to keep them fully informed. He viewed 
the situation at Salonica with "grave concern" because of the 
unsatisfactory qualities of the command and the uncertainty 
as to what the state of affairs was. Unless immediate steps 
were taken to improve matters, Robertson feared that a disaster 
might ensue(1). Under the present conditions it was unlikely 
that any of the allied army commanders at Salonica would be 
willing to send troops to reinforce another section of the 
front, for Sarrail kept no one informed of the situation or of 
his own intentions and the different nationalities always 
feared being exploited to Buit the purposes of the French. 
Plunkett, reporting on a sixth visi t'"b:> Salonica, suggested 
that to replace Sarrail by an "honest, direct and hard-hitting 
general with no political aims or interests" would be greatly 
to increase the fighting value of the allied forces. at a stroke(2). 
The one bright spot as far as Britain was concerned was the 
fall of Painlev"s government on 13 November. Hope was ex-
pressed 10 the War Cabinet that, in the event of Clemenceau 
succeeding in forming a ministry, it might again be possible 
to approach the French with a view to Sarrail's removal(3). 
Shortly afterwards, with rumours circulating of an im-
~ pending enemy attack on the Armee dlOrient, the War Cabinet 
instructed Balfour to send to the French government a copy of 
Lloyd Georgels letter to Ribot of 6 June requesting Sarrail1s 
replacement and to indicate that the views of the British 
government in ~egard to Sarrail had not been modified in the 
meantime (4) • Lloyd George himself wrote privately to 
(1) "The Situation in Macedoniaw, 14/11/17, CAB 24/32/2615. 
(2) Note by Plunkett, 17/11/17, CAB 24/11/2687. 
(3) War Cabinet 16/11/17, CAB 23/4/275. 






Clemenceau as soon .as the new French government was installed 
to point out the mistrust with which Sarrail was regarded in 
British army circles(1) •. Clemenceau expressed misgivings about 
the Salonica situation and had asked Robertson's liaison officer 
in Paris whether the British government was satisfied with the 
existing state of affairs(2). Despite instructions given as 
a result of Robertson's complaints, Sarrail had given no indi-
cation of the military position other than a meagre statement 
of the disposition of certain units(3). In the French Cabinet 
Clemenceau read out the correspondance exchanged by Ribot and 
. 
Lloyd George in the preceding June and expressed his willing-
ness to satisfy the English demands by recalling Sarrail. 
Henri Simon(4) warned of possible difficulties in the Chamber 
of Deputies and suggested that it would be best to draw up a 
list of military reasons for Sarrail's replacement. Foch 
indicated that his attempts to elicit information from the 
, 
general had always been met by Painleve's refusal, on the 
grounds that this would be a sign of distrust on the part of 
the government. In .the end the Cabinet left Clemenceau free 
to reply to Lloyd George that Ribot's promise would be honoured(S). I 
As a result Clemenceau made it known that he had agreed to 
recall Sarrai1 and replace him with General Franchet d'~~rey(6). 
At the new Supreme War Council, meeting on 1 December, 
Clemenceau frankly declared that all that was known of the 
situation at Salonica was that nothing was known. He had 
asked Sarrail for a report on the Situation, but had received 
~ only a brief reply which was in no sense a report. The French 
government was proposing to make important changes in the com-
mand, but as these were not finally settled and were of purely 
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with this prospect of more fruitful developments now that 
Clemenceau was in power, Robertson showed his irritation as 
soon as the discussion moved on to Balkan affairs. He passed 
a scrap of paper to Henry Wilson on which he had written, 
"we always get on to this subject and waste all our time over 
it"(1). It was the cry of the westerner par excellence, who 
had long seen the prosecution of the war thwarted by the inter-
vention of politics and politicians. Perhaps, even now, he 
could not bring himself to believe that a French government 
could actually dispense with Sarrail's services. When the 
French cabinet met on 4 December Clemenceau stated his belief 
that Sarrail could not be allowed to remain. But now his 
choice for the succession was veering towards the former War 
Minister, General Roques. Clemenceau indicated that he could 
not then be accused of having sacrificed Sarrail to a politi-
cal reactionary(2). Two days later Robertson voiced his 
impatience that no action yet appeared to have been taken by 
the French permier. He was authorised by the War Cabinet to 
draft a strongly worded note to be sent to Clemenceau in 
Lloyd George's name(3). This complained that while further 
reports continued to be received regarding probable hostile 
attacks on the allied forces in Macedonia, the British 
government still had no knowledge whether adequate defensive 
preparations had been made to meet such attacks(4). 
The question of Sarrail's command was finally settled 
at the first meeting under the presidency of Poincar' of the 
French C~b~et de Guerre. Clemenceau stressed the need to 
replace the general, but p'tain was anxious that he should 
not be placed at the disposition of the High Command since 
this would be to leave ~t$in the responsibility of sacking 
Sarrail. This, after all, was a prospect from which French 
politicians had consistently. retreated over the past two 
years. In Clemenceau's opinion the military situation at 





Hankey - OPe cit., Vol. 2, pp 732-3. 
~ . 
Poincare - OPe cit., Vol. 9, p. 400. 
War Cabinet, 6/12/17, CAB 23/4/293. 
Lloyd George to Clemanceau, 6/12/17, F.O. 371/295/232631; 
A.E. 'Guerre', Vol. 1043. 
209. 
pared to send out one of Francels better generals. But 
Poincar~, Leygues(1), and Foch objected that a serious situation 
would arisett the enemy were allowed to take Salonica. Foch 
insiste~ therefore, that a capable man must be appointed and 
on Petain1s suggestion the choice was made of General 
Guillaumat, who had commanded at Verdun after Nivelle had 
become commander-in-chief(2). The decision was conveyed to 
the English War Cabinet that Sarrail would learn of his re-
placement as soon as Guillaumat arrived at Salonica(3). In 
fact Clemenceau himself informed Sarrail that the government, 
"acting on general considerations· had decided to recall him 
to ~rance. This bitter pill was sugared as attractively as 
possible. The government, Clemenceau stated, appreciated 
the difficulties which Barrail had encountered and the services 
which he had rendered, and was disposed eventually to envisage 
the possibility of giving him a new post(4). In all proba-
bility, however, there was no chance of this, for Clemenceau 
had ample evidence of Barrail's ineptitude. The French 
premier explained to the Chamber Army Commission that on' the 
eve of what might be a strong enemy offensive he could not 
have left the allied troops in a state of complete disorgani-
sation and lack of command(5). Sarrail's relations with the 
allies, particularly England, had been strained and Clemenceau 
had felt obliged to carry out Ribot's promise and relieve the 
general (6) • 
After two bitter years, then, Sarraills command was at 
an end. The resolution of Clemenceau had succeeded in dOing 
what seemingly countless allied conferences had failed to 
achieve. At last it had been accepted by the French govern-
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Britain at Salonica while as distrusted a commander as Sarrail 
I 
remained at the head of the Armee d'Orient. The lasting im-
pression left by these two years is indeed of the futile waste 
of time involved in the periodic meetings of the statesmen 
of the two countries. As Lloyd George came to realise, these 
were not really conferences at all, but meetings of peop~e 
with pre-conceived ideas who desired only to find a formula 
which could reconcile them. They were really nothing but a 
"tailoring" operation at which different plans were stitched 
togethe~(1). The conduct of the Great War has frequently 
been castigated by historians as amateurish. But it is per-
haps the conduct of the allies' ,diplomacy which most merits 
this description. The Salonica campaign, moreoever, exhibits 
this element at its startling worst. What was needed was the 
construction of an inter~allied General Staff, deSigned to 
examine and advise on the military situation. No government 
could abdicate to it the right to issue orders, but if Germany 
were to be defeated the allies needed to concede that there 
was far more to participation in a coalition than the mere 
lip-service involved in the periodic gatherings of soldiers 
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The Political Background in France (l9l7) - The Ascendancy 
and Fall of Sarrail. 
Painleye's success in protecting Sarrail against Joffre's 
vindictiveness was indeed oonsiderable.He had, nonetheless, certain 
factors working in his favour. Joffre's absence from the meetings of 
the Council of Ministers made it easier for his arguments to be des-
troyed and he was in any case not the most subtle of politioal 
strategists. The opposition of premier Briand posed an altogether 
more difficult proposition for ~inleve, especially aa Berthelot t s 
position at the head of the M!isonde la ptesse gave Briand a ver.y firm 
grip on the media. At the beginning of September 1910 governmental 
£ur.y grew with Sarrailts lack of activity to support the offensive of 
the Roumanian~. ~n 5 September La Matin oarried a portrait of 
General Gouraud, carrying the captionl "La pneral qui a command_ 
en chef l'Armee dtOrient". The ~ustifiable oonclusion was reached 
that Sarrailts replacement had been decided upon. Gouraud, having 
commanded the Dardanelles foroes, was a logioal ohoioe to take over 
from the man who had origiDal17 been desisnated to replace him.(l) 
Rumours of this nature oirculated thr0U8hout P&ria, although the English 
Embassy received a denial that Gouraudts presenoe in Paris had any oon-
nection with Sarraills position at Salonioa.(2) Sarrail, on the other 
hand, heard that, in the absence of Painlev_, Thomas, Viviani and Combes 
from the Cabinst, his enemies had pushed through the appointment of 
Gour&ud as his successor.9D!y Pa1nleve's subsequent protests had 
seoured the reversal of this decision.(}) Auetin Lee alao he~ that 
Gour&udts nomination had held good for a period of three daJa before 
being revoked.(4) 
The ominously meaning~ appeanoe ot Gouraud' s photognaph in 1:!!. 
Matip. coinoided with the D8B~m1Dga of a widespread preae oampaign 
against Sarrai1. 'Phi." in it.elf was strange, considering that the 
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immediate17 cried out at what the7 saw aa a flasrant underminiDB of 
the Sacred UDiOl'l. (1) The supioion that the sovernment, or at least 
the Quai d'9raay, was givirlg tacit approval to the.e DeWspaper 
attack. agaiDst a .ervil2g J'renoh •• raJ. oblip4 Briand. to make a 
.tatemeDt to the Chaaber oa 22 September. In reply to the Sooialist 
deputy, Paul Pcmoet, who uped that the pre.s bad. launched a oon-
certed offenaive with the authoriaaticm of the ceD8or, Bri8A4 had no 
alternative but to a&7 that Sura11, who was ~ut then be.:lnn:LDc to 
achieve some aili tal:7 .. ooe .... , laac1 the 001 oonfidence of the 
government &Ild that the lIDfa1r ataou upoa hi. would be ended. (2) 
The left-wiDg pre •• was Dot, howeftr, par'tioular1.7 iapre ••• d with 
Briand's explanatiou. Ltoeun:e poiDte' out that a ciraw'Daok of the 
curreat systea of c ... orah1pvu "Waat it Pove to ~ that was 
published the chazacter of offioial approval &Dd. npport. •• there 
was no D.8W.pa.per prepaad. to "e1'7 the O888or 011 m11itar.y _tter8, 
le'o.1iI.vr8 concl\\Cle' that, had the 1O'"1"Im8at really ti.approved of the 
anti-Sa.rra11 article., tbe7 wGU.lcl Dever haft appeuecl in the firat 
place. Three day. after Jr1&Dd.'. explaDation h1Dleve heard of the 
exi.tence of gover.a.8Dtal iaatruetiORl to permit article. critical of 
Sarrail to appear aDd of ODe .,"iric ADti-sarrail piece, cenaOl'8d by 
lae HatiD OD it. CMl iait1ative, which ha4 bee. re.torecl byorcler of 
tho a.thoritie •• (') 
PaiBleft.. 101&1 t7 to the JriaDd go ... raeat wu beoOlliDg in-
creuiDcl7 que.tiGB&ble aM 'by tbe mUl. of .0veabe1" Bertie Doted 
that the JIiai.ter of bltU.o IMu,.."iOll ai,pt ... Sa:rr&il ... a lever 
with which to Oft~;_ 1., ..... ~.(4) the be11 ....... ador 
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got up a transport debate in the hope of upsetting the ministr,r.(l) 
PaiDlevtS spread a report that Briand, in oreler to get rid of Sarra1l 
had solicited complaint. asatnat hia from tba British and other allied 
governments. (2) Bertie assured JQle. CambOD that the representations 
made b7 the British goverDDaDt were spontaD8OUS aDd were the reelings 
of the BRssi~ Italian &D4 Jritiah mi1itar,r aathoriti.a in resard to 
Sarrail's performance at SalODioa.(3) Tet when tbe q~.tion of 
Sarrail'. replace.at had 00118 up for di.ouaaion in the bgli.b War 
COIlIIi tte. Lloyd Georp haci stated hi. i.pres.ion that -the French 
rather wanted us to ngp.t it-. (4) 8iIl11a.r17, &8 ear11' a. Jul7. 
Robertson bad -recei "Nd a lWit that the i'reaoh would like to have a 
hint from hill that we elid DOt liD Geaeml Sarrail-, (5) while Bertie 
himaelf bad notecl tlJat Br1aad had Dot been .orrr to reoeive the 
Engli.h reaonatrano ••• :t.u. lie oCRlld \18e the. &8 a weapon against his 
Radical-Socialiat Ca'biMt 0011...... in dellOJUltratlDg the dancers of 
baviBg a Ililit&r,J oce=,»der who too vi11iDg17 dabbled 1n POlitioa.(6) 
PaWe" , in fact, cleteote41·. 0"Pir&o7 b7 repre8.ntati vee ot the 
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G.Q.G. aDd Quai dt0ra&7 ia -ua. allied oapitals to eDCCNrage 'bOOMZUB' 
complaints agaiDat- surail, which had their tru or1aiDB inaide hanoe. (1) 
U a ooroll..r" to proaptiBs oomplaint. ap1aat Sanail from hi. 
lDBliah allie., Br1aad. o_i.teat17 rell back OIl the &llianoe •• hi. 
exc1I8e tor r8s.iJIg pre • .ue 1Uicle hi. g.ftmaeJlt to pureu 110ft ener-
getio policies at S&lODioa aD4 ia Greeoe .. ob &8 Sarza11 cleaaa4ed. 
r -- . ' 
(1) Jaertie -to -0-7 -uJll/lft, '''riie MIl, -J',~, ·"'/172/G~/16/r;5. 
(2) letieto 8&ft1Jlae'/4/17. Ll.· .. orp JeS, JS1/4/19. 
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(7) m_te nOte " h1al,."','OY. 1916, .aiaieTlJIBS. 313 I.P 119. 
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England would not toleat., BriaDd. iDai.t.d, U7 atemer action 
against the Greek BO'Y8Z'11M1lt to protect the rear of tbe Aft •• 
d'Orient. This ItDe of argument often involved a distortion of 
Ellglish polioie. &ad. __ iDoreu1Dg17 to isol.t. Briand from hi. 
oabinet coll ..... uul tr. the wishe. of the h'eDch diplomatic and 
miliar;y agenta GIll the .pot. :rrom SalOllio. Leooq(l) re.,.ot1'ull 7 
.sked WOlD Bcnu:poi. wa.tber tile resiataaoe of ft'aI1ce 'a alli.. vaa 
not in fact be!JIg .mu-a ... alIA whether :Ir1&DC1'. poli01 of in-
activity did not •• tail • zather deapezate aeazca for .xcua ••• (2) 
In better infonei. circl •• , Aow.ver , it b..... inorea.1Dal7 .y1d.llt 
that Briud'. polio i ..... n.ther ... paraoaal &DC1 iIlt1_t •• x-
Pl&D&tioas.(}) 
B7 the tiM that lloqu. retllZ'MCl to Pari. from Salonic. it va. 
becOlling evident that the triDYirat. arou4 which the I'rUcll 
goverDll18Dt had. be.. faab1ua4 tor the prec.d1Dc year vas oompo ••• 
of iDcJ.'e.s1Dgl7 lUlOOII.t'orlabl. b .. tellow.. • quiO&l observer not.d 
that sinoe BoftmDar 1915 tlI!I aftairs of i'ZUO. baA "'Na coaduot •• i7 
the 1IIli.oa of a ... of peat al_1o _t _ chaaot.r [Jr1&DC1] vi ~ a 
seDaral of ohaa.oter n.1o .. tal.at [Joftre], 1Uad..r the aegis ot &Il 
irreapou1Dl. Uld iatell.otllal17 111l1t84 chi.f -a1at:rate [PoiJaoul]. (4) 
With his f&111l1"8 to aoh1 .... a1l111t&17 'brea.kthrfNgb. 1a the own. of 
1916 ancl ill the taoa of ..... r .aoalat1D& ouulty li.t, Jofhe t • 
PJ.'e.tip ,egaD to .:Lak. ftfUli frc. the miG. of the 78ar. ot· thi. 
10S8 of popu.l.&ritl' CMat:Ul7 --.iMtl nili.-e17 uan.ra ft' at le .. t 
1rapotut to do ~ .... t:l.t. (5) Ba.t ,.11101oal17 Joffre'. lack 
of noca •• '.0_ • ,""iDs 'a'M:rz&a •• n'. •• Jriu4 peate. oat to 
Joffre'. 1ia1.cm ofno-.r .t '\he .Dd of BOfta'Hr, it va. the JIUOh 
criticis.' Sarrail vho vaa oltta''''" 1I111t&Z7 victorie.. Vb&t cCNld 
Direotnz .~ ...... ·1_lIU ..... '. 'd. -1& ·nI1101l'l;a!qu. 
:Lao .. to laoUpe1a (u.unot17 4atH), »oarpoia HIS, '101. 9. 
Sa. balaw p. 218.":' 
Ccmf.'1clatial R8ta GIl tlra. d..1reotia of the var by HaDr1 .iou, 
26/12/16, P&1aleYl _, ,1, AP 56. 
:&arthelo't to !~ 29/6/16, Jarthalot MSS. 
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1 Joffre offer by c01ll.pariaoa. Roques' report would greatly ease 
Briand' B way toward. dispoaiDg of this incubua. 
France, faced with the thJ.oeateniDg iaternational ai tuation of 
1913, had resorted to the 11IlUR&l st.p UDAler the Third R.public of 
appointing to the Ilyae. a .aD who "sa not a politioal nonentity. 
Briand' a relationship with IaJaoDi Po1acare had 'b •• n cODsid.rab17 
eased by the fact ~t the latte% feared tba oo.s.qu.nc.. for bia-
self of a governm8Dt fer.ed 'by one of the preaierts more likely 
successors, Georges Cle.aceau. Bonet_l ••• , in the course of 
1916, Poincare 0_ to the fore -0JI8 taose _mbers of the Oouncil 
of Ministera whe res.nted BriaDdt. supine polioy towards Gre.c. and. 
the Salomca O..,aip, aad his an dent hoatili ty towards Sarrail. 
Briand was becoming incresaiDgly isolated wi thin his own cabinet, 
the majority of which V&8 preaaiDg fo% stezuar action agatnst Gre.ce 
and ita monarcby'.2 
The role of Po~ 1a the pvernaeat of the OGWlt:1'7 dw:in1 
the war ia one of the ~a.auzabl. factors ill the history of these 
years.3 'l'he i-. spzead. by Cle ... eau in whioh poino~ appeared 
a8 the effective wler of the oCNlltry, with Briand little 1I0re than 
a ''beau parlew:' &ad 1..,. oi&azette IIMker sh.lteriDg lMne&th a 
f~e of fine pUaae8 is uaqu .. Uoaaa17 aa exageatiOll.4 But it 
888ms safe to ~that ~.iJaoaft exerci.ed. his prerogative. to the 
full, did have a 8&7 :La tae ooutzuotiea of polioy and. Mde hi. 
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objected to the attaoks made OIl S~l and. oonsidered that the 
latter had. never been giveR the .. oes~ foroes SAd equipment. l 
The hold which 'the BadicalSooialists appear to ban had. over 
Mme pOinoare ~ account for this attitude.2 Bertie noted that 
-for private and personal reaaona the President of the Republic 
is in awe of the rue de Valois faction whioh supports Sarrail. 
He is therefore inclined to favour him and those whoaupport him:3 
Whatever the motivation" diffexence. between Poin0ar8 and Briand 
came to a head over policy towardaGzeeoe, where t~ former favoured 
-the mailed fist- and the latter -oratorical persuaaion!4 Poinc~ 
wanted to use force to settle ~ differenoes with the Greek gover.n-
mant, but Briand continued :to diuaiaa the wa:mil'lgsvhioh poured out 
of Greece as the exoessesof ~mbittered men. 5 
In the first of a series of increasingl1 biting reproaches to 
the French Minister in Athena, JriaRd wrote to Guill~ in January 
1916 saying that he found in the diplomat.s telegrams traces of the 
exaggerations and lack of juq.nt of which he had alread,J bad cause 
to complain in the naval attachGts despatohes. Guillem.n should be 
careful not to involve himself in party political struggles in Greece 
nor to awaken Greek auace'ptibilitie. in a wa;y which might later 
rebound upon hiaaelf arid his goTernment. 6 When Poincare made refer-
ence to the despatches of de loquefeuil and Braquet in the Council of 
Ministers, :Briand tumed &.iliri17 upon him and said that certain French 
agents, tacitly support.A by Sarrail and Guillemin, wanted to p1rsue 
15 
(1) Herbil10a - 0,. oit."ftl. 1,p. ~49. 
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a polioy of violenoe tovazda Greece, but that he would not &8sociate himself 
with their ill-oonceived ideu. (1) :Briand complained in Januar,y to 
Guillemin of loose talk about a na.'ftl demonstration, a bombardment of Athens, 
the oomplete occupation of Greec. and even the removal of Conetantine. He 
was at a 108. to ••• what vas behind all this. Did Guillemin 1'8all1 think 
:rrance could secure the aupport ot bar allies tor· ncb policies?( 2) Less 
than a fortnight later Briand renewed hi. cri tici... Guillemin was too 
preoccupied with pre.s campa1&Da and Greek internal politics. Bis avalanche 
of telegrIUIB to the ~ elt Ora&7 •• 1'98d onl.7 to conceal the real. 1mPCJ*&nce 
of events and he abould Dot forpt that the uniV ct new so caretully 
established with hancel • alli •• could 0Dl.y be .aintained if J'raDce kept 
awa;r from excessive &otiOO8 in Greece. !be 8U8Psti0D8 CD1I1ng from France'. 
agent. "ne rlpondent en rien .. DOS 'VUS ni .. la situation et ne pourra1ent 
que jeter la Gnce dIma 1 •• bna de DOS ... mi.". (,) Blliot tboUCht that 
Guillemin was doiDB his best to -tab his we· from Paris, but that he was 
uuable to keep pace with b1a CO .... rIm8D~S oban8es ot 'behanour tova:t'U 
G~e08. Surail, he '.It, wu ..... Il -turther behindhand •• (4) 
Wi1l1 Br:i,and. tor 0Il08 a'baeD" ~_ a .. til18 ot the JlJ!enoh cabinet at 
the beginning of April 1916, all tbeJl1ni.tera telt able to expre8S their 
aDXiev that J-zenoh poli.,. ~ Greece vas too _alt. (5) When it beC8M 
apparent that tM Qnek 8Oft~t Vaa resisting the pu .... of the refo~d 
Serbian aDq, .'Y811 81lOh aa UGh·· philhel18ll8 &8 De~ Cochin rai8ed his &mil 
in inclipatiOD anel spoke ot .... on. Bnm4 alone still attempted to defend 
OonataDtine and his 8O"'~Dt, ba.t bili onl.7 line of def.nce vas to say 
that Jbgland vas not pre,..d to torce the band of Gre.ce and that France 
oould not act alone. (') Be ... .t the .... esament at the beginning of June J 
folloving tbe en1il:7 of Ja.lprl.- toroes on to Greek soil, to mitigate the 
.,xe energetic 81I&PstiOlail otllis· oo11eagaes in tM· heuob cabinet. (7) With 
Poin0ar4 tu:iDg the 1e., "'~i1 ot timstara tried to open Briand's 
eyes to ConatalltiDet.a ~.6tWZ7 ~1II.tt vh11e "pol!&ri17 abaet mm the 
QQai cltaraq at .. · • .,ms •. of._, Briancl vas careful to leave de Haqerie 
(1) Poinoaftl OPe oi1;." Yol<~.~t .pp 42-'. 
(2) Bri.lIDd to QU.ll8Id.D ~o",.;12T.25/J/J.',. A. B. lQa.eftel, Vol. 250. 
, - < .f.'" 
(,) 1b14 Bo. 196-7. '/2/16. 11d.t., Tol. 251. 
(4) Illiot to GnT 1,/l2/U, :r.O~ ,71/2616/29147. 
(5) :roiDOltr4l op. 01 •• , Tol. 8, ,16,. 
(6) ibicl. p 166. 
(7) ibid, p 267. 
and Berthelot with instruotions to ooncert with the veteran Minister without 
Portfolio, de Freyoinet. Jules C_bon, nominally senior to both the other 
officials and anxious to insist to the Greek go'ftrnment on the unhindered 
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passage of the Serbian &rJQ', felt tbat he bad been deliberately by-passed. (1) 
Poincaft's interventions at meetings of the Cabinet led to violent language 
on both sides, (2) and on one occasion in Ausust 1916 the two men nearly (lame 
to blows after Poinca.:N bad aoaused Briand of lying and suggested that 
Bdand1s polioies were explicable only in terms of his liaison with the 
Princess Georges of Gmece. 0nl.7 Dowarsae's tt.ly intervention and url8nt 
entreaties to PIlt patrietiam f1rat fts.red a semblanoe of orcWr to the situatio~~: 
Poinoarl bad only said what an inoreasing number of fignres in Pranoe 
were coming to accept - that the countr,"s :Balkan polioy was in the last 
resort dictated by the whims of the Prime Hinister's Greek mistress. Briand's 
biographer skates tas~tully over this question and asserts that, as 
always, raison d'It&t was his subjeot's dominating motivation. Briand's 
attempts to pursue more energetio poliCies, he asserts, inva.riably came up 
against the resistance of France's allies and, in particular, of England. (4) 
From London, however, Cambon noted Briand's tendenO)' to use any sign of 
hesitation in England as an excuse forKs own inertia. (5) Be naturally 
resented :arland's suggestion that the fault lay in the ambassador's 
presentation of France's 8.rSUJDSnts to the English government. (6) The 
English were in fact mere p::t'9p&1.'8d to purau.e a vigorous policy towards Greeoe 
than Briand was willing to accept. Ind8ed by October 1916 the Greek 
mo~ rested on one ~op alone - Briand himself. (1) Cambon tcnnd this 
intrusion of personal factors into his OOllntry'S diplaaoy extremely dis-
tasteful and· asserted that the ~ two oonaideraticms whioh bore any weisht 
with Briand vere his OVD ·inatinot for 8I1r'IivaJ. and his desire to be &8 
obliging &8 poII8ible to the Greek prince.a. (8) !At Roy Lewis tboqht the 
whole affair vaa 8i&D1ticant only in 80 far as it shoved that :Briand's 
opponents were wa01'a'tol!l:UJB8Z'OUIld bare to find atonea to throw at him't, (9) 
(1) Poinoari: OPe cit.', 'Vol. a, p 199. 
(2) A.. Ribot: Letters 1;0 a Mea, p 24. 
(~) J. Caillaux: Has ,.uita(1947), Vol. ~, p ~9l; Wright: OPe oit., p 164. 
(4) Suarez: Ope cit~, Vol.~, p 284. 
(5) Cambon to neur1au ~1/a/16, ~n: C~~8'POna.anCe, Vol. ~, p 121. 
(6) P. Cmbon to J. Cambon 6/10/16, J'ulesCambon MBS, Vol. 1. 
(1) ibid, 14/10/16, ibid. 
(8) ibid 21/10/16, ibid. 
(9) La Roy Lewis to IJ.oyd George 2~/lO/16, Lloyd George MSS, E 3/14/21. 
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but in the ~sent oontext it is indicative that ~ing other than milita.r,r 
oonaidera tions were detezmn1q the oonduot ot the Salonica O&mpai&n and 
problems assooiated with it. 
At the aaae t:lae that Briand's authority within hiB oWn government 
was weakening hi. pa;rli_l1tar;r dittioul tiE also began to increase. The 
Cbamber bad tirst usabled ill secret .. ssion with the aim ot a oompletely 
frank interroption of the sovaromant."s policies as early as June. Then 
Briand bad useel his sift ot eloqU88. and his capaci't7 to oiDuzvent detailed 
ori ticiam in a welter or oratorioal pernaaion to soore a notable trmmph. 
Paul C_bon bad been oon1lemp.ous or the whole operation: "On prononoera 
quelques 'ftBI18s parole. 8UXqueJllB Briancl npo12.Clra pu quelques vaeu&s annonoes 
et le Cabinet sera aauW-, and oOllOluded that the Prime Minister was sate 
because ot the lack of an obviou llUC088sor. (1) In fact Briand sava an able 
and moving acoount of his Ja,JkaD poliq, oonoludirlB that oonditiena tor an 
oftensi va were iaFOviDc all the while. !fbis oODlpletely nulliti~d the etfeot 
ot Dalous"s speech, ill which the tOrMr toreisn minister disolosed tor the 
first tiM that his zeaip.atiOll bad ..... n prompted b.r" anxiety which he 
fel t at aendiDB ~oh .oldiers overseas when the e~ l!eainad on Frenoh 
soil. (2) PRliaaentar;r hostiliV vu not, however, oompletely stilled and 
in September the Badioal clep.1Q' Abrui save a oogent ori tioiam ot the 
goveraentts BaJ karl poli. 1;0 the Cbaaber J.rsq Commission. (}) Moreover 
disappointments over the S-- campaign and the ROUJanian reverses so seriously 
disoredi ted the 1OT81"U8nt tbat the Chamber onoe more oonsti tuted i teelf 
into a Seoret CCDR1ttee at the end of Noveaber. !his time the problema for 
the exeouti va would be tar lION .erious than those of June. 
The tone ot the .. tiDe 1IU determined b.r Hoques' 10ng-e.wa1ted eulogy 
of Sarn.il OIl }O .o ..... r. As Painlevl was able to report to Salonioa the 
whole Cbu.ber acol.&iM4 8&'1:'ft.il when Roque. pve his expos' of the opera tiona 
of the .&a4e atrori-.t ad Sarrall.. role in them. (4) lloques' defenoe ot 
~l served ~. cletl .. t pRli_uta:r¥ or! tioia .".,. tram Briand and the 
gowxu.lnt aad tovRcla Jottre and the Hich Oomand. J'isurea prominent in 
CbantU1.7'. oapaip apinst Sar.N.U were now at obvious risk and Briand 
(1) CaaboD 1;0 L9harmes 1'16/16, Oambon: Oorrespondanoe, Vol. }, p 115. 
(2) lVli.-.· .. ~V8 •• C 7647. 
C~) .l'aAiOD ,. ~.Abzui 27/9/16, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 10}9. 
(4) Painlevl to Sarrail 2/12/16, Painleft MSS, 313 AP 110. 
L 
suggested to General Pal14 that the latter might like to take up a colllD&lld 
at the front to escape the ~nge of Sarrail's aBaocaites. (1) No such 
easy wtq out awai * General Joffre, severely discradi ted by the cwrse of 
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events on the Vestem f1'Ont. :Briand'. own survival. now necessitated the It 
effeotive removal of Joffre trom the higher direotion of the war and a 
gove~ntal reshuffle to t;r;y to injeot soma new vigour into a near 
mortbuaid r4gime. '!he premier oarried out neither task with ~ great 
expertise. Iaside b aeoret session ~, Minister of Marine at the 
oonception of the Salonioa lkpedi tion, argued that the power of Chantilly 
macle for the exiatence of two 80ftrDDBnta wi thin France. This, he believed 
ha4 bad a pa:rtioular17 pernicious etteot on Sa.rrailts oonduot ot operationsl 
"Ioue pouvons attimer que les malheura qui frappent la Roumanie sont la 
OGwquenoe fatale de.la soumission du gouvernemant au grand commandement 
qui nta jamais vouJu o0mp.t'8ncire ltimportanoe des op4rations en Orient". 
The oentre and lett S'Weted with wild enthusiasm Abrami's conoluaion that the 
names of General Jotfre and. the ChaDti lly GeneraJ. Statf "sont loin ••• 
d"voquer les 'choa, les ~, ltenthoua1aame et les illusions qulUs 
ont tait naltre au ~t". SenaiDg that his own career depended upon 1t, 
:Briand yielded to hi. crt tios by acreeing to remove Sarrail from Joffre's 
oontral, explaining that he vas siTing the latter a new rank - that of 
general-in-ohiet, teohnioal adviser to the government. (2) 
:for the rest lb:iand aanapd somehow to survive his pa:rli_nt8.rf ordeal. 
In the paiert. openiI2B apeech "the soporifio qualities of his oratory 
,... '. It 
were at-,11' •• t , anel 1te J10y Lewi. belind most depit1e. were lett 
wondering Wb¥ 'thq bad ubd to have a .ecret sitting atter the;,. bad 
lil--d to lb:iancl.. (:~) Hi. Greek polioy was prediotably a source of weale-
ne" &Del hil relatiouh1., vi th the Prinoe •• o.orses did not strengthen his 
position in d.eali.nc with it. Ja.t, by ooncentrating attention on the future 
of the llilh (te=pnd. Briand vas able to avoid detailed ex~ana. tions ot his 
own poli01, nob &8 verecalledter by seven searob1.ag ·qU8st1ona posed by 
Charles ~~oist, (4) and by the widespread realisation of :Berthelot's 
(1) ,..114 wAlbert !homaa ,/12/16, Thomas MSS, 94AP 2'7. 
(2) ~li .. ntaJ:7 a:r:ohives, c 7648. 
(,) La 1101 Lewis to Llqd Georse '30/11/16, 11o;,.d George MSS, E '/14/,2. 
(4) :Beaoist IllS, 4542. 
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involvement in the oampaiBn against Sa.r.rail.. (1) Austin Lee beaN that the 
Frenoh premier's defence of his Greek polioY' on 4 December was weak and that 
Ta.rdieu had made a violent and lou.dly' appl&U4Af.d & t1;ack on the Roumanian 
policy of the government. BIlt two day'a later Briand told Bertie be was certain 
of triumph in the Cbambar.(2) Briand oould leave Benoist's questions and 
the allegations apinat Berthelot un&nswred by quelling parliamentary 
disoontent through the sacrifioe of Joffre. As La RoY' Lewis rerated to 
u,yd Georse, Briand "has anaged to escape somehow or other". (3 
General Fell' had auapeoted that S&lonica might be removed from Joffre's 
Olbi ,t even before the Chamber went into Seoret Seasion and renected upon 
the fact that Prenoh political divisions were being allowed to unde1'Dline 
the work done towards lmi t.r of command in the war andFrenoh suP:t'8llll.C7 
among the allies baaed on Joffre'. pr8sttse.(4) Joffre later alatmad 
in 1m memoirs that Briand misled him b,r assuring him that 'his new poaition 
as technical adviser would leave him with the general. direotion of the W&'t', 
very mch as before, (5) but Pall' soon appreoiated that this was a delusion: 
"La G4n4ral 'Joffre", he told Albert !homaa, "qu'on 1e veu1l.1e au non n'ex1ate 
plus". (6) Sensing the government'. predicament Pell' thoUBht Briand had 
first wanted to get rid of Joffre completely and h&cl then oonsidered keepiDg 
him with ill-detined functions whioh the general would tind it impossible 
to tultil.(7) Not surprisingly Jottre soon tound himSelf unable to re~n 
at his new post, especially when the new M:l.n1ster ot war~ General Iqautey', 
appeared anxious to restrict his powers stUl further. (8 So the hero ot 
the Marne depa.rted., OODS01ed perhaps b,r the honorific ti tie of Marshal ot 
l'J:aDoe now granted to h1a, tor, as Bartbelot noted, if France might 1Uk: 
gratitude abe oould atU1 abow pnerosi V. (9) Sa.r.5il was thus now tree ot 
Ohantil17'. atelage, his authoriv deriving 801817 from the government, as 
it bad betore the eJaoree ot 2 December 1915. (10) 
(1) .lb:raailil __ rtion tbat Sarra111• ell8Jl1e. "ntltaient tfts floiBUs 
••• de Totra ()riand1s] cabinet" was _t b,r the C'r7, "Berthelot''', 
C 7648. . . 
(2) :Bertie to Bsrc1.inp 6/12/16, :Bertie MSS, 1'.0. 800/l72/Gr/16/57. 
(3) La llO)' LeWis to LlO)Pd Gearse 5/12/16, Lloyd George MBS, E '5/14/'53. 
(4) Pelll to Thomas 25/11/16, !l'hoas a, 94 AP 237. 
(5) Jottre: Kamoirs, Vol. 2, p 533 tt. 
(6) Pall' to Thomas 15/12/16, ThoMa MSS, 94 AP 237. 
(7) Pall. to :Bertlliot 15/12/16, Berthelot MSS. 
(8) J. C. King: OPe oit., p 138. 
(9) Note by :Berthelot 23/12/16, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 983. 
(10) Note sur les Decreta du 13/12/16, 16N 3058. 
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Briandts governmental DlBDoeuvrings produoed a lesa radical reorganisation. 
The elderly minis~ without portfolio were finally dispensed with and 
Roques was replaced at the rue St. Dominique by General ~tey. :Briand's 
moti vw here 'llJIq well bave been the way in whioh Roques had handled his 
inspeotion of Sarra.il. (1) Ba.t perhaps the most significant governmental 
obanee in the context ot the Salonioa expedition was the departure ot Paul 
Painlen. Betore the tinal disappearance of Jotfre, Painlavl told Briand 
that he was not aatiaited with the Prime Kinisterts reorganisation ot the 
High Coaa.nd, which still .e .. d to leave the general-in-cbief wi th extensive 
authortty.(2) Ba.t Painlewt .. hesitations in the period of governmental 
instability' enC01ire.ged the beliet that he was angling for a b1.gser prize 
tor hiJl8elt. (~) In tact Painlm *a_ to haw set his mind on obtaining 
the Ministry ot War. When" itbeC8D8 evident that this was not torthcoming, 
he probably 8U1'!Iised that his own tortUnaa oould best be served by sewring 
all oormeotiODS with what 1fU eTideA*ly an ailing administration. Bt'i.and's 
resbaped cabinet lIUr'I'i'f8d tor a tarthar preoa.rioUtb1'ee months. :By 
contrast, out at Salonioa, Sa.'rrail vu enjoying a period ot relative immmity. 
With Jotfre out ot 'the V8l' ancl Briand now too weak to attempt ~ further 
initiatives, the genealts enemie. within li'ranoe were tor the time being at 
ba7. lit wuperba.pe the-only fiBare to aerse trom tb8 governmental oriais 
stronger than bet~. (4) "." 
:Briand's ministerial. survival. was now verT DIUOh on. a clay to day basis 
and wi thin a fortnight ot his go'ftrnmental ohanBes he vas oblipd to face 
a Secret Session of the Senate. Paul Cambon noted the premier'. principal 
.nerd.esas Painlevl, Clemenceau and Poin0ar4, but thought th&t once again 
he would pgll throuBb be08Utt ot the lack ot an obvious candidate to replace 
b1lI at the bead ot 1ibe IOverDl8Dt. !be queations of Salonioa and Onaca 
~a, howe'98r, -un point ta1ble-. (5) De Ka:t'prie cotlfliAercadtbat Briand 
w .. 1apoa1Dc & crullbJn, lmdMl upon biuelf 'b7 retaini, conUiol a~ the ~ 
dtOmlq at 1;he ... ti.aa _ bI ftainacl PriM ltinister, ') while patriotic 
(1) c.~. ~_' Ope "oj;t., pp 1'1~., 
(2) Nal.ft~_3ri .. d ,ll/12/16, Pa1nl.vI MBS, ~13 J.P 56. 
(3) NDJ,eft to .... 20/12/16, ibid, 313 AP 55. 
(4) ..... :·op.,oit., Tol.4, p 103. 
(5) OIaboa to ~re 22/12/16, ~re MSS, Vol. 1. 
(6) 4e Jla,rprie to~ 20/12/16, ibid, Vol. ~. 
observers regretted the obsession with party po1i tios, when the war oontinued 
to drag on, seemingly interminably. (1) Briand's parliamentary majorities 
rose and fell, but as 1917 began the trend seemed to be that the opposition 
was gaining ground. Only Briand's persuasive eloquenoe and his skilful 
parliamentary manoeuvring, together with a widespread fear of having 
Clemenoeau as his successor, kept him in power. (2) An order of the day, 
respeoting the affairs of Greece and Salonioa, adopted by the inter-parliamen-
tary 'grou~s d'action national.', in the middle of J&rll1arY' amounted to a 
vote of censure on the military and diplomatic action of the Frenoh government 
sinoe 1 Deoember 1916. (:s) During the last· cla¥S of the month, therefore, the 
Chamber for a third time resolved itaelf into a seoret session. Salonio&, 
as a matter ot oourse, was the first subject ot the interpe11ations, with 
Abrami attacting Briand's thesis that J'rance'. canoi1iatory r1iey towards 
Greece was largely diotated by the pressure of her &1lies.(4 Cambon ref1eoted 
with ooncern on the possibility of Briand being removed from power: 
"S'i1 tombe ce ne sera ni Ribot, ni Bourgeois, mais Painleri avec son cortftge 
JD&9OnDique qui formera Ie Cabinet. Pa1nlen' la guerre, Sarrail pn'ralissime 
voil' Ie rfve des radicaux-aoci&listes". (5) For the last time, however, 
Briand was able to utricate hillaelf with a flow of elesant rhetorio and 
Bertie predioted a handaOlll8 majori 1:7 for the govarnD8nt. ( 6) Briand ,spoke 
for 41' hours on the second ~ ot the Secret Session and for It hours on the 
third d.IQ', and told Bertie that he was well satisfied with his majority of 
:S1:S votes to 1:S5. (7) Ba.t for most people it was not so much Briand's qualities 
as the failure of the opposition to come up with a viable al ternati ve whioh 
bad produced this result. 
:reeling in informed circles within the administration that Sarrail should 
be removed was not completely dispelled by Roques' report and Joffre's 
uparture. The new Minister of War, General Iaautey, did not hide his opinion 
from de Hargerie, and the latter, who held a similar view, startled Briand 
by' suggesting that the Salonica question could not be settled without a obanee 
in the comund. (8) The frag.Llity of the government's parlilMnt&r,y poSition, 
(1) Alben Legruad to :auru. 29/12/16, ibid. 
(2) Bertie 1;0 B&1!tiDge 11/1/17, Bertie MSS, 1'.0. 800/169/Pr/17/4. 
(:s) Bertie to Balfour 19/1/17, :r.O. :S71/2876/18217. 
(4) Par11amenta.ry' a:rohivas, C 7651. 
(5) P. Cambon to H. Cambon 22/1/17, Cambon: qOrr8spondanoe, Vol. :S, p 139. 
(6) Bertie to Ealfour 26/1/17, :Bertie MSS, 1'.0. 800/l69/Fr/17/14. 
(7) :Bertie: Dim, Vol. 2, p 109. 
(8) de Margeri...,eto :8a.r.r.'ttre :S/1/l7, ~re MBS, Vol. 3. 
however, ruled this out, even though the cabinet no longer oontained 
Sarrail's chief defender. Indeed parliament only received con£i:rmation of 
Roques t impressions when the depu.ty Benazet reported to the ohamber in the 
course of January 1917 that the.Ar.alle d'Orient and its oommander bad done 
all and more than cou.ld be expected of them, given the severe deprivation 
under which they bad laboured. The G.Q..G. bad never looked further afiEil 
than the tields of Flanders and bad never thought of trying to nip in the 
bud Ge1'Dl8oD1"S quest to establish her SUpr8JaOy' from the North Sea to the 
Persian Gulf. Benazet concluded hopefully, "Quelles que soient lew tautes 
du pass', quand une &'I:'JIIM a des chefs ca.. ceux qui ont COlllD&llei4 " 
Salonique et des soldate qui ont support4 taut de JDII,'QX sans una d4fa111anoe, 
il y a toujours lieu d'esptlrer". (1) Consequently all that Briand could 
attempt to do was to try to replace Guillemin by Jonna.rt, the fomer 
foreign minister, in the belief that the latter would be more capable ot 
keeping Sarrail in check.(2) 
Painlev4 Ja7 have been out of office, but be was not idle in .td.ng 
pftpa.rations for what he believed would be bis 1.1Dent return - a retum 
in whioh he enTisapd beiDS powrtul enoush to alte full uae ot Sar.I:a11t. 
talents. Vaing now tba inte1"JD8d.ia:t7 of' Sarrailts new li&1son off'i.cer at 
the Kiniatr,y ot War, COJIID8Ddant Deorais, who sympathised with both PainJ,e" 
and S&rrail, Painlew asked ot the general what post he would like for 
himSelt it Painlew were in a position to dete:aW1e such matters. Sarrail 
replied that he was entirely at the disposition of his political .ntor, 
but went on to show that he believed his abilities to be uncierased in the 
Salonioa Ilde-show. Whatever his faults, these did not extend to undue 
musty or lack ot _biUen: "S'U nta pas id4e sp4ciale sur r&le .. me 
donner, il pourm!t _ ci4sipr CC1111D8 chef d'8-.t major de lta,r.mH, directeur 
gRlral de personnel .t du mat4riel. Avec oe8 tonotions je pourlSia 
mtocouper des oratiOns et de l'orpniaation de Itavant &ussi bien que de 
ltint4rseur-. (3 Whatever Painlew deoided, Sarmil unreservedly placed the 
future of the.A.rmlSe d'Orient in his hands after lea.ming at the Rome 
Conference of' all that· Painlav4 had done f'or hia. (4) P&1nlew, Who bef'ore 
(1) :BenazeiJ"s report, A. E.tGu8rre', Vol. 1041; Fonds Olemenceau, 6N 209. 
(2) P. Caaben to J. Cabon 8/2/17, Jula s Oaabon !o1SS, Vol. 1. 
(3) S£ra,il 1;0 Decrai8 20/1/17, Painlew MSS, 313 AP 110; Fonds Olemenoeau 
611 200. 
(4) Sarrau to Painlm(undated), Painlew MBS, 313 AP 110. 
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entering parliament had battled in favour of the revision of the Dreytus 
case, oould be oounted on to show equal fervour in his defenoe of this 
. seoond martyred hero of the republioan institution. Many were surprised 
tha t Pain1ev~ had beoome "un fana tique de Sarrail". (1) He soaroely knew 
the general as an individu&l, but "i1 lui avait volll un oulte et le 
oonsid~rait comma 1e seul homme capable de nous assurer 1a viotoire.,,(2) 
:But sinoe Sarrail oould not really expect ever to receive the supplies at 
Salonioa neoessary to oarry out a major operation, he had to consider it 
merely as a waiting past. The conduot of operations in Franoe filled him 
wi th no oonfidenoe, but, when the ineffectiveness of the High COlllll&nd IS 
I 
methods had been d.eJaonstrated, whe~s friends had been called to power,~ 
when the emasculating effeot imposed upon French demooracy by the Sacred 
Union had been removed, then, Sarrai1 believed, he would return to Franoe 
as the representative of a different school of wufare. (3) 
II though Joffre was now out of the way the ~e d'Orient had a new 
enemy, admittedly of lesser stature, in the person ot General Nive11e, 
Joffrets successor as c01llll&llder on the Western front. Wi th the air of a 
father defending 1:18 children, Nivelle had protested at the end of Februa.r.y 
at the frequent reinforcements of the Am4e dlOrient at the expense of the 
main front and oalled for1he retum 1D Franoe of two of the extra divisions. (4) 
:But before the Comitl de Guerra bad chanoe to pur8U8 Nive1le's propoSitions 
Fainlew would have ur1ved at the rue St. Dominique. The possibi1i1;,r 
that he would support Ni vel1e aea.inst Sarrail was, of oourse, remote, 
if not non-existant.(5) For the most part, therefore, Sa.rrai1's position 
seemed to be increasingly seoure. Tbe dePU1i7 Chappede1aine, inspeoting the 
A:rrDIe dtOrient on bebalf of the Chamber, acoepted Roques oono1usion that 
Sarra1l had done "tout ce qul1l 'tait militairement possible de faire 
dans l'Itat de ses forces". (6) But he deplored the tendency to supply 
Sarrai1 with interior equ1l1J1Snt .- "bon pour l'Orient" - as if "les fran9&is 
qui se font tals 101 'taient d'une qualitl seoondaire".(7) 
(1) P. O_bon to J. C.bon 10/6/17, JulesCaabon MSS,Vol. 1; c.f. P. cambon 
to X. Charmes 11/6/17, Caabona Correspon!;:ie, Vol. }, p 17}: 
-Qaant l Painlaft; i1 a 1m Diau at un pro. . .-toe t cotest 8a.'rrail". 
(2) P. Cambon to X. ~8 21/}/17, C8abonz Comspondance, Vol. }, p 154 
X. Jean Pailllevl has no knowledge of his fa therhaving had tmy' dealings 
wi th SliLTr&il before the outbreak of the wa:t'. 
(3) Mermeix: ~l, p 12. 
(4) G.Q.G., T.O.E. ·StwQ' on the situation of the ArmIe dtOrient, 7/}/17, 
16N }017. 
(5) Note sur les effeotifs d e It.~e dtOrient, 27/}/17, 16N }OlS. 
(6) Report on the ArlnIe dlOrient, Spring 1917, 16N 3273; Painlew MSS, 
313 AP 109; Fonds Poinca.rl, 6N5. 
(7) de Fontenay to BourgeoiS 20/2/17 and 5/3/17, Bourgeois MSS, Vol. 8. 
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Briand's government was widely seen to be at the mercy of the first 
serious internal or external disturbance. '!he orunch came with the mis-
handling ot a pa.r1iamentar.Y debate on aviation by' General. lqautey, atter which 
the War Minister resigned. Briand toue;b.t desperately tor survival. but his 
options were becoming inoreaaing~ 11m1. ted. JirODl London Cambon oontemp-
tuous1y surveyed the tinal death-thro'ea ot the French gonrmaent: "11 lui 
suttit d'avoir devant lui quelques beurea pour .a aentir tranqui11e, o'est 
1a vie ministlr1elle lla jourrile. En de pareils momenta olest pitil".(l) 
Briand had, Cambon asserted, brought into the government ·ses habitudes de 
bohbe". (2) :eu.t wbat the ambassador fea.red above all was a ministerial 
oomeback by' Painlaw. In tact Briand appe&'t'S to have appro&Cbed Pa1nlavtf 
but the latter's tems p;t"O'98d too high. In thia pnvailing oonfusion Sarrai1 
was enoour888d -to believe in the po8aibili V ot his own nturn to Paris to 
till an as 78t undefined role at the .ide ot the next Minister ot War. (3) 
Briand had tinal:q to admit deteat and on 19 Ma.roh the elderly Mbus ter 
ot Finanoe in the outgoing rfg.l.me, Alexandre Ribot, suoceeded in torming 
a cabinet. In this the key post ot Minister ot War went to Paul Painlew. 
De Ma.'rger1e oonsidered that the oombination ot the PNsidenoy ot the Counoil 
and the Miniatrr ot l!'ore1.gn Atfairs, which Bibot undertook tor biJJ8elt 
atter the fashion ot his predecessor, would prove a orushing burden tor a 
man alre~ wall into his eiBhth.decade~4) and there w .. widespread be1iet 
that the new ,--r minister would be the real master ot the situation. (5) 
At all events the appointment or Bibot would oalJa the fean ot the 
pe.rliament&3:.7 lett-wiDC _ vi 1;h rep.ri. to the powers ot the mili ta.'r7, since no 
one was "pl'WI oivil, mills militariate" tban he. Moreover it had been 
enclent from the time taat Painl8W lett Briand ... goV81'tD18nt th&t be would 
be indiapeuaa'bla to B1'bot il).&rq' atteapt 117 the latter to oonatruot an 
adminiatration. The reception Painlew had reoeived on 13 De08Dlber 1916 
on entariDc the Cbaber. wbilat lkiaD.i pre .. nted his reabNec1 cabinet, had 
'testified to hi. ~1u..n1i&1.7 tolloring. (6) JUt Caabon thought Painlev4's 
appoiD .... nt m1aecia hu&e quastion a1'k over the future direotion ot the war, 
(l) P. caa'boa .'toJ. t:Jaa'tMl·lf,I'5/l7, Julea Cam'bon MSS, Vol. 1. 
(2) P. ou.'bon to H.: CrJabou,.16/3/17, Cubon: CGrremndano.', Vol. 3, p 149. 
(3) Dcl0J.'M.8 .. Saftal1 :17/5/17, :ronda Ole.noea. ·6N ,200 .. 
(4) c18.lfRprie to ltar.I.Ue .. 20/'5/17, ltar.I.Ue HSS, Vol. 3. 
(5) .. e, tor aump;J.e,. J. de P:l.~teu to P8l120/3/17 t Palll MBS 4431. 
(6) HI~i:z:: li'981le at NnJrew pp 41-6. 
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since it would be difficult for him to oooperate with Jof:f're's successor, 
General Ni velle. Might not Painlevl deoide to bring back Sarrail to replace 
the oommander-in-chief, himself newly installed ?(l) Bine ministers in the 
new government were desisDated to fora an imler War Cabinet, suoh as had been 
created in EDgland. The Badioal-Socialiat Minister of the Interior, Louis 
Mal vy, was not original~ in .... otuded in this group, but took his place wi thin 
a matter of day's tollowiq a proteat by bis pa.r1;J"a hi.rar~. This was an 
immediate indioation ot the strength ot the Sarrail faction in the new 
adminis~tion. (2) " 
Bot aurprisiDgly I&rrail was ovarjo;red to be placed under Paiulevl' a 
ordera. (3) He immediately made k:Down his wililh to be oreated Kajor General 
ot the :&'l.wlob Armies. He needed a wider aoope for bis activities than that 
provided by Salonioa which bad proved a veri table burial ground for his 
JDilita..'r7 ambition. (4) Of neoeliaiv, hOI ever , Painlevl oould Dot tully 
satisty Sarrailts desires. The pneral was intomed that Painlevl did not 
rule out the possibiliV of his retum to Franoe, but that this would have 
to oome later when Painlevl vas strong enough to impose his will. (5) Sarrail, 
therefore, should not oreate difficulties, but wait rather for the great 
role whioh would eventually tall to him. (6) In fact Painlevl would never, 
even as Prime Hinister, have nffioient parliamen'ta:ry strength to efteot; 
so oontroversial a oban., in the BiBb Comand. (7) 
The end of the :Briand; soveJ:HInt iDevitably lmouPt about oballps at 
the Quai dt Oraa7, the moat iIlportant of which vu tba, efteottn exolusion 
of Philippe Bertbalot troll 'Wile hisber direotion of po11q. Although :Berthelot 
reta1ned IlQII:f nal autbori1;,y b1a oharaoteriatio aiaD&1nIre 1.8 aissing fram the 
draft despatches of the Ribot adminiatration. '!be .. nator ~ra:rd urged that 
(1) P. Oaaboll to B. OUbon20/3/11 ,Cubolll CorzespndaDoe, Vol. 3, p 153. 
(2) lfameixl Bivalle .t lIM".ft, p 39. 
(3) sazraU to Painlm' 22/,/1.1, Ja1aleT4 ISS, 313 AP 110. 
(4) Sar.Nil to Deoaia 21/}/17, Poa.Q, Cl_lloeau, 6N 200. 
(5) When Pa.1DlIrr4 preue. tM -.cUIIh COftma.nt to iIlatra.ct tilne to 
partioipate ill Sarmil!a April ottenaive, Herb1110n bepn to wonder 
wbether the tilt1J11a:te aD .. not, b7 ellB1lr1tlg a lIUOo .. a tor Sarra11, 
to . build hia up ~ ...... ~;_te.t that he. could be reoalled to an 
elevated poat in :ranoa: -~1cJ1e .. glnlraJ.1asime na paNttr&1t 
peut-ttre plu abaU:r:U Illora-. @erb1110n: OPe oit., Vol. 2, P 63J 
(6) Decrais to S&rrail 18/4/17, JIonda Cl_nceau, 65 200. 
(1) :Bertie noteel of Painlml .. ia o~, intellipnt and speaks well, 
but ~ has not auttioieut grit-. ~: Vol. 2, P 149J 
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!erthelot, as the man who had accused Sa;rra,il of failing adequately 
to support the Roumanians, should be expelled from the Foreign M:l.nistry': 
''Fai tes dono justioe de ce mislrable, dont les agissements dans les 
arfaires balkaniquss ••• ont Itl si profon~nt Oriminals".(l) Close 
links between the Berthelot and PainleV'l families were perhaps responsible 
for avoiding so extrema a solution, (2) bu.t Cambon feared that :Berthelot 
might use his control of the Hi,ison de 180 PraSSR to launch a oampaign against 
Ribot, sinoe, having been all-powerful at the ~i d'Oraay, :Berthelot was 
unlikelY' to relish being reduced to impOtence. (:~) As :Briand's man, :Berthelot 
recognised that he would be an objeot of hostility in the new government, (4) 
but when Ribot used Jules Cambon to offer Berthelot a diromatio post 
abroad. to eaae his embarrassment, the latter declined. (5 
The reorganisation at the Quai d'Oras, inevitablY' manifested itself 
in the Greek and Salonioa polioies of the new government. Reviewing the 
ohanged si wation for the Bri tiBh sovernmant, Harold Nicolson suggested 
that, atter the personal attaoka to which Briand had been subjected, Ribotes 
policies were not lLkely to err on the side of leniency. (6) He deolared 
that the new French govermaent was "dete1'Dlin8d to support an active policy 
in Greece and that the rather intemittentoheok whioh we have hitherto 
been able to ,lace upon General Sarrail.s ambition will now be removed". (1) 
Robert Cecil oonoluded that the Ribot cabinet was more atraid of Sar:rsil than 
ita predecessor bad been.(8) ODe immediate etfect was felt in tba field 
of censorship where i teDII of news of a. nature to weaken the G1'8ek royalist 
gove1'tlJlltllt, which had been stopped under ¥and, were now allowed to 
appear. (9) Fontana, voiced the hopes of French &pnts on the spot in 
tzwating that French cl1p1.ouatio activity vould no lODger be determined by 
the personal feelingsdf the Prime Minister and that the unholY' allianoe 
(1) Blrard to Painlew 3/4/17. Painlev4 JIBS, 313 AP 94. 
(2) Conversation with H. Daniel Lrmglois-:Berthelot, 4/5/73. 
(3) P. Oambon to z. c.aboD 24/3/11, Jul •• Oambon MSS, Vol. 1. 
(4) Berthelot to :Atll' 1/5/17, Pall'MSS, 4435. 
(5) Berthelot to Ribot 6/6/11 , Berthelot NBS. 
(6) Nioolson IfamolW141lll OIl the Creek Situation, 2/4117, F.O. 311/2884/82365. 
(1) H1nute on lIeriia tokLtour 30/3/11, ]'.0. 311/2865/61185. 
(8) Kinuteon 1bi4, :&aUCNr BSS, 1'.0. 800/202. 
(9) Bote .bI' .fUlea 0aalJ0n 25/3/17, .A.. 11. IQuerz.oet , Vol. 290. 
229. 
of Briand and the courts of London and St. Petersburg would not be able 
further to shield the Greek monarchy from its just deserts. (1) Jules 
Cambon gave sarrail to understand that he would face fewer obstacles to the 
pursuance of a forceful policy than in the past,(2) but his brother Paul 
was not impressed by what he saw of the first weeks of Ribot's 'new' 
policy. This seemed to be governed above all by the desire to be as 
different as possible from l3riand in order to curry favour. The visions 
of the new government were, he feared, restricted to the corridors of the 
parliamentary chamber. (3) It was, Cambon urged, only these parliamentary 
considerations together with his fear of PBb1e~ which finally induced 
Ribot by the early summer of 1917 to agree to the deposition of King 
Constantine. (4) 
The niceties of Ribot's motivation were probably of little concern to 
Sarrail. The fact remained that this government and its suocessor, in 
whioh Painlev6 himself became Prime Minister, represented the high summer 
of ~i1ts command and the period in whioh he had least to f'ear from his 
opponents. After returning from an inspeotion at Salonica, the deputy 
Lagrossi11i~re confided to the Chamber at the end of March his hope that at 
long last Franoe had a government which would 'treat Sarrai1 fairly and 
recognise tha importanoe of the Balkan theatre of war. At all events 
perhaps the systematio starvation of the Arm6e d'Orient in men and 
munitions would be ended. (5) Not surprisingly Fainle~ proved the most 
sympathetic to Sarrai1 of the War Ministers who occupied the rue St. Dominique 
in the oourse of the Salonica expedition. Decrais reported that Painlew's 
attitude towards the Arm6e d'Orient was exollent, that he would provide 
the maximum possible supplies for the BJ:my and indeed that the generaJ.. had 
a true friend in the new Minister of War. (6) The Comit6 de Guerre meeting 
on 28 Maroh decided that, although the full extent of Sarrai1's demands 
could not be satisfied because of insuffioient resources wi thin France, an 
effort would be made in favour of the Am6e d'Orient involving the despatch 
of a further 15,000 men before the middle of May. (7) 
(1) de Fontanay' to :Bourgeois 23/3/17, :Bourgeois MSS, Vol. 8. 
(2) Deorais to Sa:rrail 2/4/17, Fonds C1emenoeau.'Qf 200. 
(3) P. Cambon to X. Cha:rlnes 3/5/17, Cambon: Correspondance, Vol. 3, P 166. 
(4) P. Cambon to J. Cambon 10/6/17, Jules Cambon MSS, Vol. 1. 
(5) Report presented 30/3/17, 16N 3139. 
(6) Decrais to Sarrai1 22/4/17, Fonds C1emenceau, 6N 200. 
(7) G.Q.G., T.O.E. Note pour l'Etat~jor de l'~e, 31/3/17, 16N 3017. 
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.As far as policy towards G1'gece was ooncerned, Painlew's greatest 
wish was to remain in oomplete agreement with Sarrail - the latter's 
feelings would guide and fortify' his own conviction. (1) Whenever Sarra.il 
was under attack, as for example following a tour of inspection by the 
~ health and lIanitation group of deputies, Painlew would leap to his 
defence,(2) while at interallied conf81'9nCeS France's allies found an 
implacable opponent to any diminution of the .bmIe cilOrient or of the 
authority' of its CQlllll8Dder. (3) The EDglish War cabinet might insist upon 
S&rrail's 1'9eall, 'ba.t Pa.inlew would find excuses to postpone the issue 
and ultimately' to ignore it. (4) A.part from his official C()1Dl!JQZlioations with 
S&rrail through the Hinistr.Y' of War, Painleft employed Commandant Decrais, 
who had been SaJ:oraiI'. liaison of'ticer with lqautey, to convey his more 
personal thoUBhts to Salonica. This semi-private channel of communication 
was a great source of satllfaction to Painlew, (5) but was to prove an 
embarrassment to himself and to Sarrail, since the boq of their corres-
pondence fell into the hands of C1emenoeau, when the latter took office in 
N'oV8lD'ber. A new position in tbe .ArmIe dlOrient was also found for Pa.ul. 
Fleurot, who had been such a useful _ans of cODIIlImj cation when Painlew 
had occupied only a minor poat under :Briand. (6) Thus the French government 
came incnuiDg17 to be dominated b7 the political. views of the group 
whioh S£rail himself zepreaented, and Denp Coohin, the only right-of-
centre member ot tba 111bet cabinet, wrote ciellpa.iring:q of the end of the 
Sacred Union in J'J!w1oe. (7) Ironioal.q, however, Sarrailts poSition was 
less .. cure than it aeemacl and both he and l?ainlew W81'9 soon to be swept 
awq in the wake of the poli tioal soandALs which rocked both France and her 
war effort in the autumn of 1917. 
Inevi tably Pa.inleft vas not the oomplete master of the situation as 
long as tibot remained premier. When, however, in September 1917, 
Painleft formed his ow. JIIiD1s'27 it wu to prove the weakest in the history 
of wartiae France and the onl7 one which fell as a direot result of an 
adverse vote in the Chamber of Deputies. Painlew's ohief difficulty 
derived from theUDViU1".". •• of the. SociaJ.ista within the cabinet to 
(l)Deoraia to Saft&U4/6/17, J'onc1sClaan088l1, 6B 200. 
(2) ibid 1/7/17,i'ti14. 
(~) ibid 27/9/17, 1bi4~ 
(4) Bote by :Bertie of oouvea&t1on with Sir H. WUson 24/6/17, :Bertie MSS, 
1'.0. 800/169/h/17/51 • 
(5) Decra1a to Sarrai1 19/4/17, Fonds Ole.noeau, 6N 200. 
(6) ibid 17/5/17, ibid. 
(7) Coohin to Ribot 27/7/17, Deloaaa4 ES, Vol. 6. 
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serve in a govarnment in whioh Ribot reWned the portfolio of foreign 
atfairs. (1) Painleft himself appeared verJ' much under theintluenoe of 
his Minister of State, Franklin Bouillon, who tended 1;0 1i:t'eat the new 
premier as if it were in tact he who headed the govemment. (2) Albert 
Thomas suggested that Painleft was fearf'ul of having anyone hostile to 
Sarrail in an important position and found this a sad CODllllentary on the 
poli tical si iiuaticn in t1lIIt of ~. (3) Even the eventual rew.acement of 
Ribot by :Ba.rthou at the Quai d t OrB&7 failed significantq to improve 
Painlewts standing and, as the weeks passed, his parliamentary majority 
fell and discussion as 1;0 his successor grew ever louder. lIut the mole 
posi tion of the goverDD8nt was undemined by the series ot scandals which 
broke whilst Ribot was still Prime Minister. 
While in Imldon for an allied. oonference tibot moeiftd an 11rsent 
despatch from the Minister of, JustiN, Vivi&Di, iafoming him that a 
series ot oonfidential. doOUll8nta and priV&te letters relationg 1;0 the 
Salonica Oampaip had been fo.unc1 in the eate of the spy .AlJaeyreda. (4) 
Presid.ent Poincm 1.ami; tbat ~cJa had :r:eoeived the documents from. 
an offioer ot Sa.1:zail's heUta1:_. stat!, who had Sarrailts authenaation 
1;0 band them over in order to ,ezeate a patritt10 capaisn in favour ot the 
Salonio& expeditiea.l&t'railwas,. however, apparently not implicated in 
the second s~ of the process, by which the dcoumentshad paased into 
enelQ' hands. (5) A.l.-,-rec1a bad.cClllllmioated a report, in which Sa.ftail had 
described the state ot the ~ d'Orient in the darkest oolcnu:&, to agents 
of the Gexman goverDlBlt, who,,~ 081181;0 know of the we&1cnesa of the 
MJp,oedonian force. Bad ,tba 81'ltNQ' been in a position to act upon this mow-
le,dge, the :Balkan .C'UIIp&'i.&n lIisht ~ve ended diaaatroU8~. The pieoes found 
in Almeyreda1s safe, which a1.~ ~ted b:om1916, inoluded a telegram from 
Joffre to Sarrail concerning the date ,and oonditions of offensive operations, 
. . l .~ . 
a telegft1ll fItOJI. Gtaillainto ~il,aeuding Briand's 1l;l8tmotiona, & 
private letter from Sazorail' to ~ roulens, (6) tomarlti.n1ater of Wu 
(l) Deora18"-tg" ~i~791i7 ~.~ Cl..enoeau, 611' 2()(j'.·' 
(2) P. C&mbon to J.OaboD. 18/3.0/17, Jules Cambon ES, Vol. 1. Paul Oambon 
was not DiU-.' by PII.i~.T1 or P.ranklin »CuiJ.lon and wrote of noes 
deux laannetolll, .JkRmd,...,ta ~'.1apuj.aaanta". Ir. Oambon to x. Oba1'mes, 
, , 21/11/17, ~bonl~l&J¥lan08, Vol. 3, p 199J 
(3) 11ndated note bT~, ~ 'MSS, 94AP 356. 
(4) Vivi&Di to R1~' ~/8~~i.\J..: ~ .. IGurrel', Vol. 1043. 
(5) Poinoarl: OPe oit., Vol. 9, p 231. 
(6) J.. PaJ..-r OPe cit., P 161 incorreotly suggests that this letter was 
addressed to Gene1'8l llocl-a. 
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and at the time of the discovery ambassador in St. Petersburg, and·· several 
letters from a Captain Mathieu in Sa.rmil's gemral statf to his friend, 
Paix~ailles, in Paris, who, interestingly enough, was a secretary of Paul 
Pa.i.nlevtf. In these lette11fMathieu sought to demonstrate the way in which 
Sarra1l was being persecuted by both Joffre and Briand. He pointed out 
that the effective size of the ~e d'Orient was nothing like as large as 
Joffre was suggesting, that the Ebglish General Mahon had been replaced because 
he got on too well with Sarra1l, that Erland was trying to create difficulties 
by inventing stories about Sarrai1's political activities and that evidently 
the government and high command were determined to destroy '"hll.m(l): 
"1e but cberc~ est de mettre Sarrail dans 1'impossibilittf de faire quoi 
que ce soi t et de crier ensui te l. l'incapaoi t4; quant au pays on s. en f ••• 
et voill. ... (2) Among the politioians whom Paix-slailles was instructed to 
contact in order that they mieht use their influence to counteract the 
hostili ty and distortions of Joffre and Briand were Caillau:x: and Painlew. 
A simila;r motive und.erl8\Y SRrail's letter to Noulens, who, at the date of 
the letter, was ~sid.ent of the Chamber .A:I:rq CODIIDission and a prominent 
figure in the Radioal-Sodist gt'Oup. In this SUrail stressed that he 
oould not tolerate bei1 made the slave of the Greek court and the valet of 
the English government. 3) 
The arrest of Almeyreda proved an. ilaediate eJllba.r.rassment to Painlew 
and he saw in it an attempt to cause cU.t'"tioulties for him over bis relation-
ship with Sarrail. (4) In the war OODD1ttee on 28 Ausust he went to great 
pains to StreBS that there was no direct link between ~l and 
.AJ.meyreda and that the blame obviously l~ only with the officer who had 
sent the documents from Salonica, that ls, Captain Mathieu. (5) DeCra1s 
kept Sarrai1 in olose touch vi th the de~loPll8n'b of the scandal in Paris. 
lie oounse1Jsd caution in a delicate Situation, (6) and wamed that the 
matter would become serious If Paix-s&ai11es and Mathieu were brought to 
trial. If they were not ~.d, Deorais believed that Sa.rra.il would be 
- .. ~ 
(1) Mathieu to Paix-slai11e. 10/5/16, Painleft MBS, 313 AP 56. 
(2) ibid 3/5/16, ibid, 313 JP ll8. 
(3) Sa;noai1 to !foulelUl 15/6/1', i~dt 313 J.P 110. 
(4) A. Ribot: Jggep.a1, p :193. 
(5) R. Poin0ar4: OPe -oit., "01.9, pp 251-8. 
(6) Decrais to Sar.ra11 28/8/11 ,:tonds C1emenoeau, 65 200. 
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required to cover Mathieu or to mete out disoiplina.ry punishment to him. At 
all events the parliament&:ry situation was grave and the poSition of the 
governmen tori tical. Decrais had heard that the i.sue would be used 
against Painlew and Sarrail by' their enemies. (1) Under pressure from 
Painlew the government repeatedly put oft a deoision on the matter, (2) 
but by early october Painl-evl did not think it would be POssible to delay 
judicial proceedings aeainst the "0 men IIII10h longer. (3) Sarrail seemed less 
aware of the gravity of the Situation and wrote that it would be unjust 
and clumsy to punish Mathieu. The seneral did not wish to do ~thing 
which ouuld give the impression that he in the least regretted the letter 
he bad sent to Noulens. (4) He was "oOllij)lt.tament indiff'rentlt to the whole 
affair and suggested that his enemies would have to find a more effeotive 
stick with which to 'beat him. (5) B,y the beginning of November, however, 
suoh accusations were being bandied about in the pr'8ss that the government 
had no alternative but to briDg Paix-s4ailles to trial under the espionage 
law of 1886.(6) . 
Despite Sarra:11 t s appa:rent lack of concern thare oan be no doubt that 
it was the delay and-besitationYhioh cha.moter:l.s.a Painlerils whole 
handling of the incident, top1iber with hie aimilar reluctance to act upon 
the oharges being made at _ ... tiM against Caillawt and the former 
Minister of the Interior, Halv,-, tbat 8UOoesaively decimated his parliamen-
tary majority. The feeling wu gaining ground that the whole administration 
was riddled with corruption aild 1ibat onl.7 a complete overbaul of the 
government could restore ita tarnished reputation. '!he famous CaUlawe 
dossier contained a pllZl tor the appo1nt.nt of General Sarrail as 
Commander-in-cntef of the J'ftnCh &:alT. (1) . 'lhe appoiatment was apparently 
to be mad.e atter a coup d'4'ta:t which Call1aux was contemplating. The 
saviour fetched back twa- the Bast Wall· to play :Botl&ll£te to Caillaux t s 
Sie18s. Even it Sai.."zal1hiMell bad; no knowled&e of thia scheme, the are 
fact that hia nama &PP8&1."8d IUIMlDg the persons in whom Cail1aux had confidenoe 
made a ve:ry bad 1aPl'*llSiOll. !lie prae1'8l di4 shoW & _aaure of anxiety when 
(1) Deoraia to ~1.a/lQ/l1,:ronda ·CI8DI8Uceau 6N 200. 
(2) Sometime atter 20 Bel\t8aber Paiulevl wrote to the Military Governor of 
Paris, ItJI.st. qutu ut • pas lieu, en It'tat, dtouvrir une infomation 
oontre le. capi taine .lfatbieu at oontre Ie sergent Paix-s4ailles:' 
Painlevl to 1f1l111ar1 Go1'erllO&', UDdatecl, Pa1nlevl MSS, ~13 A:P 118. A. 
PaJ,mer . OPe 01 t,., P ~~1 ,:po.sly miSinterprets the whole affair, 
suggesting that "Ribot and Painlevl insisted on an enquiry". 
3 Decra1s to Sa;rn.i1 9/10/11, Fonds Clemeneeau 6N 200. 
4 Sarrai1 to Decraia 1;/10/11, Painlev4 MSS, 31~ A:P 105. 
5 ibid 9/10/17, Foncla C1emenoeau, 6N 200. 
6 Deorais to 8&n.'ail 7/1l/~1,'PoniJ.sClemenceau, 6N 200. 
1 G. Bonnefousl maW¥! loling. de 1& Troisi_ R'publig, Vol. 2, 
(1951), p ~70. 
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he wrote privately to Painleve to express his hope that, whatever else 
happened, the latter would remain Minister of War. For the Armee d'Orient 
° . °t (1) B t S il' . h th1s was a neceSS1 y. u arra s p10US opes could not refurbish 
Painleve's parliamentary standing, and on 13 November, finding himself 
in a minority in the Chamber, he handed in his resignation to Poincare.(2) 
With Painleve's fall from power the whole question of Sarrail's retention 
of the army command at Salonica would be raised with new intensity. 
The question remains, however, of why Painleve had been so inept in his 
handling of the Almeyreda affair. The answer would seem to lie in his own 
involvement in the matter and his consequent fear of what the opening of 
judicial proceedings might do to his political career. There seems no 
doubt that Painleve had received copies of many of the documents found 
in Almeyreda's safe, including the letter to Noulens, at the time they 
were first sent to Paris in the early summer of 1916. He was after 
all, according to the letters themselves, one of the politicians on whom 
Sarrail and his supporters were counting to offset the attacks of the 
government and high command, and his tireless efforts in this direction 
have already been examined. The speech which Painleve prepared for the 
trial of Louis Mal vy before the High Court in July 1918 ingenuously linli ted 
the scope of the correspondence involved to a simple exchange between 
Mathieu and Paix-Seailles. (3) He conceded that the documents had been 
passed on to "quelques hommes poli tiques", but made no mention of his own 
involvement. In fact what was really at stake was a political campaign 
against Briand and Joffre in which both Painleve and Sarrail were deeply 
committed. (4) The confidential information contained in the despatches 
and letters argued strongly against the assumption of any offensive 
operations in the Balkans. It was all designed to show how the government 
had deprived the Armee d'Orient of all possibility of meaningful action. 
Moreover, Painleve's part in the affair was all the more irregular in that 
(1) Sarrail to Painleve 15/11/17, Painleve MSS, 313 AP 110. 
(2) c.f. Lloyd George: War MaDoirs, Vol. 5, p 2673: "What he [Painleve] 
lacked was the manoeuvring Skill and the force necessary to convert 
his ideas into the action which sweeps aside obstacles, cuts through 
entanglements, and bears down the intrigues of parliamentary and 
mili tary cliques". 
(3) Project of speech 20/7/18, Painleve MSS, 313 AP 117. 
(4) c.f. Villari: OPe cit., p 188. 
he had at the time been a oabinet minister in the Briand government. He 
must also have been fearfUl. lest disolosures from the Paix-s4ailles affair 
unoovered the whole of his clandestine correspond enoe with Sarrail 
oonduoted throUBh Fleurot and :Bourguignon. Herein, after all, he had 
provided Sarrail with confidential information about meetings of the 
Counoil of Ministers and cpenly' revealed that he bad worked to thwart 
the intentions of the majority of his oolleagues, inoluding the Prime 
Kinister. Unlike men such as Call1aux, who oould olaim to owe no loyalty 
to the administration other than that imposed by the state of war, 
. 
Painlevf bad been work:i.ng to undermine the authori V over an ~ cOJllDatlder 
of a government of which he vas a member. Whateftr the justice of the 
cause, sucb disolosures could only have had a disastrous impact upon 
Painlevfta politioal future.(l) 
Wi th the accession to power of Georeea Olemenoeau in the middle of 
November 1917, the possibility tbBt the oombination of allied pr8ssure(2) 
and the weigbt of opinion wi thin Pranoe JDiBht lead to the recall of Sarrail 
became real for the first time ain08 Painlevl had &l:'rived at the rue St. 
Dominique in the preceding K&rob. Sarrail's oontacts with Clemence au 
had been frigid even before the Salonica expedition. In 1911 Clemenoeau 
bad split with the Radical Socialists, accusing Caillaux of seeldng to 
appease GeJ::Dl&ll1'. His attituje towards 8.Il1' of Caillauxts associates was 
ineVitably ooloured by 'this basio political antipa~. When, upon 
receipt of a letter frGm Lloyd Georee, Clemanoeau brought up the question 
of Sarrailts replacement at the Council meeting of 27 November, one of the 
grievances raised against the eeneral was bis se~ret correspondence with 
Decrais. (3) This bad oome into Clemenoeau's bands when he took over the 
War Ministr,y from Painleft and bad of course revealed the poli tioal 
8mbi tion of Sarrail and bis diacussions with Painlevf regarding a future 
mili tary appointment at a time when Painlevf did not even bold ministerial 
offioe. Not surprisingly, tberefore, at the Cabinet de Guerre meeting 
on 6 December, Sarrailts di._al and replacement by' Gelleral Guillaumat 
(1) On 19 December Cl&a8D08&11irlt0ZD84Po!-.ft that Painlew would like 
the Paix-slail1es affair stopped. Clemenceau indicated that the 
situation oould beoolDl dif'ficult for the ex-pr8mier. ~inoar~: 
OPe oit., Vol. 9, P 4211 
(2) see above, pp 206-9. 






was decided upon. For his political associates and admirers S&1:r&il's 
recall was inevitably a shati8r1Dg blow. Leooq consoled himself with the 
thought that nil reste pour le ~ et pour son parti una force et une 
force 1 peu ~s intaoten , and that he returned to France with his stature 
increased. (1) In tact, however, Sa.1::toail t s ~time O&Ner was effectively 
over and, the dream. of the Radical Socialists rw1ely ended. The tim govern-
ment of' Clemenceau soon produced such aubatantiaJ. majorities in the 
Chamber that Sarrail's r~l never provoked the pa.rliamen'fia.ry eruptions, 
which it had al~ been UIIWDBd it would do under weaker administrations. 
The new premier handled what was potential17 an explosive situation with 
consumate skill. On 11 December he f'orwarded to the Chamber a report on 
the treasonable activities ot SRrailts associate, C&1llaux. In the next 
f'ortnight the case against the Badical Socialist leader grew blacker and 
blacker. He was found to have sent bImcJreds of' letters to men who hadilDm.ed 
out to be German &puts. When tbe warrant was iSBU8d for Caillaux's 
arrest on 13 JanU8.1'7, ~l W88 judioious17 at home in Montauban. His 
c1ayB of' political intrigue vere over~ :aut the removal of' Sarrail did at 
least open up the posllibiliV that the SalOD1oa exp.d1tiOn might emerge tor 
the first time as a seri~ mil! ~ proPOsition." , i,li tic&l. intrigues 
.r, - '" ", ' 
misht gi va ~ to pnuiDe mii ta.l:7 action - the s~es ~unding 
. .' ','t . _ ".,' < '. .. <'" ' 
persoDlLli ties to the serioUS _iDe •• ~t ":inni»c, tbe, war. In J.u&ust Sir 
William Robertson bad stated bt aSalontoa ia a bad case and baa been so 
£rom the .tart". He argaed tbLt'ait had been like' ~'mill8~ round our 
neck ••• and will be till tb8~lend"~ the' ~~(!), Sarrail'. successor 
had at least the cbance to ptrOft hill ftoDg • 
. ~] 
, .,.' ~. 
(i) IAtooq 1;o~~~.,~~fV~;':~!'~~i~t ;l~ ..:; l~. , 
(2) Robertson to ~,l/~717. Jl~~~ ~t 1/32/65 • 
. ' ' ,..., '~ ..... , ~ ", . .,r" "'1' • " >~;. --
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1JnderJ.ling moti vas 
The close interaction between ]Tench domestic politics and the developing 
course of the salonic. campatgn and its associated problem of policy towards 
Greece has already been examined at length.(l) That military considerations 
and in particular the hope that the expedition might have a material effect 
on the defeat of the Central Powers, played only a secondary role has become 
eVident. yet the q,uestion 1IU8t inevitably be asked whether the pressure of 
internal political affaira is alone sufficient to explain the fervour with 
which sections of FrenCh political society and most of the leading asents 
involved in the campa1gn championed and justified its continuation. France, 
after all, waa not in a position where aha could afford to deplol' her military 
resources indiscriminately. The paradox must be faced that for three years 
France maintained a large armJ in the Balkans, the militarr activity of which 
wasseverall' limited, until the last few months of the war, in both scope 
and effect, while at the same time any of her national provinoes were under 
constant enell}" oocupation and when German loroe. were within striking distance 
of Paris. Half of France's coalfields and the iron ore of Briey and LoJl8V1 
had fallen into the clutches ol Germany toptlwr with a big proportion of 
her industrial power. There exists there lore ~ possibility that the origins 
of French enthusiasm lor the salonica campaip go aeeper than the struggles 
wi thin the corridors of the parliament817 ohaaber. 
Certainly British observers gradually came to the conolusion that some 
sinister terri tonal. stratesio or eoonOll1o IlOtivation must underlie French 
persistence in the campaign. But as often as not their auapicions vera ill-
detined and based more on instinct than ooncrete evidence. TJpically 
Robertson had tel t since the besinniq of the upedi tion that there was 
"something behind the !'rench aiDd in reprd to their policl' in that part of 
the. worldn • What it vaa he had neTer been able to discover. (2) but he had 
learnt that there vas "a great aeal ot J'inaa.oe as well as Poli tios mixed up 
in this FrenCh enterpri.e". which explained whT the JlrenCh would not think 
of oOlling aW&J rroa salolUoa it the, oould help it. (3) Xoreover he believed 
that :P.ran08 and lta17 had "oonlliotiDg at. in that part ot the world" and 
(1) see.boTe, 'cbapten' · .... ··8 •.... ' .... - " . . . . .. ..". .. 
(2) Robertson to Jallwr 26/8/1'. Jk)Dazot8011 JIBS 1/"5/5. 







that they refnsed to make concessions "for reaoDS other than those they 
give". (1) Similarly Lord Hardinge did not "quite know wbat the Frenoh were 
up to in Greeoe". But it appeared that theymd S01l8 "ulterior objeot in 
view" whioh was perhaps the aspiration to "a sort of position of eventual 
proteotor of Greeoe in the Eastern Hediterranean-.(2) As Robert Ceoil told 
his oolleagues in the Daperial War Cabinet in Kay 19i 1, there seemed to be 
" a seotion in Franoe which aimed at utilis~ the war in order to seoure 
for Franoe some speoial political or financial position in Greeoe". It 
appeared as 1£ the:e had been a real umdlliD8l1ess to restore peaoe and harmony 
in Greek affairs and wbenever there had seemed to be an opportunity of 
. getting things back on a better plain it had s01Mhow been prevented. (3) Both 
the vagueness of Cecills oharge and the uncertainty with whioh it was d1reoted 
merl t attention. by renect the inadequate understanding with which 
Engliabmen viewed the French poli tioal struoture in the oourse of the war. 
No one was really sure where the direction or French policy lay_ Even as 
lat~ as July 1918 Maurice Bankey could only coafide to his diary that 
"t))axe are and always have been subtle influences, pos.ibly of a financial 
oharaoter, behind the !rench attitude toward. the salonica expedition. n (4) 
Reviewing the probl.. tor the cabinet C0181 ttee on War Polioy in the 
8U111118r of 1911 Lord Kilner ~eterred to shift the e1 •• nt at unoertainty 
on to the French theaaelves. Be oonoeded that they were "pla71ng a game of 
their own", but did not believ. that they ·the ... l..,..s qruite knew what they 
wanted, except to exeroise a predominant infll18nce in ~eoe and to get aome 
economio advantage out of it· in the future. '!'he policy was one of "indefinite 
grab" and Milner thought that Sarrau was the living e.bod1llent of it, 
being only inters. ted in -Soheael of future exploitation". (5) ]'rom Salonica 
itself General Milne also fooualed attentioa on Sarrail and augsested that he 
was doing all he oould tor French interests in the Bear-Bast atter the war. (6) 
As Milner informed the Illperial War oabiraet the French polioy was n a bad,_ Dne 
and one'whose obJeot val 10010."(1) T.bil emphasis on a finanoial motive was 
oonfirmed by obs.rvers 011 the s»ot, who vere also able to give greater 
(1) Robertson -to 'Konro ·1/8/17.'llobertsOl1 'JBiI-l/32/19- . 
(2) Hardinge to :Bertie 10/10/16. :Bertie JISS,. :r.O. 8OO/112/Gr./16/'58. , 
(3) Imperial War Cabinet 2/'/17, CO 2'/40/1YC 14. 
(4) ~DkeYI OPe alt., Tol. 2, p 82l~ 
(5) Hemorandum by Lord Kilner 8/7/17, CAl 21/7/WP '5. Lloyd Geors- MSS, 
'g/38/2/ 20•· .. 
(6) Hilne to Robertlon 21/10/16, llobertaon IISS, 1/14/48. 
(7) Imperial War Cabinet 2/5/17 , c.u 2'/40/1WC 14. 
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pJ:ecision 1; ... .,llt;L: &;c;W:la"iOllD. Milne reported that S&rra.il paid little 
attention to the military .tront but was giving a good-deal to Greece. The 
French wanted to occupy Thessaly, a base more cOJDlllercial than military in 
it s uses, to secure a certa.:i.n outlet for French trade. French cOlloern with 
the post-war world was evidently galling to the :British military commander, 
who argued that it was costing Britain a good dea.l in men, money and material 
with no compensatory advantages. to get Greek affa,irs entirely into French 
hands with a view to French supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Milne 
wondered how long the process of being made a catspaw was going t.o go on. 
Be would have no objection to these French activities if they ended the war, 
but in fact they seemed to have little effect on the main issues. (1) 
Similarly Jlfred Stead (2) considered that the Franch were out for .financitll 
and economic control of the Balkans after the war and that Sarra,i1 paid far 
more attantion to attaining this end than to prosecuting the war. But like 
Milner he argued that there was "no finality and no definition to be found 
in the French idea". (:~) ~ 
Even King George voiced concern about what was going on and was informed 
by Balfour1hat "the Italians suspect the French 8Zld the French suspect the 
Italians of entertailling schemes (vague perhaps but not negligible) which 
will enable them respectively to use Greece as a pawn in the game of rivalry 
which they are p1~g in the Bastern Hedi terranean". (4) For. personal and 
family reasons the English monarch was also worried·tbat France might int end 
to alter canp1etely the form of government in Greece. Bertie reported that, 
a1 though Sarra,i1 and SOlDe Frenchmen en the spot and a ffN ministers in the 
cabinet might desire a revolution, :Briand did not wish to upset the King with 
the view to setting up a repub1io, for he knew that it would quickly break 
up into several republics which would not suit French interests. (5) Bertie 
took . the fact that suspicions of this nature ccm.tinu.ed to exist as indicating 
that the aJ.g1ish Foreisn Office did not have muoh knowledge of the policy of 
Fr8nce.(6) 
(1) Milne to Robertson 28/1/17, :Balfour lES, 1'.0. 800/202. 
(2) .leD.C. to Mlmiral froubridp. 
(3) Stead to Lord llaDksboroush 11/5/17, Balfour .l§S, F.O. 800/202. 
(4) Bote by Balfour, 27/2/17, conoern:i.DB- a letter·.to Stamfordham. CAB 
. 24/6/Gf ~." .. _. 
(5) Bertie· to Grey 5/10/16, Bertie H3S. 1'.0. 8OO/l72/Gr/16/36. 
(6) Bertie. DiS'l, Vo1.-2. P 23. 
"'.',' ,-
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One very olear opini01'l of b loa.g term. a1ms of Frenoh diplomacy in the 
Jlaatern Mediterranean vas antlmsiast:Lcally' conveyed to the Foreign Office 
in Maroh 1917 by Sir Francis Elliot from the Rri tuh Intelligence Offioer 
in Greece, ComptOll MackellZie •. Searchirla for the Frenah rationale Mackenzie 
IU"l'lecl(l) tbat it was not surprising that when Gaeral Sa:rrad.l had secured. 
the aiiitary safev of Salon1ca and realised, aa h. JlWJt have realised in 
the face of UDiversaJ.4-hostile milrita.i7 opinion on the western front, the 
impossibility of a serious ad:nnce, the Frea.ch braiD. ahould have looked 
around for sOIIethillg to do. fhe reproacli often cut a.sa1nst Sa;rrail of being 
too politioal a general acoori.ed, Hlckenzie thouBht, with the .lazy lmglish 
wa;r or tJ:t!ldng that he was "up to SODletb1ngl', without trying to find out 
, . 
what it was, Tet it misht be assumed that tae whole of Sarra.i.l!s policy after 
the .Ji:Dglish re£uaal to ccmsider .. atlYance frca 8alon!ca had been dictated 
by nothing else but polit1calocmsidera1dons.'Sarra1l, however, had always 
been clever enough to Jll&8k French political aabltions under the plea of 
military necessity_ Thl'ou.p.outthe tortuous neaot1a~ with Greece the 
safev of the .t:ra4e cl~Qr1811t lied Il~ bec sa ... e for any action the 
French bad taken aud it vas otiq aGW be1agre&l.tati4 .. tb&t li'rench polioy in 
Qreece bad notb1ng waa'kt'8r to 4o".a.th the azwt!. ~"dl'eiftg. Yet even now, 
to JfIIckenzie!s irritaUon, the explartation of :ft;ench pol1q in the Nea.r-.Bast 
vas either t8&t lal'raU, .. a ..... ·of til.e c.,....olal. J)eraocratic ParV', 
,.~ . ~ 
was engineering a acheae t. :rr_cJa.~J" 1;0 ilB.keaoney, ·t11at his personal. 
41s1ike or K:lD8 Oems_tin. had \UlZ'eaaQlD&bl3' ooloareci his whole attitude, or 
even that he a:Uucl at a 1I1l1t11z7 cGupd'''tin haAce itself, after the 
• I" , 
avle or Boulanger. It ~ecl to 1). ~,""ed "that it was SlU"rail 
who was dictat.i.JlB th.·pol107 M4~, ,.it 8c'raU were remOTed, the .policy 
would chance. Haokeu:l..thOw ... ~",bel1_ed. theOQ11'trar7 vi., - that Sarrail 
vas wt the &pDt of h1a~""i!a .oh .... -, ~ 'be e9.uall7 possible. (2) 
, ,~ " '~":. I:', '" ,. 
Haokenzie a;rped ~1; ,.at1oai ~"A"'ot a ~t&1'-l'each:S.rl8 nature had 
been behiD.d ~e aaiTal of the I'r .. Gh'aaval. aiaatca 'uilder Commandant de 
lloque£eui1 in Jazma:q 191,,<3},:~.,,q as puJ.'U.8l7 Verd,zelos had 'been 
approached vi til a Ti_ .t4 .. , ..~t1iag a.~-!ol.U'1Q111a' Greeoe &Ad by April the 
occupa't1on or the oouat.:l7~W"_oh t~"had 'MeJl,.4er:1.n1tely envisaged. 
De RoquefCN11ta .. ~lt1oa ."'!.~"JIake oreece the haif'wq house to a Frenoh 
doainatlOD or~tb.WY-t~~:'4}:··_;_ti.on the hench Wished to take in 
'I', , 
Greece h84 been r .. il1ta~ii ~ -t""t.i.Weof-the Br1Bl1sh sovernment. which 
'. ·.4.~· .,~... ,',.~ '~.":"_..<; <.' ' 
, . ' ,f", , 
(1) x-orandwl b7 CGIIP"~tIa.~.~"'17l F.O. 37l/2865/flJ223. 
(2) c.r. c. MaobUZ1e •• ~I._-(19'9), p 75. 
(3) c.f. 1b14, PI 14--'."" .:, ~,,:'~',. . '. 
) Kaok_1.t op_ 8:1,.; 'J{j)6.,;:".:0;>i:':': 
:. I, ~. . '.:~ {~:~f:~~:f): .; ·~~~~?:.{i~:.,~'\}·~~~;.·' '~fi~~?~ ~~,~.~ ; 
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throughout 1916, steadily allowed them to take the lead. in every matter 
connected with Greek polit:i..cs. At that time, March 1917, the French were 
still persevering in their efforts to occupy Greece and the moment had cCllle, 
Mackenzie thought, to decide on British policy. The French now wished 
to occupy Greece as a means of interfering with Italian aspirations in the 
Near-East. Probably the reason w~ they hung on·so ardently to Salonica 
was their nervousness over $1ria. "Salonica was the expression of their 
aspirations in the Near-Bast". (1) It was, ltiLckenzie concl~ded, time to 
prevent BIlglish policy from "being made ~ longer the rubbing-rag of the 
ill-considered aspirations and unreasonable ambitions of two rival Latin 
nations. 
In Athens Jaliot was grea~ impressed with Mackanzie!s analysis of 
the situation and very much under his influence, although, -in arauing that 
Sarrail was dictating his own personal policy, he disasreed With the 
Intelligence Officer. (2) The preceding November, em Maokenzie!s inspiration, 
ae had alre~ warned' that· de Roquefeuilwould soon be returniBg from Paris 
with greatly increased powers to enable him to exeroise a practical 
sovereignty over Greece independent of the allied ministers. This, he had 
urged upon Grey, was symptomatio of the way in which France was determined 
to obtain camplete control ovett: Greece With a view to ~using 1le countr;r 
as a stepping stone between Marseilles and Syria. (3) Now, with the Foreilfl, 
Offioe in new hands, Blliot reiterated that,.the French.had a definite 
policy to bring Greece under their exolusive or at least predominant 
influenoe. (4) 
On the surface, at least, .Kackenzie!s report had a less ccmspiouOUB 
impact at the Foreign 9£!1ce. George Clerk felt it "worth reading", but 
rightly O<llllll8l1"ed thatlf&ekenzie lacked knowledge of-the general politioal 
posi tion of the llri tiah BOvermnent. (5) But the m_orandum would seem to 
have had SCDe effect on l'ore1sn Office thinking to judge from the reaction 
to a despatoh from Bertie later in the saae month, indicating that the 
recent fall of the Briand sovernment was likely to precipitate a stiffening 
(1) Mackenzie. OPe cit., p 66. 
(2) Blliot to .Mackeuie 7/3/17, F.O. 37l/2865/f:JJ223. 
(}) Klliot to Grq 18/11/16, 1.0. 37l/26;2/2}2768; Mackenziel OPe oi t., 
.pp 350-2. 
(4) Elliot to Balfour Ho. 537, 9/3/17, F.O. } 71/2876/5l5250 
(5) Minute on 1.0. 37l/2865/~223.·· 
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of French policy in Greece. Harold Nicolson argued that an early occasion 
should be taken to disouss with the French the essential objects of Allied 
policy in Greece and to discover what they were really aiming' at in the 
Near East. Discussions had previously been limited to the local problems of 
the moment, but Nicolson thought it was clear that the French regarded it 
as more than this and that Greece was to plq an. important role in their 
future Mediterranean polioy - a polioy to which, on Imperial gt"ounds, Britain 
could scarcely rElllain indifferent. The essential issue, he concluded,- was "are 
we or are we not going to allow Franee to assume a protectorate in Greece 
and the Eastern Hediterranea.n.?". Clerk showed even more olearly the im;pact 
of Mackenzie!s strictures. He~ar~ed that the time had come not only for a 
frank discussion with the Frenchpernment about Greece, but also for Britain, 
when met, as she would be, -b;y the old arauments about the safev of the 
Arm'e d 'Orient and the obvious bad faith of the Greek Government to inSist 
on oonczete proofs and to go further and s8\Y' that the question of Greece 
was vi tal to Britain and that she would no longer tolerate the lines of present 
French actionlJ (1) In fact Kacken.&ie!s anaJ.;ysis appears to have p,lqed a part 
in stiffening the will of the Foreip Offioe to make its last attempt to 
reassert British initiative in-the allied conduct of the Salonica campad.an 
and of policy in Greeoe.(2) 
(1) ~utes on Bertie to Balfour No. 290, ,0/3/17, F.O. '71/2865/67185. 
(2) With :Balfour absent in .arica, an extr_el7 loag despa'kh to Bertie was 
draft.ed in the Foreian Office b;y Harold Nioolson. Af'ter amen~ents by 
lfardinge and Ceoil, it was siped byihe latter. The despatch a.r~ed the 
urgent need of a frank and comprehensive disoussion-of the attitude to be 
8dopted towards Greece. laminal17 there was no iDdiotment of French 
policy as opposed to 1;hat pursued by the British government, ;y~t the 
whole tone of the tele ... was critical of French actions a.nd suspicious 
of 1i'.rench motives. It vas a.t"g\led that the aoticms and lanSUage of several 
of the French agents in Greece had raised the suspicion that an influential 
section of French opWon was 8ZlXi0Wl to utilise the present situation to 
secure for France seaething like & permanent protectorate over Greece. 
:Bertie, howwer, waa Biven no opportunit;y to 1SiY these observa.tions before 
the French Iovarnaent, for, on the intervention of lJ.oyd George, still 
pl¢ng the role of pardiim of the J'rench bod1' politic, the despatch was 
never sent. [Bratt of Cecil to Bertie, jprU/lilq i917, F.O. ,71/2878/ 
8'40,~ _ , _ _ '" . 
The suspicion which Mackenzie cast upon the role of de Roquefeuil in 
the fos tering of devious French plans would appear to have been misplaced. 
Ironically enough a matter of days before Mackenzie presented his analysis 
of the situation to Blliot the Quai d IOrs~ was hearing of the perfect 
collaboration which existed between the British officer and his French 
opposite number, Ricaud, de Roquefeuil's right-hand man.(l) De Roquefeuil's 
abrupt and impatient mann~,together with his conviction tha~ the defeat af 
the Gex-man enemy in the anomalous situation by which allied forces were 
occupying a neutral country imposed upon him an e.1most total disregard for the I 
susceptibilities of Greece, inevitably gaTe the ~pression that his policies were, 
directed as much with the neutral as the en~ state in mind. :But de I 
Roquefeuil genuinely regretted that his duties in counteracting- German 
propaganda and submarine activity sot him involved in inter.nal Greek politics. 
As he told tle French Minister of· the Marine this was an unlooked-for role 
which he had assumed with reluctance. (2) His actiOns, he stressed, were 
dominated by his original anti-German" mission but "les circonsta.nces du 
temps du suerre actuel er'ent des situations imprlw,es a\1%quelles i1 faut 
fa1re face avec discern_ant IIl&:i.s avec d~isiOl1". (3) But de Roquefeuil was 
not above attributing to the English the same aort of devious .designs of 
which he was accused by Mackenzie, as, for instance, when he reported to the 
MiniStry of Marine on the behaviour of the Brlgliah authorities in Orete and . 
Mitylene, which seemed to suggest the prep8Z'8.tions of a permanent occupation. (4) 
Macken.zie~s charge of French negotiations with Venizelos. at the beginning 
of 1916 to briBg about a Greek revolution remains, however, unanswered. In 
fact knowledge of such intrieue had been in the hands of at least one member 
of the British government over a year before Mackenzie produced his memorandum. 
Indeed Lord Kitchener appears to have decided that Frenoh enthusiasm for 
Salonioa masked more siniSter intentions long before any of his colleagues 
came to a similar oonolusion. On 21 Maroh 1916 he ~ster1ously informed the 
War Committee of his belief that the French were follOwing out part of a 
general scheme and were using the war ·for purposes of future expansion in the 
East(5), and a week later in conversation with Douglas Haig he suggested that 
(1) Note sur le8 Services de Renseisnem.ents 22/2/17. A.E. 'Guerre', Vol. 270. 
(2) de Roquefeuil-to Lacaze No. 163, 31/3/16, Marine arohives xf 4. 
(3) ibid No. 183, 7/4/16, xr 4. 
(4) ibid No. 26, 25/5/16, J. E. !Guerre!, Vol. 256. 
(5) CAB 42/ 11/ 6• 
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the French were aiming at the development of their dominions in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and would not now fight actively to beat the Germans in France. (1) 
The editor of Haigls papers, analysing this "remarkable conversation", has 
eoncluded that- "Kiiichener was vr~. The French re1'usal to withdraw their 
army from Balonica was based "neither 00 strategy nor a subtle foreign policy; 
it was based on the ch&racter~of General Sarra.:il ••• Therefore despite its 
normal reluctance to countenance Eastern diversions the French government was 
most unwilling to withdraw the army from Salonica in case such action would 
be interpreted as an attack on General San-ail". (2) In fact Kitchener was 
in all probability-lasing his analysis of-the sltUatioa not on-France's 
refusal to contemplate evacuation but on information he had receiVed-from 
Yarde Buller in Paris. In January and February the latter had reported on 
tle "Briand-Buonaparte intrigu.e" in Greece, which appeared designed to change 
the-ruling royal family in Athens. By the beginning of Fe'brua."q a new factor 
had uisen in the shape of a Russian- counter intrigu.e to-put up Prince Nicholas 
of Greece as an aspirant for the throne in the event of "a development of 
the revolutionary scheme". ya.ro.e-Buller considered that .. th!s might prove 
a "serious obstacle to Ma Briand's- aims". But he understood that Prince 
Roland Buonaparta had managed, by disbul!sing nin e million francs to b~ up 
mpst of- the Greek newspapers. Guillemin was to be recalled and his successor I 
would "certainly be carefully selected With a view to furthering the scheme". (3) 
There is no evidence of Xit.ohEIID.er having shared aay of this information vita 
his colleagues in the British. government. SIloh behaviour is oonsistent with 
the contempt w:ith whioh- he reprd.ed. the politioiaDa. The previOUS SeptElllber 
Hankey had taken the opportunity of letting K1 tohener . know the strength of 
feeling in the Cabinet at his giving thaa so-little information - a practice 
which was causing disoontent. Kitchener replied that he oould not tell them 
everything because they were ".0 lealq". :But he assured Hankey that "if 
they will only all divoroe their wives~I will tell them everyth1ng~ .. (4) 
(1) R. Blake: op. cit., P 157. 
(2) ibid, p 52. 
(3) Yarde-Buller to ICiWlener 6/2/16, W.O. 159/12. An e&1"lier letter of 
, 23 Jan~ on tb.~ same tb._~ ;s referred t~ in this letter, but has not 
CQlll~ to light. . .. -
(4) B.ankqa Ope oit., Vol. 1, p 221. c.f. Murr~ to Hamil ton a "He seldom 
told the Ca'binet the truth and the whole truth." - quoted V. Bonham 
Carteri Soldier ~e (1963) pp 132-30 -, 
..... ...... 
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The plot which Kitchener had at least partly uncovered rEIDa.ins shrouded 
in mystery(l), but would seem to bave been associated With the mission to 
Greece at the end of 1915 of a certain Henri Turot. When the Quai d~Orsa.y 
had put sums of money at the disposal of Guillemin fe»: the purpose of 
organising French propaganda in the Greek .press, the latter had felt obliged 
to say that ·it would be preferable if Francels official representatives were 
not involved in such activities. (2) The &;[Tival of Turot, in his capacity 
of Director of the ~ce Radio, an organisation coneeived. as an agent of 
FreBch propagandaO:;S:PPea.rs to have fulfilled this requirement and it 
was not long before he also assumed. confidential diplomatic functions to the 
exclusion of the French Legation in Athens. Moreover, contrary to the practice 
of the other allied diplomats, Guillemin had instructions to use the diplomatic 
privileges of his lesation to support the As!Bce R!dio(4). But it was above 
all as a liaison with the former premier Ven1zelos that Turot acted on behalf 
of the French Foreign M:Lnistry. The Greek statesman infQrDled Turot in 
December 1915 af his confidence ill being able to carr.! the country with him 
in his policy of bringing Greece in to the war on the side of the allies. The 
massive abstentions by his .. supp~ters in the Greek eleotions had oonvinced· 
Venizelos of the strength of his position in the country and he now appealed 
to France, through Turot, to gl ve him support and await oonorete results in 
the-spring of 1916. (5) 
Turot accordingly asked for a contribution. from the French government 
of 350,000 francs, but at the same time informed ::Briand that he had been 
engaged. in discussions with the Serbian minister with a view to oreating 
(1) Information on this. and II8DtY other problems. of French war-time politics 
may lie in the private papers of Jristide Rriand.. These were apparently 
used by Georps Suarez for his authorised. ~iogt'a~, but have not been 
made available tohiatorians since. The very existence of the papers 
is now open to dOubt, althoush an unpublished. s~ by the historical 
section of the Quai dlQr:tsq reveals that Briandls family have been 
befriended by .. former head of the French National archives and that 
the papers tldoivent Itre surveil11s~. . -
(2) Guillemin t~ Viviani No. ,592, 22/10i15, A. E.IGuerre', Vol. 246. 
(3) Note sur LI.tpp.ce Ra4i0 ~ Salon1que17/9/l6, ibid, V8l.l039. 
(4) Gui11emin to Briand No. 892, 2'/4/16, 16N 3163. 

















'incidents ~ on the graeco-bulgarian frontier. (1) In reply Berthelot warned 
against giving.the impression of intervention'"ili iBternal. Greek politics, (2) 
but was able to -&11 Guillemin that the weal ~ Greek financier, Zaharof, 
a long-time Franoophile, was pr~ared to place a sum of several million 
francs at'VeniZelos~ diSPOSal.(3 Venizelos accepted this offer with 
enthusiasm and Turot forwa.rded to Paris the opinions of the Liberal leader 
on the political situation. ~e latter felt that force would be necessar,y 
to deal with the King, aJ. though he did not wish to oreate a revolution for 
fear of disrupting the at'IIIy. He suggested in addition that France should 
occupy the Greek islands on the pret~t that this was necessary to counteract 
enemy submarine activity and announce that they would be returned to Greece 
as soon as the country once more enjoyed constitutional govemment. (4) Barly 
in the new year, following reports from Braquet and de Roquefeuil, Gailiani's 
cabinet du ministre came to the conclusion that it was neoessary immediately 
to take charge of tha situation in Greece. fhe country should be subjected 
to a total blockade and the King and royal family deported. France~s interest 
was, its report suggested, to place a Vendome or Bonaparte on the Greek 
throne. (5) Meanwhile a further agent of Briand, acting on the instructions 
of M. Ciemente1 (6), and usuming the name- of G8Z"ibaldi, had made contact with 
Venizelos with a view to the creation of parami1it&r,f organisations of 
Greek volunteers. :aut this mission appears to have proved abortive in the 
face of Venizelos I assertion that he was not prepared to overthrow the 
government by i11e8&1 aeans.(1) 
Turot rapidly became impati ent with the way in which Ven1zelos employed 
the mQney given laim by Zaharof and he urged upon the Greek ..leader the 
necessity of acting witA sreater zest and without undue concern for possible 
econOmies~a) :aut, perhape for the reason. whioh Yarde Buller conveyed to Ki t-
chener, the movement seems to have hung fire and Turot was left to defend 
(1) Gui11emin to Briand 10.1026, 22/12/15, A.B. 'Querre l , Vol. 285. 
(2) Briand to Guillem1n Bo. 954, 2"5/12/15, ibid. ~. 
("5) ibid No. 985, 28/12/15, ibid. 
(4) Gui1lemin to BriaDd .. Bo. 1111, "51/12/15, ibid. 
(5) Note sur 1a situation en ar\ce, 18/1/16, 5N 147. 
(6) lfinister for !rde and Industry. 
(1) Braquet to Joffre, 14/1/16, 16B "5162; Garibaldi to Briand 30/1 /16, 
A. B. 'Guerre I, Vol. 10"56. 
• _ 'i"'. -. .~ ", 
(a) Ouillem1n 'to Briand 10. 461, 27/2/16, .1. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 252. 
French interests to the best of his ability. He wrote, for example, to 
recommend to the Quai d 'Qrsq the services of a certa1n Maurioe Mallard, who 
was working on projects-for the development of French commerce in Greece. (1) 
By April, however, Venizelos's will appeared to ~have stiffened and de 
Roquefeuil confidently predieted that the movanent Which was developing would 
be strong enough to sweep awB\Y' the existing government and perhaps produce 
an internal revolution. Further demonstrations had been Bn'a.nged to take 
place in Athens on 16 .11. (2) Turot reported with pride tbat the popular 
movements, were not entirely spOntaneous. Through the astute use of funds 
he had sparked off meetings and danonstrations without Van1zelos even 
suspecting his involvement. Now Venizelos had bein caUBht up in events and 
it would be impossible for him to draw back. (3) Turot next became involved 
in negotiations for the purchase of the leading Greek newspaper lebros and 
appealed to Paris for assistance.(4) A sum of 200,000 francs appears to have 
been provided. Turot gave account of the w8:j" in which he had employed the 
total sum of half a million francs put at his disposal, but suggested that 
it would be disagreeable for him to have to ask a certain M. Averoff, even 
on behalf of Briand, to justify the two million franc. which appea.r to have 
been entrusted to the latter. (5) The project to l)urohase Embros had, however, 
to be dropped when it came to the·knowledge of o~er Venia.list newspapers 
which feared campetition.(6} 
Shortly afterwards, moreover, !l\1rot, vas obliged to return to France 
because of the illness of his son. ·Reporting to tJ.e Quai d,IQrSB\Y' on-his return, 
he stressed that hEmce would get nowhere while she .. re£u8ed to recopise 
that King Constantine was irrevoca'bl1' won over to tAe Gera&n. cause and that 
it was conse(Jlently futile to neaotia.te with hill. ae CIUUlidly added that 
France could not retain her influence in Greece and indeed develop it in the 
future unless the ICing uui twenty-five or.thirty other individuals were 
exiled. After such a coup d,.'tat there would be no fUrther resistance and 
'. 
the only problem facing FraAee would be the d~ision whether to replace 
Cons~tine with a. mEmber of the existing royaJ. family or to look elsewhere. 
(1) TUrot to ?Barthelo~ 14/3/16, A.B. ~Gueere~, Vol. 25}. 
(2) d.e Rotue£euil toLaoaze 114/161-l!O~...J.83, Xr.-4. 
(3) Guillemin to Briaad Ko. 820, 11/4/16, .l. B. 'Guerre', Vol. 254. 
(4) ibid No. 872,.18/4/16, .l.:B. !Guerre!,.Vol. 254. 
(5) ibid Bo. 915-', a6f./l',loid. 
(6) ibid No. 941, 30/4/16, i'bi4. 
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After recounting the reasons w~ he bad been obliged to foresake the Embros 
project Turot hesitantly broached the delicate question of Guillemin's 
position. Pointing to the French minister's oomplete lack of favour ·with 
the King and his absenoe of -self confidenoe, Turot said that he and Venizelos 
had come to the same conclusion. They believed that it would be advisable, 
during the "critical period"(l) 1Dleave Guillemin in titular authority, but 
effectively-to replace him with an extra.ord.ina;ry' envoy - preferably a general 
or an admiral. Turot oonoluded by saying that in all his suagestions he was 
merely conveying· the opinions of all Frenohmen who had. been in Greeoe long 
enough to understand. the Greek character and to get to grips with the problems 
of the lour. (2) 
The solutions proposed by Turot had however to wait more than a year 
before they were put into effect by Jonnart. (;) IJJ for Turot himself, he now 
disappeared from the Greek scene leaving behind him the reputation of "un 
hOllDle mystm-ieux, assez roublard, et qui a mani' des fonds aasez impor'\ants.,,(4) 
What happened to Briand!s ~lot' - if it ever genuinely existed. as a oonsoiQUSly 
thought-out strategEID. -"remains unoertain, althoUBh as late as the end. of 
June 1916 Elliot reported to Grey that he had most secret and confidential 
information to the effeot that Guillemin and SarraU were conoooting a scheme 
for the overthrow of Constantine and his replac_ent by Prinoe Louis Napoleon. 
"It sounds like lunacy but it is sober earnest on the part of the oonsPirators'~)1 
Iadeed it is a matter of conjecture how closely the Turot Jl:i.ssion reflected !I 









seen~alrea.dy· of the cBi'ence of tAe Greek monarc~ hT Briand(6) is .. soarcely in I 
tune with a plan hatched by the French premier to remove COnStantine. But 
as resards the sort of empire-bu:Ud.in& in the Hea.r-Jilaat of whioh Kitohener 
was so fearful, evidance 1& Dot lacld.ng to SU&S8St that Briand was alive to 
the possibilities of .furthering French interes1i8. 
When Lloyd George had visi teo. France in February' 1915 he had reoei ved 
an interesting indioation of the mO",ivation behind Briand's enthusiasm for 
a Balkan campa.i&n - at a tilIe moreover before the whole ii_ beoame 
inextrioably bound up with the political poei tion of General Sarrail. .As 
(1) presumably the proposed :t8VolutiOD&l7 situat:Lon. 
(2) Note by Turot 30/4/16; J.. B. !GI.lerre', Vol. 254. 
(;) It was JOJlD&1"t, who as ~pl()JJl&tic representative of both Franoe and 
lilrlgland, effected the deposition of King Cons1;a.n.tine in the summer of 
.. i911. . 
(4) Note by .Alu'ami 11/5/16, Painlev' lES, ;13 AF 109. 
(5) Blliot to Grq 28/6/16, Grey MSS, F.O. 800/6;. 
(6) See above, pp .216 ft. 
Lloyd George reported to Grey, the French were very amtious to be represented 
in any expedi tiona.ry force. Briand thought it desirable from the pok t of 
view of the final settlement that France and England should establish a right 
to a voice in the settlement of the :Balkans by having a force there. He did 
not want Russia to feel that she alone was the arbiter of the fate of the 
Balkan peoples. (1) In a future more or less near when Russia might become 
too powerful it" was important that the peoples of Greeoe, Serbia, Bulgaria 
and Roumania should realise that Russia was not the only state to interest 





to Russian omnipotence and· possession of Constantinople and to all the 
exclusive advantages which such a possession would give to Russia.(2) To a 
certain extent :Briand appears -to have been responding to pressure Sroups 'I 
wi thin and outside the Chamber, which clamoured for the protection of French 
interests, largely' economic, in the Mediterranean. One historian has sane 
so far as to say that the Salonica enterprise was cOllOeived by Briand 
"predominantly as a French_bid for power in the Near-Bast". (3) . 
Relatively early in the war the Chamber of Deputies voiced its concern 
at the Mediterranean situation.. When . the questicm of Italian intervention 
in the war came up for disoussion,. Georges Leygues, a .future PreSident of 
, 
the Chamber Foreign Affairs COmmission, rem.:1nded his colleagues that France j 
had vital interests in the Med1terrane8ll. When the war had been ended. France I 
would be in need of a period of economic reconstruotion. fh1s could only 1 
take place if France now protected and acquired. bases and lines of communication II 
without which industrial and oCDDlercial prosperi"t7 Yere impossible. Such 
considerations would have to be borne in mind in 8Jq diplomatio negotiations 
with Italy conoerning the Xedi.terranean, (4) and theattGtion of the govern-
ment was constantly brousht to the defenee"of the vital. eastern basin of the 
Medi terranea.n. (5) S1milar ooncern vas expressed at the damage which would 
result to French" interests if ~ were allowed to pursue her political 
and economic ambitions !en Orient! 8ZId thus oreate ~Ul immense economic 
domination from H8IIiburg~to the Pesian Gulf by ~ of Oonstantinople and 
from the North Sea "to the Indian Ocean". (6) Indeed __ bars of the Commission 
formulated as a .pri.Jaar7W&1" atm the su)tpiaDt1Bg of German economic 
(l) Lloyd George to Gr8T 1/2/15, LlO7d George MSSt B2./15/4; Lloyd George 
War MemoirS, Vol. 1, p .. 4Q9;. ~ezlop. cit~~ V~l~ 3,. p ~6. 
(2) No"te b;y Bertie of taJ.lt laeween IJ.o;yd George and Briand 5/2/15, Bertie 
.S, F.O~ eoo/112/Qr./15/5. _. . "., 
(;) W.W. Gottliebt Spdit! ;lahore" Il.plomaoz dH1D i the First World War 
(1951), p 82 •. ,.. .. ' _. . 
(4) He·~t:Ln.g or the Chamber Foreian Arfairs CoDlDSlllon 26/4/15, C 7488.' 
(5) See for exaaple.Lqpes~to iriaud 20/6/16, C 7490.- -. 
(6) Chamber F.A. CCBlllilaion, ordre du jour 20/7/l5, C 7488. 
I 
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predominance in both allied and neutral countries. (1) S1gni£icantly the 
Radical-Socialist leader, Joseph Caillaux, w~ among- the figures most anxious 
to persuade the government ·to determine the future econ(JDic r'gi.me of Europe. (2) 
Briand was not slow to reveal that his strateg,v and diplomacy were largely 
determined by the sort of considerations which influenced the left-Wing 
dominated parliamentary cClDlDission. In the course of the first secret 
session of the war he argued that the-government had recognised. the Balkans 
to be an essential theatre and that he and his colleasues had not been acting 
for the present but with an eye to the futUre. States like France did not, 
he suggested, have the right to allow their prestige to be lost in the 
countries of the Bast, and it was as a result of the deciSion to remain at 
Salonica that such a catastrophe had been avoided. (3) Later in the year, 
when appearing before the Foreign Jffairs Co~ssiOn- to- give an account of 
the course of the Balkan expedition, Briand revealed. the overriding importance 




in its Widest sense, would remain the vi tal issue evc after the war was over. I 
Moreover the countries which had. assured. for themselves a preponderant ,I 
voice in its solution would be the masters of the VGl"ld. (4) 
The Foreisn Jffairs COElission also took the lead in urging upon Briand 
the necessity of creating_an effioient system of propaganda in Greeoe itself. 
A substantial propa88Dd& f\md had. been established under Berthelot!s 
management. Bertie warned Grey that Briand'.s chef de oabi,pet was of "anti-
British sentiment, without judgement, but of a l'ushing and illtriguing uture". (5) 
But the Chamber Commission was not happy With the oraanisation of the 
prollaganda service in Greece itself and appealed to Briand to enforce the 
will of parliament by placing it under unified direction in Athens. At 
that time the defence of hench interests seEDed to be entru&ted to a ,variety 
of semi-official agents all acting independentlJ. (6) But Briand appeared to 
place his fa1 th in the co-operation of Venizelos With -the newlJ czeated 
lQnoe Radio ( 7), although he assured Lq.gu.es that the official propaganda 
organisation dealing with re1aUons with the press which was funotioning under 
(1) Chamber F.£. Commissi_, ordre du jour, speecb by M. Cruppi 11/11/15, 
C7490. 
(2) ibid, sp~e~h by C&1l1aax22/l1/16, 01490. 
(3) Secret Session 20/6/16, C 7647¥ 
(4) Foreign . .Affairs COJ8iasion 26/10/16, C 7490. 
(5) Bertie to Grey 14/2/16, Llo;rd--George H3S, D/19/7/10. 
(6) Ley-gues tohtiad.·-15/2/l" Berthelot lf3S (Propasanda), Carton 6. 




the director of the School of .Athens, M. Foue'res, would retain its 
independent existence, although working ift. cooperation With Turot's 
agents. (1) But in fact, as Colonel Braquet noted, aD element 01' eon.fusion 
remained since Fous'rea,' activities were limited to intellectual propaganda, 
while Sala.nson(~) dealt-with the press under the ultimate direction of 
Guillemin. Moreover Bertrand, the oorrespondant 01' 18 :J:ss,and Braquet 
himself were also carrying out propaganda activities~in· their om way and 
the whole network lacked unified organisation, la.rp~ because Guillem1n 
had no concept 01' what was required by an efficient propaganda service. (3) 
As the war progressed Berthelot'.s propaganda :r:y became increasingly 
concerned with 'economic expanaiGll in-the Balkans. (4 From iuolla;rest his 
agent at the French legation, ltiou.a;rd. 'TaverD1er, reported. that i1' Rou:mania 
entered the war it would be necessary to direct )'ranch proPa.sanda to the 
replacement 01' the Central. powera Dy France in 'the RoWll8llian market tor the 
post-war years. (5) As !faverD1er reported "notre intluence politique [dOi~ 
3t.re dans l'averiir tonction de notre influence 'cQlllOllique". (6) It a.fter 
defeating the enEIIV on the field of Dattle France found herseit vanquished 
on the economic plain, it would be as it noth1ng had been achieved. "Noua 
sortir.bns, au contraire, de oe terrible oonflit, 00llp11tement diminu' et 
appauvri ". (7) Wi thin the Quai d !Qrs~ de H!l.rgerie gave the weight of his 
authority to' the idea of a~e&mpaign of aeonamic sad political propaganda in 
Roumania, which would become for France an outpost of tbe Latin ciVilisation, 
protecting her against both Ge:rDI8ft and Slav Gp8D8ion, and~ at the same time 
providing a counter-weisht to the growing Itali.&n influence in the areao (a) 
fhe conclusion is thus in_capable that the cleYelopaent of French propaBanda 
(1) Briand to Le7SU8S 8/.,/16, Berthelot lIES (Prop&&U.d&), Carton 6. 
(2) arami wrote that Sal_on· 11&8 "l!hoJlllle i~ope qui pard Ie plus de 
temps en converS&tiODS ~ .... I.' !ansp:inC1pes, sans ccmnaissance du 
..• P8.1'8· et de la l&n&iie~. LlTote by J.braai 11/5716, Painlev' !mS, 313 AP l09J 
(3) Braq uet to!)JQn cher 08I4&rade!-22/3/16; ·71 1339. 
(4) 9he economic sphere baa 'been noted as·· one of the firs t areas in which 
France oonaoiou&17tOftUlated. war ams. )'rOIl the Tery beginning of the 
.. War en1luiriea were aacle to detC'lline how French industrial i,.Z'oducts could 
be made to replace GeraaDoGillpetitors in ~oreip ma.rkets. LP. Renouvina 
Lee 'buta de 1U!F!8 .. 1!U!*P •• t £rapca.i8, Revue li1atorique, (1966), 










letter), 1/1/16t je:l. ~~erre"J Vol. 1499~ . . 
(5) Tave~.r to··PerroT I1/t/16; B~thelot M8s (P.rop~), C~ton 6. a 
(6) Report D7 !aTern1er ~/lO/16, lb1d.-
(7) Gabriel DoUlerpe to If:l.niatr;r ot COIIIIlerce 18/7/16, ibid. 
(8) Undated Bote ot T1s1t ot ~ Perroy to de IBrcarie, ibid. 
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in thn Near-East, enoouraged by left-wing agitation in the Chamber, assumed 
a deeper signifioanoe than the mere influenoing of native peoples with a 
view to winning their oonfidenoe so as to defeat the Central powers in the 
current war. It was inextrioably bound up With the preparation of Franoe's 
position in the post-war world - a position in whioh the Eastern Mediterranean 
was seen to ocoupy a orucial role. In the lieht of this underlying strategy 
the continued survival of the .Arm~e ci~Orient takes on a new importance. 
Franoe's interest in the Near-EaSt was, of oourse, no new phenomenon. 
Her connections with this part of the world were oenturies old. Under the 
Anoien R'gime a treaty had been conoluded with the Sultan Suleiman the 
Masnificent, which granted Franoe far-reaching rishts and oDnoessions. These 
so-called !capitulations' were to prove the basis of Franoe's long standing 
interest ill the maintenaaoe of the integrity of the Ottoman-lbpire. This 
had become a conscious a.im of French diplomacy and a -oorners tone of her 
foreign polioy long before England gave serious thoUsht to the Eastern 
, 
Question in the nineteenth c~. Franoe~s inTolvement in the Turkish 
Empire had been stengthened when her gove:rnaent assWied the lDle of protector 
of the Catholic Christian subjeots of the Sultan. Eduoational and missionary 
aotivities, supported by the Frenoh government,had resulted and by the 
ou tbreak of the war Frenoh had become the oul tural and literary language 
of all eduoated olasses in the Levant. MoreoTer Franoe!s politioal, 
diplomatio and oul tural entanglement in the area had m&rohed hand in hand 
in the seoond half of the nineteenth oentury with a growing economio and 
finanoial oommi tment. ja the great ored1 tor nation of the pre-war era she 
held the bulk of Turkey!s publio debt, oontrolled the Imperial Ottoma.n. Bank 
and administered the r'lie dp abacs. Similarly, in Syria, Franoe had 
aoquired a monopoly of transport facilities and when W&1' broke out was in 
control of all but two railw~ lines. (1) "Constantinople in short was the 
heart of an _ire enmeshed by !manse Preach po1i tioal interests and 
finanoial investments amounting to 3,OOG million franos". (2) Organisations 
interested in the affairs of the lear-Bast had naturall1' enoU8h proliferated 
in Franoe and were constalltll' alert to.~ that llieht undermine Frenoh 
predomi nanoe in the area. It was the apprehensions or these groups whioh 
were voioed in the Chamber er ])eputies in the course or 1915 and 1916 and 
to whioh Briand proved responsive. But Briand was in no sense the originator 
of a Frenoh Hedi terranelm st;rateg,r -- merely an 8Xpcment of a continuing trend 
(1) Cassara Ope cit., PP 34-5. 






in French foreign policy. In the l880'.s Gambetta had declued that "the 
Mediterranean will always be the theau-e of French actiVity", while in 1921 
Flandin would assert that ~the Mediterranean"is the axis of..,French policylt. (1) 
In the years immediately preceding the war, moreover, the Mediterranean had, 
if anything, come to ocoupy an increasingly important position in the French 
mind. By 1907 France's armoured cruisers had been recalled from the Far-East 
and her- first line battleship strength was concentrated in the Mediterranean. (2) 
As a result of staff conversations with the British the Mediterranean was 
envisaged by France as her primary naval theatre of operations in ~ forth-
coming confrontation with the Triple Alliance. But the Mediterranean 
concentration of September 1912 was not a new policy, but merely' a reverSion 
to one agreed upon by the Btat-ltLjor G61lral and the Conaeil Su.p~eur de 
la Marine in 1906. (3) Sisnificant17 enoU8h one of the fisures to the forefront 
in the parli8llenta.1:-ydebates of 1912 leading 'to the Mediterranean concentration 
was the "rapporteur du budget de la marine", Paul .Painlev', newlY' elected 
to the Chamber of Deputies and who was to ~oV. the .ost udent champion 
of the Balanica 8XJedition.(4) 
In'this general Kedi terranea.n strategy Greece occupied an important, 
but nat overriding position for France. An indication of this country's 
significance was the establishme1'1t of a milit&.t.7 mission under General·Jitydoux 
in 1910 which was largely responsible for the reorpnisation of .the Greek 
army that made possible its victories in the :Balkan wus of 1912-13. The 
then French Minister in Athens reported that the Greek government!s orientation 
towards France was to a lB.'rf5 extent the result of the constan:~ efforts of 
the Frenoh military' attach' 5). :a,. 1914 Braquet could point to the spread 
of French influence in GreeCe "by1he officers of the mission who were "des 
agents porteurs de microbes francophiles qu'.ils distil1ent 1 jets discrete 
et continue". The implantation of French itleas in the Greek a.rrq could well, 
Braquet s~ested, lead to substantial armaments contracts for French 
indue try. ( 6 In the sWlllller of 1913 the French were also considering the 
(1) S. H. Robertsa 
(2) P. G. Halperna 
. 
Biaton'of Frapch Colopial Policl" Tol. 2, (1928), p 591. 
!l!he lfeditmanN )!,W Situation i908-14. (197l),p 65. 
(3) ibid, p 84. 
(4) G • .l. Hessel Pa1nlev'. ersw. savant. erand ciNen (1933), 
(5) Deville to Pichon No. 52, "51/3/10, 'TN 1352 •. 
(6) :Braquet to Joffre 20/,/14, 7H 1339 ... 
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possibili ty of sending a naval attach' to Athens. The purpose of the 
exercise would be largely commercial. If the French minister had the 
assistance of a senior naval officer he -would De in a better position to 
counteract German naval influence in the question of future shipbuilding 
contracts. The matter was discussed. in the French Cabinet and the Minister 
of Marine, Baudin, offered to attach an offieer to the Athens legation in 
view of the- benefits which French industry might derive. (1) Braquet also 
pressed for the appointment·of a naval attach' in the summer of 1915, 
arguing tha.t while RusSia, England, Italy a.n.d G~ were all adequately 
represented only France, despite "les int&r3tsconsidirables que noue 
possMons sur mer 1 1 !ouest comme~l 1 ~estsde la Gr\cett , continued to have 
no oneo (2) The appoiBtment of de Roqaefeuil at th~ 8lld of 1915 was the 
government!s -eventual response to this pressure. 
The abortive decision to send two divisions to Greeoe, in Fe'brwu:7 1915, 
was greeted. with enthusiasm by Pal.'ologu.e, the influential Fren.eh ambassador 
in St. Petersburg. He noted that it showed. that the French -government, 
despite all its other ca:res, had not forgotten 'Francets age-old interests 
in the Near-East. C~) Similarly, with Sarrail hsr:d pressed in December 1915, 
Lecoq called urgently for reinforcements on the Il'ounds that failure to 
provide them would result in the destruction of the acoumulated efforts 
of Frenchmen over the centuries. (4) As the WU' progressed, moreover, the 
French government and its agents ~ :in Ch-eece showed a constant ooncern for 
the protection of French influence and interests in Greece, the latter 
being generally of-an eoonCDic oharacter. !he Quai d'Orsq instructed 
Gui11emin to safeguard France!s cOlllllleroial situation en the Greek market 
so fa:r as circums tances -parmi tted. so as to cave that France maintained 
her position in the foreign purchases made by Greeoe auci tlat the direction 
of economic affairs did notf8J.l under the exclusive direction of Sir Francis 
Blliot. (5) In reply Gu1l1emin expressed his regret that he was unable to 
devote to' commercial matters the time and attention which he would have 
lked because of the burden of duties under whioh he laboured. (6) The 
(1) Halpern. OPe cit., p 3,6. 
(2) Braquet.to ? 5/1/15, TN 1339. 
(3) Pal&ologue to Deloass' lio. 193, 5/2/15, A. :I. 'Guerre', Vol. 219. 
(4) Lecoq to BourgeoiS 10/12/15, &urpioa l§~, Vol. 9. 
(5) Briand to' Guillem1n lio. 935, 22/12/15, .&..-.:1. -'Guarre', Vol. 2910 
(6) Guillemin to Briand 10. 1045, 2"5/12/15,-ibid,~V01. 248. 
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8i tuation was, however, rectified by the appointment of a commez:Lal attach' 
at the beginning of 1916. French trade With Greeee had increased steadily 
since the end of the nineteenth century and stood at the outbreak of war 
at around 24 million francs per annum. Nonetheless France occupied only 
the fifth place among Greece's trading partners and the volume of her exports 
to Greece had remained almost static since 1906. (1) 
Normal consular activities in support of French trade continued during 
the war and in some cases were given an incentive by it. In December 1914, 
for example, the Vice-Consul at Janina reported on the possibilities of 
USin~e war t¢-eplace ,Austria as the dominant commercial power in the basin 
of the Adriaticl ItJe crois m3me qu'.il nous serait possible de tirer parti 
d\s maintenant de-l'&tat de guerre-pour substituer nos articles 1 ceux 
de nos ennemis". (2) ~ His colleague at Patras came to a similar conclusion 
provided that French navigation companies set about providing the neoessary 
transport facilities, (3)while in Corfu the French representative argued that, 
if direct trading links 'were established between that island and ~seilles, 
this would have excellent results for the future of France's export trade 
to the surrounding area. (4) Acting on the advice of 'Leooq~the French Consul 
General at Salonica, S'on,-set up the Msooiatiop. J'r8ll.ce-Grlaoe with a view 
to the development of -economic and commercial relations between the two 
countries. He envisaged. it as a typical instrument of Franoe's wartime 
strategy, being a response "to the measures taken since the beginning of 
the war to develop Fran.ce's~foreisn trade", and it was well reoeived in 
commeroial and finazloial oiroles in Salon1oa. S'on thought it best not to 
maJee an immediate appeal to Frenohmen in the area, but to leave the new 
organisation to appear as a looal and spontaneous movement. He hoped, 
nonetheless, that it would be an. addition to the existing instruments of 
French poli tioal propaganda and 1hat it aii;ht even be lIappel'e " devenir ici 
le prinoipal facteur de 1 ~ influenoe fran9a1se". (5) Tke Quai d ~OrsB\Y greeted 
(1) Report in 1916 by Lefeuvre-MIaulle, .Attach' Cameroi&! de la France 
en Orient, .A. B. N.S. Vol. 53. The Quai d'Orsq, consoious of the 
- "raisons de poli tiQ,ue g4nlrale qui ne nous . permettent pas de noue 
d'sintlresser de la-arloe", hoped to·use a"'loan. to Greece as a guarantee 
that future industrial.o~ers would be placed with Frenoh industq,. 
[Undated note by Berthelot on 'Ji)aprunt Gree'. .l. Be. N.S., Vol.19d 
(2) Vioe-oonsul, Janina to Deville~1/12/14, .,1.. E. U.S., Vol. 53. 
(3) Consul, Patras to Deloass' 10/12/14-, ibid. 
(4) Ben1sni to Briand 9/2/ 16, .l. B. lGuerre', Vol. 299. 
(5) S'on to Delcass' 19/4/15, .l. E. B.s., Vol. 53. 
the new creation with approval and eXpressed the hope that it would act 
in conjunction with similar organisations in Serbia which were working 
for the expansion of French commercial activity in that oountry. (1) 
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The policy pursu8d bT Briand towards the Greek .onar~ in the caurs e 
of his premiership was not,- however, ideally des1ped t;) develop France's 
standing in Greece. With sorrow de l'ontenay noted that those with French 
interests at h~t deapaired. at the vacillat1na behaviour of the French 
government. France's prestige had suffered. 8Ilo:rDlously and. she was in no 
posi tion to assume the role of Greece!. moral protector at the end of the 
WR. (2) He urged. that France should think of herOWJl interests and pursue 
a French poliCT, rather~than all. herself to be un4ul7 influenced. by her 
allies. It was necess&r7 to look to the future &Dd. safe8ll&1'd Frenoh 
prestige in the Bear-But. (3) With the .uoo_tul. oonolusion of his mission, 
there£ore~ and the depoei tieD. of Constantine, Jozm.8.rt aoted an immediate 
~ov_ent in Prance's stand~Dgand con.f'idan.~ fec1icted that she would 
soon rege.in herpredcainant position :in Greece.<4 He oalled. for an exohilnge 
of views between the ~ d!OrslQ', the Blglishhreisn Office and himself 
to prepare for the re.eata.b1isllllent of the allies I prestige to the beneti t 
of their politioal, eoOZlOllic &ad finanoial intc~ta. (5) Simtlarly, the 
Grand Quartier o4nlral ccmsidered that the n8W situation in Greeoe offered. 
'1:' 
to Frace not onl.T a oonsideraele amelioration 1a her poli tioal position 
: ._' 
in the Bear-Bast but alao the proSpect ,of substantial. ailitary and economio 
advan:taps. (6) But £rom the AtheDS l~"ti.on Clauaae warned that the 
errors of three 1'8&1.'S ill-~~" cl1plcaacy could onJ.y be put right by the 
establishment ct a cctral.proJ8&lU1daser't'ioe Yhioh would control all 
, "' 
branches of French prop8ClU'1d.a -," ;cCIIIIIlU'ClaJ., litera.r.y,:1ntellectllal, artistio 
and press. (1l Braquet «_ Rs'lecl thfI.t' ';8ilOe would not get the bes t aut 
. . . . 
of Greece frOm. &D7 point ot ~_ un1ea. the CQ\Ul1or7 were placed under a 
Frenoh pro~ectorate. Bu~ ta1~ thisenr-. solut:1on, which he rightly 
judpd to be iJaF&Oticule~ b~: ~pcl 10hat French hazlcls ahould assume as 
JlU,ch oontrol u poa.ibl.&DCl1npart1oular~tbat the personnel of the 
milita.r.T miaaion ah0l1l4 .. ..:J.Rged.J8), 
(1) :Delcus' to S"17/~!,~»ei~:paiJ.. to Deloaas' , 11/1/15, A.I. 
B 8 Vol 53. ' ", "' "'~' , 
.. ,.. .. -. ..... - "'" -,: "!,,., .. " ... : .• ~~ . ~ -. -. 
(2) d.~Fontena7 to Bo1arp1oa'~1S/~ll~;;~geo18 lI3s Tol.8. 
(3) ibid 26/12/16, ib14. ":;:'~> '-:';:-: ~'i' 
(4) JOJlD&1"t"Cto-Bibot ~o,,~;:~,.'25/'Al, A.B. !Guerre~, Vol. 295. 
(5) ibid 10. 12~, 1/71+1{:~tit4.~ -:' ' .. ., 
(6) Bote IV' ,e Bureau-l'!f417~ 161 '161. 
(7) Cl&WI.e to Ribot 1o:},'1f.S~!<1'/8/l7, .... B. !Guerre', Vol. 216. 
(8) :B:r8llue' ~ ~oh ,28fJ.,L i:.··p~,lJ~9. 
" '" . ~ """';:;'c:'?f', 
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The concern of French agents in Greece to maintain their cOWltry'S 
prestige during the course of the war manifested. itself among sane of~· them 
in an almost neurotic fear of English intentions in the same area. Soon after 
his arrival in Greece de Roquefeuil reported. his impressions on England's 
interest in the .future of ~Crete. (1) He feared that the English would favour a 
Venizelist movement there with the ultimate aim of becoming m8$ters of the 
island themselves(2) and when Crete was placed. in the :English zone of 
surveillance de Roquefeuil thought he could discern all the features of a 
long-term occupation. Moreover the naval attach' warned of similar developments 
on the islands ~f Lemnos and Mitylene. (.~) Similar warnings came directly from 
Colonel Mas at }tyt:llene, who reported. that England was making efforts to 
monopolise trade with the island and his observations were supported by 
Braquet who passed. the information on to the Ministry of War. (4) By January 
1911 de Roquefeuil was sensing the canplete effacement of .French influence in 
the Aegean before the activities of the English Secret Service(5), while in 
the early summer Commandant !Lb.alamas reported. on~ the necessity-of installing 
French consuls in -the idands· of the Greek archipelago if France did not wish 
to find herself completely supplanted. by Britain after the war. (6) At the same 
time de Billy(7) took up again the question of English activities in Crete and 
argued. that the ~French representative in the island should be upgraded so as to 
counteract the English drive for commercial dOmination(8), while the French 
intelligence Chief in lVtilene stressed. that France should not give up a land 
which in the past had only survived because of France and which it was France's 
duty to assure lived. in the future for France alone. (9) In fact English 
commercial aspirations remained a permanent concern for French agants throu.ghout 
the war and indeed. i.J'ito the peace. The constant fear was expressed. that French 
interests were being excluied, partioularly in tle Greek islands, as a reslll t 
of the more effective organisation of the British aonsular and diplomatic 
. (10) 
sernces. 
(1) de Roquefeuil to Lacaze No. 89, 15/1/16, 51 115. 
(2) ibid No. }82, 28/5/16, x.f. 1. 
(3) ibid No. 261, 25/5/16, x.f. 4. 
(4) Mas to Braquet 21/9/16, 7N 1}50; Braquet to Roques 8/6/16, 51 115. 
(5) de Roquefeu1l to J,aeue No. 511, 1}/1/11, x.f. 5., .. 
(6) Rapp'ort du dll'gu.§ de 1a Mission fr~ia.ise aupr\s de la Division grecque de 
~ l'Archipel 21/5/17, A.E'. 'Guerre', Vol. 211. . 
. ' . 
(7) Fl'anch diplomatic reprljla~tative accxedi ted. to the Venizelist provisional 
~vernment in Salonica, he became Frencch Minister in Athens at the 
completion of Jonnart's mission. 
(8) de BillY to Ri~ot No._64,30/5/11, i. E. 'Guerre', Vol.~213. 
(9) Pluot to Revol 16/8/11, 7N 1)4,1. 
(19) See for example report of Service de Renseignements 2 2 18, 11 1340. 
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France, then, possessed considerable interests in Greece which she 
understandably enough sought to safeguard and augment pending the ultimate 
decision of the conflict with the Central powers. As the war progressed, 
however, Greece came to assume for France an importance out of all proportion 
to her pre-war interests there or indeed to the fact that allied troops were 
based in Greece I s northern provinces. By a secret arrangement of March 1915 
the allies, largely on British initiative, agreed to the acquiSition of 
constantinople by RuSsia, providing the war was fought to a sUccessful 
conclusion. This then vould have been the first step towards the possible 
dismemberment of the ottoman Empire. MOreover for the associations of Russian 
nobles, industrialists, business men and the cadets, posseSSion of Constan-
tinople and the Straits was not an end in itself but the prelude to ultimate 
supremacy in the Near-East and the posseSSion of naval power in the 
Mediterranean. (1) ay satisfying this age old desire of st. Petersburg the secret 
treaty provided not the end but the beginning of Russian expansion. Given 
the imperialist nature of Tsarist foreign policy it would be only the first 
step into the Mediterranean forum and further quests for paver and security 
in the area.(2) Thus a cardinal prinoiple of FrenCh foreign policy had been 
breached - but vi th only the very reluotant approval of her government. Bertie 
noted that the Q,WIoi d'Orsay had suggested that the Viviani government vould 
have been quite ready to take a firm line to~ Russia if the British 
government had shown ~ disposition to support the French, but the former had 
on the contrary been in a h'Url:'Y' to yield everything to Russia. (3) In addition 
the Chamber Foreign Affairs Commission showed great signs of dissatisfaction 
with any formal engagements to Russia. M$ny public figures in France hoped that 
the British and FrenCh forces would get to Constantinople before the Russians.(4). 
For years France had tried to check the slow disintegration of the 'sick 
man of Europe', for there existed in paris a genuine fear that, should the 
Turkish Empire collapse, the relative strength of Franoe in the Near-East 
might be reduoed. As Delcasse stressed at the opening of the Dardanelles 
operations, the a1m of France was not fatally to destroy the ottoman Empire. 
(1) Gottlieb. OPe cit., p 65. 
(2) ibid p 331. 
(,) Bertiea Dia;r, Vol. 1, P 132. (24/3/15). 
(4) ibid pp 132, 134-5, 141. 
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Evidently the taking of Constantinople would probably involve some loss 
of territory by Turkey, but Delcasse hoped that this would be compatible with 
the maintenance of a Turkish Empire, which was desirable for "180 sauvegarde 
des int~ts politiques et e'Conomiques franwais". (1) In subsequent 
arrangements after the treat,y of ~ch 1915, however, the break-up of Turkey 
became well-nigh accepted as a principal allied war aim. But, as the 
Secretary-General of the Society of Colonial and ~ritime Studies noted, the 
power Which would lose most from the partition of the ottoman Empire would 
be France, for in place of the effectively preponderant influence which she 
exercised before the war throughout the Empire, would be substituted a total 
influence in the relatively small areas nav designated for French dOminatiorJ 2) 
When the question of Constantinople was first mooted Poincare stressed 
that France oould not saorifioe her own interests to the satisfaction of 
those of Russia. The posseSSion of the Straits would give to Russia the 
possibili ty of becoming a great naval paver and introduce her for the first 
time to the Mediterranean. Everything would thus be ohanged in the European 
equilibrium and France could not aoquiesce in suoh annexations unless she 
herself extracted from the war equivalent oompensations. "Tout est done 
foraement li"" coDluded Poincare. "Nous ne pourrons seconder les desire 
de 180 RuSsie que proportionellement aux satisfactions que nous recevrons 
nous.-nOmes."C~) In reply France's ambassador in St. Petersburg blamed 
England for thtl si tWltion in wh1eh Franoe now found herself, for as early as 
November 1914 Xing George V bad intimated to the Russian ambassador in 
London that he and hill sovernm.ent considered that constantinople should be 
attributed to Russia.(4) At all events Franoe found herself in a position ~ 
whioh her concept of the Mediterranean balance of power in the post-war 
settlement had been overturned because the linchpin of her eaisting policy 
had fallen away, and in whioh she was anxious to compensate herself elsewhere 
in the area. France therefore secured inclusion in her adherence to the 
RuSsian agreement of a clause to the effect that the attribution of ConstantLn-
ople was dependent on Franoe and Britain realising their awn aims in the 
(1) Delcass,8 to Millerand 28/4/15, 7N 1,44. 
(2) Report by camilJe Fidel, November 1916, A. E. lA_paUl, Vol. 1;1. 
0) Poincare to pal.eologue 9/,/15, Pichon M3S 4,97; quoted POinoare: OPe cit., 
Vol. 6, p 94. 
(4) pal~ologue to Poinoare 16/4/15, P. C&mbon MSS, Vol. 5. 
Near-East as elsewhere. In the first instance this meant securing for 
France absolute rights over Syria and Cilicia - Which were no more than 
"la contre-partie et la l~gitime compensation des droits et 1nter~ts 
considerables dont nous faisons Ie sacrifice A la RuBsie".(l) But it &lao 
meant that France looked again at the whole question of her standing 
throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. In this situation Greece and the 
Balkan peninsula in general assumed a new importance. The conclusion was 
reached at the Grand Quartier aeneral that Francets Mediterranean policy 
demanded that in the future she should be able to rely on a strong and 
friendly Greece. France could no longer count on Turkey and if, after tre 
war, she occupied Syria side by side with English, Italian and RuSsian 
influences in the Levant, she would have need of an additional point of 
support.(2) Thus when England and France began tentatively to discuss the 
possible conditions of a future peace, Berthelot reminded Cambon that the 
Balkans were of direct interest to France and the. t their settlement was 
entirely a function of the ce~Bion of Constantinople to Russia.(3) 
The promise made to RuSsia in March 1915 was one of the factors 
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lessening the enthusiasm with which France invclved herself in the J)ardamlles 
campaign. This expedition has been described as a bid rtfor the last link 
in the British power chain encircling the future Levantine Empire from 
Cyprus and Suez to Aden and the Persian Gulf. rt (4) As such it was scarcely 
congenial to ~ French minds determined to use the war for the construation 
of French spheres cf influence. Before the attribution of Constantinople 
had taken place, the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission had expressed its 
anger at the French government accepting a seoondary role in a region Where 
France possessed "the ri&ht of command,,,.(5) Clemence au asserted that 
English command of the Dardanelles expedition meant "l'abandon par nous de 
notre mattrise dans 1& Med1terranean , (6) but French interest in the operation 
waned as her chances of gaining from 1 t anything tangible diminished. As 
'\!i-
. I 
(1) ])erth.l~~ to :Barrere No .. 1361. 21/9/16, A. E •• paUl , Vol. 130. . 
A. lU.bo1a. tyttfr .Is un .w, p 130, M.S. Andersonl The Eastern Q.uestion 
177+,1923 1966 p",325. . 
(2) Note sur 1& politique fran~ise vis ~ vis la G~ce, 31/8/16, 16N 3051. 
(3) Berthelot to C&mbon 12/1/11, Berthelet MSS; Pichon papers (Quai dtOrsay), 
Vol. 4. 
(4) Gottlieb: OPe Cit., p 103. 
(5) Speech by Freycinet 22/2/15, PiChon MSS 4398. 
(6) Speech by Clemenoeau 30/4/15, ibid. 
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the Salonica expedition got underway the Grand ~uartier G6neral urged that 
a French presence should be maintained at Gallipoli • but only because of 
the undesirability of leaving England in total control.of the situation.(l) 
In fact France preferred Salonica as a base for the sphere of influence she 
now sought in the :Balkans and as the main stage overland to the Golden 
Horn. (2) There was perhapS. more than nominal signi.ficance in the French 
government order of 7 October 1915 by vhiOb the announcement of the formation 
of Sarrail' s Arm8e d I Orient was made. The Gallipoli force, p1'6viously 
knovn as the Corps Expeditionnaire dlOrient was now reduced to the title 
of Corps Expeditionnaire des Dardanelles. The Salonica ~ thus became 
the expression of Francels aspirations len Orient l , while that of the 
])B.rdanelles, whiOb vas pursuing an essentially Russian goal, was symbolically 
reduced in status. (3) From Greece Colonel Bordeaux argued that France's 
influence and interests in the Levant obliged her not to end the var without 
affirming her power in the Near.East. (4) As the Dardanelles operation 
petered out the Salonica expedition remained as the only means of aQhieving 
this triumph, and France became increatngly nervous at the prospect of any 
other military activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, as for example When 
Kitchener came up with a planned campaign from Alexandretta, whiOb appeamd 
to challenge French claims to exclusive rights in Syria. (5) For the same 
reason, therefore, France struggled throughout the Salonica campaign to 
maintain her own direction cf it. Similarly, from Sarraills Headquarters 
staff Mathieu argued that it vas of cardinal importance for France to assert 
her control of the Greek Situation so as to erect Greece as a barrier agadnst 
RtIIisian panslaviam. As he warned "Ie danger du ])rang N'&ch osten est aussi 
bien du cC~, russe que du c~ austro-allemand.". (6) 
Developments in relation to the ottoman Empire vere not the only faat ara 
affecting France!s standing in the Near-East in the course of the Great War. 
After being wooed by both aides in the conflict, Italy renounced her 
allegiance to the Triple Alliance and concluded the Secret Treaty of London 
(1) erased extraot~~JI Joffre to Ml11erand 3/10/15, l6N 1678. 
(2) Gottlieb, OPe cit., p 103. 
(3) Note by War M:l.n1stry 7/10/15, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 1030. 
(4) Note on Balkans by Bordeaux 26/11/15, ibid, Vol. 250. 
(5) Panouse to Gal1ien1 No. 1555 12/11/15, l6N 2967. 
(6) Mathieu to pa1x,..~ai1les 9/6/16, painlev~ MSS, 313 Ap 118. 
l 
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with the allies on 24 April 1915. ~ this she was promised the south 
T,yrol, Trieste and Istria, many of the Dalmatian islands and reversionary 
rights to Turkish possessions if there were to be a colonial partition. 
She would thus emerge at the end of the war as an Adriatic and Mediterranean 
power of the first magnitude. These concessions naturally caused concern 
in Serbia, as the allied power most immediately affected, especially as 
their exact scope was unrevealed,(l) but with France's own growing interest 
in the Balkans she too began to regard with apprehension the prospect of 
too great an Italian expansion. From Rome Barrere warned the Quai dlOrsay 
that Italian motives for participation in the Balkan expedition were far 
from disinterested. Italy hoped that by raising her standard in the Near 
East she would stake her claim to rights and compensations commensurate with 
her military effort. The government of Sonnino had been widely criticised 
for allowing France, Russia and England to acquire territorial pawns as a 
result of their physical presence in the Aromae dlOrient, and there was 
considerable nervousness in Italy as to the nature of the secret agreements 
already existing between the three allies. Italy had thus seen herself 
arriving at the conclusion of the war in a position of marked inferiority.(2) 
French agents in ~ece were not slow to reach similar conclusions and 
Lecoq argued that it was necessary for France to erect a strong Greece to 
act as a barrier against further Italian ambitions.(3) The existence of 
Greece was indispensable, argued de Fontenay, for the equilibrium of the 
Mediterranean. She represented the obvious counterpoise to Italy and her Ii 
ever growing appetite for territorial expansion.(4) Not satisfied with what j 
had already been reserved for her, Italyts eyes wandered ever further over 
the Eastern Mediterranean and by the beginning of 1917 she was voicing a 
claim to ~. (5) De Fontenay warned that Italy was opposed to the triumph 
of Venizelos since a Ven1zelist Greece meant a strong Greece and this was 
the last thing Rome wanted. French support for Venizelos should therefore 
be given with iii. view to opposiZl8 the plans of Italy, for if France abandoned 
Greece this would mean thrOWing the country into the hands of Germany for tm 
(1). See for example Note from Bertie 4/5/15, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 220. 
(2) Barr$re to Briand No. 560, 9/8/16, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 1038. 
(3) Leooq to Bourgeios 7/9/16, Bourgeios ms, Vol. 9. 
(4) de Fonten~ to Bourgeios 28/11/16, ibid, Vol. 8. 
(5) P81eologue to Briand (from Doumergue) No. 163, 5/2/17, A. E. 'Guerre' , 
Vol. 992. 
foreseeable future, since only in Germany could Greece then hope to find a 
guarantee against Italian encroachments.(l) French and Italian interests 
in regard to Greece were thus "diametralement opposesn and de Fontenay 
appealed for a stronger French stand to resist her competitor. Was France, 
he asked, going to sacrifice her vital Mediterranean interests in order 
to satisfy her friends of the day, who, in the not too distant future, would 
become her rivals? With Serbia in need of a long period of reconstruction 
at the end of the war, only Greece could provide France with the support of 
which she was in need.(2) 
Lecoq, stressing that he was only interested in Greek affairs so far 
as they were a function of French interests, warned that Italian ambitions 
in the Aegean threatened to exclude Frenoh influence entirelY,fram a zone 
moreover where France had made her presence felt over a period of centuries.~3) 
From Corfu, for example, the French agent urged upon Braquet the need to take 
measures to counterbalance Italian expansion. (4) Lecoq almost welcaned the 
Italian declaration of a protectorate over Albania, for it had at least the 
merit ~ revealing overtly the nature of her aspirations, while, being a 
unilateral act, it would be subject to revision. (5) The :Balkans thus fooused 
a power struggle between France and Italy for the right to assert a prepon-
derant voice in the post-war situation. Moreover, when the allies agreed in 
the late spring of' 1917 to leave France with a free hand in the settlement 
of the Greek question, Ita17 attempted vainly to make her agreement conditional 
on French acceptance of her territorial claims in Asia Minor.(6) Despairingly Ii 
Elliot noted that both nations were constantly looking to the future and to i 
the partition which would come atter the war, while Britain alone was devoting 
her ''Whole faculties to the one object of winning 1t. t1 0') 
The ambitions of two of Prance's allies - Russia and Italy - thus 
exeroised a ~d e£fect upon the way in whioh she examined her own position 
in the Near-East - a _position which had been mater.1.ally altered by the 
ol&1mB ancl aspirations of these other two powers. French policy in the 
(1) de ~t~y to._BourpiOS 1)2/16, :Bourgeios ms, Vol. 8. 
(2) ibid 22/12/16, ibid. 
(') Lecoq to :Bou1'po1s ~l;/17, ibid, Vol. 9. 
(4) :araquet toSOQa-L:l.e1rlenant Rufenacht 23/5/17, 7N 1340. 
(5) LeCoq to Bourgeoi8 9/6/17, Bourgeois ltJS, Vol. 9. 
(6) Ribot to Ba~re No. 111}, 6/5/17, A. E. 'A palx' Vol. 132. 
(7) Elliot to Hardinge 9/4/17, Lloyd George MSS, F/55/}/2. 
Balkans was, however, also determined by her appreciation of the war aims 
of her greatest eneIq, Ge~. In no Sense was Francels understanding 
of the situation restricted to her desire to reoover Alsace-Lorraine. Both 
Britain and France vere conscious of the underlying expansionist push 
eastwards which fashioned German strategy in the Great War - the age.old 
Drang Nach Osten. For Britain this obviously posed a threat to her continued 
presence in Egypt, to her interests in the Near and Middle East and to her 
route to the Indian Empire. The British mind, however, never really saw 
in the :Balkan campaign a barrier against German expansion. It was appreciated 
that the Salonic& Expedition might make it more difficult for Germany to 
draw upon the resouroes of the ottoman Empire, by blocking her path to 
Cons tantinople, but the British military and political hierarchy nevEn' saw 
the :Balkans as the cockpit in which the future destinies of the great povers 
in the Near-East vere being determined. The same, however, vas not true 
of France. As the Grand Quartier ~al concluded, the Berlu..Constantinople 
rail link vas of vital importance to Garm~ and represented for her tIle g1ge 
Ie plus pm;cieux qu!-elle puisse obtenir en vue des ~ciations futures, 
en attendant qulil d.avienna entre ses mainS, la paix oonclue, Bon plus 
puissant instrument de dom1nation sur la Turquie d!Asia". (1) German aspirations 
in the Near East imposed upon France the neoessity of defending her own 
interests there. As one contemporary observer remarked, "the Balkans are 
the hinge and pivot of Gel.'ma.ny'!B Bahamas of conquest in this war. Northern 
France, Belgi\UD., perhaps even Alsaoe-Lorraine sha would abandon with 
equanimity if only ahe can keep her hold on this avenue to the East. II (2) In 
enpging in military activities in Macedonia, therefore, France was not 
merely seeking to defeat the Central powers, but to nullify specific German 
ambitions for the post-var settlement, whioh ran d:irectly counter to her CIIn. 
Moreover, as the Grand Q;uartier ~l argued, the German initiative in 
the Balkans imposed upon France the need to envisage the war sitlJilotion in 
that theatre in the same way that Ge~ did. The German aim was K>t so much 
to force a decision of the col1D.ict as to "prendre des garanties pour llavenir." 
Franoe!B positicm was 1dent1oal., she therefore should employ similar t~cticS. C~) 
(1) 2e Bureau. Note 8V 1& Situation sur le Front Oriental 2/11/16, A. E. . 
!Guerre!, Vol. 1040. 
(2) G. Ward-Prices ope O1t., p 10. 
(,) G.Q.G. Note on ~Situation en Oriant t 10/10/15, l6N 3266. 
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When Benazet reported to the Chamber of Deputies, following his il1-
fated voyage to Greece at the end of 1916(1), he argued that the Balkan 
theatre represented the key to the whole war. Germany was not really 
interested in annexations on the Western Front. What she aimed for was 
the establishment of her hegemony from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, 
reducing to vassal status Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Serbia and, if pOSSible, 
Roumania. Furthermore, if France was not on her guard, the Geman dream of 
aggrandisement would beoome a reality. Benazet was appalled at the way in 
which the French government had ignored events in the Ba~ns and at the 
dilatory manner in whioh she had finally deoided to aot.(2) The deputy was 
perhaps underestimating the government's appreciation of the Situation, for, 
in :r-~y 1911, the Grand Q,uartier General oonoluded that the Salonica a:t'm¥ 
had been maintained "pour emp~Qher A ltennemi de ragler A sa fa~on 180 question 
d'Orient".(J) When the Ribot gove~ent seemed to be heSitating to impose 
a radioal solution, de Fontenay urged t~t the Greek question should be 
settled without delay in suoh a way that the new Greek government would look 
to France to organise and. instruct its arlll3", to inspeot its finanoes and to 
provide its teachers. Only thus oould Ger.man influence be eliminated and 
her plan to install herself in Greece with the connivance of King Constantine, 
so as to dominate the Mediterranean, be destrOyed.(4) The danger was that if 
France did not aot decisively while the war was still in progress Germany 
would be able, with the advent of peaoe, to renew her push to the east with 
Greeoe as a base. What ends would then have been served, de Fontenay 
rhetorically enquired, by the Salonioa Campaign and the great sacrifices 
whioh it had involved?(5) 
For a variety of reasons, therefore, the war obliged Franoe to re-examim 
the bases of her authority and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
forced upon her the realisation that the balanoe of power in the post-war 
world would not closely resemble that to which she ~d grown accustomed. 
Greece, in particular, came to acquire a totally new importance for France 
(1) Ben$zetts semi-offioial negotiations with King Constantina, in Which the 
former appea~s to haTe been oompletely duped by the Greek monarch, provide 
the starting point in the train of events leading to. the death of several 
Frenoh troops on 1 December in what was evidently an ambush arranged by 





(2) Report to Chamber of Deputies, sent to Quai d'O:r:say 31/1/17, A. E. 'Guerre'" 
Vol. 1041. : 
(3) G.~.G. Note (Section des Th'4tres d'Op'rations Ext'rieures), l~y 1911, 
16N 3161. 
(4) de Fontenay to BCllrgeois 8/4/17, Bourgeois r.~SJ Vol. 8. 
(5) ibid 14/8/17, ibid. 
I 
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- a position which she ~d never previously occupied. It is against this 
background, moreover, that the presence of a French a~ in Northern Greece 
must be viewed. The Armee d'Orient inevitably became as much an instrument 
of French strategic and diplomatic policy as of military policy. Indeed When 
de Castelnau carried out his inspection of the a~ at the end of 1915 he 
reported that, from a military point of view, its prospects were extremely 
limited. No one, he thought, could argue t~t the presence of 150,000 
allied troops had a~ effect on whether or not Greece and Roumania remained 
neutral. Similarly the possibility of an offensive against Bulgaria should 
be ruled out, at least for the time being, since France was likely to find 
herself alone in shouldering the burden of such an operation. But, de 
Castelnau argued, the question appeared in an entirely different light if 
one considered it not from the military, but from the diplomatic, point of 
view. Salonica and its hinterland, because of the faoilities of the port and 
the richness of the area, were already the objeot of widespread envy. Was 
France really intending at the end of the war to disinterest herself fmm 
this area and leave the Greeks to reap the harvest of its potential wealth? 
Such a policy would be unaoceptace beoause "1 l'heure des traitGs, les 
inter8ts de la France devront .tre mis bien au dessus de tous les sentiments 
personnels" • Salonica should therefore be considered as a precious pawn and 
France should retain the amiD »ensM of one cll.y USing it as a bargaining 
counter in negotiations to ~urethe best settlement of French interests. (1) 
.De Castelnau regretted that. Guillemin could not see the occupation of Saloni<Jl. 
in such a light, but stressed inStead its military advantages, which the 
general himself doubted.(2) In retrospeot this report of de Castelnau 
appears crucial to an understanding of French policy in the Balkans for at 
least the next two years. only through an acceptance of such a rationale could 
the French gover.ment haVe aoquiesced in the maintenance of an army which, 
militarily at least, was 80 unproductive. 
Taking up the theme o£ de Castelnau's arguman;t the Grand Quartier ~neral 
conCl. uded in J&nu&.r7.191o iibat Salonica "constitue entre nos mains un gage 
precieux pourlt.YeDtr~ •. Ita abandonment was cons&quently unth~ble.(3) 
Salonica's stratag1C 'position in the Eastern Mediterranean, given the 
circumstances ot the war, made it the focal point of the eternal Eastern 
Question, and, as aa.o1'ticer in Sarrail's a~ noted, the solution of this 
offered tne key ta ~e continents.(4) As the general war situation failed 
(1) Report to Jot~ 31/12/15, 5N 110. 
(2) Note of c.oDTC'sation with Gui11emin 26/12/15, 16N 3142. 
(3) Note 8111:' l!ilbrp1oi d:!s Troupes Al1iees en Orient 5/1/16. 16N 3056. 
(4) Lettre dtua officier de llArmee Franyaise dlOrient 18/10/16, 16N 3144. 
to improve in the course of 1916 de Margerie called for the complete occupation. 
cf Greece to use as a pawn in future negotiations with the enemy.(l) He 
was probably think;ng in terms of joint alled action, but from Salonica itself, 
in late December, Lecoq stressed the need to see Greece in the French sphere 
of influence. He argued that the maintenance of King Constantine would mean 
the total Germanisation of the Balkans. Lecoq thought it was inevitable 
that France would lose ground in the Near-East as a result of the war, but he 
hoped at least that she would not lose everything in an area where so much 
effort had been expended over a peDbd of centuries. Greece, because of her 
geographical position was ideally suited for this role of the 1. bastion of 
French influence. (2) On the S8de day de Fontenay argued that France was 
paying too much attentio~o the interests of her allies in the affairs of 
Greece. The over-riding need was to think of French interests and carry out 
a French POliCY.(}) A Francophile Greece would be neoessary to maintain 
the equilibrium of the eastern baSin of the Mediterranean. Support o£ 
Venizelos was thus vital to France not only in terms of winning the war, but 
above all for the future. The Greek question would have to be settled before 
the end of the war, since France could not count on the acquiescence of her 
allies in her plans once peace had came and the saored union of nations 
imposed by the state of belligeranoy had ended.(4) MOreover de Fontenay 
argued that France's future moral authority in the Balkans would be 
dependent on how she acted in the course of the war. Regrettably the cataloguer 
'I 
of events did not make very impressive reading and yet "clest 11- dessus ~ 
que la Franoe de demain oompte pour r'installer son prestige e~ 'Orient". (5) 
But if the French government could be reproached with not always keeping 
to the forefront of its considerations the effeot of its actions in Greece 
on France's post-war standing the same charge could not justifiably be 
directed at the obi.f agent of French policy in the Near-East, General Sanail. i 
i 
Writing after the war was over Sarrai1 disclaimed all intentions beyond : 
what were proper in a military commander: "J"tais en Orient non pour 
edifier Itapr~s_guerre, mais pour arriver par Ie. guerre l un ~sulte.t de 
guerre".(6) Bis line of conduct was simple - to carry o~t the policy of the 
(1) Note by de lfarpria 1,)/12/16, A. E. I Guerre , , Vol. 265. 
(2) Laooq to :Bourgeois 26/12/16, Bourgeois MlS, Vol. 9. 
(3) de Fontenay to Bourgeois 26/12/16, ibid, Vol. 8. 
(4) ibid18/~17, ibid. 
(5) ibid 5/3/17, ibid. 
(6) Sarra1l: ope cit., p 271. 
! 
268. 
Entente not for the lafter-warl, but for the war itself.(l) An examination 
of Sarrailts activities at Salonica reveals, however, that the Ge~ral's 
ingenuous behaviour extended no further than the pages of his memoirs. 
Ineffective as a military commander he may have been but as the leading 
architect of a planned invisible French Empire in the post-war world he proved 
singularly adept. MOreover it was this use of a military occupation in the 
course of a war against the Central pcwers to carve out for France a sphere of 
influence which would exclude both ene~ and ally alike Which was so abhorrent 
to France's allies and particular~ to England. Whereas the British probably 
realised that for strategic reasons France could not simply ignore Greece, tbwy 
viewed with distate the subordination of the military aspects of the 
Macedonian Camp~ to the fostering of Francels post_war influence. Sarrail 
gave an interesting insight into his strategic thinking as early as August 
1915, when, ~onsidering the possiUlities of an operation from Alexandretta, 
he pointed out that posseSSion of this port would give France a posseSSion 
in the Near-E8Bt which would be a US eful ba.rgaining counter when the time came 
to talk of peace. He thought it unwise for France to arrive at the conferenoe 
table empty handed as far as this part of the world was concerned. (2) Once 
installed at Salonica the General invariably put French interests before those 
of the allies. Having acquired a preponderant voice for France in the direction 
of the Salonica railway commiSSion, Sarrail argued that this should be 
carefully maintained against the designs of the other powers.(}) Leaving 
aside any future developments in the Balkan railway network, the existing 
importance of the lines ending up at Salonica was suoh that "il apparatt 
indispensable que la France ait una politique de Chemins de fer dans ces 
regions et que lion sache profiter des circonstances militaires actuelles 
pour llasseoir sur des bases so11des tt .(4) But it was above all in the field 
of financial and commercial affairs that Sarrail was most active. Supported 
perhaps by backers on the Paris Bourse, the French military commander proved 
not uninterested in the economic veIl-being of Salonica and its hinterland.(5) 
(1) Sarrail: Ope oit., p 293. qompare what Sarrail told Joffre in A~t 1916& 
"Maler' les travaux oonsi~ables dont 11 aut A s'occuper Ie g'nera1 
Sarrai1 ne negligea pas tout ce ,ui pourrait servir l'influenoe fran.aise". e Sarrail to Joffre No. 3571, 10 8!16,16N 31433 
(2) Note au sujet·de la sit_t1on m111ta:Lre en Orient 11/8/15, 5N 132. 
(;) Sarrail to Jogal No. 1120, l4l1~16, 5N 149. 
(4) Note du Colonel Dalauney',chef du Servioe des Chemins de Fer A llEtat-Major 
des Ar.m'es ~11~'~sla/g7l1, (presented~y Lagrosilli~re to the Chamber 
Foreign Affa1ra Gomtai88ion, ;0/3/17), 16N 3139. • 
. 
(5) palmer: Ope oit., p 93. 
Salonica itself was not the worst possible choice as a base for French 
commercial penetration and expansion. Its crucial geographical position 
meant that it inevitably dominated the economic life of the Balkans and its 
influence radiated throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore the 
Society of the Port of Salonioa, Which had been responsible for its construction 
and exploitation was Turkish in name, but, bec&use of overwhelming financial 
commitments, French in fact. (1) In addition the Bank of Salonica, whose 
capital was almost exclusively French, was closely connected with the great 
French financial houses and as the French consul noted, "son concours nous 
sera precieux pour ltexpansion commerciale qui ne manquera pas de se produire 
A la suite des evenements en <;lours". (2) But French commerce had incurred l 
a setback with the imposition at the end of 1913 of heavy new tariffs at 
Salonica following the annexation of the port by Greece as a result of the 
Balkan Wars. (3) As has already been noted, French commercc1al interests in 
Greece itself wee far from neBlgible. In April 1916 the Grand ~uartier General 
argued that agreements should be made to take over pa.rt of the Greek marchant 
fleet and use it to establish a commercial ourrent between Marseilles and 
Greece which would continue after the war.(4) Similarly Guillemin thought 
that France should make use of the exoeptional war oircumstances, which 
enabled her to exclude all Austrian and German imports to develop her own 
trading links with Greece. (S) From the Arm&~ d l Or1ent Intendant Bonnier 
urged that the control of Greek food supplies by the allies oould be used 
to favour French imparts, (6) while de Vitrolles, the Commercial AttachG 
in Athens, stated that he saw his mission as not only to oatrol all imports 
into Greece but also, as far as possible, to favour French commerce.(7) 
But he was pleased to report that he and his English opposite number were 
working in loyal cooperation. (8) 'lhesa efforts" hCMever, were as nought 
when compared with~e Single-minded determination with which, under Sarraills 
direction, the attempt was made to use the military presence of the Armee 
dtOrient at Salonica to create an almost monopolistic control by France of the 
commercial life of Macedonia. ' 
(1) Delcasse to Millerand ~lO/lS, A. E. 1Guerra l , Vol. 1030. 
(2) Graillet to Br:lJlad. No. 24,19/2/16, ibid, Vol. 252 •. 
(3) See, for example, complaints of Union des Chambres Syndica1es ~onnaises, 
10/1/14, A. E. tN.S.', Vol. 11. 
(4) Note by 2e Bureau ~4.Il6, 16N 2917. 
(S) Guillem1n to Briand No.50~, 3/3/16, A. E. I Guerre l , Vol. 300. 
(6) Note sur le ravitaillement de la population-civile en Grece 31/3/16, ibid. 
(7) Report by de Vitro11es 2/S/16, ibid Vol. 301. 
(8) ibid 11/S/16, ibid. 
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Bonnier indeed was very critical of de Vitrol1es for doing next to nothing 
to create a movement of FrenCh products into Greece and claimed that the 
Commercial Attache had expressed his reluctance to "oherCher A faire gagner 
de llargent a la France en un pareil moment". (1) The result was that a 
divergence arose between the polioies of the oommercial bureaux of Athens snd 
Salonioa, the latter under the direotion of Bonnier, whioh persisted under de 
Vitrolles l suocessor Grenard. Leooq noted that Grenard believed his job was 
in the first instanoe to interoept oontraband and only seoondarily to favour 
French commerce. The essential task of the Salonioa Bureau, on the other hand, 
was seen to be the development of France's trading links. Lecoq saw Grenard1s 
attitude as an abuse of an exceptional and privileced situation lfhiah {!love 
the allies a practioal monopoly of all Greek transaotions. Nevar had suoh an 
occasion presented itself ~o develop commercial relations whiCh it would be 
the task of French producers and exporters to cDnfirm and render permanent. 
Lecoq bld heard it said that GemBlq' was bulding up in her factoriss huge 
stocks of manufactu.red gpods, which she would release upon the world as soon 
as the high seas had been reopened. to her trade. This m:i.Bht or might not 
be true, but Lecoq &Sserted that Frenohmen must be· "bien naits ou bien 
imprevoyants" not to profit from their effective control of the Greek economy. 
He himself had recognised the problem as earl1 as 1915 when he had created 
the Association France-GrIce to facilitate economic intercourse between 
France and Salonica. But'll9W France1s diplomatio 86ents in Greeoe were in 
daIl8er of letting escape "une oooasion qui ne se retournera plus d'aupenter 
notre rayonnement oommeroial et de nou.s ox:$er en oe pays UD& olien~le 
durable et fidele". In oritioising the activities of the Salonica bureau t 
Grenard failed'to realise that oontrabod vas materiall1 impossible at 
Salonica because France was in control of the port and of the oustoms. He 
could not understand that.thare was absolualy no danger in imports to 
Salonica, which, on the oont~, offered substantial advantages to Frenoh 
trade. At Athens, moreover, he was in danger of allOWi%lg Eneland to take 
the lead in the oompetition for the Greek market. The contrast with Salonica 
was stark: "Ici on lutte. ~ A.thltnes on ne lutte pas; au contraire on suit 
~ '. 
lIAngleterre". 
Lecoq noted with satisfaction that Sar.rail, on the other hand, had a 
clear understanding of thtrole of the azmy whioh he commanded in the extension 
of French influence. It .... , tor example, entirely within the orbit of the 
A~e dtOrient, lMcoq ar~,,$Mt it .howd assist in the founding of sChoo19 
which would spread the ~.,h 1~ and, by extension, French influence. 
(1) Note by Abrami 11/5/16; Painlev' MSS, 313 AP 109. 
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Undoubtedly it had a primary mi11tar,y task to accomplish when th~aited 
reinforcements, the climate and the political situation in the Balkans 
permitted, but in the meantime the ar.my should not forget its duty to leave 
behind it other traces in Macedonia than those of blood. It would bequeath 
something permanent and durable in the form of increased econanic acn vi ty 
wi th France. At the time Leooq wrote, the azmy was in the process of drawing 
up a commercial dossier to put French and Macedonian merchants and business-
men in touch with one ano$her. Special contacts had already been established 
Yith ~ons through the enthusiasm of its radical.socialist mayor, Edouard 
Herriot, with the result that Maoedonian industrialists would be represented 
at the .ext ~onnaise trade fair. Under the influence of BOnnier, moreover, 
- "un des esprits les plus ouverts et les plus pNcis de llAnnee dlOrient 
et dont llactivite egale la lucidite d1esprit" - Sarrail hal given his 
approval to a proposed circular to be signed by himself and widely distributed 
among commercial organisations in France. So Lecoq concluied by expressing 
his wiah that France would continue to interest herself in the Sal<mica 
market, which offered a potential outlet for commeroe, the extent of Which 
people in France had as yet no ooncept.(l) 
Lecoq also set out his views in a letter to Grenard. While the blockade 
of Greece should be rigorous for milit&r,1 goods, at the same time it vas in 
all other cases indispensable ,to develop French exports. From this moment 
onwards it was France's ob1.sat1on to enlarge the volume of mr foreign trade 
and in an area such &s Itloedonia, placed under her direct supervision, it 
would indeed be shortsighted not to profit f10m an exceplonally favourable 
situation to further Frencm interests in the Near-East. (2) Shortly after-
wards General Sarrailhim8elf showed that he fully merited the faith Which 
Lecoq had in his foresight "beD he pve & detailed expose of the Macedonian 
commercial situation and the role whioh France ought to play in it in a long 
despatch to Briand. Barrail arsued that it would be fatal for Francels 
economic interests in the area for Macedonia to be treated as one with Greece. 
Because of her militar1 presenoe Franoe .erciaed an absolute control over 
imports ooming into Balanioa. Her Situation 1n Maoedonia vas thus 
unprecedented and was tantamount to an economi.o sovereignty. The po si ti on 
of Salonica, mcreover, nth a quarter of a million inhabitants itself and 
being the port of transit for the Whole of the Balkan peninsula, made the 
tt •• 
(1) Lecoq to :Bourgeois 26/7/16,: Bourgeois le8, Vol. 9. 
(2) Lecoq to Grenard 24/1/16, ibid. 
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prospects particularly favourable for French industrialists and merchants to 
replace the pre-war Austro-German domination of a very sizeable market. In 
addition Sarrail expressed the belief that when finally he was able to launch 
an offensive from Salonica this held out the hope of bringing Serbian and 
:Bulgarian territories within the economic orbit of the port. In such a 
situation the task of the ~e d'Orient would be self-evident, "IA encore 
noue aurons A preparer l'apres-guerre par l'introduction immediate-de nos 
••• 
produits et de nos marques sur les places reconquises par nos amees". 
As far as articles not restricted by the bloQkade Were concerned, one could 
not encourage French industry too forcefully to export as much as POSsible so 
as to create, while the war was still in progresB, "lfhabitude et:le godt des 
produi ts fran9aislI. The need was to draw the mallhants of Salonica both 
politically and econanioallytnto the French orbit. Import permits should 
therefore be granted on a scale coDllll8nBurate With the great economic future 
which lay open to Franc....,e in Macedonia. Sarrail concluded by showing how far 
he envisaged the activities of his ~ as the vehiole of post-war French 
domination: "Ainsi seraient sauvegardes ••• les int~rOts des populations qulil 
noue appartient de gagner ~ lfinfluence fran9aise et l'aven1r du commerce et 
de l'industrie fran9ais dont l'expansion doit suivre en Orient plus que 
part out ail leurs la victoire de nos armestt.(l) _ 
Grenard took advantage of this speoific statement of Sarrail's views to 
put before the Quai dlOrsay his own opinions on the problem. He agreed that 
the commercial bureaux ~ AtheDs and Salonica should show the liveliest regard 
for the present and future deYalopment of French commerce and also that 
~cedonia offered excellent opportunities to deflect the current of Salonica.'s 
trade away from the Aus t~Ge%'m8a stranglehold in which it had previously 
existed. :But he believed that. & restricted importation, compatible with the 
maintenance of the blookade, would be adequate to acquaint the market with 
French goods and to prepare for the future. Whatever France did now, the mer_ 
chants of Salonioa would. l'8turn ·&fter the war to those suppliers whose 
conditions they found most !avour_ble. Indeed France was in no position to 
supply more than a small proportion ct'the needs of the area. The majority 
would have to come from EDg1&D4 and EI1pt, and ~sh trade should be treated 
on a basis of equalif.(2)Grenart noted that the Salonioa bureau took no 
notice of the limitations 1mpqsed on imports into Greece with a. view to reducing 
. , • -, • J ' 
(1) Sarrail to Briand No. 164,3/8/16, A.. E. tGuerra't Vol. 302. 
(2) Grenard to Briand No. 10,26/8/16, ibid. 
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enemy contraband. It even ignored the quotas which it itself had fixed for 
certain art1cles.(1) 
Interestingly enough the ~uai d'Orsay came down on the side of Grenard 
and Briand informed Sarrail that he could not be party to a plan Which took 
no account of the Anglo-Egyptian trade and which ignored the necessity for an 
agreement with the British government. Sarrail was theDiore instructed to 
conform the principles 'Uilon which his commercial bureau was organised with 
those of its counterpart in Athens. (2) The government had seemed to be lOSing 
touch with the divergenoe of polioy between its &gents in Greece and, as a 
Quai dlOrsay offiaial noted, it was as well to profit from the fact that both 
parties had written to Paris to let them know that above them both was 
"un gouvernement qui dirige l'aotion frangaise au dehors et qu'eux: n'ont 
quIA ex~cuter".(3) But in fact Sarrail had already taken major intiatives 
to put his own policies into effeot. 
On the first day of August the General had addressed a circular to the 
Presidents of the Chambers of Commerce in Franoe, settill8 out the organisation 
at Sala1ca of the ICommeroial Bureau for French Importations'. He expressed 
his conviction that they would wish to be assooiated with an enterprise Whose 
aim was to create immediately an outlet for French industry Which would 
greatly expand after the war. "»'velOPJ»8l" ~ ltheure pr'sente l'exportation 
fran~aise, ctest pNparer lavictoire et s'an aaaurer d'avance tous les 
fruits". Sarrail expla1nedthat the oreation of the Commercial Bureau under 
Bonnier responded to a unique aituatiaa in whiah the Macedonian market found 
itself devoid of goods and in wblCh French suppliers had no serious competition. 
Sarrail therefore proposed to aot·as liaison between French producers, Who 
would write to Worm him Of'the nature of their goods and the quantities they 
were able to supply, andpo~~tlal blqerB in SaJ.onica. Once contact had been 
established the two part!es vOul4 be able to conduot their business directly. 
A certain and stable olientele woUld thus be bU1.l t up for French manufacturers t 
which would assure for Francen~, ce mar~, pour ltapNs-guerre, la premiere 
place". (4) As :Berthelot noted. Sarra11 was looking to prepare for the 
, t-i 
(1) Grenard to Briand lio •. is,'i6/9/l6 , A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 302. 
(2) Briand to Sar.rail 26ftJ~~6,ibid. 
(3) minute b;y Paan. oni)1c!-~.", i - - - . 
(4) Sarrail to Presidents of J':NnQhChambers of Commerce 1/8/16, A. E. tN.S.t, 
Vol. 53. ' " •.. ,' ~ 
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"economic conquest of Macedonia" by profiting from the exceptional situation 
which resulted from Francels military OOCup&tion.(l) At all events Sarrail 
must have been heartened by the response in France to his initiative. Lecoq 
reported on 20 August that the last mailbag had contained thirty letters from 
French merchants wishing to start trading with Salonica, (2) while after less 
than three months an increase in business in the order of 600,000 francs was 
noted. Such organisations as the Salonica Commercial Bureau thus represented 
a "precious hope for the future", and should be regarded as a model to be 
copied elsewhere.(}) Bonnier found the sucoess of the new enterprise 
encouraging. In a fortnight he had received }OO letters from French 
industrialists, whom he had put in touoh with business houses in Salomon. His 
only regret was that the administrative authorities in France had sometimes 
been intransigent over the question of exportation permits. Bonnier hoped 
that these restrictions would be removed for all goods unrelated to warfare. 
All the efforts of France Whould be united to facilitate the extension of her 
economic interests in the area, which was the basic prerequisite of French 
influence in the Near-East.(4) Indeed by the end of January 1917 Bonnier noted 
with satisfaction that permits were now granted by the Customs Offices in 
Marseilles instead of the Derogations Commission in Paris. This WAS 
calculated to speed up considerably the administration involved in the export 
of goods to Salonioa and reflected "ltinterlt que temoigne le Gwvernement de 
la R.8publique au d,eveloppement des relations ... qui unissent la France au 
grand port de la Mer Egee". (5) By the beginnirlg of October Bonnier had received 
850 enquiries as a direct result of Sarraill,s circular, and confidently predicted 
that the re-ocoupation of Serbian territories would lead to an extension of 
the Bureau's aotivities and service. This expansion would, he trusted, enable 
him to make use of Pa.inlev8ls agent in the Armee dlOrient, Paul Fleurot. (6) 
Gradually Frenabmen were made aware of the possibilities Which resulted 
in the Balkan peninsula from the occupation of their axmy. Charles Debierre, 
Senator for the Nord, noted that Salonica could become one of the chief parts 
of the Mediterranean, capable of receiving the largest merChant vessels. 
(1) Minute b,y Berthelot on Sarrail to Presidents of French Chambers of Commerce 
~8/16, A. E. tN.S.t, Vol. 5}. 
(2) Lecoq to Bourgeois 20/8/16" BourgeoiS 1-155, Vol. 9. 
(}) Report by Meunier-Surcouf (Deputy) 25/10/16, Painlev' ~55, 313 AP 109. 
(4) Bonnier to ~'an 7/9/16, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. }02. 
(5) ibid )0/1/17, ibid, Vol. }04. 
(6) Bonnier to Bourguignon 3/10/16, Painleve 1-lS5, 313 AP 58. 
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Yroreover the hhterland of the port was extremely fertile and offered genuine 
prospects of agricultural development: "Les plaines de la Nacedoine peuvent 
~tre d1un grand avenir pour qui saura les mettre en valeur". And in the 
face of all this potential wealth Debierre was gratified to see that Sarrail 
line neglige rien pour augmenter llinfluence de la France en Orientll.(l) By 
the beginning of the new year Bonnier sensed that a fresh spirit was animating 
French businessmen and industrialists. The Chambers of Commerce had responded 
splendidly to the initiative of Sarrail and had given their fulle~upport. 
The example of Senator Herriot in creating a permanent Lyons-Macedonia 
Committee had been followed in Dijon, Grenoble and Marseilles. (2) In addition 
the Chambers of Commerce in Bordeaux, Rouen, Toulouse, Beauvais, Orleans, 
Angoul§me, Nancy, Belfort, Bes8ngon and Limoges were in the process of 
organising regional committees, which would be grouped in Paris. The initial 
results by which 75% of goods arriving at Salonica were Frenoh were such as 
to promise the widest extension of French economic power in ~mcedonia and, 
as a result, throughout the Near East.(3) Apart from simply putting the two 
sides in touch with one another, the Commercial Bureau offered several more 
specific serviees. B,y building up a oollection of French samples and 
catalogues open to the inspection of the looal merchants, the Bu:reau was able 
to supply potential b~ers in Maoedonia with acourate information necessary 
to complete their orders. Seoondly, by tapping the information provided by 
banks and private hformers, the Bureau had built up a file on 1200 firms in 
Macedonia, the details of which were at the disposal of French traders. 
Bonnier guaranteed to provide information within three days on any Salonican 
fim about which he had reoeived an enquiry from France. Then the Bureau 
published a monthly Commeroia1 Btilleth which contained studies on the natural : 
resources of Macedonia and the needs of the area in terms of manufactured goods ~ 4)1 
i 
(1) Artiole in Le,·.J!:Ui!W.&l 11/10/16, Painlev' MSS, 313 AP 111. 
(2) InterestlDBl1 enoush the Marseilles and ~ons Chambers of Commeroe ~d 
campaigned for the establiShment of a French protectorate in Syria as ear~ 
as 1915, C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya Forstner,The French Colonial Partz 
and Frensh Qo1onial War Aims 1914-18 - Historioal Journal, March 1974, 
P 98. 
(3) Note by Bonnier in Ciroular of National Assooiation of Economic ExpanSion 
25/1/17, A. E. IN.5.', Vol. 53. 
(4) Note on the Commeroial Euxeau 24/10/17, 5N 287. 
The first of these publications set out suocinctly the aims of the 
economic activity of the Arm&e d'Orient, "II faut d~s l present cr&er 
un courant d'affaires entre la France et la Macedoine (}U la presence et 
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Ie prestige de nos armes aussi bien que l'emploi tr~s repandu de notre 
langue noUB procurent une place privilegi'e et nous~ermettent d'esperer 
un grand avenir". A t the end of the war French commerce would thus find 
the way open and the route prepared. But at that point it Would not be 
Salonica and }~cedonia alone, but all the Balkan states Which Would be in 
need of supplies. ~e effort expended during the war would then bear fruit. 
To export to Macedonia while the war oontinued would no doubt have its own 
immediate advantages, but above all it meant reserving in advance the 
Balkan peninsula for the French sphere of int'luenoe. (1) This theme was 
taken up in the November issue of the Bulletin, which stmssed the need for 
French commerce and industry to interest themselves in the Serbian market. 
When Serbia had recovered her territorial integrity her population would be 
in need of almost complete re-equipment as a result of the devastations 
of the war. This situation would offer partioularly favourable opportunities 
to French suppliers, who at the current moment occupied only a very 10li1y 
place among Serbia's commeroial partners.(2) ~e crucial period in the 
struggle for economic supremacy vas seen to be that which would immed1ate~ 
follOW the cessation of hostilities. At that time immense works of 
reconstruction would have to be undertaken involving vast orders for 
manufactured goods. But the country whioh could seize these opportuni tie s 
would be that which offered favourable credit facilities to its merchants: 
"La nation qui pourra 1 ce moment-ll offrir du cNdit 1 ses exportateurs 
~ " "' 
sera usurae de la p~ence future sur ce march'''. 'The Commercial Bullittin 
therefom proposed the creation of a National Commercial BBJlk for the Near_ 
East, wh1ob. would offer extensive credit facilities. If France wanted her 
influence in the area to s1lZ'Vive the passage of her soldiers, this influence 
must be based on positive and ooncrete interests and the proviSion of 
oredit remained the basic and indispensable ozmdi tion of all economic 
actiVity. (3) Other isSues of the journal dealt with the need to Fovide 
adequate transp .. t facUiti •• between Macedonia and France commensurate with 
the efforts being made at both ends of the route to develop French interests. 
(1) Bulletin COIIDl8rcial de MaoMo:ine No.1, 1/9/16, A. E. 'Guerre' Vol. 302. 
(2) ibid No. " 1/11/16, Painlev' MSS, 313 AP 110. 
(3) ibid No.4, 1/12/16, ibid. 
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The danger was that commercial activity would be built up at Salonica for 
the benefit of others, for if the Greek merchant was obliged to receive 
his goods from Italian vessels he would soon came to the conclusion that it 
would be easier to place his orders in Naples than in Narseille s. It would 
be impolitic and dangerous to allow the ~~nch flag to be surpassed in the 
Eastern Mediterranean - an area whose freedom was guaranteed by the presence 
of l!"'rench arms - when it could and ought to occupy "la place qua nul ne 
songe a lui contester: la premiere".(l) A further issue examined the 
agricultural potential of Hacedonia and conclude,! that Sa10nica could 
become, what it had been in ancient times, the granary of the southern 
B.;.lkans. (2) 
In all this preparation for 'l'apres-guerre' Sarrail himself was deeply 
committed. Stead reported that Sarrail~as a political general, not a 
military one and that he knew that financial and economic success would 
better please his political supporters than military progress. (3) Bonnier 
informed Lord Granville that Sarrail passed or refused and sign~d with his 
own hand every single application for a permit to export goods from the 
district. This was "hardly the work for a Commander-in-chief of allied 
arJllies in the field". (4) Sarra!l also made use of the postal censorship 
and by it learnt which local merchants sent their orders to Franoe and which 
to other countries. The latter were not infrequently the objects of thinly 
veiled threats and perseoutions inflioted with a view to persuading them to 
change their ways. (5) With pride the general informed War Minister, 
painlev', that of a monthly total value of 22 million francs in imparts to 
Salonioa 16 millions were French. :aut he warned ths.t Shipping facilities 
were quite inadequate to sustain this commercial expansion and the. t Genoa 
might replace Marseilles as the principal port for the Salonica trade if 
steps were not t$ken tmmediately.(6) Yet, surprisingly enough, Grenard 
reported that sinoe Briand's strictures to Sarrail the commercial bureaux 
of Salonica and Athens had worked hand in hand and that agreement had been 
reaohed on the quantities of imports which could be authorised into 
(1) Bulletin Commeroial de Mao8doine No.2, 1/10/16, Painlev9 MSS, 313 AP 5~. 
(2) ibid No. 10, 1/6/17, ibid 313 Ap 95. 
(:~) Stead to LlQyd George 12/3/17, CA.] 24/8/249. 
(4) Granville to Lloyd George 6/2/11, Lloyd George l1SS, F 55/;/1. 
(5) Villari, OPe cit., p 59. 
(6) Sarrail to PaiDleve No. 651, 2/4/11, 5N 153. 
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~~cedonia.(l) But whatever Grenard might believe the contrast between the 
two offices remained marked. Admittedly the Athens Bureau ensured that 
France benefitted substantially from the disappearance of Gemany from the 
Greek market, but relations with the English authorities had been conducted 
on a basis of a "partage egal des importations et de la client~lell.(2) 
Concern for France's economic standing in Macedonia recei~ed a boost 
with the appointment of de Billy as French representative to the Greek 
provisional government of Venizelos. On arrival de Billy made it known to 
the Greek statesman that he could count on his support for Veniselos l ideas 
only in so far as they were compatible with the interests of France.(;) 
Indeed it was not long before de Billy reflected that the gratitude of the 
peoples of the area was directed more towards the allies who had enriohed 
was 
the province of Macedonia than to Venizelos himself. The need therefore/fur 
a pact with the commercial element in Greeoe to safeguard France's future.(4) 
To strengthen France's standing at Salonica itself de Billy called for a 
subtle campaign of propaganda among the large Jewish population of the port 
to convince them of the benefits of a Frenah teconomio proteotorate'. Their 
natural inclination was to favour the commerce of Germany, but Franoe would, 
after the war, need to rely in the Eastern Maditerranean on a community 
familiar with the methods of modern trade.(5) But de Billy was also anxious' 
that the commercial effects of the military occupation of Macedonia should 
be felt over Greece as a whole, where the economic situation of Franoe, 
despite large capital investment, was not strong. He noted that of a total 
volume of imports into Greeoe of l1;i million trancs per annum, France on 
pre-war figures was s~pl.ying only lot millions agains t the 37 millions of 
Germany and Austria. (6 
(1) Grenard to Briand No. 62, 20/11/16, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 303. 
(2) Commercial attaChe for the Levant to Briand No. 15, 4/3/17, ibid Vol. 305. 
(3) de Billy to Briand No.1, 10/1/11, ibid Vol. 289. 
(4) ibid No. 22,28/2/11, ibid. 
(5) de Billy to Bibot No. 42,10/4/17, ibid Vol. 291. 
(6) ibid No. ",24/3/11. A. E. 'N.S.', Vol. 19. French financial commitments 
in Greece far exceeded those of the other great powers. The Chamber 
'heard in June 1917 that "en 'valllant l un milliard et demi le chiffre 
de ltargent fran~1s en G~ce nous tenons A une limite certainement 
inf!~.ure ~ la v.~t,n. ~s figure 'was q.wble that of England, ten 
times that qf RUSSia, thirty times greater than that of Germany and 
fifty times the contribution made by Italy. Report of de Chappedelaine 
and others on the Arm&e dlOrient 1/6/17, A. E. 'Guerre', Vol. 1042. 
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.L.ctivity among the Israelites of Salonica inevitably brought France into 
conflict once more ~ith the ambitions of Italy. De Billy reported in 
February 1911 that Francels rival had installed a Commercial Bureau at 
3alonica and that her navigation services were more frequent than those 
between Nacedonia and Marseilles. Italy was delaying as long a.s possible her 
recognition of the Provisional Government so as to ingratiate herself with 
the Salonica Jews who were opposed to Venizelos f policy of hellenisation, 
since they feared that this would have a damaging effect on their commerce. 
France,ls representative concluded that "l'Italie cherche done A accrottre ses 
inter~ts et A se czier una clientele A notre detriment". (1) A. 'report on 
the same problem, originating at Sarrail's headquarters, remarked that, bad 
Italy been thinking in terms of serioUS military operations from Salonica, 
she would have sent a substantial armed force. But by sending only a division 
the Italians revealed their concern only to defend a position Where they 
considered they had interests to safeguard and to undertake an econcmic 
, 
propaganda, the essential features of whiCh had, been determined by the 
Italian government. Their true intentions had been revealed by the creation 
at Salonica of a Masa:azi,ne ltaliapo, destined not only to compet~th French 
establiShments) but to become, after the war, an immense depot of Italian 
merchandise. (2 As the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber heard in 
Harch 1911, the danger existed, 1£ France did nothing to avert it, that it 
would be Italy Which would occupy the position previously held by Gemany 
and Austria in the l1acedonian market. The action of the Italian consul at 
Salonica was tttres dangereuse" for the interests of France. lie cultivated 
the friendShip of the leading local businessmen and was ambitious and 
extremely active in his country's interests. France could expect to find 
Italian competition stronger than ever after the war. The need therefore was 
to resist this threat and to do so immediately. (3) 
The warnings of the ~e d'Orient on Italyts commercial aspirations 
were widely ciroulated among France's diplomatic and consular agent:J~ Not 
surprisingly the most forthright and interesting response came from Barrere 
in Rome. In the, first instance he was aaxious to point out that this 
revelat.19P of Italy's determ1nation to use her military presence to foster her 
(1) delJill1'to :Briand lfo. 10, 5/2/17, A. E. 'Guerre t , Vol. 289. 
(2) Bapport sur 1a P.ro~ Italienne aupr~B de 1a population israelite 
de Salonique 14/2/17, l6N ;144; l6N ;1;9~ 
(3) Note sur les procea.es de conourrence oommerciale des Italiens A Sa10nique 
- annexed to report of M. Lagrosil~re (presented 30/3/11) 161f 3139. 
commerciat1~d political ambitions in the Near-East only confirmed his own earlier 
warnings. He believed moreover that Italy's aspirations were not restricted 
to the area of Salonica itself but amounted to a desire to exercise a voice 
in the final arrangement of all the problems of the Near-East - whether they 
were in Salonica, Greece or Asia Minor. But at the same time Barrare was now 
struck by the fact that the Italians at Salonica had done no more than 
imitate the example of France. For the report of the Arm&e d'Orient itself 
revealed that the French themselves, before Italian troops even arrived on the 
scene, had been doing all they could to develop France's influence and favour 
her commerce. Pertinently Barrare noted that it was not with the Chambers 
of Commerce of Liverpool or Manchester, but rather those of Lyons, Marseilles 
and Bordeaux that the Salonica Commercial Bureau had sought to establish 
links. In such circumstances could France really feign surprise that Italy 
now sought to bring on to the Salonica market the goods of Milan, Turin and 
(2) Naples7 
Thus, because of the exceptional circumstances imposed by France's 
military occupation, Macedonia, and particularly Salonica, came to appear 
as a separate entity under its own administration, for France was never able 
to exert the same sort of absolute control over the whole of Greece. As one 
observer put it, the port of Salonica became marked with the French stamp. (3) 
Indeed, in terms of recent hiator.1, Macedonia was but tenuously connected with 
Greece, since Greece had come iDto possession of the province only as a result 
of her victories in the Balkan Wars. The imposition of Greek administration 
upon the area had, moreover, exercised a damaging effect on its economy. In 
the early months of the war French diplomacy, under the influence of Delcass&'s 
wooing of Bulgaria, had shown no fixed view of the map of the Balkans. 
Macedonia had been seen rather as a pawn in a territorial power game, the 
correct conclusion of which might be hoped to settle the tranquility of the 
peninsula. (4) At the beginning of the Salonica campaign Boissonnas had reported 
to Briand that the Jews of the port, sensitive to the damage which was being 
done to their interests by Greek rule, would become distinctly francophile at 
(4) 
See above p 262 
Barrire to Briand 17/3/17, No. 163, A.E. 'Guerre', Vol. 1041. 
Report D7 Meunier-Surool1fon "Situation navale en Orient" for the 
"ColIIDission de la Marine de Guerre" 27/10/16, Painlev& MSS, 313 AP 109. 
A.E. 'Guerre', Vol. 217 (Balkans, Dossier G~n~ral), passim. 
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the prospect of Salonioa being made a free at V and. placed UDder allied 
protection. If such a aolution were not poaeible the Jew1ah oololQ' would 
prefer to see Salonioa fall 1mder J.uatrian rather than Greek mle. (1) 
The future acba1n1stration of MaoedOl1i& waa tl:au of obvious conoern 
to li'renchmen and a pariioulR17 influential paper on the abject was wr1 tten 
and widel7 circulated b7 the joumaliat and .xperi on Jalk8ll attair., 
Rene Pinon. In a copnt ana.l.7ais of the BalkM aituation in the BWIIIIer 
of 1916, entitled r.,t.&:nnir Jallamisu, Pinon C'p8d that the arH. Was 
a QDssroada for both amiea and historic trade rou.te.. !he Germana saw 
the line from Hamburg to :Baedad as the axis of & future German .pire 
dominating the Old World, and the ke7 to bzeakins this vision now and tor 
the future 1&7 in the Jalkalls. BIt the &ima ot Ge~ we:r:e not 1;be onl.7 
oonsiderations which hanoe .. t bear in aiDd. .1t the .nd of the we the 
quest for & stable peace in tba var-torD peniaaul& would ..... itate the 
establishment of & .h'oac GrHoe to OOUDterbalaDoe Italian upirationa. 
Horeoftr it atter the VIR eaa.tm"1.aopl.. abo1Il4 tall "'1' the dca1natioo 
of ltWJeia the po11q ot .... tem all1 •• wO'llcl D&~ be to look tor 
a oounterweisht 111 tile Ballaiae to an Oftr-llilllv lluaian aapi1'8. P1non 
ars-d that ~ iDhabitaDta ot the &ft& ahaftclbla oonviotion that tba1'8 
oould n .... r be prmine ata'b11i t.r ill'" alba. =t1l Kaoedonia, which as 
oowted b7 all ita _1&11 __ ., vu Ht 1I'P .. an iD4ependent, &1ltoDOJIOUII 
etate under tba pro1ieotic of the Allie.. Uter a period ot parhape & 
deoacle itllisht be politto to allow .... unia to joill 0118 of ita -i8hboura 
if it ao wiabec1.. :lilt iD the .-ntt. tbe al1i.e would haft 111 th81r 
handa -oette Yille CIa 1alGD1~ qui •• t 1. vlritabl. O8I1tre Honomiqu du 
:Ballam oooiclental .t 1. cII1aoa.oW CIa. plaine. claDub1 ... a nr 1& _r lIde-. 
!he porf; IliBbt 'beooMtbe oeDtaot & '8aJ1ran federation wbioh would oloa. 
p81'M1W'1U7 the cloor t1rN1i&h which Gemaa:y hoped to extend aaatw&1."da. 
lforeov.1' 1;0 taD Jfaoedon1a .,., rz.o. Cneoe would haft the poei ti va val_ 
of ~ Jar t.Na ..... tem&l. 1Ierr1tor1al wnq1e. ot the JaJkNl atatea 
and 1 ...... her bI,",~ PftJliNCl to reai8t Italian upaaa101l ill the lIutem 
!1141 teraD... lIIat &'110ft &ll .lae 1 t had to be 1'8al1eecl that it Ge~ 
....... ill OGallti:_ti.D8 a • ttel!pop! u:tel'ld1ns iDto the Jal Jam. and 
bq4III4 ..... it 1f01Il4 be bue4 OIl & 1IU'bItern..nt '&3'p;r1a aDd. & reorpn1aed 
(1) Joi •• ODU to IriaDcllfo. 1, 7/12/15, A. B. 'a..rret , Vol. 10~5. 
Ottoman Empire under German~protection, the hegemony of the German Empire 
would be established in Europe once and for all. At all costs, therefore, 
the allies must out this menacing chain of territorial control. Furthermore 
it was France herself who was most gravely threatened for, even if Germany 
exhausted and half-conquered, agreed to return to France Alsace-Lorraine 
and to Belgium her independence, if she still succeeded in realising 
her schemes in the Near-East, she would have obtained such an advantage 
that there would be no room in Europe for more than one great power _ 
Gennany herself. Russia would be able to look to Asia and think in terms 
• 
of expansion eastwards; England would remain the great maritime power with 
a vast co1oni~ Dnpire; but France would be left alone in Europe to face 
an overlarge Germany. It was imperative therefore that a bar~e against 
Gennan expansion should be erected in the Balkans to save France from 
"un p~ril de mort." ( 1 ) 
Pinon developed his idea that the solution to this menacing situation 
lay in the creation of an autonomous Macedonia in a second paper written 
a little over a month later. Stressing that such an arrangement would 
receive the overwhelming support of the comercial community in Salonica, 
Pinon argued that the great port, because of its geographical posittn, 
would always be of cardinal economic importanoe and consequently of 
equivalent political importance. Whoever held Salonica was automatically 
master of the economic development of the peninsula and hece of its 
political future. From the point of view of the allies, therefore, the 
retention of Salonica should be seen as a precious oounter in the process 
of reorganising the Balkans to the best of their interests. Macedonia 
could thus represent, when the war Was over, the means by which the allies 
would retain a cormnanding say in the affairs of the area - and it was an 
area where past experience had shown that they could not afford to become 
d ' 't t d (2) 1sm eres e • 
Writing from the War Ministry, to which he was attached, Pinon sent 
both memoranda to the Quai d'Orsay and expressed the hope that they might 
receive attention. He was often asked his opinion on such questions and 
wanted to be sure that he was in line with the broad framework of the 
(1) L'Avenir Ba1kanigue 12/6/16, 16N 2944; A.E. 'Guerre', Vol 221. 
(2) L'Autonomie de 1& .ao~oine 20/7/16, A.E. 'Guerre', Vol 221; Vol. 257. 
· M" t' l' (1) Fore1gn 1n1S ry s po 1CY. Although conscious of the advantages which 
France herself might gain from his projects, Pinon did at least envisage 
the creation of an autonomous Macedonia under joint allied protection~ 
Others who took up his ideas, however, showed a more partisan approach. 
In August 1916 the Society of National Propaganda in Paris produced a paper 
on La Question Mac~doniennet which pointed out that many officers and men 
in the AImee d'Orient favoured the straightforward annexation of Macedonia. 
For a variety of self-evident reasons, however, this was not a practical 
solution. What was possible, though, was the creation of an autonomous 
state which would become in the course of a generation "une colonie 
morale de la France, dont la valeur par le rayonnement de la culture 
fran~aise dans le monde serai t tras considftrable". In return for loans to 
the new state;France would claim for her own industrialists and engineers 
orders for public works and mining rights. French would be made the 
official language and France would gain a commanding say in the education 
and upbringing of the country's youth. (2) From the Mission LaIgue at 
Salonica itself Lecoq reported that he had been in contact with Pinon and 
that he shared the latter's conclusions. Lecoq was convinced that the 
peace of the world required the definitive solution of the Macedonian 
question. This could only be done by a drastic revision of the Treaty of 
Bucharest to remove the~,province from the control of Greece. He realised 
that the question must be broached with extreme prudence at the present 
moment, but was certain that there could never be tranquility in Europe 
while the problem remained unresolved. (3) Lecoq admitted that any 
individual was liable to exaggerate the importance of the issues with 
which he was in daily contact, but thought nonetheless that the Macedonian 
question was of paramount significance. He felt justified, therefore, in 
preparing his own report on the subject, which he circulated to sympathetic 
readers including Painlev6 and Lion Bourgeois. (4) 
Whether one liked it or not, Lecoq argued, Macedonia was of interest 
to France and would continue to be so after the cessation of hostilities. 
(1) Pinon to 4e Margerie or Berthelot (incorrectly dated), •• 1. 'Guerre', 
Vol. 221. 
(2) La Question Macftdonienne, 17/8/16, Bourgeois MSS, Vol. 8. 
(3) Lecoq to Bourgeois 21/9/16, ibid, Vol. 9. 
(4) ibid 11/11/16, ibid. 
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The commercial, agricultural. and even industrial potential ot the region 
had not escaped the soldiers ot the '!rmIe d'Orient and tbe7 would not 
acCept that nothing permanent should survive trom the milita:ry ettort which 
]'rance had made. Indeed the7 tried to .'briug bolla to people in J'raaoe the 
tact that Macedonia oontaiDed resourcea ot unexploi ted richnesa which it 
would be poaaible to tap without great ditticulV. Sc'a:l.lta creation ot 
a Oo .. rcial Bureau hacl eunred aound ecoDOJlio relationabipa between Jlranoe 
and Salouica whioh would cont1Due to ~w ~vidinc PnIlce elid not abanclon 
~edon1a to ita own tate at the end ot the war. It waa atter all "m pays 
dont les riches.ea v:lrtuellea sont pmtitl __ nt illiDli tie a et ~ noua avona 
pris pied non -.ul81118nt mili ~nt -.:ia auasi caa.eroialementa • Jut no 
solution to the 8£8-o1d Kacedonian Qaeation tried ao tar had proved 
succ8saf'ul: a completely new approach vaa evidently called tor. From a 
somewhat ditterent stRtiDg point, theretore, Leooq arrived at the 8_ 
conclusion as Pinon that the aalvation ot the 'BR.l1cana and ot J'nDce t • poaition 
there 1&7 in the =eation ot an au1;on~ IfaoecloDia. J.l thoush vasu ideas 
or world-wide ba~ m:1cht ui8t, all Geman IIDd .A.uatrian at1"ateB.Y' was 
centred on the oration ot an lII.pire in the .ear-llUt. !he infamous Dr!p« 
lfach Osten, ao cJ.a.nseroWi tor JlzaDceta future, could onl1' be hal. ted and 
prevented trom _ter1al.iaiDg at a fu'tare ute. iD thia omcial. area ot the 
Balkana. Leooq aaw DO reason 1;0 vish 1;0 weaDl1 Greece - indeed a sUoDg 
Greece would be required 1;0 contain vi tb1n nuonable li111 til the 8mbi tiona 
at lte.l.7 - bat the taot 1IU that the Greek acIIIiaia1iratiOl1 at Haoedonia bad. 
not been a llUCoea. aDd bar outoBa poli07 vu in the prooe_ ot rg1ning the 
C01lllDerce ot Salonica. 1IIIt to 1''8Il10''' Ifaoec1onia troa Greece would not be to 
weaken her, lRlt rather to relie ... her ot the .. d to ~ the province 
against the co ... touaea. 01· ... 1' atatea. !ftae .. , vas evicllGtly tor an 
autoDOmou taoe4oni&' plaoecl .1IIlCIft the proteotoate ot ODe ot tbe powers -
aince a ~ODdCII:bd_ votLLcl ,.,. a 41aaatez vhioh oould only &graftte the 
aitaation at111 taribR. :1m .. 1Iho oould aeroi .. thia p:oteoto1'&te? With 
i.lBp$ooable 10SiO Lecoq 00Il0l'11484 that the tezri torial. aabi tiona ot ltal.7 
and Ruaaia ral..e4 .... _t,wld.le "'Bland vas exoluclecl b7 her laclc: ot intereat 
in the ........... O1ltaida..,.,... Only Jlrmoe theetore bad "una ai tuatien 
morale lui pei'IIIttI.n't .. 'briaur oe JII8Il4a t" • In thia WfQ' hench OOllllD8rce 
and 1Jl4u,.br ~cl ~&P benefits, while the peace ot Burope would be assured. (1) 





Whether the ooncept of an autonomous Ifaoedonia .ver beoa. an accepted 
aspect of French poli07 at the higbeat l.vel ia not olear. Althoush o.rtain 
factors, 8UOh as the creation of a neutral zone, at the end of 1916, tending 
to perpetuate the divisiou of Greece into two paria, would siva support 
to such aD idea, the available evidence is inconolUSive. On ~ val at 
8&1onio& de Bil17 ar.gued that to -.ke the town a fre. port would be to leave 
the WIW open for the Central Powra to raw. their ~t po.ition 
there with the &r.rival of pea.oe. !he in_n.t of the &J.li •• , therefore, was 
to heal the aobi .. and not to oont1ra it. (1) Horeoftl: c1e Bilq .tre ... d 
that in sending reprea.nt&1iive. to the pron,siOD&l l'OveraD8nt, ~land and. 
Franoe had rej.oted the idea of auppcn:tiDc 1I'aoecloD1_ autonOlQ'. (2) But 
even if this had never been .s.opted as heDoh poliq, it rea.:1na an indication 
of the w..,- in which the. problem wu being uamlned in J'ftDoh poliormakiDB 
cirOles. Atter all it wu a DB&n8 ather tDan an .nd, and altho. de 
Billy ruled it out on the grouDda 'bt it opme4 the ".,. to Gemlll dom1Dation, 
the aim of his stra:te8'1' 11&8 .... ntial.ll' the s_ &8 tbat of Lacoq - to 
find the best V8¥ of leav:l.Dc the area optn to Jlzenoh influence and o0Da8roiaJ. 
penetration. Indeed the ftz:r fact that cl8:Billy .antioned the idaa of 
autonOlllJ' BUg'8sta that it Vu wic1ely aprded as at le .. t a po.ailaiV. 
!he question noeiftCl a vicJer a:lriDs .tQ1'8 .... Ohamber J'o1teip .ufaira 
Co.tssion at the end of Jra1:oh 1917, vAeD it wu ftft&led that the 
aoquiai tion of SaloniO& b,y Gfteoe 1&d n81ll.4 in a 2" recluotiOD in the 
volume of trade at the port tzca the lew1 of 1912. !hi. vu 1azply the 
resul t of tariff po1iG7 .4 of .. Gnek Goverrm.ntl • de_zmination to 
favour the Piraeus ra1iber tbIID Salomoa. (3) It vas 1aberetore &'t'p8d. that 
a atrong power should eatal»liah itael1' in JIaoec1oD1& and J'J:aDoe vas the oountrr 
d.e .. ted to gift peaoe to tM. JalJcana. She oClllcl •• tab1iah a sort of 
proteotorate oftr the pov1J:soe ___ ttl wb10h the ......... would. be •••• ntially 
autonOllOU. !bt a4'9aaoe ot Qerwna u4 Slays alike voulcl thu be halted. 
and un oould _ -.de·ot the aploul1;aral, Jlinezal and induatrial potential 
(1) de .BU.l7 ·toBriMd ·.0.1.22/1/17, A.. B. lQuanl, Vol. 289. 
(2) ibicl .0. 10. 5/2/17, ib14. 
(3) 110- .am: 1 •• ooaaIt .... de 114ta.bli • ..."t de 1a once .. s&l.oniqua 
(LIC:L'O.U1ibe'. report of 30/3/17), 16K 3139. 
I !. 
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of the land. "La:ranee .11...... UoUft1'a1 t en Ifao440ine daB placementa 
tas fra.Ctueux, .n mime tempe qut.11. mainti.D4r&:l.t.t cl4valoppera1t 8& 
auprlmatie int811eo1nleU •• t moral. dana 1. pap-. (1) Moreover a maaorandum 
pres.nted on behalf ot the JewiBh _robanta ot Salonioa IlUBB8sted that they 
wanted nothing more thaD tor the port to be placed 11DdAIr -the defini ti va 
occupation of J'nIDoe-'<2), 
Jul.s Oambon noted in J11D8 1917 that the oftioerll cloa8 to Sarrail 
spoke freely ot the n .. d to create an ......". 1Iaoed0l'11a. !'hi. sort of 
l~ was oawaiDB oon081'11 to the Serbian '.., .... -.&t. (,) Caapla:l.nta 
had been :Meeivad trom the Serbian .sm.a. 8Ild PILtnl.ft tI1ou8bt it lXt"l14eIlt 
to re1ll1Dd S&fta11 that nob iIlUlIGftticma Jdsh" 8'1W ris. to miaconeeptiol18 
oonoemiDg the re&l inWntioaa at tbe Pnnob ,.--.at. ~ war lIini.ter 
theretore requested St.r.raU to 3!ea1D4 his ottioera tbat tba7 aboulel Dever 
express ill 1M'lio tIIe~ )ri-_"f1W1 Oil _t ..... , toaip polio;y. (4) In 
reply S&rrail inpUl1CJ1l8l.7 .aa..W that tile· all..-tiona were tal.. anel 
probab17 deriTed troll the ilnWati ... bnin of tlii8n1tian SOftm.nt. (5) 
:BI1t al tboush the Par.t.~ .,ft~t ~ haw cl1IIowed the ooncept of 
Maoedonian aallOlQ', which vaa obv:LOuq, victeJ.7 tavoared aong the lftnch 
- . -' _. . ,~> . , 
milita.r.r and civil O0lWlll1D1. at s&1OD1oa, npport; tor 1;be idea that the 
Armtfe dtOrient w .. the hRbiDpr of poa~'actnn"'s tor J'mDce crew 
" • 1'" 
with the advent of the Il1bot-~m ac1IIb1.tation •. With 1;be new 1OV8:m-
ment just installed c18 ~~Uf wrote ot b aOlUldal which exiated by 
which J'rench boata 1.tt iibeir ~ balt or a.,.n tbna-q:lJRtera 8IlPV. 
Moreover a sol1.t&1;y heDoh·:~~ .. r·1'e~d Sa1onioa aver, t~ or tive weeks 
with 6 or 700 tons of _~.~~ tbI ltal1aDa .. nt a staaaboat ever, 
week. Yet it was throaab" ida ~zrioe that JIraD~ hoped to implant her 
comeroa in Ifaoetlonial(') . ft. the bal"hm~DC of April 1917 both c18 Billy 
,_ ..... ',:..;,.'i.;j::.."f :~ ~ .. _; ,': - , 
md Laooq n.mad ot an 1~1D8 ori81.. !he Coapasn1. des Hasaaprie. 
'. .ii:," :\' ;'i..2~.?·J.;:' I 
Kari times "... intend1l18, to .... ter thI ate_r vb1ch oovered the Maraeille. 
• ,~, 't" ~. '0 "-E.. {" _~, ~. ,. , 
- Salonica route to .... .-·aDcl vu not ·l1.kaly to replace it for at 18&8t 
"J .-'~ ::~ ':"~"" ~ 
(1) Note sur la ',~ ·ti..u'OODri.~t d'4ta'blir .n Kao4doine, ibid. 
(2) HBoire cJd~nts. ~"'a .. 8al.ou1que, ibid. 
(3) .o"'1Q' ~.'."~t,t.~.~ .ta.mt, ··Yol. 1042. 
~ , . , 
- • ' j -, . ,,4h ~.- ' 
(4) Pt.iD1aft to ~;:~,,~,·2'/'/17, 161 2"1. 
(5) SUra1l to Ja1Jalm"" .. l124. 24/6/17 I 161 3145. 
(6) de J'oDtaDaJ'::Iio~1a 24/3/17, !oapo1. lIBS, Yol. 8. 
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three months. In the JIlfNIllt1Dle it WU oerta1n that Genoa would sain trom 
what Marseilles lost and that the iDleDS. ettons made to open up Salonica to 
J'rench COlllll8rc8 would be sacrificed in favour of Francet's "moat darleeroua 
economic and poli.tical rival in the B'.ar .... t, ItalT'. De Ml17 appeal.d to 
Ribot, and Leooq to Bourgeois to reotif7 this diaaatroua prospeot which 
would reduce almost to nothing the n6w 7;' of the Balonioa JlalLZ'ket occupied 
by France. (1) 
De J'ontanay W&1:D8d that alre~ 5 or 6,000 tons of goods were aW&1t1ng 
despatoh to Salonioa at Karaeliles because ot the abaeuoe of transport 
faoili ties, and that th:la backlog would increase 'by' 4000 tons a month until 
1 t reached the point where disheartened Salonioa ~ts would place no 
more orders with J':toano., Be telt that the need vas tor the sate to take 
over a servioe which private enterprise wea eTidentl7 unable to tul£il. Only 
thus oould one ·~di.r .. ce suioide qua notre "m1n1atration impose .. 
notre o01llll8rce". Otberwiae ltali8D8 would aoon a., into the breach in 
providing transport and it would not be lODB bet.. their powers ot persuasion 
oonvinced the bus1nes .. n o~ lfaoed.onia that 1. t VOIIld be advisable to ~ 
directly fram· Ita.l7. ":It TOil .. ooa.nt nouape1'l.ona una olien"'l. nouvelle 
qui ne daDumdait qu'" .'1Idre_r .. no.". .A. ftTOlution was required in the 
bureaucratic machinery in JIrauoe, whioh".. plao1nc .0 ~ iIIlpe~nta in 
the wa.v ot l'renoh oa.eroe. ...r;r JlrallObMn ill the .eR-Baat placed his 
tai th in War Kiniater, PaiDl..~, beoaue U _ nne au.1. t pa.a .. nous 
sauver de notre 'ada1.u1 .... ti.ont , 11 ..,. avz& plu qu'" •• as:l.per". (2) 
Graillet reiterated the.e wamiDp, 'U-HiDe that Jlnnoe was in dlmpr or 
surJ:eDCleriDg to ltal7 tba papondaaDt pl~ which bad been won in the 
MacedoniaD ..matt b;r the 82Mt .rtoria ot t.h8 ocaUate and 8&1:ft:l.l l • 
ccmmeroial orpn18&tiou.JJ8 .. the .olution as lJing in tbe use ot 
requisitioned ves .. le uncSer .ta. tizeotion. (3) In Paris the Quai dtOr~ 
took the matter up wi., .. ,1Ilniatzo.y ot toe JIu:1De &Dd the latter, oonscious 
ot the naecl to "ainten4.z __ 1.Dtl_noe en Orient", at up between :tf&'raeill •• 
and Salon:l.oa • aeni_ nD b7 .1i1:ane .. _1. taken over b7 ita own de~tmant 
and oparatiDBs8m.ou .. ,apl.&1:q ,M po •• ible. (4) On baa Bteamships 
.- -." ~ .. 
(1) de BUl7 toD~ .••• 96)q!?lr,tGu.:=e.:, Vol. 306; Leooq to Bourgeois 
4/4/17, Bo1Jr&'8o~- •. Tol. 9. . 
(2) de J'ontel3&7 ~~o~ 7!4/17, Bourpoi. MSS, Vol. 8. 
(:~) G1'Idllet toBibot.o~ 28, ',0/4/17, .1. B. 'Guerra', Vol. 306. 
(4) Har1ne to JIoreip Atta:l.1'8 Bc. 454, 22/6/17, ibid, Vol. "507. 
200 tons were to be re8en11d for JIreuoh tima which bad oontracts vi th the 
A.r.mIte d'Or.ient, while 'the' reat w01l1d be lett tor the ae ot private Frenoh 
merobants. (1) De :ronte...,. s't.res_d'that there could be no letting up in 
France's efforts. For, apart from the Italian threat, only visorous Frenoh 
eoonomic activity, suatained ewn ar* the war was OV8r, oould prewnt the 
return of .&.utriau. iDtlBDOe and her renewed eoouOJd.e a.c.iaation at 
Salonioa.(2) 
'!'he reunion ot Gaeoe tollowiDB'the deposition ot lCing Constantine 
allowed those interested in the subject to think: iD tams ot applying 
to the whole ot the ooant:1:7 the aspeots ot JlzeDCb oOlll8rcial penetration 
which had been so ~.utal in lIIceclonia. :Bonnier thouaht the time bad oome 
seriously to -PJ."8pa:t"8 tor the cJavelopiltnt ot .ooDCII:LO relationa _tween 
French induatJ::r and G.J:eek OC8D8r08-. liven it aome :h.noh industrialists 
were unable at tbat ~nt to export soocla ,:Bonnier telt it was still 
important tor them to aencl _ples to -leura oltents greos d'.prU""SWIrre-. 
It was a question of the basio intereats of ~ ... Atter the war, if 
France was going to t ... her obl:LptiO_ aDcf~ her prosperi"" abe would 
haw to find new open.1.np tolfh8rtn4e. .&D4 a.owbeze, :Bonnier a:rsaed, 
was more open to J'ranoheoonam:l.o aotloa '1ibaD '~·'.ll.n1o world where 
France had just cl:l:aatioal.l7 arti1;iad her _~~. (3) !he problem ot the 
transport orisis na:Lnec1, bow"'r, ODe wla:LOb n. Mftr fully owrcome. 
;< 
In the last weeka of his __ srj SUrail 1n'tensted h1Iuelt 1D 'b need 
l,. , ,. ---'f ".,'. ".- - .-
tor the reoonstra.otion of .. __ otSalOD:l.oa tOllow1DB the tire ot 18 
J.ugwJt. Be ramiu4ecl ... v.'lIlDi.Ui .... the "straCtion of ~ Greek 
sohools opeD8Cl the pcj":LldiltTol~~ inatituti,enu. pining • near monqpo1y 
ot education in SalGaioa, ..ibf~ 'wieso iaPC;~t in the cleft1o_nt ot ~noh 
W1unoe. (4) :BI1t With ~"'·"'ati.U ws4eOlW and hi_ work in preparing , 
J':loeDce'- situation at ·the84~' Of ~ .. lD.o_pl.te, s&rr..i1 was ot course 
recalled. Laooq aoo~ '.ai si.mil bacl'oo1'll8 'hiP the name ot France 
and bad neV8r allo_d.1Mtr 'pZi ..... .ao. to ... cli_P1ted in aq field. Now the 
danger existed 'that itbsliuil ;~t_ tbltooouion ot Sarrai1t s removal to 
launch her own pollq' ";1 ~D8' her iRhU81lOe in Greece and. the :Balkans. 
, . " ~ .. '.. . 
(1) "rchaDt __ ~~;:~""UftUiI .,21/6/ 1 T, ibid. 
(2) cJa J'onWDa7, ~:~~~',~?'/~!:" 'i~~,vo~~' 277. 
(3) :BoDn'.r ~ ~ .... ~~[ •• Ob ...... of CoDaeroe 1/7/17, PainleT4 
MBS 313 AP 96. . 
(4) Sa.r1'a1l to Painlm 5/9/17, .0. 2561, 16li 3145. 
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This should be p.&1'U4 apinat 80 that JlraDoe oould retain her preponderant 
posi tion. Her intereats in tbe .eu-&ult clemmded i t& ItUGUB n"aVDDB 
pat 1e moyen de aubir ioi un 4ebeo-. (1) 
The ax1ient of JIraace's stra.tes1c. poli tieaJ.. and OODll8mi&l. interests 
in the Hear-Baat in pneral ~d of ber .are .pecif'io concerns in part10ular 
parts of the &N& lIhould now be apt)llftl1t. !be. war .... '" to DI8BI11f7 
and accentuate these 1n tlIeu rider oontext aad in ~ta:l.n cases afforded 
Franca the opportuni V10 cleTelop tt... Iu both iutauoes, moreover, the 
ArmIe d'Orient ~ the a'qIL'Ha1ou of Jlreaob aap1rations. Ita value 
extended, theJltore, tar bqoDd vh&'t 1tE.sht otter toW&'t"da the winn1n« of 
the war (which was ofODl.:r 11111 ted .. ~) te b ana of detemining 
what sort of viotory' Jl:nnoe was lika17torin.1&rza11's &l."JQ' foouaed 
above all the datermiDatiflll.:.ofJ'anolaeu tOeaa'lln that the peace settle-
ment would repra_t, not oDlT .... tat.at of CIe~, Du.t alao the victo17 
of hance - and a v1ctoZ'7'wbioh,wa.:Ld ___ ..... in ~ble piDS, 
territorial, strat8I'iO.4...-oial ... pel11lHa1. '!he abandonment. of 
the Salonica Camp&ip was ~ UDi:l?!"~tt. ~ the baais of Fel7 French 
. _- " _. -~ .,.,~. • 1 -.. • 
oonsiderations, leavin6 ... ida wlaateftr. -..t iuf,w been desirable in tams 
. ~.; - .. ~ ~"."1 -,;. ,~~. :~~.:. ~ '. - ~_ '. ~ 
of the total allied war effort. ."S1 aoua. reaba1:quona nous pardons de 08 
.. _'-, ~: ... ' ,,_. r~' . ,.:. :..~ :::. : c.""!'-' _ 
fait 1 tout ,am&1a .notft -.otten en Orient. I.'abandon de Salonique ••• 
serait la fin de la~~~.·l. ~~ oriental de 1& Med1taZ'1W1Ie". (2) 
_.~-.'\: d',: ~::~~'~??'-.,.-.' ~I..;:~,., : 
, 
i'h8 pro~lem ... taU:l.".r ... '1Utt...,. 1a attltu4aa .'tciJwa1:da the Great 
War of the two lMd:J,..1 ;"~1.,. ... ~c ·· ... 1Ulled .1ela. ]'or PnD" the 
atrugcl.e ... 1 .. tGulMl!lr~'.'IIl't1&lq- tt.ao1u v_ther Qa~ was 
COillB to beall_at to,;~"4l&" OWD ~ 111 Ceatal and Eastern 
I\trOpe and tae ... " .... t4t:t: .• ~ "'~_.M8WI in wb10h ·:rr.nca was 
ilm8diatel7 and. 'EliliL1t';,4aNl""-. 'ad:Wb1le tbe prevention of an over-
strong power 011!~ oont1Det of lIJaropa wall, of course, a long-standing 
principle of ~~~<.~'~,II\.;lOlitJ:,. ~ a. oonsideration at'facted. Britain 
tf!;r l.s. ~11~~,.,~t<A4 ~t 8Ud _abe .owld not aha:re the latterts 
" , •• ,; _~ 1 ,._ .~, "" ".~ .. ;..; ,·,,-t - '. '_"' 
overriding coucezD ... ,: .... --- of the WE in the Eastern Mediterranaan~ 
•• _" : ~ ••• _'-. ""$":,~ •. ~",,f·~l;j.~~~~~~~:"~';:~~"?'+~(':'"'" '!-:.~ ... -r_.',.",,' ~'. _. . ' 
,. . ':' (At!, .Hs-~lq!J :. 1,11'\ ;' ),H ... :, . 
:British war aims inevitably reflected her own status as the worldts leading 
naval power and centred on her desire to protect her existing Empire. 
The defence of Egypt naturally entered into such calculations, but Britain 
never saw in the Salonica Campaign a means of defending her post-war 
interests in the Near-East and the route to India. These would be guaranteed 
as they alwqs had been by the RO~,l Navy. The belief existed in France, 
on the other hadA, that only through the maintenance of the Arm~e d'Orient 
could she secure for herself the right to a s8¥ in the post-wa;r arrange-
ment of the Near-East. Sheer ~ical, military presence was seen to 
bestow on a power the right to a commanding voice at the final settlement. 
As Briand remarked when discussing Italian aspirations in the Near-Eat in 
September 1916, her claims were not justified by her war effort in the 
:Balkans. (1) Moreover, because of the ambi tiona and encroachments of 
Francels rivals, it came to be seen that the .Arm&e dlOrient was based on a 
COWltry where France would need to interest herself to a far greater degree 
than in pre-wa.-r daiaI. The W&1! increased the importanoe of Greeoe for 
France just as her mili'tc7 presence there did the temptation to use 
this countr,r as a foothold for her own Mediterranean .. bitions. 
France olrVious17 had oertain territorial designs in the Eastern 
Medi terranean: in the first instanoe this involved the possession of Syria 
and Cilioia, and inoluded as well, at leal; in the first half of the WB.'r, 
Palestine. (2) As French diplomats reoosnised, however, the English 
government- s interest in acquiring more terri tory to add to its already 
vast Empire was m1n1maJ.. (~) :Bu.t the possession of Syria merely refleoted 
a deeply held conviction that Francels future was inextrioably bound up 
wi th her standing in the Bear Bast. It masked, therefore, a DIl10h broader 
aim to carve out aa wide a sphere of influenoe as possible in the whole 
area. Thus while oampaisDB on the Western front might help Franoe win the 
war, those in the East would play no less impa:f;ant a role in aiding her 
to win the peace. 
In a strateB10 .. nae, then, the Salonica Expedition was a lever of 
French ambition in a vide area. More immediately, however , it came to 
(1) Briand to a.abon •• 3089, 22/9/16, A. E. tA Pai:x: t Vol. 130. 
(2) Note by :Bertbel~t, 27/8/15, ibid. 
(3) see, for ... pl.~P~ OImbon 1;0 Deloaas' No. 183, 27/3/15, Paul cambon 
MSS, Dossier 9. 
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be used as the vehicle by which France would acquire direct economic and 
hence political influence in the area closely affected by the presence 
of the Armtfe d'Orient. It was calculated in October 1917 that more than 
825 million francs of French money were tied up in the Greek econom;y, (1) but 
in pre-war circumstances only a very small proportion of this sum was taken 
up by French commerce with Greece. Sarraill s ~ attempted to rectify 
this si tua. tion by using its control of the Macedonian econ~ to favour the 
development of trading links with France. Wi th the return of peace and 
with Salonica established as the great port of transit for the Dalkans, it 
might be hoped to increase to around 200 million francs per annum the volume 
of French trade passing through Macedonia. French industry at the end of 
the war would find itself in a difficult postion. The vast plant which ha d 
been employed in the manufacture of armaments would have to be converted 
to peace-time production if serious unemployment was to be averted. But 
to cope with the inevitable increase in production France would need new 
markets and the :Balkans, which would be in great need of agricultural. 
equ;tpment and manufactured goods, were ideally sui ted to fill this role. (2) 
"La. Mactfdoine est un pays absolument neuf cOllvrant awe initiatives 
intelligentes des horizons illimitls ••• II appartiendra ~ nos jeunes et 
intelligentes initiatives dlen faire un des plus beaux et plus riohes 
domaines d'influence de notre ~S".(3) The ArmIe dlOrient therefore fought 
a commeroial war for Franoe in addition to the efforts it made on the 
battle-£ield - and its opponents in the two struggles were not neoessarily 
the same, since that for economic supremacy involved "une lutte pacifique 
contre nos alli'sW.(4) 
All of these factors made it most unlikely that France and England 
would be able to cooperate fully in the Salonica venture, especially, as 
has been seen, wheu there were few advocates to be found in England even for 
the continuance of the campaign. Francels underlY'iJi4g strategio motivation 
inevi tably out across Bri tim interests in the Madi terranean 8alance of 
power, while her cOJlJlD8roial and poli tioal aspirations in Greeoe and 
Macedonia ran oounter to British policy, which in this part of the world s.t 
least, was more ooncerned with winning the war as soon as possible. What 
(1) Note 'by ,H. :Bompard,October 1917, A. E. tN.S.I, Vol. 5;. 
(2) Note sur les relations oommerciales entre la France et Is. Mactfdoine 
;/12/17, 5H 287. 
(;) Report of de Chappedelaine, OPe oit. 
(4) ibid. 
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is difficult to determine, however, is the extent to which what have 
been seen as 'French ambitions' permeated the whole of the French 
governmental hierarcy - whether in fact they can be seen to represent 
government policy rather than the sectional and vested interests of 
pressure groups in Franee and of French agents in Athens and Sa10nica. (1) 
No satisfactory study of French war aims has yet appeared and any attempt 
to remedy this situation will be confronted with enormous difficulties in 
terms of archival material. (2) While i~ still be tru.e to say that "Ie 
but de guerra essatiel, Ie seul qui &oi t soutenu par un grand mouvement 
d'opinion dans tous les secteurs de l'extrAme-droite A llextr8me-gauche 
••• clest la restitution de l'Alsace-Lorraine", (3) the present study 
has perhaps done sanething to indicate that there was also widespread. 
concern among Frenchmen for whatbappened in South~t EUrope and the 
Mediterranean. What seems unquestionable ia that French agents on the 
spot and in particular those closely assooiated with the Armle d'Orient, 
were almost unanimous in appreoiating and championing at least same of the 
non~litar.y advantages deriVing fram Franoe's partiCipation in the 
Eastern theatre. 'While no coherent and preoise governmental policy ever 
seems to have emerged, this understanding of the ai tuation was apparently 
shared, to varying degrees, by the ohanging governments in Paris. Not 
surprisingly it appears that Paris and its aeents were most olosely 
in tune on this matter during the asoendanc,r in 1911 of those politioians 
moat sympathetic to General Sa.3:rail himself. 
(1) "Only- Clemanceau, the strongest prime minister of the Third Republic, 
possessed tbe power and determination to shape Middle East policy-
according to his own design". C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner: 
(2) 
The French Colonial and Frenoh Colonial War Aims 1 1 -18 
Historical Journal ~ 1914,p 10 • 
The Foreign Ministry documents for the Great War were divided fram 
the outset into two basio oategories: those conoerned with the 
prosecution of the war itself and those appertaining to war aims and 
the question of the future peace. Approximately 80 per cent of the 
seoond oategor,y (SIne A-Pail:) were destroyed in the oourse of the 
Second World War. !u.t the very fact that two suoh categories were 
devised perhaps suggests a greater interest in Franoe than in England 
in the early- stages of the conflict with war aims and the oondi tions 
upon dioh J'ranoe would be prepared to make peace. 
(:~) P. Ren~n: Les buts de S!l8rre du gouvernement franoais _ Revue historique 
1966, p 3. 
ClIAPrm 10 
Conclusion - 1918 and the End of the CampaiRn 
No one can look at the documents relating to the last year of the 
Salonioa Campaign without realising that radical changes had occurred 
since the beginning of the expedition in 1915. The divisive problems 
which had so frequently threatened to tear the Entente apart are no 
longer to the forefront and one witnesses instead, perhaps tor the 
first time, a genuine assessment on both sides of the Channel of the 
military prospects of the campaign. No longer is the diplomaa,y of the 
allies fatally hamstrung b,y political considerations. Thus, as political 
intrigue sinks further into the background, attention focuses lzlgtead on 
the actual military struggle against the ene~. The problem of Greece 
no longer occupies the centre of the stage. The decision of the British 
government in the early summer of 1911 to accede to the deposition of 
King Constantine and to leave to France the directing hand in allied 
diplomacy in Athens had effectively' removed this bone of contention. As 
the Q;u.a.i dtOrsay concluded in Febru.uy 1918, "les affaires de Gmce donnent 
lieu 1 des difficulMs dtordre secondaire, mais ont cesstf de tenir 
dtfsormais, dans les ~occupa.tions des Al1ils, la place si importante qui 
avai t tfM la leur pendant longtemps". (1) Dlt the changing situation is 
,explicable above all else in terms of personalities. The succession of 
Clemenceau to the Presidency of the Council and the removal of Sarrail 
from the com.and of the ~ dtOrient were as significant as any events 
in the history of the campaign. 
The diplomatic instruotions personally given by the new foreign 
minister, Stephen Pichon, to Gilillaumat, before the latter left Paris to 
take up his new command, contained a tacit recognition that the presence of 
Sarrail as Commander-in-cb1ef bad been one of the prinCipal causes of the 
lack of inter-allied cooperation on the Salonica front: "lIs [the EnglisbJ 
n'ont jamais envis. qu'avec rtfpugnance Ie concours qu'ils nous ont donn~. 
La ~rise de possession de votre haut commandement permettra, je ltesp~re, 
de faire disparattre les divergences de vues qui n'ont plus leur place 
et qui seraient nuisibles .. nos efforts concert~s ... (2) For long past 
(1) Note sur lesaffa.ires de Gmce 15/2/18, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 281; Vol. 310. 
(2) Pichon's instructions for Guillaumat 11/12/11, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 1043. 
See also Note for Pichon 24/3/18, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 1044: "La 
question de Salonique qui avait ~ttf l'objet h plusieurs reprises de 
~ts assez mouvementtfs entre les Alli~es ••• ne donne plus de puis 
que1que temps, de sujets graves de discussion ••• La personn~i M du 
~n~ra1 en' chef a pu 8tre aussi un tfltfment de cette attitude ••• Son 
passtf et la rtfputation quail a de ne oonsidESrer les choses qu'au point 








no other single factor had so prevented Britain's whole hearted oooperation 
in the campaign as the fact that the army was under the command of a general 
whose interests appeared to lie anywhere other than the battle-field. What-
ever Sarrail's military worth ~ have been, and he was not without his 
admirers, British politicians and soldiers were almost unanimously' convinced 
tha t no good could be done at Salonica while he remained in charge. \Vi th 
the arrival of Guillaumat, therefore, a fresh wind blew throueh the allied 
headquarters at Salonioa whioh could not but be benefioial. On 12 December 
1917 the English War Cabinet heard that the new oolllllBllder was a "plain, 
blunt Soldier", who had oollllll&Dded at Verdun after Nivelle had become 
commander-in-ohief, and that he was regarded by Clemenoeau as "a first-
class man". (1) Wi thin ~ of Guillaumatts arrival Milne assured 
Robertson that it would "tend to ease the situation as tar as this theatre 
of war is concerned". The action of the various armies would be 
co-ordinated, future events oonsidered and preparations made to meet them. 
After "two years of uncertainty", Milne found it refreshing to have someone 
with a definite plan, even if that plan was a purely' defensive one. (2) 
Early' in the new rear Milne oonoluded that Guillaumat was "essentially a 
soldier", and that in marked oontrast to Sarrail, he regarded the situation 
from a mili ta.r;y point of view. He appeared to be a firm believer in 
thorough organisation and was willing to listen to the opinions of others, 
while at the same time having very olear views of his own. (3) Guillaumat 
made a similarly favourable first impression on Plunkett. The latter heard 
that Guillaumat had spent a fortnisht at the French War Offioe getting in 
touch with the situation and that he had been particularly warned against 
becoming influenced by, or interested too great an extent in politioal and 
eoonomic considerations. Guillaumat had been instruoted to oonfine himself 
to the oommand of the allied armies and had also been informed of the 
neeessi ty of getting on good terms socially with the other allied generals 
and their staffs. (4) 
As important as the ohangeover between Guillaum t and Sarrail was that 
;' 
between Clemenoeau and Painleve, or rather between Clemenoeau and that 
I' political 87ate. which PaiDleve represented and to whioh, to one degree or 
(1) War Cabinet l2/12/17, CAB 23/4/296. 
(2) Milne to Robertson 30/12/17. CAB 25/27/9A 
(3) ibid 17/1/18, ibid 
(4) Report on seventh visit to Salomca 22/1/18, W.O. 106/1347. 
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another, the ministries of Vivani, Briand and. Ribot had all conformed. 
That the recall of Sarrai1 did not give rise to the great outory which might 
have been expected was in large measure due to the forceful personality of 
the new Prime Minister. As one observer put it, fiLe ~n:ra1 Sarrai1 
revient, tout reste calma et ce retour ne produi t pas d 'effet". (1) 
For almost the first time in the war France found herself with a government 
which oou1d sovern without undue oonoern for the f1uotuating votes of the 
Chamber of Deputies or for the party po1i tioal intrigues of the 
parliamentary oorridors. (2) With the formation of C1emenceau's ministry 
in November 1917 France acoepted what amounted to a ministerial dictatorship 
and, after initial trials of strength in the Chamber and. Senate had revealed 
that the premier oou1d command a oomfortable majority, the Frenoh parliament 
relapsed into the seoondary' role whioh it had not ocoupied sinoe the early 
months of the war and the asoendanoy of Joffre. The possibility now 
existed, therefore, that the Salonioa oampaiSD would be viewed in Paris on 
its intrinsio merits and removed from the nuanoe of political implications 
in which it had hitherto been enveloped. With so dominant a figure as 
Clemenoeau, oompleteq overshadowing the men who surrounded him, (:~) at the 
head of the government, the future of the :Balkan venture 1", very muoh in 
the hands of the new premier. Clemenoeau's views on the Sa10nioa 
expedi tion, moreover, were likely to place him nearer to the point of view of 
his English allies than ~ of his predeoessors bad been. 
EVer sinoe October 1915 there had not been a more ardent or vooiferous 
oritio in Paris of the J'renoh government's oonduot of the oampaign than 
'the Tiser'. Ruthlessly attacking what he saw to be a wasted effort, 
Clemenoeau had launched a series of bitter assaults on the ohampions of 
the &1 tan front throuch his notorious newspaper L 'homme Enoha"th&. 
Frequent olaahas with the oensor had failed to lessen the severity of his pen. 
An article written in ~ 1917 epitomised the attitude whioh C1emenoeau had 
held throughout: "Pour moi, sans vouloir entrer dans oet examen d'lioat, je 
oontinue de me demander si les quelques oentaines de mille hommes jet's en 
Orient, aveo un ~ieuz .Uriel, n I'auraient pas 't' d tun profit plus 
d'oiaif pour nous sur notre front dtOooident. Nous ~erons jusqu'au 
bout, .t 48- trop-de .m)re8~ 18 ooup de gGnie de M. Briand". (4) 
-
(1) BBrbillon - op,oit, vol 2, p 186 
(2) For the almost miracUlous effeot ~hiohClemenoeauls oommand of the 
parliament&r,1 situation had on the politioal lile of Franoe, see 
D.R. Watson - Georses Clemenoeau - A Politioal EiosraphY (1974), p 281 
(~) P. Cambon to ~re 19/12/17, ~re MSS, vol 1. 
(4) Lt holllD9 Encbatn:, 6/5/17. 
Sarrail was to argue that for many months Olemenceau subjeoted successive 
French governments to flagrant blackmail to prevent them from sending the 
reinforcements which were indispensable to success. In office, however, 
Clemenceau seems to have concluded that it was now too late in the day to 
pullout from Salonica and "on my successors in the ]Bst he lavished 
cooperation and support - the reinforcements he had defied successive 
governments to grant me even piecemeal". (1) Sarra1l's words were an 
exaggeration. To the end of the war Olemenceau remained a convinced 
Westerner. As he told the Chamber J'l)reign Affairs Coll'lDission in May 1918, 
" "Je ne suis pas tres 'Saloniquais'''. But he was not prepared to abandon 
the expedition when it had already consumed so much in terms of energy and 
resources. (2) General Franchet d'Es~rey, who sucoeeded Guillaumat in the 
summer of 1918, was probably near the mark when he argued that "M. Clemenceau 
n 'a jamais ai~ l'Orient: cependant, comma c 'est un grand han~aiS, il se 
rend oompte de ltimportance des interi'ts qui sty de'~battentlt. 3) At all 
events, with Clemenoeau in power England could be sure that politioal factors 
would no lonear dominate the direction of the French war effort. In 
February 1915 Guillaumat reported from Salonica that ilIa France et 1 'Angleterre 
sont les seules ioi ~ stoccuper de la guerra, Les autres puisances ne 
pensent qut~ lta~s guerra. (4) What was signifioant in this was not that 
other powers were still concentratfQg on the post-war settlement but that 
France oould now be oounted among those who put the war itself to the forefront. 
Less conoerned than others with the peace and the post-war world Clemenceau 
oame to offioe obsessed only with the war itself and with a determination 
to fight it to a viotorious oonolusion. AIr1 other solution was, for him, 
tantamount to defeat and treason. 'lhis primacy of military' considerations 
was imp110i t~ reoosnised in the ohoioe of Lord Derby to replace the ailing 
Bertie at the :British embassy in Paris in April 1918. As Lloyd George 
pointed out to the War Cabinet there was "not very' much diplomaoy required 
in Paris". What was needed was some representative who was in close touoh 
(1) Coblent. - Ope oit., pill 
(2) Meeting 3i5/1S, 07491. of Cambon to Charmes 9/10/1S: ItC1emenoeau 
ne s'interesse nulle.nt ~ 1 'Orient". (Cambon - Correspondanoe, vol ~, p 275) and for a very- reoent view",. Andrew and Kanya _ Forstner _ 
Ope cit., p 96 lib prime minister (Clemenceau) had no war aims outside 
Europe and his single-minded oonoentration on the Western front ended all 
hope of effective French action in the Middle East" 
/ . 
(3) d'Esperey to C. de Freycinet 4/2/19, de Freycinet MSS, vol. 1. 
(4) Guillaumat to Foch 13/2/18, l6N 3146 
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wi th the views of the :Bri tish go~rnment on the innumerable questions, 
essentially of a mili ta.ry cba.ra.cter, which arose from day to day between 
the two countries.(l) 
These crucial ohanges in personnel coincided with. signi:l:1oant 
improvements in the allied direction of the war as a whole, resulting from 
a regularisation of the relationship between the political and military 
authorities in England and France. The task of coordinating the activities 
of the allied armies, which for the first two years of the war had, almost 
by defa.ul t, been entrusted to the French G.Q.G., bad, owing to the 
supertession of Joffre and the failure of his successor, gradually fallen ~ 
out of French hands. Nonetheless the groundwork for a m~ satisfactory 
arrangement had been carried out while Painlew was at the M1nis~re de 
Ie. Guerra. On 29 April 1917 there were recreated for ~ta.in the functions 
of mili ta.ry technical adviser of the Comi tI de Guerra which Joffre had 
exercised for a single week in December 1916. Moreover the disastrous 
campaign of Chemin des Dames had, by making inevitable the removal of 
Nivelle, the compensatory effect of harmonising relations between the High 
Command and the government in Franoe to a greater degree than at any time 
since the opening months of the war. (2) Painlew's nomination of Foch and 
Ntain to the two highest offices in the French army command was the first 
step in the creation in an acceptable fo~ of a unified allied control of 
the war. Upon the prestige of Fooh it would be possible to build a 
unified command structure. When Clemenceau assumed the premiership he 
did no more than follow in the paths alread1 charted by his predecessor.(3) 
As Painlew himself was to write, although in the light of his role in 
the Salonica expedition his words seem somewhat inappropriate, "pOUX que 
la victoire ret pessible, i1 a fallu que s"tab1issent entre les a.1liSs une 
conf'iance mutuelle, une bonne vo1on~ ~ciproque de se comprendre et une 
absolue loyautl". (4) Painlevtf had begun preliminary talks with the British 
on the tickliSh question of a unification of strategy on the Western front 
as early as August 1917, but Lloyd George and Milner had. counselJe d patience 
(1) War CabinetlS/4/lS. ~ 23/6/394. 
(2) J. C. King: OPe oit., pp 165, 170. 
(3) J. M. Bouxget: Ope cit., p 109. 
(4) P. Painlew: OPe cit., p ix. 
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in trying to obtain the appointment of Foch as chief of an inter-eJ.lied 
General Staff. (1) The Italian disaster at Caporetto in October, however, 
demonstrated the urgent need of unification and Painle~ hurried to London 
for renewed consultation. From this conference there emerged the so-c~led 
Supreme War Council - a body to be made up of the premier (whenever possible) 
and a permanent military representative from each of the countries to be 
included. "The Supreme War Council did not supersede the ConnnanderS-in-
Chief but gave them for their guidance an expression of the definite 
policy of the Allied Gove~nts. It was not to act as a Commander-in-Chief, 
but as an agency for the adoption and maintenance of a general policy for 
the Allies in the prosecution of the war, consistent with the total resources 
available and the most effective distribution of those resouroes among the 
various theatres of operations". (2) BIlt it was left to Clemenceau at the 
Doullens Conference of March 1918 to secure for Foch functions which amounted 
to those of cOIIDD8nder-in-cbief of the Anglo-French armies. Thereafter 
Foch's title and powers expanded haphazardly with the course of events. In 
the Supreme War Council, however, the allies found a far more satJ:Ifa.ctory 
means of conducting the Salonica campaign than the seris of ad hoc 
conferences of the preceding two years, which had proved so barren of 
a.chievement. 
While all these developuents were taking place poli tico-mili t&ry 
relations in England were also being put on a firmer footing with the 
replaoement of Robertson by Sir Henry Wilson on 18 February 1918. Sir 
John French's downfall and Xi tchener's loss of authority bad contributed 
as much as any positive achievement on his own part to raise Robertson to 
a higher plane. Gr1.mly Robertson had held on to office, defying a Prime 
Minister who was eager to be free of his official advisers, and in the end 
he had virtually to be ejected fD)"1I1 offioe. There is little direct evidence 
of the personal views of Wilson on the Ma.cedonian campaign. But during the 
remaining months of the war the situation on the Western front was such 
that Wilson was to have little time to devote to Salonica. It appears, 
(l) P. Painlevl: OPe oit., P 241. 
{2} T. H. Bliss: The Evolution of the Unified Command, Foreign Affairs (Dec 
1922) P 6. 
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however, that he was on the whole less opposed to it than his predecessor 
had been. At all events he wasmt prepared to make such an issue of the 
campaign as Robertson had.(l) 
Wi th the premiership of Clemenceau, then, the Salonica campaign inevitably 
decreased in importance. It was not poeaible, however, that it would 
disappear altogether, nor that the interests of France in the a:t'ea., which 
had provided the underlying motivation behind the expedition and fed the 
suspicions of her allies, would vanish overnight. Indeed the same Quai. 
d' Orsay note, which ooncluded that the affairs of Greece were no longer 
giving rise to great problems, stressed that efforts were being made to 
develop commeroial relations between France and Greece and to au:rmount the 
difficul ties posed by the ma:t'th of Shipping available. The Frenoh 
Chamber of Commerce and the Athens Commercial Bureau were working hand 
in hand with the French Leeation and were supported by the Foreign Ministry 
in Paris. (2) General :Bordeaux, who had replaced :Braquet as Frenoh Military 
AttaoM at the end of 1911, warned that the struggles for influence in 
Greece between the great powere would start up aeain with the end of 
hostilities. (3) Frenoh oonsuls in Greece continued their attempts to use 
the extraordinary situation of the war to foster trade between France and 
the towns and districts to which they wereaooredited. In February 1918, 
for example, Dussap sought Pichon's assi81iance in favouring the importation 
of French products in Epirus, "en vue de mer un oourant d'affaires entre 
notre pays et oette 1'4Bion". (4) Simila:rly, with a view to facilitating large 
scale purchases ot J'rench goods by the Greek government, there was created 
in Paris a speoial office with the title "Service des 'l'ra.vaux Pu.blics en 
Gritoe". (5) 
The Frenoh government retajn ed a strong interest in the commeroial and 
financial affairs of Greeoe throughout 1918. As Pichon eta ted in March 
1918 the support of the Quai d'Ors&y' was assured for all enterprises which 
aimed at the dewloPlllEn:~t of Frenoh economio activity in Greeoe. (6) Similarly 
(1) Falls: OPe oit., Tol. 2, p 62. 
(2) Note sur las Attaires de ~oe 15/2/18, A. E. 'Guerra', Vol. 281. 
(3) Note oonoernant Ie roi Alexandre 1er de G~oe, 11/1/18, 16N 3161. 
(4) Dussap to Pichon No. 14, 21/2/18, A. E. 'Guerra't Vol. 310. 
(5) A. Romano. to Pichon 5/2/18, 1N 1342. 
(6) Piohon to Ministries of Finance and Commerce 12/3/18, A. E. 'N.S.' Vol. 53. 
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Klotz, the Minister of Finanoe, deolared tha. t "nous devrions nous efforoer 
de d6velopper en G~oe nos ventes dans toute 1& mesure oh le permettent 
les moyens de transport". (l) From Athens de Billy urged that Greeoe should 
be disabused of the idea that at the end of hostilities she would be 
allowed to resume the unrestrioted oommercial interoourse with the Central 
Powers whioh she had enjoyed in the years before the war. It was not 
thinkable that the finanoial assistanoe afforded b,y Franoe and En~land had 
not imposed obligations and restriotions on Greeoe in this field.(2) De 
Billy even seemed worried that the Greek government might have sufficient 
money to payoff its debts to the allies since this would remove from 
Franoe her power of oontrol.(3) The Military Attaoh6 in Greece oalled in 
March 1918 for the country to be made the point of departure "de tout notre 
rayonnement futur dans les :Balkans et en Turquie". (4) Similarly the French 
oonsul at Salonica, Gra.illet, oonsistentl,.. pressed upon Paris the need to 
preserve the Commeroial Bureau set up by Sarrail and :Bonnier in 1916. It 
had provided Franoe with the opportunity of acquiring a preponderant 
posi tion in the commerce of the a:t'ea and must be retained after the 
departure of the ArDq under whose auspices it had flourished. (5) ::aut the 
fostering of Frenoh trade in the post-war world oould not, in the circumstances 
of 1918, oooupy the oruoial and oentral role whioh men such as Sarrai1 and 
Bonnier had attempted to give it in 1916 and 1917. Wi th the German offensive 
on the Western front of the spring of 1918 France faced what was possibly 
the most serious orisis of the war and, in the words of Jonnart, now 
C1emenoeau1s Minister of Blookade, "1& question de 1a or6ation de nouveaux 
oourants oommeroiaux ne peut plus actue11ement que jouer un r61e seoondaire 
dans 1a po1itique Ifoonomique fran9&ise; i1 slagit avant tout d1assu:rer 
llexistanoe du pays". (6) Bonnier was therefore to be informed not to a.rra.nge 
for Greek purohases in France without first acquainting himself with the 
resources avai1ala1e on the Frenoh I118.X"ket. The tonnage orisis, moreover, 
became so acute that in April 1918 it was found neoessary to halt all Frenoh 
(1) Klotz to Ministries of Commerce, Industr;y, Posts and Telegraphs and 
Merohant Marine 22/3/18, A.E. 'Guerra I , Vol. 310. 
(2) de Billy to Piohon No. 67, 15/3/18, ibid. 
(3) Granville to Balfour No. 228, 12/9/18, F.O. 371/3158/163493. 
(4) Note on propaganda, 31/3/18, 'TN 1~. 
(5) Grail1et to Pichon No. 82, 20/11/18 r No. 267, 13/12/18, A. E. "Z" f 
G~ce, Vol. 98. 
(6) Jonnart to Piohon No. 297, 4/4/]13, A. E. 'Guerre l , Vol. 310. 
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oomneroial servioes between Franoe and Greeoe. (1) The Frenoh COllIllercial 
Attaoh~, l3argeton, warned de Billy that if this situation oontinued the 
oommeroial future of Franoe in Greeoe would be gravely oompromised. In no 
other oountr,y were preparations for post-war eoonomio expansion more 
justified than in Greeoe, where it was imperative "de profiter des 
oiroonstanoes qui l'isolent momentanlment des Empires Centraux". The needs 
of the hour obviously imposed a reduotion of Frenoh exports but Frenoh 
manufacturers and Greek merohants would be deeply disoouraged if all means 
were refused them of oarryiD8 out the transactions whioh "doivent 8tre 
l'embry-on de rapports loonomiques intenses d})s la fin de la guerra". (2) 
:Bu.t Bargeton did not receive from Guillaumat the sort of suppcmt whioh 
Bonnier would have expeoted from Sarrail. The new oommander insisted that, 
although the expansion of Frenoh influenoe in the Near-East was an entirely 
admirable goal, he oould not spare space on boats arriving at Salonioa 
and Athens for the benefit of purely oommercial traffio: "avant de pmpa.rer 
l'apNs-gu.erre, il faut fairs face aux nloessi'tls de llheure pmsente". (3) 
His oonolusions, moreover, were upheld by Clemenoeau in Pa.ti.s. (4) 
Franoe simply did not have the resouroes to replace German oommerce in 
areas from whioh the latter had been exoluded as a result of the war. The 
Frenoh Commercial Bureau in Athens reoeived, therefore, from Paris a list 
of the products whioh France oould provide and another of those for whioh 
Greece should look to other markets.(5) The dilemma existed of either 
compromising the supplies of the ~e d'Orient in favour of FrenCh 
oomneroial interests, n~s llgitimes en soi, mais impossible' oonoilier 
a.vec oette nloessi tI mili taire lt , or of saorifioiD8 these same oommeroial 
interests, "oonfondus ••• avec ltaveuir mime de notre expansion en Orient", 
to the advantage of the seouri ty of the FrenCh forces in the :Balkans. In 
suoh oircumstanoes no real choice existed and the deoision imposed itaelf.(6) 
The consequenoes in Greece were inevitable and Dussap oomplained of the 
daily visits he reoeived from Greek merchants, frustrated in their attempts 
(1) Commission aux Transports Haritimes to Affaires E~res ~ /4/18 
A.E. 'N.S.', Vol. 19. 
(2) Bargeton to de Billy 12/4/18, A.B. 'Z' ,G~oe, Vol. 128. 
(3) Guillaumat to C1emenoeau No.613/3, 5/5/18, A.E. 'ZI, G~oe, Vol. 128. 
(4) Clemenoeau to Commissaire aux Transports Maritimes, No. 22116, 19/5/18, ibid. 
(5) Mlnistr,y of Elookade to Pichon No. 102, 12/7/18, ibid. 
(6) Commissa.ire aux Transports Maritimes to Piohon 30/7/18, ibid. 
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car to plaoe orders on the French ma:t'ket. "Cette situation est bien regrettable 
• •• 1 t oooasion est unique pour nous de nous ouvrir le marcM tfpirote qui 
avant le. guerra tHait en grande partie approvisionntf par ltAutr10he et 
ltItalie". (1) At the beginning of 1919 the French Military Mission in Greece 
noted with regret that Franoe was not well placed to benefit from the important 
orders whioh were being placed by Greek merchants. The devastation oaused by the ' 
German invasion would occuv,r the attention of France for the foreseeable 
future, leaving to France's "allies" unrestricted opportunities on the Greek 
ma.rket.(2) 
In fact French interest in Greece and Salonica declined rather more than 
did her interest in the Near-East as a whole. The reason for this is to be 
found in a reversal of those peculiar circumstances which had g.lven the area 
a. orucia.l inportanoe for France in the first instance. As early as May 1917 
the Russian Provisional Government bad been obliged to declue that it had 
no territorial designs and that it proposed to conclude a peace without 
annexations. In July of the same year Miohaelis had specifically renounced 
interest in Constantinople since this oi ty was not Russian. Indeed the 
implications for France of the Russian Revolution and the withdrawal of the 
Soviet Union from the war, finalised by the Treaty ot lkest-Litovsk in 
March 1918, but apparent tor some time before, were enormous. The whole 
question of the settlement ot the Nea.r-East; whioh bad appea:red to be 
determined by the attribution ot Constantinople to Russia in March 1915, was 
now reopened , giving France a second charice to assert herself in an area 
where she had come to feel herself excluded. Wi1;b viotory over Baleana 
assured in October 1918 General Gaillaumat asserted that this bad to be 
viewed in conjunction with the aclips. ot Russia. 1t18 probla. oriental se 
pr4sente soua un aspeot entibement d:l.tt4rent de celui que des suoc's 
analogues, obtanus U y a de\1x ana, lui auraient donnln • C~) ConseqlBlt1y 
Greece and the port ot Salonica, which bad never been more than a second-
best in France's quest for a lpoint dtappdl in her oriental aspirations, 
resumed the seoond&ry role inP.toench thinkiBB which they had oooupied until 
1915. 
(1) Dussap to Pichon No.5, 6/6/18, .leE. ItZIt, G~ce, Vol. 128. 
(2) Situation G4n'rale en Grtce 28/2/19. Fonds Clemenceau, 6N 168. 
(3) Note b,y Guillaumat on militar,r situation in the Balkans 2/10/18, 16N 3147. 
Wi th Bulgaria finally eliminated from the oonfliot Lloyd George noted in 
Ootober 1918 that the Frenoh government was anxious to have full oontrol of 
an attaok on Constantinople. The British ~ had for three years oocupied 
at Salonioa a position ontbe right flank in a most unhealtby situation, but 
now Franchet dtEs~rey issued orders for the British oontingent to be broken 
up and for another army under a French general to take its place in that 
position. (1) General Wilson even proposed that the French should be informed 
that Milne was to be removed from dtEs~reyts oommand. (2) Under pressure from 
Rri tain, however, Milne was given oOlllDald of the Constantinople operation, 
muoh to Franchet d'Esptfreyts dismay. (~) When England began to exploit this 
situation to her own advantaee, the ory was raised in Parl.s for the 
transference of dtEs~rey's headquarters to Constantinople: liLa situation de 
Salonique est devenu.e doublement ~gative". The struggle for oommeroial 
and poli tioal domination thus began to shift eastwards. liLa viotoire loonomique 
sera acquise l ceme qui sauront faire signer, ~s maintenant, des oontrats 
de longue du:ree avec les gouvernements ou les hoIIIDSS dta.ffaires de cas pays". 
The mili ta.ry viotories of the :Balkans oould not be ignored, "il est impossible 
dtadmettre que la Franoe qui a fait tous les sacrifices dans les :Ba.1lams et y 
a tous les droi ts n ty gagne pas au moins oet avantaee", but in the overall plan 
of French expansion in the Near-East Salonioa oould no longer be the oentral. 
point of radiation. (4) Charles Meunier, when urging upon the Chamber Arm3 
Commission the need to follow up the oommercial activities of the ArmIe 
d tOrient, was no longer thinking only in terms of Greece or even of the 
]3a.lk:ans; but of Turkey as well: "A voir les portes ouvertes dans tous oes 
pays serait un des grands W~ficas de la guerra". (5) Even the Salonioa 
Comneroial Bureau began to set its horizons further afield than Macedonia 
and Greeoe. As the Commercial BIllletin pointed out in the autumn of 1918, 
Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey were going to beoome a vast plain of eoonomio 
activity, where Franoe should seek a leading role. Circulars were sent to 
the French oonsuls in these countries immediately' a.fter the oonolusion of 
the armistioe to inform them that the Salonioa :Bureau was now at the disposal 
of merchants in these states. The important thing was to act straight away 
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before German and Austrian commerce bad had. time to recover. Once again, 
moreover, the idea of an economio victory being the necessary corol.l>ary 
of a military triumph came to the fore: "Nous avons remport.{ la plus belle 
des victoires mili taires; il nous la faut compllter par une victoire 
~conomiquen.(l) 
By March 1919 d'Esp:{rey reported that each of the allies was pursuing 
its own aims in Asia Minor, exploiting the situation to the best of its 
abilit,y in support of individual political and commercial interests.(2) 
The head of the French legation at the TlJtish Ministry of War concluded in 
July 1919 that French interests demanded the maintenance of a large Turkish 
Empire. Nowhere else, Greece included, would France find so solid a prop 
in the Near-East. The condi tion of international politics, he argued, had 
not changed so radically since the days of the nineteenth oentury that 
France could afford to be without such a support. (:~) All the signs were 
therefore that France was revertin8 to her traditional policy, whioh she 
had been forced to abandon in the three years following the Seoret Treaty 
wi th Russia of March 1915. In December 1918 Pichon bad joined in the call for 
the ArmIe d'Orient to be based on Constantinople. The ohoioe of Salonioa 
had been imposed by circumstances but was now beooming increasingly 
inopportune. (4) Bu.t ]'rance lacked tba resouro8S at the end of four years of 
war, and perhaps also her leaders lacked the will, to pursue a new strusgle 
in Asia Minor and as the months passed it became increasingly apparent that 
the dominant influence in the area was that of England. (5) The British 
armies in the Near and Middle East gave British negotiators a position of 
strength which F1'8Zloe, with wbat became only a token oontingent, oould 
never hope to challenge. (6) By February 1919 hanobet dlEsplrey was 
complaining bitterly of the systematic demobi1isation of tbe Frenoh troops in 
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the A.rmle dtOrient and of the govemmentts failure to replace them. By 
contrast the English reinforced their contingents b,y taking men from 
their armies in Syria and Egypt. DtEspirey found the means at his disposal 
ridiculously insuffioient wben oompared with those of his English rival. 
"Clest tr~s bien de vouloir tenir una place dans Ie monde, mais encore 
faut-il faire Ie n'cessaire".(l) A Qwai dtOr~ note prepared for Pichon 
refleoted sadly on the failure of France to follow up her military triumph 
wi th a political one - that is on the failure to achieve what had always 
been seen to underlie the Salonica Expedition - a post-war French domination 
of the Near East: ttOn ne saurait done ooncevoir que la France qui a 
exerc' Ie oommandement su~rieur en Orient, qui a largemant pris sa part 
des pertes subies par les A11iSs aux Dardanelles, qui a maintenu, mAma dans 
les oirconstances les plus difficiles, ltoooupation de Salonique et Ie 
front de ~doine, soit aujourdthui 8%01118 du oOJllll8ndemant en Turquiett. (2) 
But the ousting of France as the dominant influenoe was particularly 
noticeable in Greece. As Pioher;y reported to the Chamber of Deputies as 
early as March 1918, it was England and not Prance which was ingratiating 
herself with the new Greek government. "Notre gouvarnemant semble se 
d'sint'resser de 1a question, Ie gouvarnement he 1 llni que s'en fllioite 
et les Anglais en abusent". (}) As Piohon heard in May Frenoh interests were 
no longer spoken of except to sacrifice them to the insatiable appetite of 
Italy or to the requ;tioements of &lgland. "Nous ne faisons rien. Nos oonsuls 
ne font rien, trois fois rien". (4) De Pontenay warned that Bngland was 
cashing in on Venizelosts tenderness for the Bri Ush and that there was 
already talk of placing an English prince on the throne of Greece instead 
of the present king who bad failed to win the affeotion of his subjeots.(5) 
As a sign of the times the Greek premier was oonstantly acoompanied b,y the 
British Naval Attaohl, CODlllBnder Talbot. (6) 
With the termination of the war Astraud wrote from the military mission 
in Athens that it was Erlgland which sousht to draw the benefits from both a 
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poli tical and oommercial point of view, while ala France ne paratt faire 
aucun effort pour jeter les premi~res bases dtun essor commercial dans Ie 
Levant apNs la guerra". The post of French commercial a ttabf, whose 
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ho14er had been changed three times in two years, had been allowed to lapse 
in the summer of 1918, whereas the head of the Ebglish Commercial Bureau had 
had his starf substantially increased. Moreover, as Astraud noted with 
regret, the French merchant fleet oompletely ignored private commeroe. (1) 
The English Bureau, on the other hand, seemed to mow more about Greek 
trade than did the native government and was soon preparing an industrial 
exhibition in Athens. (2) A group of Greek industrialists, headed by the 
Minister of Agriculture visited Ebgland at the invitation of the British 
Industrial Union, and arlen ne fut lpargnl pour les convainore de la 
puissance industrielle de la Grande Bretagnen .(3) Similarly the British 
fostered the creation of pro-British sentiment in the Greek press by 
providing paper at a time of acute shor1;aee. (4) In general, then, England 
gave the impression of understanding the needs of the hour and showed 
a willingness to tr,y to satis~ the requirements of the Greek population.(5) 
French commerce never developed, therefore, in Greece to the extent to 
whioh the supporters of the Salonica Campai8n bad hoped. Even &.round 
Salonioa itself, French trading interests remained relatively underdeveloped 
throughout the inter-war years. (6) 
What then of the last year of the Salonica Expedition? Upon Gui11aumat's 
appointment Fooh defined the mission of tbe ArmIe d'Orient as firet and 
foremost to prevent the oonquest of Greece by the enem;y. When defenSive 
arrangements had been finalised it would be up to the new oommander to etudy 
the possibility of offensive action acoording to the circumstances of the 
mament.(1) These instructions differed materially from those issued to 
Sarrail and olearly implied that it was considered to be of more importance 
to cover Old Greece than Salonioa, whioh might in oase of need be left as an 
(1) AstrBud to Clemenoeau No. 184, 29/10/18, ibid; ibid No. 10, 26/1/19, 
'TN 1344. 
(2) de Billy to Piohon No. 489,2/12/18 and No. 513 12/12/18, TN 1342. 
(:~) Undated note on British propa,ganda in Greees, 1N 1344. 
(4) French Military Mission note, "Situation Gtfnlrale en G~c", September 1918 
20N 214. 
(5) Naval Attaohl: Bulletin dlInformationa ''51/3/19, 1N 1342. 
(6) Conversation with M.R.J.E. C10uet, Frenoh Consul at Sa10nioa 1934-9, 
(15/2/13). 
(1) Direotives pour Ie GlMN1 Commandan t en Chef des ArmIes Al1iles 
dtOrient/No. /128}8, 16/12/11, 16N 2991; Note from S.W.C., 19/12/11, 
F.O. 311 2895 240045. 
isolated fortress while the allied armies found new bases elseWhere.(l) 
Even now, in what was supposed to be a new period of cooperation, these 
important changes were made without reference to the Supreme War Counoil 
or consultation with the British War Cabinet. (2) Fortunately, however, the 
instructions to Guillaumat oorresponded almost exactly with the suggestions 
of the l1rrmanent Military Advisers to the Supreme War Counoil. () But an 
over-riding consideration which lurked ominously in the background was the 
defection of Russia from the allied cause. It was widely reoognised that 
this might at any moment enable Germany to throw the weight of her foroes 
against the Western front, thus neeessi tating at least the partial 
evacuation of secondary theatres by the allies.(4) This, however, was a 
hurdle which would be orossed if and when the need arose and a proposal 
by Haig at a mili ta.ry oonference in Compllgne in January 1918 that all the 
British and French forces in Macedonia should be brought back to Franoe 
reoeived little support. (5) Nonetheless, as divisions of the Greek regular 
~ became available for1he forward zone, they were oounted delightedly 
by the War Office which hoped that as soon as there were enoU8h it would 
be possible to withdraw the Br1 tiBh troops &1 together. (6) For the time 
being, though, the :Balkan campaign would have to remain "a oonsiderable 
drag" for Britain. From a war point of view Salonica was now of questionable 
value and the Ad.mira.l ty bad expressed the opinion that it would be pleased 
to be rid of it. But if the town were abandoned a great mass of stores 
would have to be dastroyed, as there was suoh a oolleotion there that it 
would take about nine months to olear the place even if all military and 
shipping resouroes were used for the purpose.(1) 
Gui11aumat t s initial examination of the troops under his oommand 
revealed severe shortoomings and diffioul ties. While the Italian and 
British oontingents were in relatively good oondition, the Frenoh forces 
were short of supplies, suffering from hunger and 28,000 men below strength. (8) 
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The Italiandivision, moreover, had been maintained not to "faire la 
guerre, mais bien pour pr6pa.rer 1 ta~s-guerre". Italy was bing no 
opportunit,y in trying to oreate for herself a sphere of influenoe to the 
north of Greece in her avowed quest to beoome mistress of the' Adriatio.(l) 
The Germans too, though, had withdrawn forces from the Balkans with the 
resul t that something approaching numerical equality existed between the 
two sides. (2) From the Supreme War Council Brigadier-<;eneral Studd 
reflected on ho~ar removed the Ba1 lean campaign now was from producing the 
sort of easy victory in the war which had been envisaged by some optimists 
at the beginning of 1915. Military activity for some tl.me past had been 
confined to normal trench warfare, such as had plagued the fighting on 
the Western front. The attitude of the Ehtente had been due to lack of 
troops and to the fact that there existed no taotioal or strategic 
objective within rane;e to justify an offensive on a large soale. At the 
beginning of 1918 reinforcements were even less likely than before to be 
available for 'an offensive. Moreover, no offensive in the Balkans, 
concluded Studd, however sucoessful, would have any deoisive effeot in 
bringing the war to a conclusion. To fritter away men there would only 
weaken the forces available for a decisive attack in France or Flanders.(3) 
But the British War Cabinet agreed in March that for the time being none 
of their divisions should be bmught back to Prance, sinoe, although up 
to strength numerically, they were now weakened by malaria. (4) 
Inevitably some anxiety was expressed in the Frenoh Chamber at the 
inaotivit,y of the ArrIrIe d I Orient(5) and in Maroh 1918 Guillaumat told 
Foch that he oould undertake a modest operation along the Vardar and the 
Struma. (6) But when Lloyd George and Wilson met 01emenceau and Fooh at the 
townba.ll in Beauvais at the beginning of April the attitude of the British 
government had altered significantly and the Prime Minister now pressed 
for the withdrawal of British troops. Fooh retorted that as far as the 
French government was concerned the possibility of a reduotion of the allied 
force had only been envisaged in the event of a m1lituy setback. (7) Wilson 
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now informed the War Cabinet that only eight German battalions were left in 
Macedonia as far as was known. (1) The English General Staff were considering 
the advisability of withdrawing troops and would report to the Wax Cabinet 
when they had delibe~d.(2) At the same time Clemenceau reminded Guillaumat 
that, with the German offensive on the \t/estern front underway, the deoisive 
act of the war appeared to have been engaged. In suoh oircumstances there 
could be no question of reinforcements for the ~e d'Orient and Guillauma.t 
could only count on the resouroes alre~ at his disposal. (3) At the same 
time, however, it was the generalis duty to ensure that no enellV foroes 
could be withdrawn from the BaJ lean theatre to be used in the offensive 
in France. In such circumstances it was indispensable that the Arm'e dlOrient 
should be ready to take the offensive if the situation demanded it.(4) 
Wilson was understandably concerned at this suggestion of an offensive and 
proposed to Foch that allied policy should be to develop the Greek a:t:'JD¥ and 
use it to draw Frenoh and British troops into reserve as required. With 
enellV forces steadily wi tbdrawing an allied offensive at Salonioa would 
achieve no good purpose. (5) Clemenoeau, however, would not oountenance 
Wilson's suggestion that _lva battalions should be withdrawn from Salonioa 
to reinface the Western front. (6) Belin, the Frenoh military representative 
at the Supreme War Counoil, argued that it was essential that any reduotion 
of the Anglo-Frenoh force should be oompensated by the arrival of new Greek 
uni ts, thus keeping the overall Etrength of the .A.rnrlfe d I Orient at its ourrent 
level. (7) Clemence au was determined to do nothing whioh would weaken the 
M8cedonian front or lessen the possibility of minor offensives there and he 
secured the agreement of Britain to having the matter deoided by the Supreme 
\-Tar Counoil. (8 ) . 
Meeting at the beginning of Mrq in Abbeville, the SUpreme War Counoil 
reached oonolusions which Ja.rgely satisfied the British point of view. :Beoa.use 
of the fact that the allied Salonioa force was being reinforced by the 
addition of Greek diviSions, the Council argued that it ought to be possible 
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to transfer some battalions to the Western front, where every man was urgently 
needed. It was agreed, however, that no transfer should take plaoe without 
consultation with Guillaumat, although attention was drawn to the general's 
suggestion that Indian battalions could be substituted for British troops 
wi thdrawn to the Western front. (1) But oonoern was being voioed in the 
Bri tish War Cabinet at reports that the help being reoeived from the Greeks 
had become insignificant and that if things did not go well on the French 
front, all of Greece and possibly Serbia as well might turn against the 
allies. (2) The War Office also expressed anxiety that Guillaumat's plans 
had not been disolosed to Britain in suffioient detail, while what was Imown 
of their general scope left some oause for ooncern. C;) In fact Guillaumat 
was casting off mu.ch of his caution and his staff were preparing for a 
powerful offensive on both sides of the Vardar, with Greek attaoltB on the 
struma and a Serbian diversion further to the West.(4) Yet b,y the end of 
the month Wilson was able to inform the War Cabinet that the Frenoh were 
removing about 12,000 of their troops from the Salonica front. This seemed 
surprising in view of their attitude at Abbeville, but Wilson felt that no 
action was necessary as the arrival of Indian forces would also make 
possible the withdrawal of a few British battalions.(5) 
Bu.t the Wax Cabinet was still anx10us about the general nature of the 
allies' defensive policy in the Balkans. Guillaumat had bden repeatedly 
asked for his plans in the event of a retirement, but these had still not 
been obtained. If, as there was reason to fear, there were no proper plans, 
it was quite possible that a disaster might ensuei Wilson, however, informed 
the Cal:tlet that the problem was taking on a new aspeot, sinoe he understood 
that Guillaumat was being recalled from Salonica, to be replaced b,y General 
Franohet dlEspSrey, whose name had been mntioned when the possibility 
of a Balkan expedition had first been oanvassed at the beginning of 1915. (6) 
It was assumed that, with the crisis on the Western front at its peak, 
Guillaumat was to assume ite mili ta.ry governorship of Pa.ris. Then, if the 
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allies suffered a reverse, he would be at hand to replace ~tain or 
even Foch. At the same time the Militaxy AttaoM, General Bordeaux, was 
also recalled, probably as a result of his differences of opinion with 
Guillaumat.(l) Bordeaux had wished to maintain his independent authorit,y 
over the small groups of French officers detached by himself to the staffs 
of the various Greek ar.my corps actually on the Salonica front, whereas 
Guillaumat had naturally wanted to be master in his own house. But 
it was the departure of Guillaumat whioh was viewed with particular regret. 
Admi ttedly, not everything had run smoothly since the dismissal of Sarrail, 
yet in a matter of six months Guillaumat's actions and influence had had an 
extraordinarily beneficial effect upon the Salonica oommand and upon the 
relations between the various oontingents. Franohet d'Esp4rey had to feel 
his w~ to the oonfidenoe of the allied armies in the faoe of their almost 
universal sorrow at his predecessor's recall. Something of a soapegoat 
for recent setbacks on the Western front, d'ES~rey'S reputation did not 
stand very high at his arrival in the Balkans. 2) But at least the British 
representative at the Supreme War Counoil was able to assure his government 
that the recall of Guilla.uma.t was dictated solely by mili (;) oonsiderations 
and did not portend a change of Frenoh policy at Salonioa.(; In fact 
Guillaumat oontinued, in Paris, to have an influential voice in tho direction 
of France's J3alka.n s tra tegy. (4) 
On 22 June Clemenoeau informed the newly installed Franohet d'Esp6rey 
that the general militaxy situation demanded the assumption of offensive 
aotion by the ~e d'Orient.(S) It was essential to relieve the Western 
front by going over to the offensive in the outer theatres of war and the 
allies should acoordingly seek to oraok the Bulgarian defenoes by a general 
and oonoerted action. Five days later the military representatives on 
the Supreme War Counoil produoed a joint note whioh deolared that it was 
indispensable for the allied forces, within the limite oonsidered possible 
by the Commander-in-chief, to oontribute to the oommon aotion against the 
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ene~ by active offensive operations. Moreover, in a revision of the 
instructions given to Guillaumat, it was now stated that the retention 
at all costs of the Salonica base was of the greatest importance for the 
Entente, although bases and communications in Old Greece should at the 
same time be developed.(l) 
Lloyd George, however, was not happy at the way in which matters 
had been carried on since the recall of General Guillauaa t. The Supreme 
War Council of 3 July was distinguished by a "terrific, sudden and 
extremely violent" outburst by the English premier against the French for 
appointing Franchet d'Espt{rey to command at Salonica and for issuing 
orders for an offensive there without oonsul ting the COWlcil. Maurioe 
Hankey found the whole situation rather stra.nge since Clemenoeau, as he 
asserted during the course of the meeting, had always been and still 
professed to be an ardent opponent of the expedition. Part of the 
difficulty lay in the vaguely defined position of General Fooh. The 
instructions issued to d'Es~rey and only later oommunicated to the allied 
mili tary representatives b.a.d been sent by Fooh and oOWlter-signed by 
Clemenoeau. Unquestionably Foch and Clemenoeau had not been over-taotful 
in this episode, since Foch's authority did not go beyond the Western and 
Italian fronts and Clemenceau ought not to have approved inatrations 
to an allied ~ in another theatre without oonsulting the governments 
concerned. (2) The French premier managed, however, to extricate himself 
from a difficult situation by arguing that with his record of opposition 
to the campaign - "Je suis l'homme qui a Ie plus critiqul l'oplration 
balkanique ••• Je n'ai jamais cru aux Naultats d'une offensive n.-bas" -
he could not now be suspectecl of wishing to launch a major offensive in the 
Balkans. But the a.rri.val of American troops on the Western front made it 
possible to reconsider the decision to ~srer allied soldiers from the 
:Balkans to France and gave force to the instruotions issuad to Gu11laumat 
as early as December 1911 that he should study the possibilities of offensive 
action. (3) Nonetheless the incident did revive an element of unrest in 
English circles and ooncern was expressed in the Imperial War Cabinet on 
9 July at the French tendency to taka things into their own hands without 
(1) Joint note: 'Situation in the YMUkans' , 21/6/18, CAB 25/26/6BA. 
(2) Palmer: op.cit., p 189; Bankey: OPe cit., Vol. 2, p 821; Maurioe: OPe dit., 
p 155. 
(3) Proo~s-verbal 3/1/18, l6N 3140; CAB 28/4/1.0. 10. 
;1;. 
regard for the views of the Supreme War Council.(l) 
Two days later, however, the military and diplomatic representatives 
of England and France meeting at Versailles determined that it was advisable 
to study the ques tion of a. general offensive in the :Balkans, but tha. tit 
was not desirable to carry out this offensive unless it led to a viotory 
of more than local imPortance.(2) Guillaumat, present at Versailles, 
expounded upon his plan for an offensive designed to keep up the morale of 
the Serbians and Greeks and to undermine that of the Bulgarians. But he now 
argued that the offensive Should not take place before the month of 
october.(;) For once, though, it was the British commander at Salonioa 
who now believed that the moment of the ~e dtOrient might finally have 
a.rri ved. v11 th the Bulgarians beginning to get war-weary, the Austrians 
in difficulties in Italy and the Germans held up in France, Milne argued 
the. t the time appeared to be approacbUIg when the Salonica army would be 
able to take action "possibly with far-reaching results" and that it .hould 
be ready to do so when the neeessi ty arose. (4) Franohet dtEs¢rey gave 
Milne the impression of being less oautious than his predeoessor and by the 
end of July the English commander informed the War Offioe that d t Esp4rey 
appeared to be oontemplating a more ambitious projeot than his original. 
instructions had authorised.(5) ConsequentlY the SUpreme War Counoi1 
agreed at the beginning of August that preparations for an offensive should 
be pushed ahead with all speed and that dlEaplrey was to be left free to 
la.unch this offensive when he thought 15. t, unless new and unforeseen 
oircumstances arose.(6) The one proviSO was that preparations for a 
Balkan offensive should not in any w~ weaken the Western front. (1) At the 
beginning of September the Frenoh government Bent over Gui11a.uma.t to 
London for discussi~s with English political and military ohiefs. The 
general put before Lloyd George, M:ilner, Ceoi1 and Wilson the reasons whioh 
favoured the early assumption of offensive operations and secured their 
agreement to British partioipation in them.(S) The aim of the operations 
(1) CAB 2;/41/1.W.C. 2;. 
(2) Resolutions of the Supreme War Counoi1, 11/1/18, CAB 25/26/llA. 
(3) Imperial War Cabinet 18/1/1$, CAB 23Al/I.W.C. 25. 
(4) Milne to Wilson 22/1/18, CAB 25/26/19A. 
(5) Palmer: OPe oit., p 191. 
(6) ibid p 192. 
(1) Note au sujet de 1 t offensive en Orient 21/8/18, l6n 3140. 
(8) CambDn to Clemenceau No. 1039, 4/9/18, ibid. 
was to defeat and remove from the conflict the enemy armies, to invade 
Bulea~>:'ia and to occupy Sofia. ( 1 ) 
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The advance began in the middle of September and produced an immediate 
d~bacle among the now disintegrating Bulgarian arD\V. Briand, the foremost 
archi tect of the campaign, noted sadly in his diary the irony of seeing 
Clemenceau, flqui rut l'a.dversaire acharn~ de l'ex~dition", at the head of 
the government at this moment of victOry.(2) In fact the sucoess of the 
operation had taken just about everyone by surprise. On 21 September the 
Frenoh General Staff aotually considered the possibi1it,y of withdrawing 
more troops from Macedonia, in anticipation of whioh d'Es~rey was to give 
thought to measures flfor limiting his offensive and stabilising his new 
front". Even as late as 25 September, with the ~e d'Orient well on the 
way to a deoisive success, the British representative on the Supreme War 
Council telegraphed to Wilson to ask to be informed of the scope of the 
operations and whether aqr reinforcements bad been promised to the Frenoh 
commander. (3) Clemenoeau, indeed, was embarraSsed by the suooess of the 
offensive and feared that he might become too involved in it. He oonfided 
to Poinoar~ that he bad supported the offensive with the aim of then 
bringing back to Franoe a part of the Frenoh oatingent. If the allies now 
marohed on Sofia this would not be possible. But Clemenceau remained as 
convinoed as ever that it was in France and not the Balkans that the war 
would be deoided.(4) 
Franchet d'Esp~rey was in fact taking matters very much into his own 
hands and it was he who laid down the terms upon whioh an a.z:mi.stioe was 
conoluded with Bulgaria. The oourse of events dragged Clemence au along 
wi th it and the Frenoh premier was obliged to authorise dtEs¢rey to go on 
to the Danube as quickly as possible in order to out off supplies from the 
enemy. When the English War Cabinet assembled on 1 October, there was 
oonsiderable unoertaint,y as to the true state of affairs. But there was 
gener~ement that the allied governments would have to be consulted 
bef ore any further mili tary operations took place and ths. t this consultation 
(1) Historique des o¢rations en Serbie, Septembre 1918, ibid. 
(2) Suarez: OPe Cit., Vol. 4, P 319. 
(3) Falls: OPe Cit., Vol. 2, p 203. 
(4) Poincar4: OPe cit., Vol. 10, p 351. 
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could only take place at a meeting of the Supreme War Council. (1) This 
ignorance in England was matched in the French press, where the government 
imposed a silence on reports of the allies' successes on 2 and 3 October. 
Was Clemenceau, evon at this late date, reluctant for it to be known that 
the Salonica Cam~ign was, after all, pl¢ng its part in the determination 
of the conflict~ 2) At all events, with d'Esp4rey preparing to march on 
Vienna and Berlin, the general received a curt despatch from Clemenceau 
demanding that he should put an end to such personal ir$iative and ordering 
him to restore the British divisions to General Milne, who was to assume 
the high command at CODstantinoPle.(3) The Supreme War Council decided that 
operations against Germany should be subordinated to General Foch, while Fooh hll 
self assigned the chief responsibilit,y for an advance through Austria and 
into southern Germany to the victorious forces of ltaly.(4) No glorious 
finale was to be permitted to the ill-fated ~e d'Orient. 
For two years the Salonica campaign illustrated the allies' conduot of 
the war at its worst. PoliCies were not arrived at by any straightforward 
assessment of military factors but rather by the juxtaposition of outside 
pressures with personal wills and weaknesses. These ranged from the vested 
economic interests of Frenoh commerce to the personal antipathy between Joffre 
and Sarrail - from the ever-present politico~litary tension within 
France to the infatuation of Paul Painle~ with Sarrail and Aristide 
Briand with his Greek mistress. From these diverse sources arose strange 
policies, but unless these sources are examined the whole campaign beoomes 
(1) CAB 23/8/480. 
(2) Suarez: OPe cit., Vol. 4, P 378. 
(3) Article by d'Esp&rey in La Matin 15/9/22; Suarez~ OPe cit., Vol. 4, 
p 382. Briand's biogra~ argues that Clemenceau was not willing to 
allow the former premier to take any oredit for the final victory: 
nc'tftait pour que oe mlrite ne rut pas reoonnu aux autres, justemant, 
que Clemenoeau n'avait pas voulu de la viotoire dlOrient.n ibid p 388; 
c.f. David: OPe cit., p 298: "Les souvenirs du poltfmiste influonct.rent-
ils les aetas du chef du gouvernement?" :Both David and Suarez, however, 
are of course anxious to stress the inherent military possibilities of 
the campaign which, they argue, could have brought viotory much earlier, 
and they attempt to do this by overstating the significanoe of the final 
breakthrough in September/October 1918. 
(4) Palmer: op; oit., p 234. 
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inexplicable. The Salonica Expedition testifies to the importance of 
personalities in the determination of history. But it was above all else 
this excessive obtrusion of personal factors which made the campaign such 
a disaster. If this ineptitude had been maintained throughout the conflict 
in all theatres then it seems unlikely that England and France could have 
emerged victorious at the end of 1918. But Salonba. was unique. Sta.rting 
off as an unhappy compromise between, onihe one hand, the strategy of the 
Easterners, which had already been partly discredited by the relative 
failure of the Dardanelles Expedition and, on the other, a pieoe of party 
political intrigue in France, its prospects never looked good from the 
outset. Mili tarily the campaign proved largely irrelevant to the outcome 
of the war and to this extent the attention lavished upon it by the 
politicians and statesmen of the Great War exaggerates its intrinsic 
significance • But the very fact that it did become so great a preoocupa tion, 
indeed almost an obsession, in its own day imposes upon the historian -
at least the diplomatic historian, if not his militar,r oolleague - the need 
to examine and aQUyse it. As the campaign progressed the element of 
French political intrigue became entwined with the vaguely defined 
aspirations of France to playa dominant role in the Near~t in the 
post-war world. These partly predated the expedition, but were inevitably 
given new intensity by it. As a result, the Frenoh concept of the 
Salonioa Campaign, instead of moving closerto that of Britain as the months 
passed, drifted further and further away from it, m.a.king meaningful 
cooperation between the two powers inoreasingly improbable. British observers 
consequently developed progressively jaundiced opinions of the motives and 
intentions of their allies. As Brigadier-General Wake wrote as late as 
July 1918, "It must always be remembered in dealing with the Frenoh that they 
generally have another motive, besides their avowed one for what they do 
and that they never can believe in a disinterested or generous motivs in 
anyone elselt • (1) For Eri. tain Salonica appeared to offer none of the 
ulterior attractions which it did for France. If the campaign had a value, 
therefore, it could only be a military one, and, as military opinion in 
Britain was virtually unanimous in condemning the expedition as a useless 
dissipation of resources, the attitude of Brl. tain was remarkably fixed and 
consistent throughout the three years of its duration. The French mind, 
however, was on the whole prepared to ignore the unpromising military aspeot 
of the whole affair, since the campaign was, in the first instanoe, a 
practioal neoessity for stability within the Frenoh political arena and was 
(1) Notes on the Political Situation in the Balkans 3/7/18, CAB 25/35/3A. 
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not, in the second, unattractive for Prance :from the point of vie\-1 of ultimate 
strategic, diplomatic and economic advantage. To this extent, then, 
England and France were fighting not one but two separate ware in the Balkan 
theatre. Not even the enemies were identical for France soon recognised her 
nominal allies of the battlefield to be her post-war adversaries in less 
violent fielS. The last year of the campaign was not without its problems 
from the point of view of interallied cooperation. This could not be 
otherwise since the solutions found to the question of unified command of 
the war effort were far from perfect. :But at least 1918 saw the effective 
disappearance of that profound suspicion of French intentions, whioh came 
to see militar,y aotivities in the Balkans as little more than a charade 
beneath whioh the real political, diplomatio and eoonomio issues were being 
decided. This improvement can largely be explained in terms of personalities. 
The Salonica campaign, then, tells us much about the workings of the 
Entente in wartime. It tells us perhaps even more about the struggles wi thin 
Franoe itself and the quest of that country for stability between its political 
and militar.y factions. The abrupt dismissal of General sarraifin the summer 
of 1915 extended the scope ofibe politico~ilitary conflict in Franoe by 
pitting a substantial part of the Chamber and Senate and evan some ministers 
against the War Ministr,y and the High Command. This extension of friction 
foreshadowed the abandonment of the government's resolution to defend the 
command against parliamentary attack, come what may. The gauoherie of 
Sarrail's removal redounded to the political advantage of the general's 
supporters and an open rupture of the Sacred Union was only narrowly averted. 
:But the vi 0 tory of Joffre was a Pyrrhic one and the beginning of the 
Salonica Campaign marked also the beginning of the end for the victor of the 
Marne. For L'Affaire Sarrail reopened those internal political conflicts 
in France which made it impossible for parliament and the ministr,y to sit 
back and acoept the military dictatorship of Joffre. From then on the 
fortunes of the Maoedonian Expedition were irretrievably bound up with the 
wider struggle for control of war policy inside Franoe; thereafter military 
oonsiderations became increasingly secondary,passions and animosities 
progreSSively more bitter and the prospect of smooth oooperation with England 
correspondingly more improbable. Aprropriately enough it was Briand who was 
reputed to have remarked to Lloyd George during the course of the confliot: 
''War is much too serious a thing to be left to military men". (1) The 
Salnnica Campaign certainly epitomised this maxim. 
(1) OXford Diotionary of ~otations (1953), p 526. 
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